In re: Appeal of Maplewood, Ltd.

CourtVermont Superior Court
DecidedMay 14, 2001
Docket166-8-00 Vtec
StatusPublished

This text of In re: Appeal of Maplewood, Ltd. (In re: Appeal of Maplewood, Ltd.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Vermont Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re: Appeal of Maplewood, Ltd., (Vt. Ct. App. 2001).

Opinion

STATE OF VERMONT

ENVIRONMENTAL COURT

In re: Appeal of Maplewood, } Ltd. } } Docket No. 166-8-00 Vtec } }

Decision and Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment

Appellant Maplewood, Ltd. appealed from decision of the Development Review Board (DRB) of the Town of Berlin, granting Appellee-Applicant LaGue, Inc.= s application for a conditional use permit. Appellant is represented by Paul S. Gillies, Esq.; Appellee-Applicant is represented by Brian J. Grearson, Esq.; the Town is represented by Robert Halpert, Esq. The following individuals: Randall W. LaGue, Henry A. LaGue, III, Henry A. LaGue, Jr., and Thomas McGoff, appeared initially as interested persons, representing themselves. They may all be associated with Appellee-Applicant but have filed nothing to that effect with the Court, nor have they withdrawn as parties, nor do they appear to be represented by Attorney Grearson. Neither they nor the Town participated in the briefing of these motions.

Appellant= s motion seeks summary judgment on the first three issues in its Statement of Questions: 1) whether the lot has sufficient frontage; 2) whether the lot is an existing small lot; and 3) whether the lot needs a variance before any consideration of this project. Appellee- Applicant seeks summary judgment that the portion of the project which is a permitted use in the district should be approved for lack of a timely decision from the DRB.

The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted.

Appellee-Applicant owns an approximately 60,720-square-foot parcel of land in the A CG@ Commercial zoning district, on which exists a house to be demolished as part of the proposed project. The parcel appears to be rectangular1, measuring 132 feet along the property line along the road (Paine Turnpike2), and approximately 460 feet in depth. The property has no right-of- way access; the only access is directly to the road. Appellant owns the property directly to the north of Appellee-Applicant= s lot, on which it operates a gas station and convenience store. Appellant also co-owns the property directly to the south of Appellee-Applicant= s lot.

Appellee-Applicant proposes to remove the existing structure, to construct a convenience store with fast-food drive-through restaurant, and a gas station with gasoline pumps in the front of the lot and diesel pumps in the rear of the lot. A gas station and a fast-food restaurant are conditional uses in the CG district; a convenience store is a permitted use in the district. The original application also proposed a car wash, but the application for car wash was withdrawn after the Zoning Administrator ruled that a car wash was not an allowed use in the district. The original application apparently3 showed the building oriented with its entrance facing the street; the revised application is described as A reorienting@ the building, which the Court understands to mean that the building= s entrance was moved to face the lot= s longer dimension.

Method of calculating A lot frontage@

This is the second appeal in which this Court has had occasion to analyze the Town of Berlin= s rather unusual zoning requirements regarding A lot frontage@ and A street frontage.@ In In re Appeal of Ran-Mar, Inc., Docket No. 60-4-99 Vtec (Vt. Envtl. Ct., Nov. 27, 2000), the Court noted that:

[d]uring the course of the hearing, it became apparent that neither Appellant nor the Town had measured lot frontage according to the definition in the regulations, which is the distance across the width of the lot at the building or proposed [building] front line, and which is required to be measured along the chord of a curve. Instead, both parties were acting on the basis of a measurement similar to that of "street frontage" (defined as the lineal distance of the lot along the edge of the traveled way), but measured along the proposed front lot line rather than along the traveled way.

It appears that the same error was made in the present case (which was decided by the DRB prior to the issuance of the Ran-Mar decision).

The Zoning Regulations set forth two frontage requirements: lot frontage and street frontage, each of which is defined in ' I(8). > Lot frontage= is defined as the A [d]istance measured across the width of the lot at the building front line or the proposed building front line. Curves shall be measured by the chord.@ The > building front line= is defined as a line A parallel to the front lot line transacting that point in the building which is closest to the front lot line.@ In Article IV, a minimum lot frontage is provided for development in each zoning district. In the Commercial zoning district the minimum lot frontage is 150 feet.

'Street frontage' is defined as "[t]he lineal distance of the lot as measured along the edge of [the] traveled way. "However, the regulations do not otherwise refer to the term > street frontage= nor do they require a minimum amount of street frontage, other than the general requirements for adequate access found in the definition of "lot4" or in the statutory requirement of frontage on a public road, public waters, or, with DRB approval, on a right-of-way at least 20 feet in width. ' III(3).

By referring to the A width@ of the lot, the definition of A lot frontage@ must intend the measurement to be taken along the face of the building facing the road, regardless of where the entrance of the building is placed. This interpretation is supported by the common meaning of the A front@ lot line, meaning the property line at the road or street. Cf., A front@ yard minimum setback.

It appears likely the lot frontage of Appellee-Applicant= s parcel is about 132 feet, based on the incomplete site plan provided to the Court. However, technically, without agreement as to the fact that the measurement across the width of the lot at the face of the proposed building, parallel to the roadway5, is 132 feet, the Court cannot completely grant Appellant= s Motion for Summary Judgment on this issue. Therefore, Appellant= s Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on Question 1 of the Statement of Questions, in that the lot frontage is to be measured across the width of the lot at the face of the proposed building facing the street, subject to confirmation by the parties that the lot frontage, as required to be measured by the Zoning Regulations, is 132 feet. The Court specifically notes that changing the "orientation6" of the building on the lot does not affect this measurement.

Whether the lot is an A existing small lot@

Appellee-Applicant= s parcel is not an existing small lot under 24 V.S.A. ' 4406(1) and ' III(2), because it is conforms to the minimum lot size requirements of the Commercial zoning district. Appellee-Applicant= s parcel is 60,720 square feet in area; the minimum lot size is 40,000 square feet.

Appellee-Applicant argues that if the lot does not meet the lot frontage minimum, it is too small, and therefore qualifies as an existing small lot. Appellee-Applicant confuses the > existing small lot= concept (' III(2)) with the concept of a pre-existing, non-conforming lot (' II(12)). Appellee- Applicant= s lot may well be pre-existing and non-conforming as to lot frontage. If so, Appellee- Applicant may be entitled to apply to the DRB for change, enlargement or expansion to a nonconforming use under ' II(12)(1), without having to apply for a variance. However, as Appellee-Applicant has not made such an application and the DRB has not acted upon it, the matter would have to be remanded to the DRB should Appellee-Applicant wish to pursue such an application.

Moreover, even if Appellee-Applicant= s lot were undersized, the existing small lot provision only applies to an undeveloped parcel. Appellee-Applicant= s lot is already developed with a house. See Lubinsky v.

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Related

Lubinsky v. Fair Haven Zoning Board
527 A.2d 227 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1986)
Reyes v. United States
758 A.2d 35 (District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 2000)
In Re Maple Tree Place
594 A.2d 404 (Supreme Court of Vermont, 1991)

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In re: Appeal of Maplewood, Ltd., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-appeal-of-maplewood-ltd-vtsuperct-2001.