In Re Appeal of Abcon, Inc.

387 A.2d 1303, 35 Pa. Commw. 589, 1978 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1084
CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 2, 1978
DocketAppeal, 577 C.D. 1977
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 387 A.2d 1303 (In Re Appeal of Abcon, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Appeal of Abcon, Inc., 387 A.2d 1303, 35 Pa. Commw. 589, 1978 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1084 (Pa. Ct. App. 1978).

Opinion

Opinion by

Judse Rosees,

Abcon, Inc. has appealed from a decision of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas which upheld the constitutionality of the Plorsham Township Zoning Ordinance of 1969 and refused Abcon’s request for curative amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

Abcon, Inc. is the owner of a 247 acre tract of land located in the southeast corner of Horsham Township. On April 26, 1974, Abcon submitted a curative amendment application to the Board of Supervisors of Horsham Township pursuant to Section 1004 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §11004, challenging the substantive validity of the Horsham Township Zoning Ordinance of 1969 on the basis that it made only token provision for multi-family development in general and no provision whatsoever for townhouse development within the township. At the time it submitted its challenge, Abcon’s 247 acre tract was zoned R-3 Residential which permitted only single-family detached dwellings on lots of not less than 25,000 square feet provided that public water and sewer were avail *591 able. Abcon’s curative amendment application included a proposed ordinance which would change the zoning classification of its tract from R-3 Residential to the classification of Planned Residential Development (PRD). Abcon’s development plan also submitted with the curative amendment proposed the construction of 716 one and two story townhouse units, 342 apartment units, 46 semi-detached units, and 126 single-family detached units on the 247 acre tract. After eight evenings of hearings which commenced on June 19, 1974 and concluded on December 2, 1974, the Board of Supervisors rejected the curative amendment application on February 4, 1975 without making findings of fact or conclusions of law and giving no reason for its decision. Abcon appealed to the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas which took no additional evidence but made findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon the evidence adduced at the hearings before the Board of Supervisors. That court affirmed the decision of the Board of Supervisors in an opinion dated March 14, 1977 and it is from that decision that Abcon has appealed to this Court.

The initial question for our decision in this appeal is whether there was any ordinance pending in Horsham Township at the time Abcon filed its curative amendment application which would have cured the alleged constitutional infirmities in the Horsham Township Zoning Ordinance of 1969. Although the court below did not specifically hold that there was such an ordinance pending at this time, it did suggest that this might have been the case. We disagree. Ab-con filed its curative amendment application on April 26, 1974. For approximately two years before that time, the Board of Supervisors had been informally considering the rezoning of a 170 acre bract within the township to permit development thereon of housing at *592 a density of seven dwelling units per acre. Formal application for this zoning change had been made on March 25, 1974 and the Board of Supervisors had, on April 2, 1974, adopted a resolution to hold a public meeting to consider the matter. However, public notice of this meeting (by advertisement) was not given until May 15,1974, nineteen days after Abcon had submitted its challenge. An ordinance is pending only from the time the municipality has resolved to consider a particular scheme of rezoning and has advertised to the public its intention to hold public hearings on the rezoning. Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 284 A.2d, 744 (1971). There was thus no ordinance pending in Horsham Township which would have cured the constitutional deficiencies challenged by Abcon as of April 26, 1974, the date on which Abcon’s curative amendment application was filed.

Abcon asserts that the Horsham Township Zoning Ordinance of 1969 is exclusionary and thus invalid because it makes no provision whatsoever for townhouse development within the township. The court below held that the zoning ordinance did provide for townhouses and that there was thus no de jure exclusion of this use. We believe that the court below was correct in so holding. The Horsham Township Zoning Ordinance of 1969 provides for seven residential districts. Only single-family detached dwellings are permitted in the R-l through R-4 districts on lots varying in size; the largest lot size requirements are found in the R-l district and the smallest in the R-4 district. The R-5 district permits duplexes or double houses as well as single-family detached dwellings. It is only in the R-6 and R-7 districts that multi-family dwellings are permitted. The R-7 district provides only for apartment development and mentions no other type of multifamily housing. The R-6 district does, however, pro *593 vide for several types of multi-family development and it is there that townhouses, if permitted at all, would be found. Article XI, Section 1100 of the zoning ordinance provides:

The R-6 Residential District is hereby established as a district in which regulations are intended to permit and encourage low density, low lot coverage, garden apartment and townhouse type multi-family development that is compatible with a predominantly single-family residential environment. (Emphasis added.)

Section 1101 which contains the use regulations for the R-6 district provides:

A building or group of buildings may be erected or used and the lot may be used or occupied for any of the following purposes, and no other:

1. Multiple dwelling or apartment house.

“Multiple dwelling” is defined in Section 200(13)C of the ordinance as: “a building not a single-family dwelling nor a two-family dwelling, designed for and occupied and exclusively for dwelling purposes by three or more families living independently of one another, in units commonly called apartments, townhouses, or dwelling units.” (Emphasis added.) The ordinance therefore provides for townhouse development in the R-6 district and, at least facially, satisfies constitutional requirements.

The more difficult assertion made by Abcon is that the ordinance effects a de facto exclusion of multifamily dwelling units because the area zoned for multifamily use is so small a percentage of the total land area of the township that it constitutes “a mere token in response to the legal mandate” that a municipality assume its “fair share” of the present and prospective regional need for low and moderate income hous *594 ing as set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 'the exclusionary zoning cases such as Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). The challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance on the ground that it results in mere “tokenism” has been the subject of many recent decisions of both this Court and our Supreme Court, the most recent of which is Surrick v. Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Providence Township, 476 Pa. 182,

Related

New Bethlehem Borough Council v. McVay
467 A.2d 395 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1983)
Hostetter v. Township of North Londonderry
437 A.2d 806 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1981)
Villa, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Board
426 A.2d 1209 (Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, 1981)

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Bluebook (online)
387 A.2d 1303, 35 Pa. Commw. 589, 1978 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 1084, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-appeal-of-abcon-inc-pacommwct-1978.