In re Anonymous No. 132 D.B. 88

7 Pa. D. & C.4th 331
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 5, 1990
DocketDisciplinary Board Docket no. 132 D.B. 88
StatusPublished

This text of 7 Pa. D. & C.4th 331 (In re Anonymous No. 132 D.B. 88) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Anonymous No. 132 D.B. 88, 7 Pa. D. & C.4th 331 (Pa. 1990).

Opinion

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania:

TUMOLO, Member,

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Disciplinary Enforcement 208(d), the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania submits its findings and recommendations to this honorable court with regard to the above-captioned petition for discipline.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Respondent is an [ ] County attorney who was admitted to the practice of law in 1956. His only previous disciplinary infraction was an informal admonition in April 1986. That resulted from the slow handling of an estate, but there was no loss of money to any client.

On December 29, 1988, the Office of Disciplinary Counsel filed a two-count petition for discipline. That petition alleged the following rules violations:

(A) Rule 1-102(A)(4) — conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation;

(B) Rule 1-102(A)(6) — conduct adversely reflecting an attorney’s fitness to practice law;

(C) Rule 6-101(A)(3) — conduct involving neglect of a legal matter entrusted to an attorney;

(D) Rule 7-101(A)(l) — failure ,to seek the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law;

(E) Rule 7-101(A)(2) — failure to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client for professional services;

[333]*333(F) Rule 9-102(A) — all funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated, and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein;

(G) R.P.C. 1.3 — a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client;

(H) R.P.C. 1.15(a) — a lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons, that is in a lawyer’s possession in connection with their representation, separate from the lawyer’s own property;

(I) R.P.C. 1.15(b) — upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. A lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.

(J) R.P.C. 8.4 — it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.

Hearing Committee [ ], chaired by [ ], and with members [ ] and [ ] conducted a hearing on May 15, 1989. The parties presented a stipulation of facts which was amplified slightly by the hearing committee in its recommendation to the board. The stipulated facts bind both parties. See Disciplinary Board Rule 89.131.

With regard to charge 1 the hearing committee found violations of rule 1-102(A)(4); rule 1-102(A)(6); rule 9-102(A); rule 1.15(a); rule 1.15(b); and, rule 8.4(c). With regard to charge 2, the hearing [334]*334committee found violations of rule 1-102(A)(4); rule 1-102(A)(6); rule 9-102(A); rule 1.15(a); and, rule 8.4(c). ,

On October 6, 1989, the hearing committee filed its report and recommendation, and with a thorough consideration of the stipulations and dispositional witnesses recommended to the board that respondent be suspended for two years.

On October 18, 1989 the petitioner filed a brief on exceptions. Aside from some grammatical corrections petitioner accepted the findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the hearing committee, but took exception to the hearing committee’s recommendation for a two-year suspension, contending that the discipline should be for a minimum of three years in the event the board found that respondent cooperated in the investigation, and a disbarment in the event the board found this mitigation was simply “damage control.”

On October 26, 1989, respondent filed a brief on exceptions, requesting that pursuant to section 89.202(a)(2) of the Disciplinary Board Rules that certain additional findings of fact which were offered by respondent should have been accepted by the hearing committee. Respondent also contended that he had not violated the “Escrow Rules” i.e., rule 9-102(A) and rule 1.15(a). But the main thrust of respondent’s exceptions were that the hearing committee had made inaccurate references in its discussion (not in its findings of fact) to various misrepresentations respondent made to clients, and that this error lead to an overly severe recommendation for discipline.

Oral argument was heard before a panel of the board on December 6, 1989, and the matter was adjudicated before the entire board on December 8, 1989.

[335]*335FINDINGS OF FACT

The board finds the facts to be as set forth by the committee, but supplemented in accord with Disciplinary Board Rule 89-202(a)(2) as will be hereinafter set forth:

(1) Respondent, [ ], Esq., was admitted to practice law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1956, with his current office located at [ ].'

(2) On or about April 10, 1985, [A] met with respondent concerning respondent representing him in a personal-injury action.

(3) [A] was injured on March 16, 1985, while using a posthole digger on the property of his neighbor, [B]. [A] received medical treatment at the cost of $3,969.40. Respondent agreed to represent [A] for a 40-percent contingency fee.

(4) On or about March 10, 1987, respondent filed a writ of summons on [A’s] behalf against [B] and the [C] Company, the manufacturer of the posthole digger used by [A], in the Court of Common Pleas of [ ] County, and on May 13, 1987, he filed a complaint in civil action against both parties.

(5) In early June 1987, respondent negotiated a settlement with defendants’ insurance carriers by which [A] was to receive $8,000 from [D] Insurance Company, which insured the [C] Company; and $1,000 from [E] Insurance Company, which insured [B].

(6) Shortly thereafter, [A] met with respondent and signed a settlement agreement, prepared by respondent, in which [A] agreed that:

(a) he accepted $9,000 to settle his claims arising from the March 16, 1985 accident; and,

(b) respondent would receive $3,600 as his attorney’s fee.

[336]*336(c) [A] was to receive $5,400 out of which respondent would pay to [A’s] medical providers the following sums:

(i) $2,140 to [F] Surgical Associates;

(ii) $76 to [G] Radiology;

(iii) $222.75 to [G] Hospital;

(iv) $300 to [G] Anesthesia; and,

(v) $1,230.65 to [G] Hospital.

The balance and any savings affected by the creditors reducing the amount owed to them was to be paid to [A].

(7) On or about June 10, 1987, respondent received a check from [D] Insurance Company, dated June 10, 1987, in the amount of $8,000 made payable to [A] and respondent which they then endorsed.

(8) On June 10, 1987, respondent deposited this check into his [H] Bank Account, no.

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Bluebook (online)
7 Pa. D. & C.4th 331, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-anonymous-no-132-db-88-pa-1990.