In Re Annexation Proposed by Annexation Ordinance Number X-07-91

645 N.E.2d 650, 1995 Ind. App. LEXIS 7, 1995 WL 8949
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 12, 1995
Docket02A04-9406-CV-216
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 645 N.E.2d 650 (In Re Annexation Proposed by Annexation Ordinance Number X-07-91) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Annexation Proposed by Annexation Ordinance Number X-07-91, 645 N.E.2d 650, 1995 Ind. App. LEXIS 7, 1995 WL 8949 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).

Opinion

OPINION

CHEZEM, Judge.

Case Summary

Defendant-Appellant, (“Remonstrators”), appeal the trial court’s denial of their remonstrance to Plaintiff-Appellee’s, City of Fort Wayne’s (“City’s”), annexation proposal. Having reviewed the evidence, findings, and conclusions of law, we affirm.

Issue

Remonstrators present one issue for our review, which we restate as follows: whether the specific findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the trial court were clearly erroneous.

Facts and Procedural History

The City of Fort Wayne Common Council adopted Annexation Ordinance X-07-91 and fiscal plan R-78-91 on December 26, 1991. The Blackhawk territory sought to be annexed by X-07-91 was part of the territory proposed to be annexed by a 1979 City of Fort Wayne Annexation Ordinance, X-04-79. A remonstrance was filed against X-04-79 on September 13, 1979. On June 27, 1989, the City of Fort Wayne repealed X-04-79. Following the repeal of X-04-79, the City filed a motion to dismiss the remonstrance against the ordinance on the grounds the remonstrance was moot. The City’s motion to dismiss was granted on February 2, 1993. Remonstrators filed a petition challenging the 1991 annexation proposal. They appeal from the denial of that petition.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

The trial court entered specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. The special findings will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. T.R. 52(A). We determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether the findings support the judgment, and we disturb the judgment only where there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment. Chidester v. City of Hobart (1994), Ind., 631 N.E.2d 908; Indianapolis Convention & Visitors Ass’n v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. (1991), Ind., 577 N.E.2d 208. For a party to prevail on appeal from an adverse trial court judgment in a remonstrance action, “there must be a complete failure of proof with regard to the determinant at issue.” Abell v. City of Seymour (1971), 150 Ind.App. 163, 166, 275 N.E.2d 547, 550; see also Baker v. City of South Bend (1971), 148 Ind.App. 596, 268 N.E.2d 623.

We do not reweigh the evidence; rather, we consider the evidence most favorable to *652 the judgment of the trial court with all reasonable inferences therefrom. Smith v. Town of Culver (1968), 249 Ind. 665, 234 N.E.2d 494 (affirming trial court’s decision to uphold annexation); City of Aurora v. Bryant (1960), 240 Ind. 492, 165 N.E.2d 141 (affirming trial court’s decision to invalidate annexation).

The power of annexation is fundamentally legislative, and the judicial role in annexation cases is limited to that prescribed by statute. King v. City of Bloomington (1959), 239 Ind. 548, 159 N.E.2d 563. Under the current statute, if the remonstrators are able to garner the requisite level of support, they may appeal the annexation to the courts. At the remonstrance hearing, the burden is on the municipality to demonstrate its compliance with the statute. This court’s review is limited to ensuring that the municipality has not exceeded its authority and that the statutory conditions for annexation have been satisfied. Cf. City of Indianapolis v. Wynn (1959) 239 Ind. 567, 157 N.E.2d 828.

II. Whether Specific Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Were Clearly Erroneous

A. Annexation Ordinance X-07-91 in Relation to Annexation Ordinance X-04-79.

Remonstrators argue that the City did not have the power to enact Annexation Ordinance X-07-91 for a period of two years after February 2, 1993, the date upon which the Allen Superior Court issued a decision in respect to Annexation Ordinance X-04-79. Essentially, Remonstrators argue that the decision by the Allen Superior Court was adverse to Annexation Ordinance X-04r-79 and, as such, the two-year statutory moratorium should be applied to Annexation Ordinance X-07-91. 1

The current moratorium statute, I.C. 36-4—3—15(b) provides:

If a judgment under section 12 or 15.5 of this chapter is adverse to annexation, the municipality may not make any further attempts to annex the territory during the two (2) years following the judgment, unless the annexation is petitioned for under section 5 [I.C. 36-4-3-5].

The annexation moratorium statute no longer references “any decision adverse to annexation.” See I.C. 18-5-10-26, repealed effective September 1, 1981 by Acts 1980, P.L. 212, Sec. 10(c). The application of the annexation moratorium statute is limited to judgments adverse to annexation entered under either I.C. 36-4-3-12 or I.C. 36-4-3-15.1. I.C. 36-4-3-15.1 refers to a complaint made by an owner of land within one-half Qk) mile which “must state that the reason the annexation should not take place is that the territo *653 ry sought to be annexed is not contiguous to the annexing municipality” and, thus, has no application to the present proceedings. I.C. 36-4-3-12 involves a hearing on whether the annexation should take place following the filing of a sufficient remonstrance.

Remonstrators argue that the current moratorium statute is inapplicable because the 1979 annexation effort predates the adoption of I.C. 36^1-3-15(b) and that the prior statute mandated a two-year moratorium against further annexations when there is a “decision” adverse to annexation. First, the order issued by the trial court granted the City’s motion to dismiss the annexation proceeding; thus, the City received a favorable and not an adverse outcome. An adverse judgment is one entered against a party defending on a given question. Vanderburgh County v. Rittenhouse (1991), Ind.App., 575 N.E.2d 663, trans. denied. The City was defending its motion to dismiss and judgment was rendered in their favor on the motion.

Nonetheless, the current moratorium statute is a mere recodifieation of the earlier moratorium statute, I.C. 18-5-10-26. As noted in Town of Porter v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
645 N.E.2d 650, 1995 Ind. App. LEXIS 7, 1995 WL 8949, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-annexation-proposed-by-annexation-ordinance-number-x-07-91-indctapp-1995.