Filed 12/8/15 In re Angelo G. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re ANGELO G. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D067759 SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. EJ3515) Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MARIA M. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carol
Isackson, Judge. Vacated and remanded with directions.
Rosemary Bishop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant Maria M.
Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant F.G. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County
Counsel, and Paula J. Roach, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
F.G. appeals an order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights to his sons
Angelo G. and Emilio G. (collectively, the twins), under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26 and placing the twins for adoption. F.G. contends the juvenile court did
not comply with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA; Family Code section 3400 et seq.), lacked sufficient evidence of adoptability,
and erred in finding the sibling and beneficial parent relationship exceptions did not
apply.1 Maria M., the twins' mother, also challenges adoptability and joins in F.G.'s
arguments to the extent they inure to her benefit.
We need not address the contentions regarding adoptability and exceptions thereto
because we find the court did not comply with the UCCJEA. We therefore vacate the
findings and orders and remand to the juvenile court to conduct a further hearing
regarding subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
1 Statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise noted.
2 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
The twins were born in May 2008. At the time, F.G. and Maria were in a long-
term relationship, lived together, and had two other children, one of whom (Adrian G.)
lived with them.3 F.G. and Maria have never married.
The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) opened the
twins' dependency case in February 2012 when they were three years old. The Agency's
child abuse hotline had received a report Maria accompanied a friend to the superior
court in El Cajon while intoxicated and caring for the twins; she smelled of alcohol, was
stumbling and falling down, and was unable to fill out paperwork for the children's
waiting room. One boy had bruises on his face. A social worker visited Maria's housing
complex the next day and found the twins playing in the middle of the complex without
proper supervision. On February 7, 2012, the Agency filed juvenile dependency petitions
on the twins' behalf.
According to the detention report, Maria said she "moved to San Diego two
months ago from Colorado Springs" and lived in New Mexico prior to Colorado.4 A
social worker sent child welfare history requests to Colorado and New Mexico. F.G. said
he, Maria, and the children lived in Colorado "until Oct[ober] 2011, when he was
2 We confine our summary to the facts relevant to and providing context for the UCCJEA issue.
3 The other children are not at issue in this appeal.
4 Maria also had filled out a parentage questionnaire, indicating the twins did not live with F.G., but visited "every weekend."
3 deported to Mexico," "[t]he mother and children later moved to [California]," and he
currently was residing in Tijuana, Mexico. He stated the parents initially alternated
weeks with the children, but then said there was no set visitation schedule; the visits
lasted "a week at a time," occurred "regularly," and the last visit prior to detention ended
on January 30, 2012. The report also indicated the twins "only spoke in the Spanish
language."
At the detention hearing, the court found "[t]he UCCJEA may apply."
(Capitalization omitted.) The court took emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA and
stated the "order for emergency jurisdiction is to expire on 3/6/12 unless extended by the
court." (Capitalization omitted.) The court also ordered the twins detained.
The jurisdiction/disposition report again addressed the family's residential history,
but reflected different reports from the parents. Maria and F.G. agreed the family lived in
Colorado prior to F.G.'s deportation.5 However, according to this report, Maria said she
and the children lived with F.G. in Mexico "temporarily" in November 2011, until she
could establish a home in the United States, and then moved to Spring Valley, California,
in December 2011. She denied the children ever had a permanent residence with F.G. in
Mexico and stated they only visited him. Maria also denied she had lived in New
Mexico. As for F.G., he indicated he was deported in March 2011 and went to stay with
his family in Guadalajara, Mexico. He said Maria and her father helped bring the twins
to stay with him. He explained the twins lived with him in Guadalajara from March 2011
5 The report indicated the family also had lived in Utah for a few months after Adrian's birth.
4 to October 2011, at which point he and the twins moved to Tijuana to be closer to Maria
and Adrian. He agreed Maria and Adrian stayed with him in November 2011, but stated
the "twins continued to live with him in Mexico" and were only visiting Maria for a
dentist appointment when they were taken into protective custody. He maintained the
twins had been "solely in his care since March 2011" and wanted them returned to him.
The jurisdiction/disposition report also provided some additional information
about the parents and twins. Maria had a second interview at a fast food restaurant and
F.G. worked at a restaurant and did carpentry jobs. Maria stated "[s]he and the children
would have cookie parties and barbecues with the other families in the neighborhood"
and attended church weekly. F.G.'s paternal uncle and aunt lived near Maria and assisted
with caring for the children. The report confirmed the twins "primarily [spoke] the
Spanish language." The twins were not of school age, but their foster mother was
preparing to enroll them in Head Start. The doctor who conducted the twins' well-child
exams upon detention recommended follow-up with their primary physician, but it is
unclear if they had one or if this was a general recommendation. The twins were not
participating in any mental health or behavioral services. The report confirmed the
Agency requested child welfare history from Colorado and New Mexico.
On March 6, 2012, the court held a hearing to address the UCCJEA, among other
matters, and provided notice to the parties. Maria attended; F.G. did not, but his counsel
appeared. The court found "conflicting" evidence as to whether Mexico could be the
twins' home state, observing "[t]here's an indication that the mother was visiting the
father in Mexico with the children, pending her obtaining a residence in the United
5 States" but that "[t]here was also some statement in the report that no, they actually lived
there."
The court proceeded to examine Maria about Mexico, first asking whether she
"live[d] with [F.G.] and the kids" in Mexico. She indicated "[w]e stayed there for one of
the summer breaks for three months. Yes, we did have residence, but we've never been --
we lived with his sister in Guadalajara. We visited in Tijuana and in Juarez. So I've
never had a home residence . . . ." She denied going "with the children to Mexico with
the intention" of residing there or being a citizen. The court asked, "So in a sense, you
were just visiting relatives and killing some time until you were able to get a home here.
Is that what we're looking at?" Maria responded "I've had a home here. I've lived here
all my life. From the transition from Colorado to San Diego, we stayed out there for a
couple of months." The court elicited further testimony that Maria had never rented or
established a home in Mexico. The court again asked if it was Maria's position she was
"just visiting" F.G. in Mexico; she stated "I was, but the twins had stayed there longer
with him." It then confirmed Maria had not been involved in court proceedings with the
children in Mexico or had custody orders outside of the present case. The court then
stated "[b]ased on the mother's -- if anybody wants to be heard on this, I'm prepared to
say the UCCJEA does not apply in this case."
County counsel examined Maria briefly about other states and confirmed there
were no Colorado custody proceedings. The court found "even if [Colorado] was a home
state . . . , because neither of the kids or a parent is located there, that would not qualify
as a home state . . . . And . . . even if there [had] been proceedings there, they are now
6 submitting to the jurisdiction of the California [c]ourt." It concluded the UCCJEA did
not apply.
At subsequent hearings in March and April 2012, the court found jurisdiction
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 et seq. and declared the twins
dependents. In March 2015, the court ordered F.G.'s and Maria's parental rights
terminated and the twins placed for adoption. F.G. and Maria appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Background on the UCCJEA
The UCCJEA is the exclusive method for determining subject matter jurisdiction
for child custody proceedings in California. (§§ 3421, subd. (b), 3402, subd. (d); In re
Gino C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 959, 965 (Gino C.).)
Pursuant to the UCCJEA, a state may assume jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination only if any of the following apply: (1) the state is the child's home
state (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1)), (2) the child has no home state or the home state declined to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground the state is the more appropriate forum under sections
3427 or 3428, and both (a) the child and at least one parent have significant connections
to the state and (b) substantial evidence can be found there (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)), (3) all
states with jurisdiction declined to exercise it on the ground the state is the more
appropriate forum under sections 3427 or 3428 (§ 3421, subd. (a)(3)), and (4) no other
7 state has jurisdiction under the foregoing tests (Id., subd. (a)(4)). A state also may have
emergency jurisdiction under certain circumstances. (§ 3424.)6
" '[S]ubject matter jurisdiction either exists or does not exist at the time the action
is commenced . . . .' " (In re A.C. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 854, 860 (A.C.).) "We are not
bound by the juvenile court's findings regarding subject matter jurisdiction, but rather
'independently reweigh the jurisdictional facts.' " (Ibid.)
II
Permanent Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The juvenile court found the UCCJEA did not apply. Given UCCJEA exclusivity,
we interpret this to mean the court found California had jurisdiction pursuant to the
UCCJEA. (See Gino C., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 965.) For the reasons discussed
below, we find the record was insufficient to support California jurisdiction. (See In re
Baby Boy M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 588, 599 (Baby Boy M.) [finding the record did
"not contain sufficient facts to establish whether California has subject matter
jurisdiction" and the absence of certain evidence "[did] not constitute the affirmative
showing required to establish jurisdiction"]; see also In re Marriage of Hopson (1980)
110 Cal.App.3d 884, 894 (Hopson) [subject matter jurisdiction under predecessor statute,
6 We discuss each basis for jurisdiction in more detail, post.
8 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), required findings that statutory
criteria were met].)7
Although this court independently reviews jurisdictional facts, we decline to find
there is no subject matter jurisdiction on the current record. Instead, we discuss
deficiencies in the record, post, and remand to the juvenile court for further proceedings.
Remand will allow the court to determine the remaining jurisdictional facts and preserve
the due process rights of the parties to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.
(§ 3425; A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 864.)
A
Home State Jurisdiction
Home state jurisdiction exists when "[t]his state is the home state of the child on
the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent
from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state."
(§ 3421, subd. (a)(1).) A child's " '[h]ome state' " is "the state [or country] in which a
child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months
immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding." (§§ 3402, subd.
(g), 3405, subd. (a) ["[a] court of this state shall treat a foreign country as if it were a state
7 "Cases interpreting the UCCJA may be instructive in deciding cases under the [UCCJEA], except where the two statutory schemes vary." (A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.)
9 of the United States" for the UCCJEA purposes].) The six-month period includes a
"temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons." (§ 3402, subd. (g).)
The juvenile court made no explicit findings on California or Mexico home state
jurisdiction, but presumably found both lacked it. (See A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at
p. 862 ["For California to have subject matter jurisdiction under [§] 3421, [subd.] (a)(2),
(3), or (4), Mexico must lack jurisdiction."].) The relevant date for home state
jurisdiction was six months prior to the twins' February 7, 2012, petition date, or August
7, 2011. There is no question California lacked home state jurisdiction, as the twins
moved to California no earlier than December 2011 (if at all; F.G. maintains they
continued to live with him through detention). Mexico, however, could have had home
state jurisdiction if the twins lived there from August 7 to February 7, other than
temporary absences. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1).) This is F.G.'s position: that the twins lived
with him in Mexico from before August 7 until they were detained on February 7, other
than visits to California. The record reflects insufficient evidence to support the court's
apparent rejection of Mexico home state jurisdiction.
As the court recognized at the outset of the March 6 hearing, there was conflicting
evidence in the Agency's reports about the twins' time in Mexico.8 By the end of the
8 The Agency contends a social worker adopted Maria's account in the jurisdiction/disposition report. The report identifies the competing views, but does not appear to adopt either one, and the same social worker later acknowledged the conflict at the disposition hearing. The Agency also cites an April 2012 addendum report, in which the social worker recounted Maria's version of the residential history. Even assuming this reflected adoption of Maria's view, this was not before the court at the relevant time and would not have resolved the conflict in any event.
10 hearing, the court concluded the UCCJEA did not apply, meaning it viewed the conflict
as resolved. However, Maria's testimony did not resolve the conflict and there was no
other evidence to do so. Significantly, her testimony did not address a critical issue―the
twins' particular whereabouts throughout the relevant time period―instead focusing on
her living situation and intentions. Maria's only specific comment about the twins (as
opposed to her or the children generally) was that they "stayed there longer" in Mexico
after she left. As for her intentions in visiting Mexico and then establishing a residence
in California, they are of limited relevance to the factual question of where the twins
actually lived. (See Ocegueda v. Perreira (2015) 232 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1088-1089.)
She also did not address F.G.'s position that the twins lived with him or evidence
potentially in support of it, such as the detention report finding the twins spoke only
Spanish at the time.9
Maria's testimony also reflected inconsistencies. She first testified she and the
children stayed in Mexico over a summer for three months, with F.G.'s sister in
Guadalajara and in Tijuana and Juarez. She then said they stayed in Mexico during the
transition to San Diego "for a couple of months," without specifying the time frame. In
the jurisdiction/disposition report, she indicated this transition was in November 2011
9 The Agency suggests on appeal the twins may have spoken Spanish because they were not yet in Head Start, whereas their older brother Adrian had started in the United States and thus spoke English. County counsel could have, but did not, ask Maria about these matters at the March 6 hearing.
11 and only for one month.10 It is unclear whether Maria was referring to different stays.
Either way, if she and the children were in Mexico over the summer of 2011, this
potentially supports F.G.'s position he was deported in March 2011. In addition, the
reference to F.G.'s sister in Guadalajara aligns with F.G.'s account he stayed with his
family there upon returning to Mexico. That said, F.G. did not report Maria staying with
him in Mexico before October or November 2011, other than to transport the twins there.
The Agency does not explain how Maria's testimony resolves the conflict in the
parents' accounts, instead suggesting we should disregard F.G.'s version. It contends
"[o]n review in this [c]ourt, all conflicts in evidence are resolved to support the court's
ruling," relying on In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576. However, we
independently review jurisdictional facts and, as discussed ante, do not find sufficient
evidence to evaluate F.G.'s account (other than Maria's similarly problematic testimony).
(See A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) As for In re Autumn H., it does not address
the UCCJEA, or even subject matter jurisdiction generally, and thus offers no guidance
here. The Agency also suggests F.G.'s request for custody at the disposition hearing as a
noncustodial parent means he agreed the twins did not reside with him prior to detention.
However, F.G.'s counsel stated at the same hearing the twins had lived with F.G. for up to
six months and it appeared the parents were trying to figure out a way to share them. 11
10 Maria also had diverged from her initial detention report account suggesting she moved directly from Colorado to California with the children.
11 The social worker testified earlier in the hearing that F.G. indicated he had sole care of the twins for approximately six months between March 2011 and October 2011. 12 The record was deficient even prior to the hearing. The Agency did not request
child welfare services history from Mexico, had no records from Mexico, and there is no
indication it sought to verify F.G.'s deportation date prior to or at the March 6 hearing.12
In light of the inconsistencies both within and between the parents' accounts, the
lack of any substantive effort to resolve them, and the absence of relevant jurisdictional
facts, we find the record inadequate to support the juvenile court's rejection of Mexico
home state jurisdiction.
B
Significant Connection Jurisdiction
Even if Mexico had no home state jurisdiction, the juvenile court next was
required to consider whether California or Mexico had subject matter jurisdiction under
section 3421, subdivision (a)(2). (See Baby Boy M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 600.)
This form of jurisdiction requires that "[a] court of another state does not have [home
state] jurisdiction . . . , or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more appropriate forum . . . , and both of
the following are true: [¶] (A) The child and the child's parents, or the child and at least
one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state
other than mere physical presence. [¶] (B) Substantial evidence is available in this state
12 We note the juvenile court stated at the Welfare and Institutions section 366.26 hearing in March 2015 that "the history shows that the father was deported on February 12th." It is unclear what history the court was referring to or whether it was available at the time the court ruled on UCCJEA jurisdiction.
13 concerning the child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships." (§ 3421,
subd. (a)(2).)
The juvenile court made no findings at to the twins' significant connections or the
location of substantial evidence and we again turn to the record.
Courts applying the significant connection prong look to the residence of the
custodial parent and child, with some courts also considering other ties to the state. (See,
e.g., In re Marriage of Sareen (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 371, 381 (Sareen) [mother's
declaration indicating she and the child were settled in California after three months of
residence, her "family, work and financial connections to Sacramento," and the absence
of contradictory evidence from father supported significant connections]; In re S.W.
(2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1510 (S.W.) [mother and children had significant
connection to California "because they were residing in this state at the time the
proceedings were commenced"]; In re Marriage of Arnold & Cully (1990) 222
Cal.App.3d 499, 503 [finding no significant connections under the UCCJA where the
only evidence of California connections were the noncustodial parent's residence and
short visits by the child].) The record is inadequate to permit this analysis. As discussed
ante, there is insufficient evidence to permit a determination regarding where the twins
lived. Although the social worker's reports contain some information about other
connections (such as F.G. having an uncle residing near Maria and Maria's statements
regarding community relationships), they do not offer a complete record and these facts
were neither considered, nor supplemented, at the March 6 hearing.
14 The substantial evidence prong focuses on the location of evidence regarding the
"child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships." (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)(B).)
(See, e.g., Sareen, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 381 [finding "undisputed evidence
established that the relevant current information relating to [the child], her day[]care, her
family relationships, her friends and her activities, as well as the relevant information
regarding her future care, protection, and schooling was available in California, where
she and [the mother] had settled"]; S.W., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1510-1511
[substantial evidence existed in the state, where the paternal grandmother permitted use
of her home and provided food and clothing, local child welfare workers observed the
family's living conditions, and the children's closest relationship was with the mother,
who resided in California].)13 Here, the social worker's reports contain limited
information on relevant evidence available in California, and some was only in
connection with detention (e.g., the well-child medical examinations) or not necessarily
supportive of California jurisdiction (e.g., the twins speaking only Spanish). (See, e.g.,
Plas, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 1016, fn. 6 [noting child "speak[ing] English fluently"
may "have some bearing" on substantial evidence inquiry].) No evidence was presented
at the March 6 hearing on this issue.
F.G. contends the record supports Mexico's significant connection jurisdiction and
argues key information, including about his efforts to obtain return of the twins and the
13 The twins' citizenship also may be relevant. (See Plas v. Superior Court (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1016, fn. 6 [child's citizenship "may have some bearing" with respect to substantial evidence]; Gino C., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 963 [noting juvenile court inquired as to children's citizenship at the UCCJEA hearing].) 15 suitability of his home, "comes from Mexico." He explains he lives there, did his
services there, and received home approval from the Mexico social services agency. The
Agency rejects his argument on the grounds significant connection jurisdiction cannot
exist unless a home state has declined jurisdiction and because F.G. cites events from
"long after" the court took jurisdiction. We reject the first contention. Significant
connection jurisdiction also can exist where there is no home state. (§ 3421, subd.
(a)(2).) We do agree significant connection jurisdiction turns on circumstances at the
outset of the case and again find insufficient evidence. (See A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th
at p. 860.)14 The Agency's reports contain little or no information on significant
connections with Mexico or substantial evidence located there, the Agency did not
request or obtain records from Mexico at the time, and the court did not address the
possibility of Mexico significant connection jurisdiction at the March 6 hearing.
14 Courts have disagreed as to whether significant connection jurisdiction is determined as of the petition date or the hearing date. (Compare, e.g., Haywood v. Superior Court (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 949, 955 [finding, as to corresponding UCCJA provision, that "unlike the 'home state' provision," it "does not tie jurisdiction to events occurring before or at the time an action is commenced"]; and Hopson, supra, 110 Cal.App.3d at p. 894 [relevant time for significant connection jurisdiction is "the date of the hearing"], with Plas, supra, 155 Cal.App.3d at p. 1015, fn. 5, 2d par. [finding Hopson unpersuasive and concluding significant connection jurisdiction is better decided when the "action is commenced"].) However, here, as in Plas, the difference "is of no consequence," as the petition and hearing were only one month apart and "there was no change in circumstances . . . ." (Plas, at p. 1015, fn. 5, 3d par.)
16 C
More Appropriate Forum Jurisdiction
A state also has jurisdiction if "[a]ll courts having jurisdiction under [§ 3421, subd.
(a)(1) and (2)] have declined to exercise [it] on the ground that a court of this state is the
more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child . . . ." (§ 3421, subd.
(a)(3).) The record does not reflect any other state declined jurisdiction, and thus does
not support jurisdiction on this basis.
D
Vacuum Jurisdiction
Finally, jurisdiction exists when "[n]o court of any other state would have
jurisdiction under the criteria specified in [§ 3421, subd. (a)](1), (2), or (3)." The Agency
relies on this provision. However, on the record before us and for the reasons discussed
above, we cannot conclude that no state would have jurisdiction over the twins under the
other provisions of section 3421.
The Agency's remaining contentions in support of permanent jurisdiction likewise
are unpersuasive. It notes F.G.'s counsel "did not request the court question the father,"
suggesting F.G. had the burden of establishing there was no California jurisdiction. He
did not. (Baby Boy M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 599 ["Implicit in [defendant's]
argument is the assertion the Department, which initiated the dependency proceedings,
bears the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. We agree [citations] . . . ."].)
The Agency also implies F.G. either consented to or waived jurisdiction, observing his
counsel "did not object to the UCCJEA finding." Neither consent nor waiver can create
17 jurisdiction. (A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 860 [" '[S]ubject matter
jurisdiction' . . . cannot be conferred by stipulation, consent, waiver, or estoppel
[citations]."].)15
III
Emergency Jurisdiction
Emergency jurisdiction is a separate basis for the UCCJEA jurisdiction. (§ 3424.)
Although the Agency does not rely on it, we elect to address it pursuant to our
independent review of the jurisdictional facts. (A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.)
A court may exercise "temporary emergency jurisdiction" when a "child is present
in this state and . . . it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the
child . . . is subjected to, or threatened with, mistreatment or abuse." (§ 3424, subd. (a);
Gino C., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 965-966.) "The finding of an emergency is to be
made only after an evidentiary hearing, although the juvenile court can detain the child
before that hearing." (A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 864.) Temporary emergency
jurisdiction "does not confer authority to make a permanent child custody determination."
(Gino C., at pp. 965-966.) However, where there is no existing child custody proceeding
in another state, "a child custody determination made under this section remains in effect
until an order is obtained from a court of a state having jurisdiction . . . . If a child
custody proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having
15 F.G. also raises a consent issue, noting the juvenile court's comment about the parties "submitting to the jurisdiction of the California [c]ourt" and suggesting this was a "key factor" for the court in finding jurisdiction. To the extent the court relied on consent to find jurisdiction, this was error. (A.C., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) 18 jurisdiction . . . , a child custody determination made under this section becomes a final
determination, if it so provides and this state becomes the home state of the child."
(§ 3424, subd. (b).)
Here, the juvenile court purported to take temporary emergency jurisdiction at the
detention hearing. Even if it properly did so, its failure to assess adequately the
possibility of Mexico jurisdiction (and, if applicable, provide Mexico an opportunity to
act) precluded any temporary jurisdiction from ripening into permanent jurisdiction.
(§ 3424, subd. (b); Gino C., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 966 [finding emergency
jurisdiction did not "automatically convert to permanent jurisdiction," where Mexico had
home state jurisdiction but there was no existing proceeding, explaining "the only
apparent avenue for the court to obtain home state jurisdiction over the children is for
Mexico to decline to exercise its home state jurisdiction. [Citation.] Since the court
opted to remain passive and did not contact Mexico, Mexico has not been given an
opportunity to decide whether to exercise its home state jurisdiction. Therefore, the court
erred in assuming permanent jurisdiction over the matter."].)
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional, dispositional, and subsequent findings and orders are vacated.
The matter is remanded to the juvenile court to hold a further hearing regarding UCCJEA
subject matter jurisdiction. The matter must be given priority on the calendar and
handled expeditiously. If the court determines subject matter jurisdiction existed at the
time the action commenced, the court is directed to reinstate its orders. If the court
19 determines there was no subject matter jurisdiction, the court is directed to dismiss the
dependency petitions.
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.