NUMBER 13-20-00440-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE ANGELIC ROMO
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria1
Relator Angelic Romo seeks mandamus relief from the trial court’s order granting
the withdrawal and substitution of counsel in favor of real party in interest Samuel Suarez.
Relator contends that the trial court improperly granted the motion to withdraw Greg
Hokenson as counsel and allow substitute counsel absent a sufficient showing of good
cause and by failing to “consider whether foreseeable prejudice would result from Mr.
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so,” but “[w]hen granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). Hokenson’s continued representation of Real Party In Interest Magnum Oil Tools
International, Ltd. [(Magnum)] after withdrawal from his representation of [Suarez].” We
deny relator’s petition for mandamus relief.
I. MANDAMUS
Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is
no adequate remedy by appeal. In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 613 (Tex. 2011) (orig.
proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it fails to correctly
analyze or apply the law. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.
2010) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). With respect to the resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the
trial court’s discretion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless
the relator establishes that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one
decision and that the trial court’s decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. In re Sanders,
153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40. In
other words, we give deference to a trial court’s factual determinations that are supported
by evidence, but we review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo. In re Labatt
Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).
Absent extraordinary circumstances, mandamus will not issue unless the relator
lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203,
210–11 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839). This
requirement “has no comprehensive definition.” In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315,
317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). Whether a clear abuse of discretion can be
2 adequately remedied by appeal depends on a careful analysis of the costs and benefits
of interlocutory review. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008)
(orig. proceeding). As this balance depends heavily on circumstances, it must be guided
by analysis of principles rather than simple rules that treat cases as categories. Id.
An appellate remedy is adequate when any benefits to mandamus review are
outweighed by the detriments. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding). When the benefits outweigh the detriments, we must conduct
further analysis. Id. An appeal is inadequate for mandamus purposes when parties are in
danger of permanently losing substantial rights, such as when the appellate court would
not be able to cure the error, the party’s ability to present a viable claim or defense is
vitiated, or the error cannot be made part of the appellate record. Van Waters & Rogers,
Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 210–11; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843–44. An appellate court should
also consider whether mandamus will allow the court “to give needed and helpful direction
to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments” and
“whether mandamus will spare litigants and the public ‘the time and money utterly wasted
enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.’” In re Team Rocket,
L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Prudential, 148 S.W.3d
at 136).
II. DISCUSSION
Relator brought a personal injury lawsuit for damages arising from a motor vehicle
accident, alleging negligence against Suarez, the driver of the other vehicle that collided
with relator, and vicarious liability against Suarez’s employer, Magnum. On September
12, 2019, a joint answer was filed on behalf of Suarez and Magnum by attorney Robert
3 R. Stearns. On February 12, 2020, Hokenson, an attorney with the same firm as Stearns,
made an appearance and took over as lead counsel for Suarez and Magnum.
Subsequently, on September 3, 2020, attorneys Tracy Freeman and Stephen A. Hebert
from a different law firm filed “Samuel Suarez’s Motion to Withdraw and Substitute
Counsel,” seeking to have Hokenson removed as Suarez’s counsel and Freeman and
Hebert substituted. Hokenson’s representation of Magnum would continue. Relator
opposed the motion, arguing good cause had not been shown. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 10
(“An attorney may withdraw from representing a party only upon written motion for good
cause shown.”). Suarez and Magnum filed a joint reply to relator’s opposition, arguing
that Hokenson was not required to show good cause because professional considerations
required his withdrawal from representing Suarez. A hearing was held and the trial court
subsequently granted Suarez’s motion, allowing Hokenson to withdraw and substituting
Freeman and Hebert as Suarez’s counsel. This original proceeding ensued.
A. Representation of Suarez
As their attorney, Hokenson acts as a fiduciary to Suarez and Magnum, a
relationship characterized by “integrity and fidelity,” and which requires “most abundant
good faith,” absolute perfect candor, openness, and honesty, and the absence of any
concealment or deception. Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (quoting Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett–Wallace Corp., 160
S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1942), and citing Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 263–
66 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1991, writ denied)). This relationship and the
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NUMBER 13-20-00440-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
IN RE ANGELIC ROMO
On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Silva Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria1
Relator Angelic Romo seeks mandamus relief from the trial court’s order granting
the withdrawal and substitution of counsel in favor of real party in interest Samuel Suarez.
Relator contends that the trial court improperly granted the motion to withdraw Greg
Hokenson as counsel and allow substitute counsel absent a sufficient showing of good
cause and by failing to “consider whether foreseeable prejudice would result from Mr.
1 See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d) (“When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not
required to do so,” but “[w]hen granting relief, the court must hand down an opinion as in any other case”); id. R. 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions). Hokenson’s continued representation of Real Party In Interest Magnum Oil Tools
International, Ltd. [(Magnum)] after withdrawal from his representation of [Suarez].” We
deny relator’s petition for mandamus relief.
I. MANDAMUS
Mandamus relief is proper only to correct a clear abuse of discretion when there is
no adequate remedy by appeal. In re State, 355 S.W.3d 611, 613 (Tex. 2011) (orig.
proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law or if it fails to correctly
analyze or apply the law. In re Olshan Found. Repair Co., 328 S.W.3d 883, 888 (Tex.
2010) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig.
proceeding). With respect to the resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the
trial court’s discretion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court unless
the relator establishes that the trial court could reasonably have reached only one
decision and that the trial court’s decision is arbitrary and unreasonable. In re Sanders,
153 S.W.3d 54, 56 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40. In
other words, we give deference to a trial court’s factual determinations that are supported
by evidence, but we review the trial court’s legal determinations de novo. In re Labatt
Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding).
Absent extraordinary circumstances, mandamus will not issue unless the relator
lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203,
210–11 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (citing Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839). This
requirement “has no comprehensive definition.” In re Ford Motor Co., 165 S.W.3d 315,
317 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding). Whether a clear abuse of discretion can be
2 adequately remedied by appeal depends on a careful analysis of the costs and benefits
of interlocutory review. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008)
(orig. proceeding). As this balance depends heavily on circumstances, it must be guided
by analysis of principles rather than simple rules that treat cases as categories. Id.
An appellate remedy is adequate when any benefits to mandamus review are
outweighed by the detriments. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding). When the benefits outweigh the detriments, we must conduct
further analysis. Id. An appeal is inadequate for mandamus purposes when parties are in
danger of permanently losing substantial rights, such as when the appellate court would
not be able to cure the error, the party’s ability to present a viable claim or defense is
vitiated, or the error cannot be made part of the appellate record. Van Waters & Rogers,
Inc., 145 S.W.3d at 210–11; Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843–44. An appellate court should
also consider whether mandamus will allow the court “to give needed and helpful direction
to the law that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments” and
“whether mandamus will spare litigants and the public ‘the time and money utterly wasted
enduring eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.’” In re Team Rocket,
L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Prudential, 148 S.W.3d
at 136).
II. DISCUSSION
Relator brought a personal injury lawsuit for damages arising from a motor vehicle
accident, alleging negligence against Suarez, the driver of the other vehicle that collided
with relator, and vicarious liability against Suarez’s employer, Magnum. On September
12, 2019, a joint answer was filed on behalf of Suarez and Magnum by attorney Robert
3 R. Stearns. On February 12, 2020, Hokenson, an attorney with the same firm as Stearns,
made an appearance and took over as lead counsel for Suarez and Magnum.
Subsequently, on September 3, 2020, attorneys Tracy Freeman and Stephen A. Hebert
from a different law firm filed “Samuel Suarez’s Motion to Withdraw and Substitute
Counsel,” seeking to have Hokenson removed as Suarez’s counsel and Freeman and
Hebert substituted. Hokenson’s representation of Magnum would continue. Relator
opposed the motion, arguing good cause had not been shown. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 10
(“An attorney may withdraw from representing a party only upon written motion for good
cause shown.”). Suarez and Magnum filed a joint reply to relator’s opposition, arguing
that Hokenson was not required to show good cause because professional considerations
required his withdrawal from representing Suarez. A hearing was held and the trial court
subsequently granted Suarez’s motion, allowing Hokenson to withdraw and substituting
Freeman and Hebert as Suarez’s counsel. This original proceeding ensued.
A. Representation of Suarez
As their attorney, Hokenson acts as a fiduciary to Suarez and Magnum, a
relationship characterized by “integrity and fidelity,” and which requires “most abundant
good faith,” absolute perfect candor, openness, and honesty, and the absence of any
concealment or deception. Goffney v. Rabson, 56 S.W.3d 186, 193 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (quoting Kinzbach Tool Co. v. Corbett–Wallace Corp., 160
S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. 1942), and citing Perez v. Kirk & Carrigan, 822 S.W.2d 261, 263–
66 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 1991, writ denied)). This relationship and the
duties it imposes align with the additional duty, provided by the disciplinary rules, to
promptly withdraw from multiple representation if a conflict of interest arises. TEX.
4 DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06(e). As the rules recognize, to protect the
duties he owes to his client, an attorney may not be able to reveal the circumstances of
such a conflict to the trial court. Id. R. 1.06(e), cmt. 3. And a trial court should not expect
or demand that he do so; to the contrary, judges have an obligation to enforce ethical
standards in our system of justice. See, e.g., TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 1, reprinted
in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. B (“A judge should participate in
establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct . . ..”); Royston,
Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 S.W.3d 494, 506–07 (Tex. 2015)
(Guzman, J., concurring) (noting that courts have been constitutionally and statutorily
charged with the “solemn duty” to promote and enforce ethical behavior by attorneys);
see also In re Reed, No. 02-18-00088-CV, 2018 WL 1974470, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth Apr. 26, 2018, no pet.) (orig. proceeding) (holding that an attorney should be
allowed to withdraw where attorney believed there was a conflict of interest but did not
divulge the conflict to the trial court). The trial court, as the factfinder, was the sole judge
of credibility and was free to accept Hokenson’s assertions that he had cause to withdraw.
See, e.g., Scruggs v. Linn, 443 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014,
no pet.) (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005)); In re Marriage
of Harrison, 557 S.W.3d 99, 116 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied)
(holding that the trial court had not abused its discretion in granting attorney’s request to
withdraw where she represented a conflict had arisen that prevented her from ethically
representing a party but did not give any further information or detail regarding the
supposed conflict).
5 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Hokenson to
withdraw as counsel for Suarez. In re Marriage of Harrison, 557 S.w.3d at 116.
B. Continued Representation of Magnum
Relator contends that there would be a conflict of interest to allow Hokenson to
withdraw from representing Suarez, but to continue to represent Magnum. This issue is
not properly before this Court. Relator did not contest the representation of Magnum by
Hokenson, but rather Relator specifically contested the withdrawal of Hokenson from the
representation of Suarez, which we have already addressed. There was no motion to
disqualify Hokenson as counsel for Magnum, nor any order related to such
representation; the order before this Court relates to the withdrawal and substitution of
counsel for Suarez. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court, having examined and fully considered the amended petition for writ of
mandamus, the response, the reply, and the applicable law, is of the opinion that the
relator has failed to meet his burden to obtain mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny the
petition for writ of mandamus.
NORA L. LONGORIA Justice
Delivered and filed on the 29th day of March, 2021.