In Re Anderson Grain Corp.

222 B.R. 528, 12 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 353, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 642, 1998 WL 278768
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas
DecidedMay 28, 1998
Docket19-30387
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 222 B.R. 528 (In Re Anderson Grain Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Anderson Grain Corp., 222 B.R. 528, 12 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 353, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 642, 1998 WL 278768 (Tex. 1998).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION ON CIT’S ATTORNEY’S FEES

JOHN C. AKARD, Bankruptcy Judge.

The CIT Group/Business Credit, Inc. (CIT) seeks a determination that the attorney’s fees and expenses which it charged the reorganized debtor in this case are reasonable under § 1129(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. 1 Pursuant to the confirmed plan of reorganization, the reorganized debtor paid CIT $489,194.34. 2 The court finds that the reasonable fees and expenses to be charged to the reorganized debtor are $289,095.37. Therefore, CIT should refund $200,098.97 plus interest to the reorganized debtor. 3

BACKGROUND

On October 1, 1996, Anderson Grain Corporation (Anderson) and its three subsidiaries, Sunmark Grain, Inc. (Sunmark), Zipp Industries, Inc. (Zipp), and Pax Industries, Inc. (Pax) (collectively the Debtors) filed for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Each Debtor had separate assets, separate businesses, and separate creditors, except that CIT asserted a lien on all assets of all the Debtors. Prior to the bankruptcy filing, Anderson Grain served as the financial clearing house for all entities. Following extensive and very difficult negotiations, the court confirmed a consensual, complicated and very inventive plan of reorganization. The principal author and negotiator of the plan was L.E. Creel, III, attorney for the Zipp Creditors Committee. During the Chapter 11 case, liens claimed by CIT on assets of Pax were set aside as unperfected. As a result of the negotiations on the plan of reorganization, attacks on some of the liens held by CIT on assets of Sunmark and Zipp were withdrawn and the Anderson Creditors Committee withdrew its action to subordinate the claims of CIT. One of the negotiated provisions of the settlement, which was *531 incorporated in the plan of reorganization and initially approved by the court in the order confirming the plan, was that reimbursement to CIT for the fees and expenses which it had paid to its attorneys would be paid out of the first draw on postconfirmation financing. Consequently, CIT would not request attorney’s fees under § 506(a), thereby eliminating a dispute as to whether CIT was an oversecured creditor, and eliminating review of those fees under § 1129(a)(4).

Following confirmation of the plan, the reorganized debtor secured postconfirmation financing from CIT and CIT deducted reimbursement for all of the fees and expenses paid to its attorneys in connection with the bankruptcy case. In addition, it reimbursed itself for attorney’s fees and expenses in connection with the postconfirmation financing. The United States Trustee filed a timely motion for clarification of the confirmation order asserting that for CIT to be reimbursed for its bankruptcy attorney’s fees and expenses, it must first establish that it is an oversecured creditor under § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and second, that those fees and expenses must be proved to be reasonable and necessary under § 506(a) and under § 1129(a)(4). For the reasons stated in this court’s Memorandum of Opinion on Motion for Clarification dated September 18, 1997 and styled In re Anderson Grain Corp., 212 B.R. 560 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1997), the court found that reimbursement to CIT for its attorney’s fees and expenses was a part of the expense of the postconfirmation financing and, thus, not subject to the requirements of § 506(a). However, the court found that it must review the fees for reasonableness under § 1129(a)(4). This case shows Congress’ wisdom in enacting that statute.

Pursuant to the court’s instructions, CIT filed an appropriate fee application. 4 The United States Trustee, the attorneys for each of the four Debtors, and the attorney for the Anderson Grain Creditors Committee all questioned the reasonableness of parts of CIT’s application. CIT vigorously asserts that all fees and expenses were both reasonable and necessary to protect CIT’s interests in the bankruptcy case.

ISSUE

In order to confirm a plan of reorganization, the Bankruptcy court must determine that the standards prescribed by § 1129 have been satisfied. The pertinent portions of that section read:

§ 1129. Confirmation hearing

(a) The court shall confirm a plan only if all of the following requirements are met:

(4) Any payment made or to be made by the proponent, by the debtor, or by a person issuing securities or acquiring property under the plan, for services or for costs and expenses in or in connection with the case, or in connection with the plan and incident to the case, has been approved by, or is subject to the approval of, the court as reasonable.

(emphasis added)

The issue is not how much a creditor may pay its attorney. That is a matter between the creditor and its attorney. The issue is the extent to which the debtor should reimburse the creditor for fees and expenses 5 the creditor paid to its-attorney.

The term “reasonable” in this statute implies that the fees must also be necessary in connection with the reorganization. To allow fees for unnecessary services just because the charges were at a reasonable hourly rate would frustrate the Congressional intent of allowing the debtor to reorganize.

STANDARDS OF REIMBURSEMENT

Clearly, CIT can have as many as attorneys as it wishes working on a case for it. CIT can pay those attorneys whatever CIT and the attorneys agree upon. The amounts paid by CIT to its attorneys are not *532 within the province of this court to review. In re Schepps Food Stores, Inc., 25 BCD 1400, 1402 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.1994). What this court must review, however, is the amount of reimbursement CIT is to receive from the reorganized debtor. Under § 1129(a)(4), that amount must be both reasonable and necessary. It must bear a reasonable relationship to what the reorganized debtor would have paid for fees and expenses to attorneys with comparable experience in Lubbock County, Texas.

Debtors, creditors and the court are all benefitted by having skilled lawyers practicing in Bankruptcy courts. Often a skillful, experienced lawyer can achieve a good result quicker and less expensively than a less qualified lawyer charging a substantially lower hourly rate. Bankruptcy courts want and need good lawyering to achieve results which are beneficial to debtors and creditors. The plan negotiated in this case by Mr. Creel is a good example. Consequently, bankruptcy courts need to be mindful that financial rewards to attorneys in bankruptcy court should be comparable to what they could achieve in other areas of commercial practice.

CIT is entitled to use attorneys from outside Lubbock County and reasonable accommodations for travel expenses will be allowed, but not to exceed travel expenses allowed under federal government travel guidelines and. federal government per diem rates. Having traveled extensively as an attorney and as a judge, this court finds it ludicrous to charge full hourly rates for travel time. This court’s standard of not more than one-half hourly rates for time

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

In re Shree Mahalaxmi, Inc.
522 B.R. 899 (W.D. Texas, 2014)
In Re Idearc Inc.
423 B.R. 138 (N.D. Texas, 2009)
Caplin & Drysdale Chartered v. Babcock & Wilcox Co.
526 F.3d 824 (Fifth Circuit, 2008)
In Re Woods Auto Gallery, Inc.
379 B.R. 875 (W.D. Missouri, 2007)
In Re Teraforce Technology Corp.
347 B.R. 838 (N.D. Texas, 2006)
In Re Vantage Investments, Inc.
328 B.R. 137 (W.D. Missouri, 2005)
In Re 900 Corp.
327 B.R. 585 (N.D. Texas, 2005)
In re Caribbean Construction Services, Inc.
283 B.R. 388 (D. Virgin Islands, 2002)
Bachman v. Laughlin (In Re McKeeman)
236 B.R. 667 (Eighth Circuit, 1999)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
222 B.R. 528, 12 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 353, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 642, 1998 WL 278768, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-anderson-grain-corp-txnb-1998.