In re Anchor Mobile Home Movers, Inc.

34 Fla. Supp. 123
CourtFlorida Public Service Commission
DecidedDecember 18, 1969
DocketDocket No. 69258-CCT, Order No. 8697
StatusPublished

This text of 34 Fla. Supp. 123 (In re Anchor Mobile Home Movers, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Florida Public Service Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Anchor Mobile Home Movers, Inc., 34 Fla. Supp. 123 (Fla. Super. Ct. 1969).

Opinion

BY THE COMMISSION.

Pursuant to notice the commission by its duly designated examiner, Leon F. Olmstead, held public hearings on this matter in Lake City on June 11, 12, 25, 26 and 27, 1969.

The examiner’s report and recommended order was duly served on all of the parties. Exceptions to the recommended order were filed with the commission. Oral argument was heard on the exceptions on December 9, 1969. The entire record herein, including the application, the testimony adduced at the public hearing, the exceptions to the recommended order and oral argument heard thereon, has been examined by the full commission. After due consideration, the commission now enters its order in this cause.

By this application Anchor Mobile Home Movers, Inc., P. O. Box 950, Lake City, Florida 32055, is seeking authority to transport mobile homes between points in 19 counties in peninsular Florida, [125]*125lying east of Jefferson and Taylor counties and north of the southern boundary lines of Levy, Marion and Flagler counties. Protestants to this application are the three largest interstate and intrastate mobile home movers with their principal places of business in Oklahoma, Indiana, and South Carolina, and two smaller intrastate operators: Brown, who is limited to Putnam County, and Interstate, which has non-radial authority in Duval, Clay, St. Johns, Putnam and Alachua counties.

During the course of the hearing, protestants sought to inspect and use certain corporate records of applicant company brought to the hearing by applicant pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum issued by the administrative secretary of this commission. Upon objection of applicant’s attorney that such records were not relevant or material the examiner sustained the objection and denied protestants the right to inspect and use these records. This had the effect of quashing the subpoena pursuant to the provisions of Rule 310-2.86.

Protestants sought an interlocutory review of this ruling but a review of the merits of the examiner’s ruling has been deferred by order nos. 8576 and 8640, entered on September 12, 1969, and October 29, 1969, respectively, on the grounds that it is not commission policy to review each specific ruling of a hearing examiner made during the course of a hearing prior to exceptions being filed. The question now presented is whether the examiner correctly quashed the subpoena pursuant to applicable law. We are of the opinion he did. In Pembroke Park Lanes, Inc. v. High Ridge Water Co., 186 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1966), the 3rd District Court of Appeal held that Florida Rules of Civil Procedure 1.28 (discovery and production) and 1.34 (subpoena duces tecum) should be considered in pari materia. Accordingly, a moving party must demonstrate relevancy, good cause, and designation in order to withstand a motion to quash a subpoena duces tecum.

Protestants have stated essentially that they need to inspect such records for the purpose of assisting in the preparation of their case and to prepare for cross-examination. This is not in itself good cause as defined by the courts in numerous cases. For this reason alone, a motion to quash the subpoena should be granted. Further, as the examiner determined in his broad discretion, these records were not relevant to the proceeding and we find no compelling reason to disturb this finding. Protestants further contend that City of Miami v. Florida Public Service Commission, 226 So.2d 47 (Fla. 1969), sustains their position.in that they are not interfering with the company’s business activities and that the records are adequately designated. While the aboye may be partially correct, [126]*126that case still sustains the general rule of law that all three criteria must be met, and as discussed hereinabove, the protestants have failed to demonstrate good cause and relevancy. Accordingly, this contention has no merit and the examiner’s ruling should be affirmed.

The applicant’s president has been moving mobile homes for about 15 years, having worked at various times for each of the three statewide mover-protestants. Since he will be the operating official the applicant is considered qualified by experience to perform the proposed transportation. The applicant has equipment and resources on hand and available, including tow trucks and a terminal site in Lake City. Like the protestants it can resort to leased-operator owned vehicles if necessary so the existing financial resources are considered sufficient to conclude that the applicant is able to conduct the proposed transportation.

In support of the application, 15 witnesses were presented, consisting of 2 manufacturers of mobile homes, 3 dealers in mobile homes and 4 park operators all in the Lake City area as well as 3 mobile home owners and 2 parties who move mobile homes from outside the Lake City area.

The manufacturers move 85-90% of their homes with their own equipment, however, they use common carriers for the overflow and for economic reasons prefer them for the shorter moves. The dealers likewise move most of their units with their own equipment but need the common carriers for the overflow. Both ship to and from the 19 county area herein requested. The park operators have moves intra park as well as in and out of their parks. New units are moved by the dealer but thereafter the park operators and their tenants are dependent on the common carriers. Park operators are occasionally asked to obtain a carrier for a tenant and try to do so as an accommodation, frequently such accommodation is necessary to get the tenant to move into their park. These moves are mostly within about 25 miles of Lake City though some extend into Suwannee and Hamilton counties. Without exception, all of the foregoing witnesses stated that when they could get a carrier the move was satisfactory, but they were unable to obtain service when it was needed.

Of the mobile home owners, one arranged with Morgan’s agent in Lake City to move his coach from White Springs to near Gainesville, setting the hour and date for the move. When the tow vehicle did not show at the appointed time he made inquiry and found out it had broken down. Because he had to move that day, he borrowed a truck and hired a driver and moved himself. Another tried to contact Morgan’s Lake City terminal agent for [127]*127an intra park move at White Springs and couldn’t, so had to. abandon the plan for the time, but is moving to Lake City in the near future. While this testimony involves a proposed municipally exempt move (assuming the city of White Springs regulates motor carriers), it relates to the.overall difficulty of mobile home movers to secure prompt and adequate service. The other was moving from Archer to Ocala and wanted immediate service. He called Morgan in Ocala and was advised that there were no vehicles in then but that some were expected soon. He then called National in Ocala with the same result. He then called Transit; they promised to move him in a couple of days. He contracted for the move with Transit and was in fact moved four days later. One witness in the house moving business in Cross City, Dixie County, moves mobile homes in the area as a “favor” when the owners cannot get anyone else to do it. He could not say how many he had moved.

On cross-examination the, applicant’s president corroborated testimony of shippers that while he was employed by Morgan, he received transportation requests that he was unable to obtain vehicles to meet, from either Morgan, National, or Transit, and that he had loaned his truck or moved mobile homes as favors for people unable to get service otherwise.

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Bluebook (online)
34 Fla. Supp. 123, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-anchor-mobile-home-movers-inc-flapubserv-1969.