In Re Amend. to Standard Jury Inst.
This text of 41 So. 3d 853 (In Re Amend. to Standard Jury Inst.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In re AMENDMENTS TO STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASESINSTRUCTION 7.7.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Judge Lisa T. Munyon, Chair, Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases Committee, Ninth Judicial Circuit, Orlando, FL, for Petitioner.
PER CURIAM.
As amended on the Court's own motion, we authorize for publication and use instruction 7.7 of the Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, on an interim basis. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 2(a), Fla. Const.
In State v. Montgomery, 39 So.3d 252 (Fla.2010), we approved the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Montgomery v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly D360, ___ So.3d ___, 2009 WL 350624 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), to the extent that it concluded that use of instruction 7.7, the standard jury instruction on manslaughter, resulted in fundamental error in Montgomery's first-degree murder case because the instruction erroneously required the State to prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim.
In light of Montgomery, we hereby authorize on an interim basis the publication and use of instruction 7.7 as amended, set forth in the appendix to this opinion. In doing so, we express no opinion on the correctness of the instruction and remind all interested parties that this authorization forecloses neither requesting additional or alternative instructions, nor contesting the legal correctness *854 of the instructions. We further caution all interested parties that any comments associated with the instructions reflect only the opinion of the Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases and are not necessarily indicative of the views of this Court as to their correctness or applicability. New language is indicated by underlining, and deleted language is struck-through. This interim instruction is authorized for use immediately and until further order of the Court.
We specifically seek comments on the Court's amendment to instruction 7.7 from the Supreme Court Committee on Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases (Committee), along with any suggested changes that the Committee deems appropriate. We also welcome comments from any other interested parties. All comments shall be filed with the Court no later than sixty days from the date of this opinion.[1]
It is so ordered.
QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur.
APPENDIX
7.7 MANSLAUGHTER
§ 782.07, Fla. Stat.
To prove the crime of Manslaughter, the State must prove the following two elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. (Victim) is dead.
Give 2a, 2b, or 2c depending upon allegations and proof.
2. a. (Defendant's) act(s) intentionally caused the death of (victim).
b. (Defendant) intentionally procured the death of (victim).
c. The death of (victim) was caused by the culpable negligence of (defendant).
However, the defendant cannot be guilty of manslaughter if the killing was either justifiable or excusable homicide: as I have previously explained those terms.
The killing of a human being is justifiable homicide and lawful if necessarily done while resisting an attempt to murder or commit a felony upon the defendant, or to commit a felony in any dwelling house in which the defendant was at the time of the killing. § 782.02, Fla. Stat.
The killing of a human being is excusable, and therefore lawful, under any one of the following three circumstances:
1. When the killing is committed by accident and misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means with usual ordinary caution and without any unlawful intent, or
*855 2. When the killing occurs by accident and misfortune in the heat of passion, upon any sudden and sufficient provocation, or
3. When the killing is committed by accident and misfortune resulting from a sudden combat, if a dangerous weapon is not used and the killing is not done in a cruel or unusual manner.
Give only if 2(a) alleged and proved, and manslaughter is being defined as a lesser included offense of first degree premeditated murder.
In order to convict of manslaughter by intentional act, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had an premeditated intent to cause death, only an intent to commit an act that was not justified or excusable and which caused death. See Hall v. State, 951 So.2d 91 (Fla.2d DCA 2007).
Give only if 2b alleged and proved.
To "procure" means to persuade, induce, prevail upon or cause a person to do something.
Give only if 2c alleged and proved.
I will now define "culpable negligence" for you. Each of us has a duty to act reasonably toward others. If there is a violation of that duty, without any conscious intention to harm, that violation is negligence. But culpable negligence is more than a failure to use ordinary care toward others. In order for negligence to be culpable, it must be gross and flagrant. Culpable negligence is a course of conduct showing reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed to its dangerous effects, or such an entire want of care as to raise a presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly careless disregard for the safety and welfare of the public, or such an indifference to the rights of others as is equivalent to an intentional violation of such rights.
The negligent act or omission must have been committed with an utter disregard for the safety of others. Culpable negligence is consciously doing an act or following a course of conduct that the defendant must have known, or reasonably should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily injury.
§ 782.07(2)-(4), Fla. Stat. Enhanced penalty if 2c alleged and proved. Give a, b, or c, as applicable.
If you find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, you must then determine whether the State has further proved beyond a reasonable doubt that:
a. (Victim) was at the time [an elderly person] [a disabled adult] whose death was caused by the neglect of (defendant), a caregiver.
b. (Victim) was a child whose death was caused by the neglect of (defendant), a caregiver.
c. (Victim) was at the time [an officer] [a firefighter] [an emergency medical technician] [a paramedic] who was at the time performing duties that were within the course of [his] [her] employment. The court now instructs you that (official title of victim) is [an officer] [a firefighter] [an emergency medical technician] [a paramedic].
Definitions. Give if applicable.
"Child" means any person under the age of 18 years.
§ 782.03, Fla. Stat.
"Dangerous weapon" is any weapon that, taking into account the manner in *856 which it was used, is likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
"Elderly person" means a person 60 years of age or older who is suffering from the infirmities of aging as manifested by advanced age, organic brain damage, or physical, mental, or emotional dysfunctioning, to the extent that the ability of the person to provide adequately for the persons own care or protection is impaired.
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