In re Amber DD.

26 A.D.3d 689, 809 N.Y.S.2d 657
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedFebruary 23, 2006
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 26 A.D.3d 689 (In re Amber DD.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Amber DD., 26 A.D.3d 689, 809 N.Y.S.2d 657 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006).

Opinion

Kane, J.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Tompkins County (Rowley, J.), entered December 29, 2004, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 10, to adjudicate respondent’s children to be neglected.

Respondent’s two children were removed from her care due to allegations that she abused alcohol and failed to provide ade[690]*690quate supervision. She appeals from Family Court’s order finding that she neglected her children and placing the children under petitioner’s supervision.

The evidence supports Family Court’s determination that respondent neglected her children. Proof that a parent repeatedly abuses drugs or alcohol constitutes prima facie evidence of neglect, except “when such person is voluntarily and regularly participating in a recognized rehabilitative program” (Family Ct Act § 1046 [a] [iii]). The record establishes that respondent abused alcohol and several drugs, including marihuana, cocaine and ecstacy. She claims that she falls within the exception because she is receiving rehabilitative treatment as a result of her participation in a city drug court program. While participation in drug court by a person charged with a crime is voluntary (see CPL 170.15 [4]; 180.20 [3]), the alternative is incarceration or other criminal sanctions. Even without considering whether respondent’s attendance record indicates that she is not regularly participating in treatment, her participation based on her desire to avoid prison cannot be considered voluntary as envisioned by Family Ct Act § 1046 (a) (iii).

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Bluebook (online)
26 A.D.3d 689, 809 N.Y.S.2d 657, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-amber-dd-nyappdiv-2006.