In Re Alvis Ray Coker Jr. v. the State of Texas

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)
• Decided: January 5, 2026
• Docket: 09-25-00522-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-25-00522-CV __________________

IN RE ALVIS RAY COKER JR.

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Original Proceeding 411th District Court of Polk County, Texas Trial Cause No. CIV25-0370 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Alvis Ray Coker Jr. petitioned for a writ of mandamus seeking to compel the

trial court (1) to stay enforcement of a default judgment dated September 24, 2025,

(2) vacate orders in Trial Cause Number CIV25-0370, (3) transfer the case to the

411th District Court, (4) enjoin the Real Party in Interest, Regina Prince, and her

attorney from entering, attempting to sell or encumber, or remove personal property

from the real property at issue in Trial Cause Number CIV25-0370. For the reasons

explained below, we deny the petition.

1 We may issue a writ of mandamus to remedy a clear abuse of discretion by

the trial court when the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. See In re

Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding);

Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). We

determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the benefits of

mandamus review against the detriments, considering whether extending mandamus

relief will preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or

loss. In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).

“The operative word, ‘adequate[,]’ has no comprehensive definition; it is simply a

proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when

appellate courts will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of

lower courts.” In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136.

The trial court case appears to be a suit between heirs pertaining to a partition

of property. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 23A.002(5). “A partition case, unlike other

proceedings, has two final judgments and the first one is appealable as a final

judgment.” Griffin v. Wolfe, 610 S.W.2d 466, 466 (Tex. 1980). A two-stage process

governs suits for partition of real property. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 756-771; Bowman v.

Stephens, 569 S.W.3d 210, 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.). In

the first partition order, the trial court determines the share or interest of each owner

in the property, all questions of law or equity that may affect title, and whether the

2 property in dispute is subject to partition or sale. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 760, 761, 770;

Bowman, 569 S.W.3d at 221. Matters that were or that should have been decided in

the first stage cannot be challenged in an appeal from the second judgment that issues

at the completion of the second stage. Bowman, 569 S.W.3d at 222. The process

applies to suits under Chapters 23 and 23A of the Property Code. Id. (Chapter 23);

Rogers v. Coslett, 646 S.W.3d 1 (deciding merits of appeal from an order of partition

by sale pursuant to section 23A.010).

The trial court’s Order of September 24, 2025 is an appealable order from the

first stage of the partition proceeding. Coker may challenge the trial court’s order

and the interlocutory rulings and orders that preceded the order by timely filing a

notice of appeal in the trial court and a motion for extension of time in the appellate

court. See Tex. R. App. P. 26.1(a) (if a party timely files a motion for new trial,

notice of appeal is due ninety days after trial court signed the judgment); 26.3 (the

appellate court may grant an extension of time to file notice of appeal if the appellant

files the notice of appeal within fifteen days of the due date). Since Coker has not

shown that he lacks an adequate remedy by appeal, we deny the petition for a writ

of mandamus and request for temporary relief. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a), 52.10.

PETITION DENIED. PER CURIAM Submitted on January 2, 2026 Opinion Delivered January 5, 2026

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ. 3