In re Align Technology, Inc. Securities Litigation

District Court, N.D. California·Decided March 29, 2021·No. 3:20-cv-02897·Unknown

Opinion

Case No. 20-cv-02897-MMC

IN RE ALIGN TECHNOLOGY, INC. ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS; DISMISSING SECURITIES LITIGATION AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND; CONTINUING CASE

Before the Court is defendants Align Technology, Inc. (“Align”), Joseph M. Hogan (“Hogan”), John F. Morici (“Morici”), and Julie Tay’s (“Tay”) Motion, filed September 18, 2020, “to Dismiss Amended Class Action Complaint.” Lead plaintiff Macomb County Employees’ Retirement System has filed opposition, to which defendants have replied. Having read and considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court rules as follows.1 In the operative complaint, the Amended Complaint (“AC”), plaintiff alleges Align “is a global medical device company” that designs, manufactures, and markets “Invisalign,” a set of removable, plastic braces used “to treat misaligned teeth,” and “iTero,” a “mandibular scanner” that “allow[s] dentists to take extremely precise digital images of patients’ teeth,” which images are “then immediately sent electronically to Align to manufacture the plastic braces.” (See AC ¶¶ 2, 20.) Plaintiff alleges Hogan, Morici, and Tay are officers of Align. (See id. ¶¶ 21-23.) Plaintiff further alleges that, between April 25, 2019, and July 24, 2019 (“the Class Period”), “[d]efendants repeatedly told investors . . . that [Align’s] Invisalign sales growth in China remained strong at levels of approximately 70% annual growth as had been achieved in the prior two years,” whereas, according to plaintiff, defendants “knew, or were deliberately reckless in disregarding, that Align’s sales growth in China had materially decreased to a range of 20%-30%.” (See id. ¶ 1.) Plaintiff alleges that, on July 24, 2019, Align announced its financial results for the second quarter of 2019 and “revealed” that growth in China, during that period, “had plummeted.” (See id. ¶ 106.) Based on the above allegations, plaintiff asserts the following three Claims for Relief: (1) a claim alleging, as against Align, Hogan, and Morici, violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder (Count I); (2) a claim alleging, as against Morici and Tay, violation of § 20A of the Exchange Act (Count II); and (3) a claim alleging, as against Hogan, Morici, and Tay, violation of § 20(a) of the Exchange Act (Count III). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual material, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation and citation omitted). // I. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 To plead a claim under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance . . . ; (5) economic loss; and (5) ‘loss causation,’ i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss.” See Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (emphases omitted) (internal citations omitted). Claims brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 must also meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“In alleging fraud . . . , a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud.”); Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985) (applying Rule 9(b) to claim made under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5), and, in addition to alleging the “time, place and nature of the alleged fraudulent activities,” must “plead evidentiary facts” sufficient to establish any allegedly false statement “was untrue or misleading when made,” see Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Further, such plaintiff must meet the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, which requires the plaintiff to “specify each statement alleged to have been misleading [and] the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1). Additionally, to the extent an allegation is based on information and belief, the plaintiff must allege “with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed,” see id., and, in so doing, must “reveal the sources of [its] information,” see In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation and citation omitted). In the instant action, plaintiff alleges that various statements made during the Class Period by Hogan and Morici on a conference call and at a number of “healthcare industry conferences hosted by the research divisions of various financial institutions” Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on May 2, 2019, were “false and misleading” (see id. ¶ 84). As set forth below, the Court finds plaintiff has failed to plead facts sufficient to support those allegations.2 A. Statements of Corporate Puffery and Optimism Defendants contend “[n]early all of the challenged statements are quintessential inactionable statements of corporate optimism.” (See Mot. at 8:7-8.) “Statements of mere corporate puffery, ‘vague statements of optimism like “good,” “well-regarded,” or other feel good monikers,’ are not actionable because ‘professional investors, and most amateur investors as well, know how to devalue the optimism of corporate executives.’” Police Ret. Sys. of St. Louis v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 759 F.3d 1051, 1060 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Cutera Sec. Litig., 610 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010)). “The distinguishing characteristics of puffery are vague, highly subjective claims as opposed to specific, detailed factual assertions.” City of Sunrise Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., No. 18-cv-04844-BLF, 2019 WL 6877195, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2019) (citati

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