In re Alexander

1 F. Cas. 354
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedJuly 1, 1869
StatusPublished

This text of 1 F. Cas. 354 (In re Alexander) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Alexander, 1 F. Cas. 354 (W.D. Tex. 1869).

Opinion

DUVAL, District'Judge.

Upon motion of the bankrupt’s counsel, the officers of the •court were required to tax their costs in this case, and this having been done the following items were objected to, and the opinion of the court sought thereon, viz.:

Of the Clerk’s Costs.

1st — Filing, certificate and entry of order to record assignment.... 40c.

2d. — Filing, certifying and entry of

assignment .$1.05

The objection made to these two items, if I understand it correctly, is predicated upon the idea that the register has no authority to order the clerk to record the deed of assignment required to be made by the 14th section of the bankrupt act, and that in fact it is not intended by the law to be recorded. This, as it seems to me, is a mistake. The section above referred to; according to my understanding, contemplates that the original deed of assignment, aftdr being recorded by the clerk, shall be given to the assignee, who is required to have the same recorded in the different counties, &c., wherein the bankrupt may own real estate. It provides that “a copy duly certified by the clerk of the court, under the seal thereof of the assignment, made by the judge or register, as the case may be, to him as assignee, shall be conclusive evidence for such assignee to take, hold, sue for, and recover the property of the bankrupt.” If the original deed is to be delivered to the assignee, and not recorded by the clerk, I am at a loss to know how he could, if called upon, comply with this provision of the law. Moreover, if the original deed is not to be entered of record by the clerk, and the same should be lost or destroyed before the assignee could have it recorded in the proper registry offices, then no copy of it could be had. In such •case, the only mode for supplying its loss would be for the judge to order the register to make another deed nunc pro tunc, and this the law does not seem to contemplate. From a careful examination of section 14, my construction is that it not only intended, but that substantial reason requires, that the clerk should record the original deed of assignment. This being so determined, the two charges above made by the clerk are unobjectionable, unless it be as to their amount, and to this I do not understand the bankrupt as excepting.

3d. — Certified copy of deed of assignment . $1.00

It results from the views expressed by me in regard to the two foregoing items that tne clerk has no authority to make out and charge for a certified copy of the deed of assignment unless it is demanded by the as-signee. Until it was otherwise ordered by the court the practice here was to • file the original deed of assignment in the clerk’s office, and deliver a certified copy to the as-signee. I presume this was done in the present case, and hence the charge was made. Believing that such a mode of proceeding is incorrect, I sustain the exception taken to this item, unless it should appear that the certified copy was made at the request of the assignee.

The next charge objected to is:

4th. — To issue warrant in bankruptcy . $1.50

This charge, as I am informed by the clerk, is composed of the following items, viz.: Warrant, $1; certificate of the clerk of the date of its issuance endorsed, 15 cents; entering on docket, 15 cents, and certificate of filing same when returned, being 10 cents for filing and 15 cents for certificate, making an aggregate of $1.55, 5 cents more than the amount charged. This item is ' taxed under the fee bill of 1853. The objection taken to it is that it is the duty of the register to issue the warrant, and tnat he having charged a fee therefor in this case, the clerk can make no charge for the same act. It is true that section 11 of the bankrupt act, provides that the “judge or register shall issue a warrant to be signed by such judge or register directed to the marshal, &c. But this is qualified by rule 2, of the general orders, which requires that all process, summons, and subpoenas shall issue out of the court, under the seal thereof, and be tested by the clerk; and blanks with the signature of the clerk and seal of the court, may, upon application, be furnished to the registers.” Section 10 of the bankrupt act makes it the duty of the justices of the supreme court of the United States to frame general orders for the following purposes, among others, viz.: “For regulating the fees payable, and the charges and costs to be allowed, except such as are established by this act, or by law,” &c. So .1 take it that for all necessary services performed by the clerk of the court in proceedings in bankruptcy, the fees for which are not provided for by the act or general orders, but are provided for by the fee bill of 1853, that they may rightfully be taxed and allowed under the latter. That this is so is rendered still more obvious by the 47th section, which enacts, “that in each case tnere shall be allowed and paid in addition to the fees > if the clerk of the court, as now established by law or as may be established by general orders, &e., the following, lees, &c.” Thus clearly recognizing the right of the clerk to chaige according to the fee bill of 1853, for services required by the bankrupt act, and not otherwise provided for. My opinion is that the warrant is a process within the meaning of general order No. 2, and that in being tested by the clerk under seal of the court he is entitled to charge therefor as for issuing a warrant un[356]*356der the fee bill of 1853. In one respect the ■warrant may be regarded as being issued by the register, for after it has been tested by the clerk under the seal of the court it is countersigned by the register, who inserts therein the names of creditors, the time appointed for their meeting, &e. My conclusion is that the clerk is entitled to the fees as charged, and that the exception taken thereto should be overruled.

Next, as to the register’s bill of costs. The items excepted to are:

1st. — To filing three papers, (petition, order assignment, order reference) . 75c.

I can find no warrant for this charge, inasmuch as the register is not required nor does the law seem to contemplate that he shall, technically speaking, file any papers in his office. But I think it is right that he should endorse upon each paper that comes to his office the time at which it was received. The charge made is therefore allowed, as for a certificate of this character. This, as it seems to me, is authorized by a just construction of the 30th rule. The charge made is therefore allowed to the extent of 45 cents.

2d. — Certifying correctness of petition and schedules.. 55c.

Rule 7 makes it the duty of the register to examine the bankrupt’s petition and schedules, and to certify whether the same are correct in form. This is a duty of some trouble and importance. Rule 30 allows him for every certificate of question to be certified to the district judge, under the 4th and 5th sections of the act, one dollar, while the certificate of the register as to the correctness of the petition and schedules is a certificate of a question which ought to be made to the court. I do not believe it is that character of certificate contemplated by the fifth section. But it seems to me it may be properly regarded as a certificate of a question arising under the fourth section, while the register is sitting in chambers, and des-patching there the administrative business of the court If this be not so, I am at a loss to conceive under what other part of the 4th section any question could be certified.

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1 F. Cas. 354, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-alexander-txwd-1869.