In Re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation

629 F. Supp. 593, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28642
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedMarch 3, 1986
DocketMaster File ESM I
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 629 F. Supp. 593 (In Re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Alexander Grant & Co. Litigation, 629 F. Supp. 593, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28642 (S.D. Fla. 1986).

Opinion

ORDER

GONZALEZ, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE has come before the court upon the Motion for Reconsideration filed on behalf of third-party intervenors, News and Sun-Sentinel Company and John Edwards.

The movants seek reconsideration of the court’s July 31, 1985 Protective Order. (Appendix A). The movants contend that as the Protective Order obstructs public access to court records, it operates as a prior restraint of dissemination of information in the public domain. The movants request that this court permit them access to the Grant depository, direct that they receive notices of depositions and finally, that the court lift a “gag order” contained within the Protective Order.

Initially the court notes that the Protective Order was requested by and drafted by the parties themselves. It was presented by the parties in open court during a regularly scheduled monthly status conference. Following lengthy discussion during which the parties expressed their interests in litigating these cases without notoriety and prejudicial publicity, the Protective Order was approved and adopted as the Order of this court.

Contrary to the movants’ position, the Protective Order does not contain any “gag order” type provisions. It merely provides the mechanism for promoting the free flow of discoverable information, which may or may not ultimately be filed with the court, by setting guidelines for the designation of specific matters and proceedings as “confidential.” The Protective Order further provides the means by which any party can contest a “confidential” designation by filing timely objections with this court.

Thousands of documents have been deposited, not with this court, but with a depository maintained by the parties for both convenience and to expedite these proceedings. Numerous individuals have been and will continue to be deposed. The court recognizes the need for these discovery procedures to continue without the fear of adverse publicity, intimidation or the exertion of other outside forces that could interfere with the free flow of information, most of which would not be admissible during the actual litigation stage of these cases.

The Protective Order provides necessary safeguards to insure the continued exchange of discovery without infringing upon the public’s right to information.

In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 2208, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984), the United States Supreme Court recognized that since pretrial discovery is not within the public domain, “restraints, placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.” Further, “an order prohibiting dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the kind of classic prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny.” Id. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 597 F.Supp. 621, 622 (D.D.C.1984). See, Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Burk, 471 So.2d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

Finally, as noted in Seattle Times Co., 104 S.Ct. at 2207-2208:

[Pjretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial. Such proceedings were not opened to the *595 public at common law, and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice. Much of the information that surfaces during pretrial discovery may be unrelated, or only tangentially related, to the underlying cause of action. Therefore, restraints placed on discovered, but not yet admitted, information are not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information.

(Citations and footnotes omitted).

The court finds that its Protective Order is therefore a proper exercise of its obligation to control the discovery process in this litigation. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Motion for Reconsideration filed on behalf of the News and Sun-Sentinel Company and John Edward be and the same is GRANTED. Having reconsidered its July 31, 1985 Protective Order, the court AFFIRMS the Protective Order without modification.

APPENDIX A

PROTECTIVE ORDER

1. This Order governs the handling of confidential documents, depositions and deposition exhibits, interrogatory answers, responses to requests to admit and other written, recorded or graphic matter (“discovery material”) produced by or obtained from any party, or any non-party who agrees to be bound by this Order (said party or non-party hereinafter referred to as “the producing party”) during the proceedings in each of the captioned cases.

2. The following definitions shall apply to this Protective Order:

(a) “Parties” shall mean and refer to each plaintiff, defendant and third-party defendant in the captioned cases which are subject to the Omnibus Pretrial Order No. 1 entered by the Honorable Jose A. Gonzalez, Jr., on July 31st, 1985.

(b) “Qualified person(s)” shall mean and refer to:

(i) Outside or inside counsel that have appeared for a party in any of the captioned cases and regular and temporary employees of such counsel assisting in the conduct of such case, including employees of any firm retained to reproduce the discovery material for use in accordance with this Order;
(ii) Experts or consultants assisting counsel in this litigation;
(iii) Employees of any party who are required to assist counsel in the conduct of this action;
(iv) Directors, officers, and employees of parties who are noticed for depositions or designated as trial witnesses and other persons who counsel for a party in good faith believes may be fact or expert witnesses either at deposition or at trial, to the extent deemed necessary by counsel for the witnesses’ preparation for testimony;
(v) The insurance carriers for the parties, their counsel, and employees of such carriers assisting in the conduct or monitoring of this litigation;
(vi) Deponents, and their counsel, during the course of depositions taken in this action, and court reporters and persons preparing transcripts of depositions;
(vii) Personnel responsible for staffing the document depositories established pursuant to the Omnibus Pretrial Order No. 1 referred to in Paragraph 2(a) hereof of this Order;
(viii) The Court and Court personnel, pursuant to Paragraph 9 of this Order; and
(ix) Other persons only upon order of the Court, or upon stipulation of the party that produced or disclosed the confidential discovery material.

3. Any party or non-party producing discovery material in this action, which material contains or discloses tax returns, trade secrets, or other sensitive material which would be entitled to confidential sta-' tus under applicable law or by order of this Court, may designate such discovery mate *596

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Bluebook (online)
629 F. Supp. 593, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28642, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-alexander-grant-co-litigation-flsd-1986.