NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2020 IL App (3d) 180249-U
Order filed April 30, 2020 _____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
In re ALEX B., a Person Found Subject to ) Appeal from the Circuit Court Involuntary Admission and Involuntary ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit, Administration of Psychotropic ) Rock Island County, Illinois. Medication ) ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Appeal Nos. 3-18-0249, 3-18-0250 Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit Nos. 18-MH-9, 18-MH-11 ) v. ) ) Alex B., ) The Honorable ) Frank R. Fuhr, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Schmidt concurred in the judgment. _____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: In two mental health cases that were consolidated on appeal, the appellate court found that the respondent’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he was subject to involuntary admission and involuntary administration of psychotropic medication was moot and was not excused by any applicable exception to the mootness doctrine. The appellate court, therefore, dismissed respondent’s appeal as moot in each of the two consolidated cases. ¶2 In separate cases in the trial court, mental health professionals filed petitions to
involuntarily admit respondent, Alex B., to a mental health center and to involuntarily administer
psychotropic medications to respondent. After conducting separate hearings, the trial court
granted both petitions. Respondent appeals in both cases, and the cases have been consolidated
on appeal. We dismiss respondent’s appeal as moot in each case.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Respondent was a 37-year-old man with over a 10-year history of mental health problems
who lived in his mother and stepfather’s basement. Despite his history of mental problems,
respondent had apparently never been involuntarily committed or involuntarily medicated in the
past. On April 17, 2018, respondent’s mother called 9-1-1 after she found handwritten notes in
respondent’s room threatening to kill her and her husband (respondent’s stepfather). When the
police arrived, they found that respondent was intoxicated and was being combative. The
officers eventually had to tase respondent to get him under control. Respondent was transported
by the police to a mental health center for evaluation and treatment.
¶5 The following day, a crisis counselor for the mental health center filed a petition in the
trial court to involuntarily admit (also referred to as involuntarily commit) respondent to the
center for treatment. Attached to the petition were numerous supporting documents, including a
one-paragraph narrative description of the information that the counselor had obtained about the
current incident and about respondent’s mental health history; a copy of the threatening notes
that respondent had written; a certificate of examination that was completed by a social worker at
the center; a history and physical examination report that was completed by the attending
psychiatrist at the center, Dr. Rickey Wilson; a predispositional report prepared by Dr. Wilson;
and a certificate of examination completed by Dr. Wilson. The petition and supporting
2 documents essentially alleged that respondent was a danger to himself or others (his mother and
his stepfather) because he had over a 10-year history of mental illness (previously diagnosed
with schizoaffective disorder), had been abusing alcohol, had written notes about killing his
mother and stepfather, had shoved his mother into a wall a few days earlier, had cornered his
mother in his room, and had to be tased by the police during the most recent incident due to his
combative behavior.
¶6 About a week later, Dr. Wilson filed a second petition in a separate case in the trial court
seeking to involuntarily administer certain specified psychotropic medications to respondent.
Attached to the second petition (also referred to as an involuntary medication petition) was a
written explanation of the recommended treatment of psychotropic medication. The written
explanation listed the recommended treatment (long-acting injectable medication); the benefits,
side effects, and other risks of the recommended treatment; the alternatives to the recommended
treatment; and an assessment of respondent’s decisional capacity with regard to psychotropic
medications. At the bottom of the written recommendation form, a box was checked indicating
that a copy of the form had been given to respondent and to any representative for respondent.
The trial court appointed an attorney to represent respondent in the two court proceedings.
¶7 On April 30, 2018, the trial court held a separate hearing on each petition. Respondent
was present in court for each hearing and was represented by his attorney. At the hearing on the
involuntary commitment petition, Dr. Wilson was the only witness to testify for the State.
Wilson testified that he was respondent’s treating physician at the mental health center, that he
initially examined respondent on April 18, 2020, and that he had seen respondent numerous
times since that date. Wilson diagnosed respondent as suffering from a mental illness—
schizoaffective disorder—and from alcohol abuse. Based upon his training and experience,
3 Wilson opined that respondent was a person who because of his mental illness was reasonably
expected to engage in conduct placing himself or another in physical harm or in a reasonable
expectation of being physically harmed, unless respondent was treated on an inpatient basis.
When asked what behavior had been reported to him or that he had personally observed that led
him to reach that conclusion, Wilson stated that respondent’s mother reported that respondent
had been pushing her around at home; that she and respondent’s stepfather had found notes
threatening to kill them, which they believed respondent had written; and that when the police
were called, respondent was agitated and had to be tased by the police. Wilson noted further that
when respondent was first brought to the center, he was agitated and was threatening to harm
others. Respondent had since calmed somewhat, although he remained quite paranoid and
delusional with feelings that people were out to hurt him in some way. Wilson had personally
observed respondent getting agitated but had not seen respondent swing at anyone. Wilson felt
that if respondent was released from the center untreated, he “significantly [had] the potential of
hurting people in his family.”
¶8 Wilson had developed a treatment plan for respondent and had considered the various
treatment alternatives available in doing so. Wilson stated that respondent was quite delusional
and was in need of psychiatric hospitalization. The treatment plan that Wilson developed for
respondent was based upon Wilson’s psychiatric education, training, experience, personal
examination of respondent, and respondent’s social history. In Wilson’s opinion, respondent
needed to be placed on a long-acting injectable medication to control his paranoia and delusions.
Wilson noted that respondent had been on such medications in the past and had reportedly
benefitted from those medications. Wilson described the goals of the treatment plan and stated
that he was hoping to meet respondent’s treatment needs within a 90-day time period. According
4 to Wilson, the least restrictive treatment alternative available for respondent was the mental
health center. Although a residential facility was a less restrictive option, Wilson did not believe
it was an acceptable alternative at that point because such a facility was not locked down and
respondent could easily walk away from the facility and potentially harm someone.
¶9 On cross-examination, Wilson acknowledged that the decrease in respondent’s aggressive
behavior in the emergency room and at the mental health center coincided with the decrease in
respondent’s use of alcohol. Wilson clarified, however, that in his opinion, the decrease in
respondent’s aggressive behavior was due to respondent being a fairly intelligent person and
quickly learning what behaviors were not acceptable, rather than from a decrease in respondent’s
alcohol use. Upon additional inquiry, Wilson stated that respondent had exhibited voiced
delusions while at the center and had continued to talk about being poisoned and about various
people in federal agencies plotting to get him.
¶ 10 Respondent testified in his own behalf at the involuntary commitment hearing and denied
that he had any plans to hurt his mother or stepfather. Respondent stated that his relationship
with his mother and stepfather was very close for the most part. The biggest issue that
respondent and his mother and stepfather always had was that respondent liked to drink and to
enjoy himself. When asked about hearing voices, respondent stated that the voices the doctor
assumed was respondent talking to nobody could “be mimicked with top secret technologies”
that he was “not at liberty to talk about in this meeting.” Respondent believed that Dr. Wilson
had a “personal vendetta” against him and stated that, “I feel a doctor that wants to put me on
medication for his own profits is probably not the best solution for what his either diagnosis or
misdiagnosis of me is.” According to respondent, he was brought to the mental health center
5 because he was drunk and had an incident with his parents, which he could have resolved on his
own, if his mother would not have made a phone call (presumably to 9-1-1).
¶ 11 After respondent’s attorney had finished questioning respondent, the trial court asked
respondent some questions of its own. Among other things, the trial court asked respondent
whether he had written the threatening notes that respondent’s mother and stepfather had found.
The following conversation ensued:
“THE COURT: Did you write that note indicating—
THE RESPONDENT: I mean this is a national security issue and he wants
to turn it into a mental health issue.
THE COURT: Did you write the note indicating that you were going to
kill your stepfather and your mother.
THE RESPONDENT: That is a night that I drank a lot of alcohol that
night, and I will not confirm or deny I did that, and if I did that, it’s because it was
out of irritation and not an actual desire to do so.”
¶ 12 At the conclusion of the involuntary commitment hearing, the trial court granted the
State’s petition, finding that respondent suffered from a mental disease, schizoaffective disorder,
and that at the present time, respondent was in need of inpatient hospitalization because if
respondent was released before he was stabilized, he would be a danger to himself or others.
The trial court concluded, therefore, that the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence
that respondent was subject to involuntary admission on an inpatient basis. Accordingly, the trial
court entered a written order involuntarily committing respondent to the mental health center for
a period not to exceed 90 days. See 405 ILCS 5/3-813(a) (West 2018).
6 ¶ 13 Immediately thereafter, the trial court held a hearing on the petition for involuntary
medication. Again, Dr. Wilson was the only witness to testify for the State. Wilson testified that
he was respondent’s treating physician at the mental health center and that he had diagnosed
respondent with schizoaffective disorder, a serious mental illness. According to Wilson, due to
respondent’s mental illness, respondent’s ability to interact effectively with others in the mental
health unit had shown a deterioration. Although respondent had exhibited threatening behavior
prior to admission to the center and for the first few days thereafter, he was no longer doing so
and was only making accusations that people were out to hurt him in some way. Respondent’s
symptoms had been present throughout his stay at the center and for at least the past 8 to 10
years.
¶ 14 The treatment plan that Wilson proposed was to have respondent remain at the mental
health center and to start respondent on a long-acting injectable medication to help maintain
respondent’s compliance. Wilson described in detail the medication or medications he was
recommending, the dosages he was recommending, other medications that could potentially be
used in the alternative and the dosages of those medications, the person who would be
responsible for administering the medications, whether respondent had previously taken any of
the medications and the results of respondent doing so, the less restrictive treatment alternatives
that Wilson had considered, whether respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision
about his treatment, and the testing that would be done for the safe and effective administration
of the medications. During his testimony, Wilson confirmed that he had advised respondent both
orally and in writing as to the benefits and risks of the treatment and that he had given
respondent a written copy of the warnings on the medications that he was proposing for
respondent. Wilson stated that he had also tried to discuss the risks, benefits, and side effects of
7 the treatment with respondent. A written copy of the risks and benefits was admitted as an
exhibit at the hearing without objection from respondent, although it was apparently not made
part of the record on appeal. When Wilson was asked in court whether he had advised
respondent of the alternatives to any proposed treatment, Wilson stated, “I believe I did.”
¶ 15 On cross-examination, Wilson acknowledged that respondent’s threatening behavior had
lessened since respondent had been in the mental health center and that it had done so largely
without the administration of psychotropic medication.
¶ 16 On re-direct examination, Wilson opined that without the recommended course of
treatment, the nature of respondent’s illness was such that people with respondent’s illness would
deteriorate over time and would most likely revert into a much more aggressive state.
¶ 17 Respondent testified in his own behalf at the involuntary medication hearing. During his
testimony, respondent stated that he had considered the risks of taking the medications.
According to respondent, he had taken some of the recommended medications for a couple of
months in the past in an oral version and they did not work for him. Respondent believed that
Dr. Wilson wanted to use him as a test subject. Respondent stated that he was brought into the
mental health center because of an alcohol issue and that it was now being turned into something
else.
¶ 18 Respondent suggested during his testimony that Dr. Wilson was receiving some type of
benefit for prescribing the medications to respondent, stating:
“I have the ability to make people millions and millions of dollars and Dr. Wilson
wants to keep me chained up in a—in his own facility so he can make money
based on controlling me.”
¶ 19 A few moments later, respondent stated further:
8 “I have lived with who I am for 37 years. I feel I should be in charge of my own
treatment and not allow a man whose known me for 12 days to be in charge of it
because that—it shows a lack of professional understanding of letting the patients
be in charge of their own treatment.
I used to run marathons. I have such an IQ it got classified. I make a lot
of intelligent agencies money and I help them with things without asking for
anything. It is my belief that Dr. Wilson has the intelligence alliance that he is not
telling me and he was ordered to put me on these medications.”
¶ 20 Dr. Wilson was recalled to the witness stand, and he confirmed that he was not employed
by any other private or public organization, that he did not have any economic interest in any
company that produced psychotropic medications, and that no public or private entity had
contacted him with instructions about what to do with respondent.
¶ 21 After the parties had finished their questioning, the trial court asked respondent some
questions of its own. The following conversation took place:
“THE COURT: Mr. [Respondent], do you feel like you have
schizoaffective disorder?
THE RESPONDENT: No.
THE COURT: And that is what you are basing your decision on refusing
the meds?
THE RESPONDENT: I feel that spiritual people in today’s society are not
valued like they used to be. Five hundred years ago they used to work with kings
and queens. Nowadays they get thrown on meds.”
9 ¶ 22 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the petition for involuntary
medication. In doing so, the trial court commented that respondent did not think he had
schizoaffective disorder and that respondent’s belief that he did not have the condition made it
impossible for respondent to render a reasoned decision as to whether to take the medication, so
the trial court had to make the decision for respondent. The trial court found, therefore, that the
State had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was subject to the involuntary
administration of psychotropic medication. Accordingly, the trial court entered a written order
allowing Dr. Wilson or other staff members at the center to involuntarily administer medication
to respondent. The involuntary medication order was to be in effect for a period not to exceed 90
days. See 405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(5) (West 2018).
¶ 23 Respondent appealed in both cases. The cases were consolidated on appeal by agreement
of the parties.
¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 25 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court erred in granting the two mental health
petitions. Respondent asserts that the trial court’s rulings misinterpreted, misapplied, and
violated the Code. More specifically, respondent contends first that the trial court should not
have granted the involuntary commitment petition because the State failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent was a person subject to involuntary admission as required
by the Code. Respondent maintains that the State’s evidence was lacking because: (1) the State’s
entire case was based upon the testimony of Dr. Wilson and upon Dr. Wilson’s opinion that
respondent was reasonably expected to be a significant danger to his mother and stepfather if he
was not hospitalized on an inpatient basis; (2) Dr. Wilson’s testimony/opinion in that regard was
cursory, was not supported by the evidence, and relied primarily upon hearsay information; (3)
10 the State failed to call to testify any of the underlying witnesses who had provided the hearsay
information upon which Dr. Wilson relied; (4) the State failed to present an adequate factual
evidentiary basis to support Dr. Wilson’s opinion; and (5) any information elicited by the trial
court in questioning respondent about whether he wrote the threatening notes should not be
considered since that information was not elicited by the State and was improperly elicited by the
trial court acting as an advocate in the proceeding. Second, respondent contends that the trial
court also should not have granted the involuntary medication petition because the State failed to
prove that respondent was provided with written information about less restrictive alternatives to
psychotropic medications as required by the Code. For those reasons, respondent asks this court
to overturn the trial court’s rulings granting the two mental health petitions.
¶ 26 The State argues that the trial court’s rulings were proper and should be upheld. The
State asserts that it met its burden in the trial court to prove each petition, that the trial court’s
rulings to that effect were well supported by proper evidence, and that the trial court did not act
improperly in questioning respondent at the involuntary commitment hearing. In making those
assertions, the State contends that respondent’s claims on appeal are not about the interpretation
or application of the Code as respondent suggests but, rather, are merely about the sufficiency of
the evidence. For all the reasons set forth, the State asks that we affirm the trial court’s ruling on
each petition.
¶ 27 Before we proceed any further in our review, we must first determine whether there is an
exception to the mootness doctrine that would apply in this case that would allow us to reach the
merits of the parties’ arguments on appeal. The two mental health orders at issue in this case
were limited in duration to 90 days and have long since expired. Thus, there is no question—and
no dispute between the parties—that the underlying issues in the two consolidated cases are now
11 moot. See In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338, 349-50 (2006) (indicating that an appeal is moot if it
presents no actual controversy or if the issues involved in the trial court no longer exist because
intervening events have rendered it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effective relief to
the complaining party); In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d 345, 350-51 (2009) (recognizing in a
similar case that the underlying question of whether involuntary commitment and medication
orders were valid was moot because the 90-day time period during which the orders were in
effect had long since passed and the respondent could not be held involuntarily or forced to take
medication against his will unless new petitions were filed and new hearings conducted). It is
well settled that Illinois courts will not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or
consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues are decided.
See Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 351. Therefore, unless an exception to the mootness doctrine
applies in this case, we will not reach the merits of the parties’ arguments.
¶ 28 Whether an exception to the mootness doctrine applies is a question of law, which the
appellate court reviews de novo. In re Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶ 13. There is no
general exception to the mootness doctrine for mental health cases. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at
355. Instead, courts should evaluate mental health cases using a case-by-case approach to
determine whether one of the three recognized exceptions to the mootness doctrine applies—the
public interest exception, the capable of repetition yet evading review exception (capable of
repetition exception), and the collateral consequences exception—and must consider those
exceptions in light of the facts and claims raised. See id. at 364. The exceptions to the mootness
doctrine are to be construed narrowly. J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 350. For a particular exception to
apply, the complaining party must make a clear showing that each element of that exception is
present. See id.
12 ¶ 29 In this particular case, respondent argues that the capable of repetition exception applies.
The capable of repetition exception has two elements that the complaining party must prove: (1)
that the challenged action is too short in duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation; and
(2) that there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to
the same action again. Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 358; Vanessa K., 2011 IL App (3d) 100545, ¶
14. Here, the parties agree that the first element has been satisfied due to the relatively short 90-
day duration of the two orders at issue. Thus, the only remaining question as to whether the
exception applies is the second element—whether there is a reasonable expectation that
respondent will personally be subject to the same action again.
¶ 30 To establish the existence of the second element of the capable of repetition exception,
respondent must show that there is a substantial likelihood that the issue presented in the instant
case, and any resolution thereof, will have some bearing on a similar issue presented in a
subsequent case involving the respondent. See Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 360. “For example, if
the respondent's appeal raises a constitutional issue or challenges the trial court's interpretation of
a statute, the exception applies because the court's resolution of [those] issues could affect the
respondent in subsequent commitment proceedings.” In re Amanda H., 2017 IL App (3d)
150164, ¶ 27. On the other hand, appeals that merely challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
in a particular case will not satisfy the second element of the exception. Id.
¶ 31 Upon reviewing respondent’s arguments and the facts in the present case, we find that
respondent failed in his burden to prove the second element of the capable of repetition
exception. Although respondent initially categorizes his arguments on appeal as claims that the
trial court misinterpreted or misapplied the Code, a deeper look at the substance of respondent’s
arguments shows that respondent is really attacking the sufficiency of the evidence—that the
13 State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was a person subject to
involuntary commitment and that respondent had been given written information about less
restrictive alternatives to psychotropic medications. Respondent does not claim that any of the
statutes involved are unconstitutional, and neither the trial court nor this court was called upon to
interpret any provision of those statutes. See Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 360 (indicating, although
somewhat implicitly, that the capable of repetition exception will apply where the respondent
raises a constitutional issue or challenges the trial court's interpretation of a statute because the
court's resolution of those issues could affect the respondent in subsequent commitment
proceedings); Amanda H., 2017 IL App (3d) 150164, ¶ 27 (same). Rather, respondent merely
contends here that the State failed to meet its burden of proof in each of the consolidated cases.
Considering that argument and the facts before us, we cannot say that there is a clear indication
of how a resolution of the issues raised in the two consolidated cases could be of use to
respondent in a future litigation as any future litigation would be based upon new petitions, new
hearings, new evidence, and an assessment of whether the State met its burden of proof in those
cases. See Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 360 (making a similar statement about the argument raised
in that case).
¶ 32 In addition, and contrary to other mental health cases where courts have found that the
capable of repetition exception applies, this is apparently the first time that respondent has been
involuntarily committed and involuntarily medicated, even though respondent has had mental
health problems for over the past 10 years. We cannot say, therefore, that it is reasonably likely
that respondent will be involuntarily committed or medicated again in the future. Compare In re
Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 492 (1998) (finding that the second element of the capable of
repetition exception had been satisfied where the respondent had a prior history of mental illness
14 and hospitalization, including involuntary hospitalization, such that it was reasonable to expect
that the same action taken against the respondent in that case might confront the respondent
again in the future); In re Robin C., 395 Ill. App. 3d 958, 963 (2009) (ruling that the second
element of the capable of repetition exception had been satisfied where the respondent had
suffered from schizophrenia and had been involuntarily committed on prior occasions such that
there was a reasonable expectation that respondent would be subject to the same action again in
the future).
¶ 33 Based upon the arguments respondent has made on appeal, the facts of the cases before
us, and the established law in this area, we must conclude that respondent’s arguments in the two
consolidated cases are moot and that respondent has failed to establish that any exception to the
mootness doctrine applies. See Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 360. We, therefore, dismiss
respondent’s appeal as moot in each of the two consolidated cases. See id. at 364.
¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss respondent’s appeal as moot in each of the two
consolidated cases.
¶ 36 Appeals dismissed.