NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: ALAN J. COUTURE, No. 22-35479
Debtor, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00002-BMM ______________________________
CRYSTAL MOORE, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALAN J. COUTURE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 5, 2023 Submission Vacated June 14, 2023 Resubmitted September 18, 2023 Seattle, Washington
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Crystal Moore (Moore) appeals the district court’s order
affirming the Montana Bankruptcy Court’s order granting Defendant-Appellee
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
- Alan Couture’s (Couture) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion and
vacating its prior order finding certain obligations of Couture non-dischargeable in
his 2012 bankruptcy. We affirm.
Moore and Couture divorced in 2002 and signed a Decree of Dissolution of
Marriage (Divorce Decree) outlining monetary obligations of Couture related to
alimony, mortgage payments, child support, and a marital tort judgment. In 2004,
Couture filed for bankruptcy in Indiana. Moore was listed as a creditor, and
although the two signed a reaffirmation agreement intending to preserve the
marital tort judgment in the Divorce Decree, the agreement was not approved by
the bankruptcy judge. Moore did not file any other documents related to the
dischargeability of the marital tort judgment and the bankruptcy judge did not
make any findings as to dischargeability.
Couture filed a second bankruptcy in Montana in 2012, in which Moore did
file a dischargeability complaint and the bankruptcy judge found the marital tort
judgment to be non-dischargeable. In 2017, Couture filed a motion to reopen the
Montana bankruptcy and a subsequent Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the Montana
bankruptcy judge’s prior finding of non-dischargeability on the basis that the
marital tort judgment had previously been discharged in the 2004 Indiana
bankruptcy. The Montana Bankruptcy Court granted the Rule 60(b)(6) motion and
vacated its prior order holding the debt to be non-dischargeable. Moore appealed
2 to the district court, which affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy judge, and then
timely appealed to this court.
We review a bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo. In re The
Mortgage Store, Inc., 773 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2014). We review an order
granting or denying a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b)(6) for abuse of discretion.
Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004). A bankruptcy
court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if its decision rests
on a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Id. We review the bankruptcy court’s
decision without deference to the district court’s conclusions. In re Weisman, 5
F.3d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1993).
1. Under Rule 60(b)(6), “a court may relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding . . . for any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(6). An error of law is an “extraordinary circumstance” that
supports the grant of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int’l
Fibercom, Inc., 503 F.3d 933, 940-41 (9th Cir. 2007). A Rule 60(b)(6) motion
must be filed in a reasonable time, which is evaluated in terms of possible
prejudice and justification for failing to act sooner, and depends on the facts of a
particular case. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(c)(1); In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 889
F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir. 1989).
Because the marital tort judgment was discharged in the 2004 Indiana
3 bankruptcy, the later ruling of the Montana bankruptcy judge finding the marital
tort judgment to be non-dischargeable was a legal error. The Montana Bankruptcy
Court correctly determined the marital tort judgment as a non-support obligation
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). Under the Bankruptcy Code as it existed during the
2004 Indiana bankruptcy, Moore was required to file a dischargeability complaint
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) in order for the debt to survive the bankruptcy.
Although Couture’s Rule 60 motion was filed three years after the
dischargeability ruling from the Montana Bankruptcy Court, the bankruptcy court
did not err in finding Moore had not suffered substantial prejudice due to the delay.
Based on the accounting from the Indiana state courts, Moore received at least
some amount of payments that counted towards the marital tort judgment even
though she was not legally entitled to those payments after the 2004 Indiana
bankruptcy. Furthermore, this situation arose in part from Moore’s failure to make
the appropriate filings during the 2004 Indiana bankruptcy.
Therefore, given the Montana Bankruptcy Court initially erred as a matter of
law in finding non-dischargeable a debt that had been discharged in a previous
bankruptcy proceeding, the subsequent grant of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was
within its sound discretion.
2. Moore argues that Couture is judicially estopped from now claiming
the marital tort judgment was discharged. “[J]udicial estoppel is an equitable
4 doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.
742, 750 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review the
availability of judicial estoppel de novo as a question of law, and if available, the
decision to apply it for an abuse of discretion. In re Gurrola, 328 B.R. 158, 162
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005); see also Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d
778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has held
that in light of the strong anti-waiver provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a), which
states that a discharge “voids any judgment at any time obtained . . . whether or not
such discharge is waived,” equitable exceptions cannot prevent a debtor from
relying on a bankruptcy discharge (i.e., judicial estoppel would not apply). See In
re Gurrola, 328 B.R. at 160, 163 (describing a discharge in bankruptcy as an
“absolute, nonwaivable defense,”); In re Kimmel, 378 B.R. 630, 638 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2007) (“First, the chapter 7 discharge is absolute and, in light of the anti-
waiver provisions of § 524(a), does not admit of an equitable exception that would
permit it to be waived by postdischarge conduct.”). Accordingly, Moore may not
raise judicial estoppel in challenging the bankruptcy court’s Rule 60 order. And,
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 18 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: ALAN J. COUTURE, No. 22-35479
Debtor, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00002-BMM ______________________________
CRYSTAL MOORE, MEMORANDUM*
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ALAN J. COUTURE,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Brian M. Morris, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted June 5, 2023 Submission Vacated June 14, 2023 Resubmitted September 18, 2023 Seattle, Washington
Before: SCHROEDER, HAWKINS, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Crystal Moore (Moore) appeals the district court’s order
affirming the Montana Bankruptcy Court’s order granting Defendant-Appellee
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
- Alan Couture’s (Couture) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) motion and
vacating its prior order finding certain obligations of Couture non-dischargeable in
his 2012 bankruptcy. We affirm.
Moore and Couture divorced in 2002 and signed a Decree of Dissolution of
Marriage (Divorce Decree) outlining monetary obligations of Couture related to
alimony, mortgage payments, child support, and a marital tort judgment. In 2004,
Couture filed for bankruptcy in Indiana. Moore was listed as a creditor, and
although the two signed a reaffirmation agreement intending to preserve the
marital tort judgment in the Divorce Decree, the agreement was not approved by
the bankruptcy judge. Moore did not file any other documents related to the
dischargeability of the marital tort judgment and the bankruptcy judge did not
make any findings as to dischargeability.
Couture filed a second bankruptcy in Montana in 2012, in which Moore did
file a dischargeability complaint and the bankruptcy judge found the marital tort
judgment to be non-dischargeable. In 2017, Couture filed a motion to reopen the
Montana bankruptcy and a subsequent Rule 60(b) motion to vacate the Montana
bankruptcy judge’s prior finding of non-dischargeability on the basis that the
marital tort judgment had previously been discharged in the 2004 Indiana
bankruptcy. The Montana Bankruptcy Court granted the Rule 60(b)(6) motion and
vacated its prior order holding the debt to be non-dischargeable. Moore appealed
2 to the district court, which affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy judge, and then
timely appealed to this court.
We review a bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo. In re The
Mortgage Store, Inc., 773 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2014). We review an order
granting or denying a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b)(6) for abuse of discretion.
Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004). A bankruptcy
court abuses its discretion if it does not apply the correct law or if its decision rests
on a clearly erroneous finding of fact. Id. We review the bankruptcy court’s
decision without deference to the district court’s conclusions. In re Weisman, 5
F.3d 417, 419 (9th Cir. 1993).
1. Under Rule 60(b)(6), “a court may relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding . . . for any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. Pro. 60(b)(6). An error of law is an “extraordinary circumstance” that
supports the grant of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Int’l
Fibercom, Inc., 503 F.3d 933, 940-41 (9th Cir. 2007). A Rule 60(b)(6) motion
must be filed in a reasonable time, which is evaluated in terms of possible
prejudice and justification for failing to act sooner, and depends on the facts of a
particular case. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(c)(1); In re Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 889
F.2d 242, 249 (9th Cir. 1989).
Because the marital tort judgment was discharged in the 2004 Indiana
3 bankruptcy, the later ruling of the Montana bankruptcy judge finding the marital
tort judgment to be non-dischargeable was a legal error. The Montana Bankruptcy
Court correctly determined the marital tort judgment as a non-support obligation
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(15). Under the Bankruptcy Code as it existed during the
2004 Indiana bankruptcy, Moore was required to file a dischargeability complaint
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) in order for the debt to survive the bankruptcy.
Although Couture’s Rule 60 motion was filed three years after the
dischargeability ruling from the Montana Bankruptcy Court, the bankruptcy court
did not err in finding Moore had not suffered substantial prejudice due to the delay.
Based on the accounting from the Indiana state courts, Moore received at least
some amount of payments that counted towards the marital tort judgment even
though she was not legally entitled to those payments after the 2004 Indiana
bankruptcy. Furthermore, this situation arose in part from Moore’s failure to make
the appropriate filings during the 2004 Indiana bankruptcy.
Therefore, given the Montana Bankruptcy Court initially erred as a matter of
law in finding non-dischargeable a debt that had been discharged in a previous
bankruptcy proceeding, the subsequent grant of the Rule 60(b)(6) motion was
within its sound discretion.
2. Moore argues that Couture is judicially estopped from now claiming
the marital tort judgment was discharged. “[J]udicial estoppel is an equitable
4 doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S.
742, 750 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We review the
availability of judicial estoppel de novo as a question of law, and if available, the
decision to apply it for an abuse of discretion. In re Gurrola, 328 B.R. 158, 162
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005); see also Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d
778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel has held
that in light of the strong anti-waiver provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 524(a), which
states that a discharge “voids any judgment at any time obtained . . . whether or not
such discharge is waived,” equitable exceptions cannot prevent a debtor from
relying on a bankruptcy discharge (i.e., judicial estoppel would not apply). See In
re Gurrola, 328 B.R. at 160, 163 (describing a discharge in bankruptcy as an
“absolute, nonwaivable defense,”); In re Kimmel, 378 B.R. 630, 638 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 2007) (“First, the chapter 7 discharge is absolute and, in light of the anti-
waiver provisions of § 524(a), does not admit of an equitable exception that would
permit it to be waived by postdischarge conduct.”). Accordingly, Moore may not
raise judicial estoppel in challenging the bankruptcy court’s Rule 60 order. And,
even if judicial estoppel were available, Couture’s conduct appears to be the result
of a misunderstanding of the law. See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 753 (noting “it
may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel when a party’s prior
position was based on an inadvertence or mistake.” (internal quotation marks and
5 citation omitted)). In sum, Moore has not shown the Montana Bankruptcy Court
erred in declining to apply judicial estoppel.
3. The Montana Bankruptcy Court owed no deference to the 2020
Indiana Court of Appeals ruling characterizing the debt as related to a willful and
malicious injury. Bankruptcy courts have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the
dischargeability of debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). In re Aldrich, 34 B.R. 776,
781 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983). Even if the Montana Bankruptcy Court had agreed
with the Indiana Court of Appeals’ characterization of the debt, the outcome
remains the same—just as with a non-support obligation, a debt related to a willful
and malicious injury only survives bankruptcy if there is a dischargeability
complaint filed under 8 U.S.C. § 523(c), and Moore failed to file any such
complaint in the 2004 Indiana bankruptcy.
We recognize the difficult situation presented by this case, but cannot find
any abuse of discretion by the Montana Bankruptcy Court. Therefore, the ruling is
AFFIRMED.