In re Air Specialties Corp.

56 F.3d 70, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 19865, 1995 WL 314634
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMay 22, 1995
Docket93-56628
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 56 F.3d 70 (In re Air Specialties Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Air Specialties Corp., 56 F.3d 70, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 19865, 1995 WL 314634 (9th Cir. 1995).

Opinion

56 F.3d 70
NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

In re AIR SPECIALTIES CORPORATION, a Washington corporation,
d/b/a Air America, Debtor,
Zev MELAMID, Appellant,
v.
Ronald DURKIN, Trustee, of the Chapter 7 Estate of Air
Specialties Corporation, Appellee.

No. 93-56628.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted May 4, 1995.
Decided May 22, 1995.

Before: BEEZER and TROTT, Circuit Judges, and SHUBB,* District Judge.

MEMORANDUM**

Zev Melamid appeals the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's ("BAP") affirmance of the bankruptcy court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Ronald Durkin ("Trustee"), the Trustee of Chapter 7 debtor Air Specialties Corp. ("ASC"). The bankruptcy court determined Melamid did not have a perfected security interest in certain aircraft spare parts on which ASC had previously granted Melamid a lien, because he failed to record his security interest with the Federal Aviation Administration Registry ("Registry") as required by 49 U.S.C. app. Sec. 1403 (repealed July 5, 1994).1 The bankruptcy court also allowed the Trustee to set aside an $81,000 preferential transfer from ASC to Melamid.

We have jurisdiction over this appeal, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 158(d), and we affirm the decision of the BAP.

* Aircraft Spare Parts

The controlling issue in this case is whether Melamid perfected a lien on some or all of the collateral for the loan which Melamid made to ASC. This issue turns on whether the collateral for the loan consisted of aircraft spare parts as defined in 49 U.S.C. app. Sec. 1301 and thus subject to the recording requirements of 49 U.S.C. app. Sec. 1403.

Section 1403 states in pertinent part:

(a) The Secretary of Transportation shall establish and maintain a system for the recording of each and all of the following:

....

(3) Any ... instrument executed for security purposes, which ... affects the title to, or any interest in, any aircraft engines, propellers, or appliances maintained by or on behalf of an air carrier certified under section 1424(b) of this title for installation or use in aircraft, aircraft engines, or propellers, or any spare parts maintained by or on behalf of such an air carrier ....

(c) No conveyance or instrument the recording of which is provided for by subsection (a) of this section shall be valid in respect of such aircraft, aircraft engine or engines, propellers, appliances, or spare parts against any person other than the person by whom the conveyance or other instrument is made or given ... until such conveyance or other instrument is filed for recordation in the office of the Secretary of Transportation ....

49 U.S.C. app. Sec. 1403.

If the collateral was subject to the recording requirements of Sec. 1403, then Melamid's interest is imperfect and he can only make claims against ASC as a general creditor. On the other hand, if the collateral was not subject to the recording requirements of Sec. 1403, Melamid argues he perfected his interest by filing the UCC-1, thus, allowing him to make claims against ASC as a first priority creditor.

Specifically, Melamid alleges that two issues of material fact exist requiring the reversal of the summary judgment order: 1) whether the collateral included at least $81,000 worth of spare parts for ground and service equipment which are not subject to the recording requirements of Sec. 1403; and 2) whether Auxiliary Power Units ("APUs") are aircraft spare parts within the definition of Sec. 1301.

A. Ground and Service Equipment Spare Parts

No evidence was presented at any stage of the proceedings as to what value, if any, could be attributed to spare parts intended for ground or service equipment. The only mention of non-aircraft spare parts was made in Melamid's declaration filed in opposition to the Trustee's motion for summary judgment, where he stated: "Although I am not an airline operations or maintenance expert, I know that ASC had ground and service equipment, not for use in flight. Spare parts were kept for this equipment."

Melamid contends the bankruptcy court ignored other relevant portions of his declaration in finding no evidence had been presented as to the value of non-aircraft spare parts. He notes that in his declaration he stated ASC's spare parts inventory was valued at "approximately $2.3 to 2.5 million dollars." He also valued the two APUs as being "worth up to a million dollars apiece." He argues this should have been sufficient to establish the genuine issue that the non-aircraft spare parts had "some" value.

Melamid's argument is flawed in two respects. First, the fact that the spare parts, excluding the APUs, are worth between $300,000 and $500,000 does nothing to indicate what value, if any, is attributable to non-aircraft spare parts. Melamid produced no evidence as to the value of the aircraft spare parts other than the APUs.

Second, Melamid produced no evidence to indicate he had an interest in any ground or service equipment spare parts. The Chattel Mortgage and Security Agreement executed between ASC and Melamid did not give Melamid any interest in non-aircraft spare parts. The Security Agreement only gave Melamid an interest in "[e]ach aircraft spare part now owned or hereafter acquired by Company which is not subject to any other Lien, including but not limited to the parts listed on Schedule A as such schedule may be amended from time to time." (Emphasis added.) The Security Agreement further provided:

Mortgagees understand and agree that the Parts listed on Schedule A are spare parts currently not in use on any of Company's aircraft or engines and that Company may place one or more such Parts on such aircraft or engines from time to time. When any such Part is placed on such aircraft or engines, the Part so placed will no longer be subject to the lien of this Mortgage and shall not constitute a Mortgaged Property hereunder, and the part being replaced on such aircraft or engine shall immediately become subject to the Lien of this Mortgage.

(Emphasis added.) The collateral for the loan to ASC was clearly intended to be "aircraft" spare parts.

Significantly, Melamid did not produce any evidence indicating that any of the parts listed on Schedule A were non-aircraft spare parts. As the BAP noted, even Melamid's UCC-1 financing statement lists the collateral inventory as "aircraft spare parts." As the BAP stated: "The burden is on Melamid to show why his financing statement ... should not be taken at face value. Melamid has not attempted in his brief on appeal to shed any light on the subject, but rather improperly seeks to shift the burden to the Trustee, contrary to Celotex."

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Bluebook (online)
56 F.3d 70, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 19865, 1995 WL 314634, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-air-specialties-corp-ca9-1995.