NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 260090-U NOTICE Decision filed 06/04/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NOS. 5-26-0090, 5-26-0091, 5-26-0092 cons. Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re AIDEN M., SOPHIA M., and KHAI B., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Piatt County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Nos. 21-JA-16, 21-JA-17, ) 22-JA-31 Amanda W., ) ) Honorable Dana C. Rhoades, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BARBERIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Boie and Sholar concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the State met its burden of proving best interest. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶2 The respondent, Amanda W. (Mother), appeals from the February 2, 2026, order of the
Piatt County circuit court terminating her parental rights over her three minor children. On appeal,
Mother challenges only the court’s determination that it was in the minors’ best interests to
terminate her parental rights. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Adjudication of Neglect and Initial Proceedings
¶5 This case began on October 8, 2021, when the State filed petitions for adjudication of
neglect regarding Aiden M. and Sophia M. The petitions identified Mother as the minors’ mother,
and alleged that the minors were neglected by reason of an environment injurious to their welfare
because they were exposed to domestic violence and substance abuse. 1 The circuit court held a
shelter care hearing, after which it entered a temporary custody order placing the minors in the
temporary care of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶6 The circuit court entered an adjudicatory order on February 7, 2022, finding Aiden and
Sophia to be neglected by Mother pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
(Juvenile Court Act). 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020). Its findings were based on the fact that
police responded to Sophia’s report of domestic battery in the home. The minor also reported that
Mother abused alcohol and marijuana, which the police corroborated through drug testing. The
adjudicatory order also stated that Mother had a history of domestic violence, and had previously
been offered domestic violence services. The circuit court granted the State’s petitions and placed
the minors under the guardianship and custody of DCFS on March 8, 2022, pursuant to a
dispositional order.
¶7 On October 11, 2022, the State filed a petition for adjudication of neglect against Mother
and an unknown father 2 regarding the newborn minor Khai B. The State alleged that the minor
was neglected due to an environment injurious to his welfare because he was exposed to substance
1 The petitions also named the minors’ father, who also had his parental rights terminated in the underlying proceedings. As he is not a party to this appeal, we do not discuss him here unless relevant. We note that the petitions specified that Mother was the alleged cause of the minors’ exposure to substance abuse. 2 No purported father ever came forward, nor was DCFS ever able to confirm the paternity of any individual as to Khai B. 2 abuse and because Mother had failed to correct the conditions that led to the two older minors’
removal. The circuit court entered a temporary custody order the same day, naming DCFS as
Khai’s temporary guardian. On January 28, 2023, the circuit court entered an adjudicatory order
finding that Khai was neglected by Mother pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act.
705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2022). The court entered a dispositional order in Khai’s case on
February 22, 2023, placing him under the guardianship of DCFS.
¶8 B. Fitness Hearing
¶9 The State filed motions seeking findings of unfitness and the termination of Mother’s
parental rights as to the three minors on October 2, 2024. In all three cases, the State alleged that
Mother was an unfit parent for failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors
during the nine-month post-adjudicatory period of January 1, 2024, through October 1, 2024,
pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022).
¶ 10 The circuit court held a fitness hearing on March 24, 2025. At the hearing, Mother
stipulated to the State’s fitness allegations in all three cases. The circuit court read each allegation
and confirmed with Mother that she was admitting to them, and that her stipulations were
voluntary, knowing, and unforced. The State then provided its factual basis, stating that Mother
was assigned mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence services. She completed
assessments for each service, and successfully completed “some services,” including parenting.
However, she failed to maintain progress in those services during the nine-month period from
January 1, 2024, through October 1, 2024. The State would present the testimony of police officers
and caseworkers, which would show that Mother had several incidents involving the police,
including three during the relevant period. In all three instances, she appeared to be under the
influence of alcohol.
3 ¶ 11 The State further provided that Mother had participated in mental health services but did
not make sufficient progress on those services according to her counselor, and “alcohol remained
an issue” at the end of the relevant period. Mother’s counsel stipulated that the State would be able
to present evidence on all aforementioned points. After hearing testimony and argument on the
State’s allegations against Aiden and Sophia’s father, the circuit court delivered its findings that
both the father of these minors and the unknown father of Khai B. were unfit. The court changed
the permanency goal for all three minors from return home within 12 months to substitute care
pending the court’s best-interest findings. The matter was set for a best-interest hearing.
¶ 12 C. Best-Interest Hearing
¶ 13 Webster Cantrell Youth Advocacy (WCYA) filed a best-interest report on June 18, 2025,
in which it provided notes on each relevant statutory factor as applied to each minor. Regarding
Sophia, the report stated that she had been living with her paternal aunt and her husband since
December 2024. Both foster parents were employed and financially able to care for her. Sophia
had her own bed and her own space in the home, but shared a bedroom with another female child.
The caseworker conducted monthly home inspections and found Sophia’s home environment to
be safe and the family to be nurturing. Her foster family met all of her needs, including keeping
her medically up to date, and there were no concerns about her wellbeing.
¶ 14 Sophia, who was 11 at the time, expressed to the caseworker that she wished to remain
with her foster family. The caseworker described her as doing well and not displaying any signs
of emotional distress. There were no concerns about her ability to identify her caregivers. She
enjoyed playing and doing various activities around the home and the foster parents’ farm. She
was attending counseling to help her process her feelings, and she expressed that she enjoyed
speaking with her counselor. Since Sophia was placed with family, her background, cultural, and
4 religious ties remained unchanged. Her brother Aiden was also placed with this family, so the
siblings were living together.
¶ 15 The foster family was involved in and supported by their community. Sophia had lived in
this community since birth, had friends there, and participated in various events and recreational
activities. She was doing well in school and continued to improve academically, with the help of
her foster parents. Sophia had built a strong attachment to her foster parents and foster siblings,
and she identified her foster parents as her parental figures. Her foster parents continued to provide
physical and emotional support to her in order to foster this attachment further.
¶ 16 The caseworker wrote that the foster family had “gone above and beyond” to provide
Sophia a safe and loving environment and to support her permanency goals. Sophia was thriving
and well-adjusted in her current placement, and was surrounded by people who love and care for
her. Her foster parents also attempted to maintain a relationship with Sophia’s biological parents.
WCYA had no concerns about Sophia staying in her current placement. Her foster parents were
committed to providing her with permanency through guardianship.
¶ 17 Eight-year-old Aiden, as previously mentioned, had also been placed with his paternal aunt
and her family since December 2024. The caseworker made similar observations about his safety
and wellbeing in the home as she had regarding Sophia. Aiden had his own room in the home, and
all of his physical and emotional needs were being met, including up-to-date medical care. Aiden
was also thriving in his current placement and showed no signs of emotional distress, nor did the
caseworker have any concerns about his wellbeing. Regarding his identity, his background,
cultural, and religious ties, and his involvement in the community, the caseworker again had
similar observations as she had for Sophia. He was doing well in school and his foster parents
helped him to thrive academically. Aiden was enrolled in counseling, which was going positively.
5 ¶ 18 Aiden was also strongly attached to his foster family and identified his foster parents as his
parental figures, and the family continued to provide him with physical and emotional support. He
had expressed a desire to remain with his foster family. His foster family had worked just as hard
to provide him a safe and loving environment as they had for Sophia. WCYA had no concerns
about his remaining in this placement. The foster parents were committed to providing him with
permanency through guardianship.
¶ 19 Lastly, two-year-old Khai had been living in a traditional foster placement since December
2024. His foster parents were financially able to care for him, and could provide him with all the
time and attention he needed. Khai had his own bed in a room he shared with another boy. The
caseworker had conducted monthly home inspections of the foster home, and found it to be a safe
environment with nurturing foster parents. All of Khai’s needs were met, he was up to date on
medical care, and there were no concerns regarding his wellbeing.
¶ 20 Due to his young age, Khai was not able to express his wishes about his living situation,
but his actions and behavior indicated that he was happy in his current placement and loved his
foster parents. He was thriving in the home, enjoyed playing and other activities, and had built a
strong attachment to his foster parents, who he called “Mommy” and “Daddy.” His background,
cultural, and religious ties remained unchanged in this placement, and while he was living in a
different city than his place of birth, he was active in community events and recreation where he
currently lived. He was also making friends in this community.
¶ 21 Khai’s foster parents worked hard to provide him with a safe and loving environment, and
treated him as if he were their biological child. They also involved him with their extended family
and friends. Khai was loved and cared for in this placement, and there were no concerns regarding
6 his wellbeing. The foster parents were committed to providing Khai with permanency through
adoption.
¶ 22 The circuit court held a best-interest hearing on June 30, 2025, at which it heard testimony
from Mother. The State did not call any witnesses or provide any other evidence at the hearing,
and only referred to the best-interest report. The circuit court found that it was in the minors’ best
interests that Mother’s parental rights be terminated. Mother appealed, and this court reversed the
circuit court’s judgment, finding that the State failed to properly admit the report into evidence.
In re Aiden M., et al., 2025 IL App (5th) 250550-U.
¶ 23 The circuit court set the matter for another best-interest hearing on January 29, 2026. Prior
to the hearing, on January 9, 2026, WCYA filed an updated best-interest report. In addition to the
previous report’s observations, the updated report stated that Sophia’s mental health was
improving, and her grades were good. Her foster parents maintained communication with the
maternal side of Sophia’s family, as well as with her biological father. Since the previous report,
the foster parents had passed the legal screening required for guardianship. These last two points
also applied to Aiden, who was living in the same foster placement. Lastly, Khai also continued to
do well in his current placement.
¶ 24 At the January 29, 2026, hearing, the circuit court took judicial notice of the updated best-
interest report and it was properly entered into evidence. The court then heard the testimony of
WCYA caseworker Jalisa McClennon, testifying for the State. She explained that she had been
assigned to the minors’ cases for approximately the past three years and participated in preparing
the best-interest report. McClennon testified to the contents of her report, beginning with Aiden
and Sophia’s placement with the family of their paternal aunt. She stated that the aunt and her
husband did foster other children, and they had one adopted child in the home. McClennon found
7 the home to be safe and appropriate, and the foster parents adequately provided for the minors’
safety and welfare. Sophia and Aiden were previously on medication for depression and ADHD,
respectively, but had improved to the point of no longer needing it. Both minors were also doing
well in school.
¶ 25 McClennon testified that she spoke with both minors about living with their aunt and uncle.
Sophia expressed that she was “fine with being there,” but “she wanted to live with [Mother] if it
was possible.” However, Sophia understood the situation and was “completely fine with doing the
guardianship.” Aiden, who was nine, did not understand everything as well, but McClennon
described him as happy and fine with living with his aunt and uncle. McClennon also confirmed
that the foster parents’ preferred arrangement was guardianship.
¶ 26 Sophia and Aiden had frequent visitation with other family as well, including their maternal
grandmother, paternal grandfather, father, another aunt, and their oldest sister. They also spent
some weekends and other days with Khai. Both minors were also opening up more and doing well
in counseling.
¶ 27 McClennon testified that three-year-old Khai had lived in his traditional foster placement
since December 2024—for most of his life. McClennon had also visited this home, where Khai
lived with his foster parents and their oldest daughter. McClennon believed that Khai had a strong
bond with his foster parents, and considered them his parents. The foster parents had built a good
relationship with Sophia and Aiden’s foster parents in order to maintain sibling contact. The foster
parents also facilitated Khai’s contact with his maternal grandmother. They adequately provided
for his needs, and were willing to adopt.
¶ 28 On cross-examination, McClennon stated that she did not know of any contact between
Mother and the minors while she was incarcerated. She was also asked whether the older minors
8 asked about Mother and whether McClennon had explained the guardianship to them. She testified
that the minors did not ask about her, and that she believed that both minors were too young to
have a full understanding of the situation.
¶ 29 Next, Mother testified from Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) custody. She stated
that her expected release date was January 28, 2028. She said that she was told by her mother that
DCFS would not allow her to contact the minors through cards or letters, but that her mother said
Sophia asked about her regularly. Mother also spoke about the classes and services she had
voluntarily taken while incarcerated, including a domestic violence class, substance abuse
counseling, and anger management. The State stipulated that Mother had completed these courses.
Mother also testified that she was currently working and in school, and had not had any disciplinary
issues while in IDOC custody. She was also eligible for credit on her sentence for some of the
classes she was taking.
¶ 30 Mother stated that she was opposed to Sophia and Aiden having a legal guardian and Khai
being adopted, but she recognized that she could not care for the minors while incarcerated. She
also said that while Khai was being well taken care of in his placement, she wanted the opportunity
to be his mother, as he was taken from her when he was only six days old.
¶ 31 After hearing arguments, the circuit court took the matter under advisement. The court
entered an order terminating Mother’s parental rights on February 2, 2026. It also explained its
decision in a written memorandum order, in which the court mentioned taking notice of the best-
interest report, and summarized McClennon’s testimony regarding the appropriateness and safety
of the minors’ current placements. The court further wrote that the welfare of the minors in these
placements was not a concern. The court noted that if Mother’s parental rights were terminated,
the permanency goal for Sophia and Aiden would become guardianship, and for Khai, adoption.
9 McClennon also told the court that both foster families intended to maintain the minors’ current
contact with their maternal grandmother.
¶ 32 The circuit court also summarized Mother’s testimony, writing that she spoke about the
coursework and services she took advantage of while incarcerated, some of which qualified for
time off of her sentence. The court stated that Mother seemed to acknowledge that the minors’
current placements were in their best interests while she was in IDOC custody, but that she did not
agree to the proposed changes in permanency goals. She also testified to wanting the opportunity
to be a mother to Khai, since he had been in DCFS care for most of his life. The court wrote that
Mother’s “efforts [during incarceration] deserve credit and recognition,” but that the primary
concern here was the minors’ need for long-term stability and permanency.
¶ 33 The circuit court then considered the best-interest factors as applied to each minor. It noted
that the older minors had been in care since 2021, and Khai, since 2022. Sophia and Aiden were
doing well in school, showed improvements in their mental health, and had contact with other
family. Sophia did express her wish to live with Mother, which the court stated was normal for a
preteen girl, but that Mother could not be considered a potential caregiver at this time, due to her
incarceration. Khai had been in his current foster placement for most of his life and had developed
a strong bond with the family.
¶ 34 Thus, the circuit court found that the evidence showed that the foster families cared for the
minors’ stability and permanency, continuity in placement, and safety and welfare. Based on the
totality of the best-interest factors, the court concluded that it was in the minors’ best interests that
Mother’s parental rights be terminated. This appeal followed.
10 ¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 36 On appeal, Mother argues that the circuit court’s finding that termination of her parental
rights was in the minors’ best interests was against the manifest weight of the evidence. She
concedes that there is no meritorious argument to be raised challenging the circuit court’s unfitness
finding.
¶ 37 A parent’s right to raise his or her child is a fundamental right, which a court may not
terminate without the parent’s consent except as authorized by statute. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.
2d 340, 354 (2005). A court’s statutory authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights is
governed by the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption Act. Id. Pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act,
the involuntary termination of parental rights requires a two-step process. In re Donald A.G., 221
Ill. 2d 234, 244 (2006). First, the court must determine, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
parent is an “unfit person” as defined by section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. Id.; 705 ILCS 405/2-
29(2) (West 2024); 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024). If the court makes a finding of unfitness, it
next considers whether termination of the parent’s rights is in the best interests of the child. In re
Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d at 244; 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2024).
¶ 38 Once the court makes a finding of unfitness, “[t]he issue is no longer whether parental
rights can be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child’s needs, parental rights should
be terminated.” (Emphases in original.) In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). The parent’s
interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship “must yield to the child’s interest in a stable,
loving home life.” Id. At this stage of the termination hearing, the State bears the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.
In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 31.
11 ¶ 39 In making a best-interest determination, the court must consider several factors, within the
context of the child’s age and developmental needs. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024). The
factors are as follows:
“ ‘(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child.’ ” In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 32 (quoting In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072 (2006)).
¶ 40 As with the circuit court’s findings at the unfitness stage, we afford the court great
deference, as it is in a superior position to view the witnesses, assess their credibility, and weigh
conflicting evidence. Id. ¶ 33. We will not reverse the circuit court’s best-interest determination
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.
¶ 41 On appeal, Mother argues that the circuit court’s ruling was against the manifest weight of
the evidence because the balance of statutory best-interest factors does not favor termination of
her parental rights. She admits that the following factors did favor termination: (1) the physical
safety and welfare of the children, as it was undisputed that all three were safe in their current
placements; and (2) community ties, as there was testimony that the two older children were doing
well in school and the youngest was set to begin preschool in his community. She argues that the
following factors favor neither side: (1) background and family ties, as the minors have ties to
Mother, Sophia and Aiden are placed with family, and Khai’s foster family agreed to facilitate
sibling contact after adoption; and (2) the preferences of persons available to care for the minors,
as all parties “are willing to care for the children.”
12 ¶ 42 Of the remaining factors, Mother first argues that the development of the minors’ identities
falls in her favor because Sophia wished to preserve the identity that she had developed with
Mother. She concedes that Khai had been with his foster family since birth and did not develop an
identity under Mother’s care, but argues that he should be afforded the opportunity to do so. She
further admits that Khai and Aiden were too young to understand this issue in the proceedings.
¶ 43 She next argues that the factor of the minors’ feelings of attachment favors her because
Sophia clearly loves her mother, feels attached to her, and has security, familiarity, and affection
with her. She concedes that Aiden did not have an opinion, due to his young age, but states that he
lived with Mother for most of his life. She further concedes that Khai did not spend time in her
care, but argues that he “should not be deprived of the opportunity.” She also contends that the
factor of the minors’ wishes falls in her favor as applied to Sophia, the only child old enough to
express her wishes. Mother notes that the circuit court acknowledged in its decision that Sophia
indicated a desire to return to Mother.
¶ 44 As for the minors’ need for permanence, Mother argues that while Khai’s foster family
expressed a desire to adopt, Aiden and Sophia’s did not. Mother contends that guardianship—the
form of permanence the latter foster family sought—could be easily changed and was reliant on
the guardian’s continued willingness to serve in that role. By contrast, Mother states that she is
willing to offer actual permanence for her children. Mother specifically questions the foster
family’s motivations for selecting guardianship over the more permanent adoption, and challenges
the validity of terminating her parental rights in favor of the potential guardians, especially since
the guardianship terminates in the future. She alleges that the factor of the risks attendant to
substitute care falls in her favor for the same reason.
13 ¶ 45 Lastly, Mother challenges the circuit court’s finding that Sophia could not be returned to
Mother despite the child’s wishes because Mother could not be considered a caregiver due to her
incarceration, which she describes as a temporary condition. She states that, since the court gave
no other reasons, there was no reason the minors could not be returned to her upon her release, as
long as she was released before the guardianship terminated.
¶ 46 We initially note that Mother’s primary argument as to why returning the minors to her
would be in their best interest, rather than why keeping them in their current placements would
not, is her willingness to care for them and her desire to have them grow up with a connection to
her. Mother’s love and affection for her children, as well as her wishes to have them in her care,
are not relevant considerations in the best-interest analysis. See In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364.
Furthermore, Mother recognizes that she cannot care for the minors while in IDOC custody, which
she is expected to be until 2028.
¶ 47 Additionally, Mother admits that Khai spent the majority of his life with his foster family
rather than in Mother’s care, and she testified that he was being well cared for in his current
placement. Thus, his identity, attachments, community belonging, and sense of permanency were
built with his foster family, and his foster parents were the only parental figures he had ever known.
She further acknowledges that Khai and Aiden were too young to articulate their wishes. Lastly
on the point of family, while the minors’ potential future contact with Mother is relevant to their
family ties, the evidence showed that, in their current placements, the minors were able to maintain
contact with a range of family members, as well as with each other. The older minors were also
placed with family, which allowed them to keep their background, cultural, and religious ties
intact.
14 ¶ 48 Mother also places great emphasis on the evidence that Sophia expressed wishes to live
with her. However, the circuit court appropriately balanced this consideration with the other
evidence, and concluded that this was expected and understandable in a preteen girl, but that she
could not return to Mother while Mother was incarcerated. Furthermore, McClennon’s testimony
indicated that Sophia was able to understand her situation to an age-appropriate extent, and
McClennon observed in the WCYA report and in her testimony that Sophia felt positively about
living with her aunt and uncle. She was also noted to be thriving in all areas of her life in this
placement. Notably, both she and Aiden no longer needed medication for mental health conditions
while living with their aunt and uncle.
¶ 49 The circuit court also acknowledged that Sophia and Aiden’s foster parents were seeking
guardianship rather than adoption. However, nothing in the record suggests that the foster parents
were not prepared to provide the minors with stability, continuity, and permanency by becoming
their guardians. Indeed, the circuit court noted McClennon’s uncontroverted testimony that they
were willing to provide permanency for Sophia and Aiden. There was no evidence presented
challenging the foster parents’ commitment to caring for the minors in every way. Lastly, as the
State argues in response to Mother, the relevant statutory factor in the Juvenile Court Act does not
treat guardianship as a lesser outcome than adoption, stating “the preferences of the persons
available to care for the child, including willingness to provide permanency to the child, either
through subsidized guardianship or through adoption.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/1-
3(4.05)(j) (West 2024).
¶ 50 In its memorandum order, the circuit court detailed its reasoning regarding certain statutory
factors, and concluded with a statement that it had considered all factors, whether explicitly
mentioned or not. Contrary to Mother’s argument on appeal, the court did not terminate her
15 parental rights based solely on the fact that she is presently incarcerated. As we have stated, the
court clearly considered all relevant statutory best-interest factors and weighed all of the evidence
presented. We find no basis to override the circuit court’s discretion in making its findings, and
we determine that its decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 51 In conclusion, we find that the circuit court’s best-interest determination, as well as its
decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights over the three minors, was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶ 52 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 53 For the reasons stated, the circuit court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights.
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 54 Affirmed.