An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-809
Filed 15 April 2026
Nash County, No. 24 JB 000091-630
IN THE MATTER OF: A.H.
Appeal by Juvenile from order entered 18 March 2025 by Judge Joseph E.
Brown III in Nash County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 January
2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Sarah G. Zambon, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Wyatt B. Orsbon, for Juvenile–Appellant.
MURRY, Judge.
A.H.1 (Juvenile) appeals from the trial court’s adjudicational and dispositional
orders that collectively commit him through his nineteenth birthday to a youth
development center (YDC) within North Carolina’s Department of Public Safety,
Juvenile Justice Division. He also files a conditional petition for writ of certiorari
1 We refer to Juvenile by a pseudonym in accordance with N.C. R. App. P. 42. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: A.H.
Opinion of the Court
(PWC). The State responds with a threshold challenge to the timeliness of the appeal
itself. For the following reasons, this Court dismisses the conditional PWC as
unnecessary, affirms in part the trial court’s adjudication order, vacates its
disposition order, and remands both orders for further findings and proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
I. Background
On 11 June 2024, Juvenile admitted delinquency to the State’s initial petition
alleging that he “communicat[ed] threats” under N.C.G.S. § 14-277.1, committed
misdemeanor assault under N.C.G.S. § 14-33(a), and committed felony “[a]ssault
[i]nflicting [s]erious injury” under N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c)(1). On 11 June 2024, the trial
court entered consecutive adjudication and disposition orders holding him delinquent
of these charges. The trial court documented its required findings of fact and
conclusions of law within the orders’ blank boxes, stating in relevant part that
“Juvenile understood his rights, the nature of the charges, and the most serious
disposition that can be imposed; Juvenile is satisfied with his representation; there
is a factual basis for the admission; Juvenile’s admission is the product of his
informed choice; and Juvenile is competent to stand trial.” (Quotation modified.)
Nearly two months later on 4 August 2024, Juvenile’s mother (Mother), called
the Nash County Sheriff’s Office for assistance with involuntarily committing
Juvenile to State custody. Juvenile became physically belligerent when the officers
-2- IN RE: A.H.
arrived and bit the finger of one officer hard enough to cause “permanent nerve
damage.” The remaining officers eventually subdued Juvenile with a taser.
On 18 March 2025, Juvenile entered into a plea agreement in which he
admitted to this later charge of “[a]ssault on [a] government official inflicting injury”
under N.C.G.S. § 14-34.7. Based in relevant part on this admission, the trial court
entered a “juvenile order” on 18 March 2025 “find[ing] that . . . [J]uvenile admits to
Assault on a Law Enforcement [Officer] and is adjudicated delinquent.” Unlike the
11 June 2024 adjudication, though, this order did not document any conclusion of
evidentiary proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court entered a consecutive
“disposition and commitment order” finding that the law-enforcement assault
required the order’s entrance. It also documented the relevant “predisposition report”
and “assessments,” but it left blank the formulaic box meant for required
dispositional factors under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2508.
On 18 March 2025, the trial court confirmed in open court the Juvenile’s
understanding of his plea agreement and the resulting orders. Ten days later, Mother
wrote down a notice of appeal that she immediately filed. In the handwritten appeal
itself, she sought to “file an appeal on 28 March 2025 on behalf of her son, A.H.” in
reaction to the “order by Judge Brown” that he “be in a YDC.” (Quotation modified.)
She also specified the “Case # 24JB291” alongside her personal signature. The trial
court confirmed the appellate entry in AOC-J-470 (ICMS) but left blank either
checkbox designating Juvenile’s custody status pending this appeal.
-3- IN RE: A.H.
II. Jurisdictional Analysis
The State challenges our jurisdiction to hear Juvenile’s appeal based on
Mother’s apparent deficiencies on the face of the written appeal itself, as well as her
timeliness in filing it. Mother has filed a conditional PWC in response. Because
Mother filed a timely PWC from which we “can . . . fairly infer[ ]” her “intent to appeal
from a specific judgment,” though, we disagree with both parties’ respective
arguments on this point and proceed to the merits of Juvenile’s appeal. Von Ramm v.
Von Ramm, 99 N.C. App. 153, 157 (1990) (emphasis and quotation omitted).
A party may appeal “a judgment . . . reduced to writing, signed by the judge,
and filed with the clerk of court,” N.C. R. Civ. P. 58, by “serving copies thereof upon
all adverse parties within fourteen days after [its] entry,” N.C. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). This
two-week time clock does not start until the judgment’s formal entry of the written
order, thus allowing that appellant however much additional time to appeal from the
earlier point of its formal rendering in open court. See State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264,
268 (2012). Generally, though, the “notice of appeal” must “specify the party taking
the appeal; the judgment from which appeal is taken[;] the court to which appeal is
taken; and sign[ature] by any such party not represented by counsel.” N.C. R. App.
P. 4(b) (ellipses omitted).
Here, Mother met all these core appellate requirements for our jurisdictional
purposes. Her handwritten appeal identifies her desire to “file an appeal today . . .
[on] March[ ] 28th[, 2025] on behalf of [her] son, [A.H.]” in response to a
-4- IN RE: A.H.
contemporaneous “order[ ] by Judge Brown” that he “be in a YDC.” She specified the
correct trial-court number of “24JB91” in the document’s top-right corner and signed
it herself at its bottom. Although she failed to specify the intended appellate
destination, we typically disregard this particular omission as immaterial when “this
Court is the only court with jurisdiction to hear [the] appeal.” State v. Sitosky, 238
N.C. App. 558, 561 (2014). At any rate, the State’s response to the conditional PWC
evinces no “suggest[ion] that it was in any way misled by th[is] notice of appeal.” Id.
at 560. Thus, this Court dismisses the conditional PWC as unnecessary and instead
proceeds to the merits of Juvenile’s appeal under N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1001, -2602.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(3) (2025) (“Any initial order of disposition and the adjudication
order upon which it is based.”); id. § 7B-2602(3) (“Any order of disposition after an
adjudication that a juvenile is delinquent . . . .”).
III. Substantive Analysis
On appeal, Juvenile substantively contends that the trial court reversibly
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-809
Filed 15 April 2026
Nash County, No. 24 JB 000091-630
IN THE MATTER OF: A.H.
Appeal by Juvenile from order entered 18 March 2025 by Judge Joseph E.
Brown III in Nash County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 29 January
2026.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Sarah G. Zambon, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Wyatt B. Orsbon, for Juvenile–Appellant.
MURRY, Judge.
A.H.1 (Juvenile) appeals from the trial court’s adjudicational and dispositional
orders that collectively commit him through his nineteenth birthday to a youth
development center (YDC) within North Carolina’s Department of Public Safety,
Juvenile Justice Division. He also files a conditional petition for writ of certiorari
1 We refer to Juvenile by a pseudonym in accordance with N.C. R. App. P. 42. See N.C. R. App. P. 42(b). IN RE: A.H.
Opinion of the Court
(PWC). The State responds with a threshold challenge to the timeliness of the appeal
itself. For the following reasons, this Court dismisses the conditional PWC as
unnecessary, affirms in part the trial court’s adjudication order, vacates its
disposition order, and remands both orders for further findings and proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
I. Background
On 11 June 2024, Juvenile admitted delinquency to the State’s initial petition
alleging that he “communicat[ed] threats” under N.C.G.S. § 14-277.1, committed
misdemeanor assault under N.C.G.S. § 14-33(a), and committed felony “[a]ssault
[i]nflicting [s]erious injury” under N.C.G.S. § 14-33(c)(1). On 11 June 2024, the trial
court entered consecutive adjudication and disposition orders holding him delinquent
of these charges. The trial court documented its required findings of fact and
conclusions of law within the orders’ blank boxes, stating in relevant part that
“Juvenile understood his rights, the nature of the charges, and the most serious
disposition that can be imposed; Juvenile is satisfied with his representation; there
is a factual basis for the admission; Juvenile’s admission is the product of his
informed choice; and Juvenile is competent to stand trial.” (Quotation modified.)
Nearly two months later on 4 August 2024, Juvenile’s mother (Mother), called
the Nash County Sheriff’s Office for assistance with involuntarily committing
Juvenile to State custody. Juvenile became physically belligerent when the officers
-2- IN RE: A.H.
arrived and bit the finger of one officer hard enough to cause “permanent nerve
damage.” The remaining officers eventually subdued Juvenile with a taser.
On 18 March 2025, Juvenile entered into a plea agreement in which he
admitted to this later charge of “[a]ssault on [a] government official inflicting injury”
under N.C.G.S. § 14-34.7. Based in relevant part on this admission, the trial court
entered a “juvenile order” on 18 March 2025 “find[ing] that . . . [J]uvenile admits to
Assault on a Law Enforcement [Officer] and is adjudicated delinquent.” Unlike the
11 June 2024 adjudication, though, this order did not document any conclusion of
evidentiary proof “beyond a reasonable doubt.” The trial court entered a consecutive
“disposition and commitment order” finding that the law-enforcement assault
required the order’s entrance. It also documented the relevant “predisposition report”
and “assessments,” but it left blank the formulaic box meant for required
dispositional factors under N.C.G.S. § 7B-2508.
On 18 March 2025, the trial court confirmed in open court the Juvenile’s
understanding of his plea agreement and the resulting orders. Ten days later, Mother
wrote down a notice of appeal that she immediately filed. In the handwritten appeal
itself, she sought to “file an appeal on 28 March 2025 on behalf of her son, A.H.” in
reaction to the “order by Judge Brown” that he “be in a YDC.” (Quotation modified.)
She also specified the “Case # 24JB291” alongside her personal signature. The trial
court confirmed the appellate entry in AOC-J-470 (ICMS) but left blank either
checkbox designating Juvenile’s custody status pending this appeal.
-3- IN RE: A.H.
II. Jurisdictional Analysis
The State challenges our jurisdiction to hear Juvenile’s appeal based on
Mother’s apparent deficiencies on the face of the written appeal itself, as well as her
timeliness in filing it. Mother has filed a conditional PWC in response. Because
Mother filed a timely PWC from which we “can . . . fairly infer[ ]” her “intent to appeal
from a specific judgment,” though, we disagree with both parties’ respective
arguments on this point and proceed to the merits of Juvenile’s appeal. Von Ramm v.
Von Ramm, 99 N.C. App. 153, 157 (1990) (emphasis and quotation omitted).
A party may appeal “a judgment . . . reduced to writing, signed by the judge,
and filed with the clerk of court,” N.C. R. Civ. P. 58, by “serving copies thereof upon
all adverse parties within fourteen days after [its] entry,” N.C. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). This
two-week time clock does not start until the judgment’s formal entry of the written
order, thus allowing that appellant however much additional time to appeal from the
earlier point of its formal rendering in open court. See State v. Oates, 366 N.C. 264,
268 (2012). Generally, though, the “notice of appeal” must “specify the party taking
the appeal; the judgment from which appeal is taken[;] the court to which appeal is
taken; and sign[ature] by any such party not represented by counsel.” N.C. R. App.
P. 4(b) (ellipses omitted).
Here, Mother met all these core appellate requirements for our jurisdictional
purposes. Her handwritten appeal identifies her desire to “file an appeal today . . .
[on] March[ ] 28th[, 2025] on behalf of [her] son, [A.H.]” in response to a
-4- IN RE: A.H.
contemporaneous “order[ ] by Judge Brown” that he “be in a YDC.” She specified the
correct trial-court number of “24JB91” in the document’s top-right corner and signed
it herself at its bottom. Although she failed to specify the intended appellate
destination, we typically disregard this particular omission as immaterial when “this
Court is the only court with jurisdiction to hear [the] appeal.” State v. Sitosky, 238
N.C. App. 558, 561 (2014). At any rate, the State’s response to the conditional PWC
evinces no “suggest[ion] that it was in any way misled by th[is] notice of appeal.” Id.
at 560. Thus, this Court dismisses the conditional PWC as unnecessary and instead
proceeds to the merits of Juvenile’s appeal under N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1001, -2602.
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a)(3) (2025) (“Any initial order of disposition and the adjudication
order upon which it is based.”); id. § 7B-2602(3) (“Any order of disposition after an
adjudication that a juvenile is delinquent . . . .”).
III. Substantive Analysis
On appeal, Juvenile substantively contends that the trial court reversibly
erred at his adjudication, disposition, and commitment proceedings in the wake of his
plea agreement. Having reviewed all three of these “alleged statutory errors de novo,”
we affirm the adjudication order in part, vacate the disposition order, and remand
both for further findings and proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. In re
K.C., 225 N.C. App. 452, 462 (2013).
A. Adjudication
-5- IN RE: A.H.
First, Juvenile argues that the trial court reversibly erred “by failing to
affirmatively state in writing that the” State had “proved beyond a reasonable doubt”
his alleged delinquency. We agree to a certain extent; thus, we affirm in part the
adjudication order yet still remand it for further necessary documentation explained
further below.
The State must “prove[ ] beyond a reasonable doubt” the charges in “a petition
alleging th[at a] juvenile is delinquent.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-2409 (2025). If the trial “court
finds that th[os]e allegations . . . have been proved,” then it must “so state in a written
order of adjudication” that includes at least “the date of the offense, the misdemeanor
or felony classification of the offense, and the date of adjudication.” Id. § 7B-2411.
This documentation is mandatory, and failure to fully outline it in the record merits
remand at minimum. See In re Walker, 83 N.C. App. 46, 47 (1986).
Although the trial court “unequivocally state[d] the standard of proof in its
order” adjudicating Juvenile as delinquent on 11 June 2024 (AOC-J-460) , it did not
do so in the 18 March 2025 adjudication order (AOC-J-462) subject to this appeal. In
re B.E., 186 N.C. App. 656, 662 (2007) (citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-2411). Despite this
subsequent omission, the record below nonetheless shows that “the trial court
considered all of the evidence . . . presented” by Juvenile’s plea “and made its
adjudication” as a result. In re J.J., 216 N.C. App. 366, 371 (2011). We thus affirm
the core substance of the 18 March 2025 adjudication order and merely remand it “for
-6- IN RE: A.H.
clarification of the standard of proof used [there]in.” B.E., 186 N.C. App. at 662. On
remand,
If the trial court did find that the facts underlying the adjudication were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it must enter an amended order so stating. If the trial court did not find that these facts were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the trial court must dismiss the petition with prejudice and vacate the disposition order based thereupon.
Id. (citing N.C.G.S. § 7B-2411).
B. Disposition
Second, Juvenile argues that the trial court reversibly erred in its failure to
completely document its disposition order sentencing Juvenile to YDC until age
nineteen. More specifically, he alleges that the trial court failed to document any
“consideration of the required dispositional factors” or “compelling reasons why he
should not be released pending appeal.” (Brackets omitted.) Under N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-2512, it must render “[t]he dispositional order . . . in writing” that “contain[s]
appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-2512(a). It must
also “state with particularity . . . the precise terms of the disposition” regarding “the
kind, duration, and the person who is responsible for” its execution, as well as the
“agency in whom custody is vested.” Id. Having reviewed this statutory obligation
among others de novo in the same manner as the adjudication order above, we
similarly agree only to the extent that the trial court must completely document this
information on remand. See In re N.M., 290 N.C. App. 482, 483 (2023).
1. Factors
-7- IN RE: A.H.
Section 7B-2508 outlines several “dispositional options” a trial court may reach
in this latter stage of juvenile-delinquency proceedings. In re V.M., 211 N.C. App. 389,
391 (2011). In making this assessment, though, it must first “consider the following
factors”:
(1) The seriousness of the offense; (2) The need to hold the juvenile accountable; (3) The importance of protecting the public safety; (4) The degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the particular case; and (5) The rehabilitative and treatment needs of the juvenile indicated by a risk and needs assessment.
Id. (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-2501(c)(1)–(5)). The trial court must consider these factors
in writing, even if by merely “mark[ing] the appropriate box in the . . . pre-printed
form portion of the order.” In re I.W.P., 259 N.C. App. 254, 259 (2018).
Here, the trial court properly documented Juvenile’s “delinquency history
level” and risk-and-needs assessment. But it improperly left blank the immediately
following subsection requiring it to “[s]tate any findings regarding” the § 7B-2501
factors. Because this omission “is reversible error,” we vacate the disposition order
and “remand for a new dispositional hearing and entry of an order that includes
written findings showing its consideration of th[os]e five factors.” N.M., 290 N.C. App.
at 485 (citing V.M., 211 N.C. App. at 392).
2. Custody
-8- IN RE: A.H.
In North Carolina, a trial court should presume that a juvenile deserves pre-
commitment release unless it “enters a written order to the contrary.” In re Bass, 77
N.C. App. 110, 117 (1985) (citing N.C.G.S. § 7A-668 (1983) (current version at
N.C.G.S. § 7B-2605 (2025)). If the trial court finds custody “to be in the best interests
of the juvenile or the State,” it must “state[ ] in writing” “compelling reasons” for so
ordering. N.C.G.S. § 7B-2605. “Typically, trial[-]court orders denying release pending
appeal contain a number of facts stating why a juvenile should not be released.” In re
G.C., 230 N.C. App. 511, 517 (2013). Here, the trial court “determin[ed] that . . .
[J]uvenile’s commitment should be extended” to his “nineteenth . . . birthday” but left
blank any “[c]ompelling reasons release [wa]s denied” in the AOC-J-470 (ICMS)
Form. Because “the trial court failed to state any compelling reasons in writing why
. . . [J]uvenile should not be released pending his appeal,” he “should have been
released.” J.J., 216 N.C. App. at 376. Thus, we vacate the disposition order and
“remand the matter to the trial court for findings as to the compelling reasons for
denying release.” Id.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, this Court (1) dismisses the conditional PWC,
(2) affirms in part the trial court’s adjudication order, (3) vacates its disposition order,
(4) and remands both of the latter orders for documentation of further findings and
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
-9- IN RE: A.H.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Judges COLLINS and WOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
- 10 -