J-A25012-23
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: A.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : APPEAL OF: L.D-W., MOTHER : : : : : : No. 827 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered June 12, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Orphans' Court at No(s): OC-3685-2022
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: February 9, 2024
L.D-W. (“Mother”) appeals from the June 12, 2023 order involuntarily
terminating her parental rights to her biological daughter, A.H., born in March
2020.1 After careful consideration, we affirm.
We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the
certified record, which provides as follows. Clearfield County Youth and Family
Services (“CYS”) first became involved with this family in March 2020, when
CYS learned that Mother and A.H. both tested positive for amphetamines and
methamphetamines at the time of A.H.’s birth. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 7. On
April 8, 2020, CYS was granted emergency custody of A.H., which was
confirmed in a shelter hearing held the same day. Id. at 8. On April 13, ____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 In a separate order filed the same day, the orphans’ court also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of S.H. (“Father”), who did not file an appeal. J-A25012-23
2020, A.H. was adjudicated dependent. CYS was awarded legal custody, while
A.H. was initially returned to Mother’s physical custody. Id. at 9.
A.H.’s initial dependency goal was established as reunification and
Mother was assigned several permanency goals related to the concerns
revealed by CYS’s investigations up to that point. She was directed to
cooperate with CYS and other service providers, maintain her sobriety,
participate in mental health and substance abuse counseling, obtain stable
housing, secure consistent employment, and refrain from criminal activity.
See id. at 7, 15-17. Mother was also ordered to undergo regular urine
screenings for substance abuse. In permanency review orders issued between
May 2020 and July 2021, the court found Mother’s compliance to be minimal.
CYS removed A.H. from Mother’s physical custody in July 2020 after
Mother again tested positive for methamphetamines. See id. at 9-10.
Thereafter, she was placed in a foster home with L.H.C. and E.C. (collectively,
“Custodians”). Mother was permitted supervised visitations with A.H. several
times a week, which she consistently participated in during the dependency
proceedings. See id. at 24. In December 2020, Mother continued to test
positive for methamphetamines and was, ultimately, held in contempt by the
dependency court. Id. In connection with this finding, Mother participated in
an in-patient rehabilitation which concluded in March 2021. See id. at 13-14.
Subsequently, however, Mother’s urine screens indicated that she
continued to abuse methamphetamines upon her release from rehab in March
2021. See id. at 15-16. She tested positive for methamphetamines in
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screens administered every month during the seven-month period between
March 2021 and October 2021. Id. In August 2021, Mother underwent a
parental capacity evaluation administered by Dr. Bradley Beckwith. Based
largely upon Mother’s intransigent abuse of illicit substances, Dr. Beckwith
recommended that Mother “not serve as the primary parenting resource” for
A.H. See id. at 50.
Contemporaneously, A.H. became a patient of audiologist Dr. Emily
Morris at UPMC Children’s Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, after she failed
her “newborn hearing screening.” See id. at 69-70. A.H. was diagnosed with
significant hearing loss and was recommended for cochlear implant surgery in
her left ear. See id. at 70-71. Mother disputed this diagnosis and objected.
See id. at 10-11. Specifically, Mother was concerned that the surgery would
“sever” A.H.’s cochlear nerve and, thereby, preclude Mother from having her
voice “encoded” upon the child. See id. at 46. Mother was also difficult to
communicate with when her consent and input were required on these critical
issues. See id. at 10. Thus, CYS requested and was granted medical
decision-making authority as to A.H. in September 2020. See id. at 11.
A.H. underwent successful cochlear surgery in February 2021. See id.
at 71. She also was fitted with a hearing aid in her right ear. See id. at 70.
Consequently, A.H. requires frequent check-ups and has significant daily
medical needs related to the upkeep of her auditory aids, including regular
disassembly, inspection, and replacement of the devices. See id. at 78-79.
These medical implants also have related software that must be monitored
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through a digital device like a cellular telephone. See id. at 75. Following
this successful medical intervention, A.H. performed “above average” with
respect to her developmental milestones. See id. at 80.
Ultimately, on October 14, 2021, the dependency court awarded
Custodians subsidized permanent legal custody (“SPLC”) of A.H.2 See id. at
18. Mother did not file an appeal. While Mother’s parental rights were not
terminated by this determination, the SPLC order discharged A.H. from
dependency, terminated CYS’s oversight, and directed that CYS was no longer
obligated to provide reunification services to Mother. Id. In anticipation of a
forthcoming custody complaint from Mother, however, the SPLC order also
directed that Mother “shall continue to have weekly visits until an order is
entered in the civil docket.” Id. at 34; see also In re B.S., 861 A.2d 974,
977 (Pa.Super. 2004) (observing that when it is “deemed appropriate,” a trial
court may “permit continued visitation by the dependent child’s natural
parents” following an award of SPLC).
The visitation portion of the SPLC order was intended to bridge the gap
between the closure of A.H.’s dependency and the anticipated initiation of a
custody proceeding by Mother. See id. at 96-98. However, Mother did not
____________________________________________
2 Subsidized permanent legal custody (“SPLC”) is “an arrangement whereby a
juvenile court discontinues intervention as well as supervision by a county agency, and awards custody of a dependent child, on a permanent basis, to a custodian. Parental rights are not terminated.” In re S.H., 71 A.3d 973, 977 (Pa.Super. 2013). Additionally, “[t]he custodian is typically provided a financial subsidy for the child by the local county children and youth agency.” Id.
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file a custody complaint concerning A.H., and disputes quickly arose between
Mother and Custodians regarding visitations with A.H. Id. Specifically,
Custodians were concerned that CYS would no longer be providing supervision
and drug testing services in connection with Mother’s visits. See id. at 34-
45, 55, 98-99. Conflict also arose when Custodians would not utilize the
visitation service provider recommended by Mother since that organization did
not provide drug testing. Id. In December 2021, Mother filed in the
dependency court a petition for contempt against Custodians in connection
with Mother’s lack of visitation with A.H.
On April 19, 2022, an unrecorded conference was held in chambers on
Mother’s contempt petition and the parties negotiated a temporary order
providing the general parameters for Mother and the Custodians to negotiate
a resolution to visitation. See Custodians’ Exhibit 8 at ¶¶ 1-7. Under the
terms of this order, if no agreement was reached within thirty days, Mother
was permitted to seek a conference or hearing. Id. at ¶¶ 5-6. On May 12,
2022, Custodians’ counsel at that time, Joshua S. Maines, Esquire, transmitted
a proposal for visitation to Mother’s attorney.3 See N.T., 12/22/22, at 34-45,
55, 98-99. Mother did not respond to this communication, nor did she request
a hearing or conference before the dependency court.
On June 22, 2022, Custodians filed a petition seeking to involuntarily
terminate Mother’s parental rights to A.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8)
3 Custodians retained separate counsel in these termination proceedings.
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and § 2511(b).4 An evidentiary hearing was held on December 22, 2022, and
continued to February 9, 2023, before the same jurist that oversaw A.H.’s
dependency proceedings.5 At this point in time, A.H. was just shy of her third
birthday. During the evidentiary proceedings, Custodians testified and
presented four witness: Dr. Beckwith, Dr. Morris, Attorney Maines, and CYS
caseworker Crystal Miller. Represented by counsel, Mother testified on her
own behalf.
On June 12, 2023, the orphans’ court filed an opinion and order that
involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(8) and (b) and set forth its rationale. On July 11, 2023, Mother
submitted a timely notice of appeal along with a concise statement of matters
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). In lieu
of a Rule 1925(a)(2)(ii) opinion, the orphans’ court submitted a letter advising
4 We note that Custodians have both physical and legal custody of A.H. and submitted a report of their intention to adopt A.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2531. Although no party has challenged Custodians’ standing in this matter, we note that they appear to be within the class of individuals entitled to pursue the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(a)(3). See In re Adoption of J.F., 572 A.2d 223, 225 (Pa.Super. 1990) (noting that “custody” within the meaning of § 2512(a)(3) “means legal custody, not merely physical custody” (emphasis omitted)).
5 On September 30, 2022, the orphans’ court appointed counsel to advocate for A.H.’s legal interests pursuant to the mandates of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). The child’s best interests were separately represented by a guardian ad litem (“GAL”). In this Court, Custodians, legal-interest counsel, and GAL, filed a consolidated brief collectively supporting the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.
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this Court that it would rely upon the reasoning already set forth in its
thoroughly drafted June 12, 2023 opinion and order.
Mother raises the following issues for our consideration:
1. Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion and commit a reversible error of law when it held the statutory grounds for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights had been established pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) by clear and convincing evidence by Custodians?
2. Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion and commit a reversible error of law when it held that the statutory grounds for involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights had been established pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), by concluding that the conditions which initially led to the child’s removal from Mother’s care were still in existence?
3. Did the orphans’ court abuse its discretion and commit reversible error of law when it held that terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve the needs of the child?
Mother’s brief at 6 (cleaned up).
Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill- will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial
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courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’ court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa.Super. 2022) (cleaned up).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of
the Adoption Act, which calls for a bifurcated analysis that first focuses upon
the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct that may warrant
termination. Id. at 830; see also 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1)-(11). If the
orphans’ court determines the petitioner has established grounds for
termination under at least one of these subsections by clear and convincing
evidence, the court then assesses the petition pursuant to § 2511(b), which
focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
Our analysis concerns § 2511(a)(8) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
....
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(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
In order to satisfy § 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove that: (1) the
child has been removed from the parent’s care for at least 12 months; (2) the
conditions which led to the removal or placement still exist; and (3)
termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child. See In re Adoption of J.N.M., 177 A.3d 937, 943 (Pa.Super. 2018).
Section 2511(a)(8) does not necessitate an evaluation of a parent’s
willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to the removal of the
child. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 446 (Pa.Super. 2017).
Rather, our inquiry is focused upon whether the at-issue “conditions”
have been “remedied” such that “reunification of parent and child is imminent
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at the time of the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa.Super. 2009).
Thus, the statute recognizes “that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while the parent is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume
parenting responsibilities. This Court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of
progress and hope for the future.” Id. at 11-12 (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted). Finally, this Court has also explained that,
while both [§] 2511(a)(8) and [§] 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve the analysis relative to [§] 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by [§] 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address [§] 2511(a) before reaching [§] 2511(b).
In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc).
With these overarching legal principles in mind, we turn to Mother’s
claims for relief. Although framed separately, we discern that Mother’s first
two arguments essentially advance the same claim, namely, that the trial
court’s findings pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) were not supported by sufficient
evidence. See Mother’s brief at 9-10 (“The entire testimonial record . . .
demonstrates that the conditions that [led] to the removal of [A.H.] from
Mother’s care were no longer in existence, or alternatively, that Mother was
capable of remedying those conditions[.]”). We must disagree.
Mother challenges the orphans’ court’s findings pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(8) based upon her perspective that the trial court relied upon
assumptions and speculation concerning her behavior in concluding that the
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conditions that led to A.H.’s removal continued to exist at the time of
termination.6 See Mother’s brief at 13-14. Specifically, Mother focuses upon
L.H.C.’s admission that she lacked direct knowledge of Mother’s condition
following the termination of CYS supervision and oversight in October 2021.
See id. at 13 (citing N.T., 12/22/22, at 176).
However, Mother’s arguments ignore the significant evidence that
speaks directly to her failure to address the conditions that led to A.H.’s
removal. The orphans’ court determined that “Mother has not refrained from
using illicit substances; she has not refrained from criminal activity; she has
not completed drug and alcohol counseling; and she has not maintained safe
and stable housing.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 14. As discussed,
infra, we find ample support in the certified record for the court’s conclusions.
This case revolves around Mother’s drug use. Ms. Miller testified
extensively regarding Mother’s history of substance abuse during CYS’s
involvement with the case. As detailed above, Ms. Miller’s testimony reflects
that Mother used amphetamines and methamphetamines during A.H.’s
pregnancy. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 9-12. Thereafter, Mother continued to
abuse the same drugs with impunity, which ultimately resulted in her being
jailed for ninety days on contempt of court charges. See id. at 12-14. Even
following the completion of inpatient rehabilitation, Mother tested positive for
6 There is no dispute that A.H. has been removed from Mother’s care for at least twelve months. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8).
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methamphetamines every month between March 2021 and October 2021,
when dependency was terminated by SPLC. See id. at 14-16.
Although there is scarce direct evidence speaking to Mother’s continued
drug abuse after oversight by CYS ended, that is due largely to Mother’s failure
to submit to drug tests as a component of her visitations with A.H. Moreover,
we find Dr. Beckwith’s assessment of Mother to be instructive on the extent
to which Mother addressed her substance abuse. Specifically, he reported
that during his evaluation, Mother “denied almost all of the allegations of
substance use against her” and characterized the evidence of her drug use as
fabrications manufactured by CYS caseworkers. See id. at 43. Even when
she was willing to acknowledge her drug use on a limited basis, Mother
attempted to shift blame for her misdeeds upon A.H.’s father and her “other
paramours.” See id. at 44. Critically, Dr. Beckwith’s testimony noted that
Mother’s substance abuse problems would persist “until she took
accountability for her actions, sought treatment, and maintained sobriety for
a period of one or two years.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 9 (citing
N.T., 12/22/22, at 50).
It is clear from Mother’s representations at the termination hearing that
she still lacks this necessary ability to take accountability for her actions.
Despite the voluminous evidence directly confirming her drug use up until at
least October 2021, Mother baldly insisted during her testimony that she
ceased abusing drugs in October 2020. See N.T., 2/9/23, at 77, 98. The
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orphans’ court found Mother lacked credibility concerning her alleged sobriety
and we are precluded from disturbing such a credibility determination that is
supported by the record. See M.E., supra at 829-30.
Similarly, while Mother also claimed that she had completed drug and
alcohol counseling, she failed to provide any documentary proof or specific
information regarding her alleged completion of such a program. See N.T.,
2/9/23, at 101, 118, 126-27. Relatedly, she also failed to curtail her criminal
behavior and has accrued at least eight outstanding cases related to driving
with a suspended license, which carries the threat of incarceration. See id.
at 104-05. Finally, Mother’s own testimony indicates that her housing
situation has significantly worsened since the close of dependency, as Mother’s
home has been foreclosed upon due to non-payment. See id. at 78, 109.
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, the orphans’ court did not abuse its
discretion in concluding that the conditions that led to A.H.’s removal
continued to exist at the time of the termination hearing.
Mother’s argument also implicates the parties’ failure to reach an
agreement concerning visitations prior to the filing of the underlying
termination petition. See Mother’s brief at 10 (“Mother asserts that the
evidence introduced at the time of the hearing demonstrates that [Custodians]
were extremely difficult to work with, and unilaterally severed [A.H.’s] contact
with Mother in an effort to aid their adoption efforts.”). While the propriety of
the dependency proceedings is not directly before this Court, our review of
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those proceedings demonstrates that Mother failed to secure visits due to her
own inaction. Specifically, she neglected to institute timely custody
proceedings or respond to the visitation proposal advanced by Custodians in
May 2022. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 34-45, 55, 98-99.
As to the effect of the parties’ failure to reach consensus, Mother asserts
that Custodians’ insistence upon drug testing oversight and third-party
supervision created “obstacles” and erected “barriers” that impeded “free
communication and regular association’” between Mother and A.H. See
Mother’s brief at 16-17 (quoting In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855-56
(Pa.Super. 2004)). The legal authority that Mother invokes for this proposition
concerns the termination of parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), which
entails an assessment of whether the parent has “evidenced a settled purpose
of relinquishing parental claim to a child or failed to perform parental
duties.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) (emphasis added). As part of that
evaluation, “[w]here a non-custodial parent is facing termination of his or her
parental rights,” Pennsylvania courts consider whether “a custodial parent has
deliberately created obstacles and has by devious means erected barriers
intended to impede free communication and regular association between the
non-custodial parent” and the child. B.N.M., supra at 855-56.
The orphans’ court found this argument unpersuasive. See Orphans’
Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 8 (“[T]he argument that [Custodians] erected
barriers to prevent Mother from performing parental duties is moot, as
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[Custodians] are not seeking termination under an applicable subsection.”).
We agree with the trial court’s interpretation. We emphasize that involuntary
termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) does not involve consideration of the
parent’s respective ability to perform parental duties or ameliorate the
conditions that led to their child’s removal. See M.A.B., supra at 446.
Rather, as outlined in our discussion of the primary component of Mother’s
argument, in order to preclude termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) the
record must indicate that the underlying conditions are already fully remedied
such that reunification is “imminent.” See I.J., supra at 11. Thus, Mother’s
assertion that Custodians erected barriers to impede her communication with
A.H. is misplaced.7
Although Mother has not advanced any arguments related to the third
element of § 2511(a)(8), out of an abundance of caution we will briefly
consider the trial court’s findings with respect to whether termination would
best serve the needs and welfare of A.H. See J.N.M., supra at 943. At
bedrock, the trial court found that termination was warranted on this point
due to Mother having consistently “put her needs ahead of those of the
child[.]” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 14. Again, we agree.
7 Assuming arguendo that In re B.N.M., 856 A.2d 847 (Pa.Super. 2004) is pertinent to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), there is no allegation that Custodians’ failure to permit Mother’s visits with A.H. had any impact on her ability to address the conditions that first led to the child’s removal, i.e., her persistent substance abuse. Hence, the quarrel over Mother’s visitations with A.H. is not pertinent to the orphans’ court’s assessment of § 2511(a)(8).
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As detailed at length above, Mother has demonstrated a consistent
inability to address the problems that led to A.H.’s removal, which is indicative
of her repeated failure to prioritize the needs of her daughter. Moreover, the
testimony and documentation provided by Dr. Morris at the termination
hearing indicates that Mother’s passive attitude also extends to A.H.’s
specialized medical needs. Specifically, Dr. Morris testified that Mother did
not regularly attend A.H.’s medical appointments and, consequently, did not
gain critically important knowledge regarding the upkeep and monitoring of
A.H.’s medical implants. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 71-75, 87-88. Of nine total
medical appointments related to A.H.’s surgical procedure, Dr. Morris averred
that Mother attended just one meeting. See id. at 87-88, 92. Additionally,
Dr. Morris testified that Mother did not independently seek out information,
nor did she independently contact the hospital. See id. at 78.
By contrast, the record indicates that Custodians have diligently and
aptly shepherded A.H. through her medical hardships. Ms. Miller averred that
A.H. is “flourishing” with Custodians. See id. at 19. Dr. Morris similarly
testified that Custodians are attentive with respect to A.H.’s medical needs
and, consequently, that the child is now considered developmentally “above
average.” See id. at 80-81.
Based upon the foregoing, we observe no abuse of discretion or error of
law in the orphans’ court’s conclusion that termination would best serve A.H.’s
needs and welfare. Therefore, we do not disturb the orphans’ court’s
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determination that involuntary termination was warranted pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(8). See J.N.M., supra at 943.
We now turn to Mother’s arguments pursuant to § 2511(b), which
largely reiterate the arguments implicating § 2511(a)(8). See Mother’s brief
at 19-21 (repeating earlier arguments). Section 2511(b) requires that the
court “give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Of note,
we “should consider the matter from the child’s perspective, placing [their]
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for
the parent.” In the Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1105 (Pa. 2023).
Moreover, this determination “should not be applied mechanically,” but “must
be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must determine each
child’s specific needs.” Id. at 1106. Thus, there is no “exhaustive list” of
factors that must be considered. Id. at 1113 n.28. While the particular facts
of each case determine the factors to be considered, our precedent indicates
that relevant points of inquiry include “intangibles such as love, comfort,
security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra at 267.
Our Supreme Court has mandated, however, that an evaluation
pursuant to § 2511(b) should consider the child’s bond with his or her parent.
See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993). Specifically, the orphans’ court
must render “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial
to the child[.]” K.T., supra at 1113. This evaluation involves consideration
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of the effect of severing the child’s bond with their parent. Id. at 1109. In
termination matters, “severance of a necessary and beneficial relationship is
the kind of loss that would predictably cause ‘extreme emotional
consequences’ or significant, irreparable harm.” Id. at 1109-10 (quoting
E.M., supra at 484). Our Supreme Court has distinguished, however,
“extreme emotional consequences” from a mere “adverse impact” in the
termination context. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the High Court has cautioned
that Pennsylvania courts must not truncate their analysis and preclude
severance “based solely on evidence of an ‘adverse’ or ‘detrimental’ impact to
the child.” Id. at 1114.
Furthermore, “courts must not only consider the child’s bond with the
biological parent, but also examine the . . . love, comfort, security, and
stability the child might have with the foster parent.” K.T., supra at 1111
(emphasis in original; cleaned up). Thus, stated generally, we consider factors
that arise from the facts of each case, such as: (1) the child’s need for
permanency and length of time in foster care; (2) whether the child is bonded
with foster parents; and (3) whether the foster home meets the child’s needs.
Id. at 1113. Overall, “bond, plus permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’
factors may contribute equally to the determination of a child’s specific
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare, and thus are all of
‘primary’ importance in the § 2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109.
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In giving primary consideration to the developmental, physical and
emotional needs and welfare of A.H., the orphans’ court determined that
termination was appropriate. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/12/23, at 18-19
(“[T]ermination of Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interest of
[A.H.] as Mother has failed to support, nurture, and provide security and
stability for [A.H.] and such termination would not cause the severing of a
beneficial bond as no bond exists.”). We must agree in the orphans’ court’s
assessment.
We first observe that the certified record does not evince a beneficial
parental bond between Mother and A.H. aside from Mother’s own testimony.
It is well ensconced that, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond
between the parent and the child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.”
In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008). Hence, we do not
disturb this aspect of the court’s determination.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Mother and A.H. share some manner
of a bond, it is not of such a nature that severance would predictably cause
A.H. “extreme emotional consequences or significant, irreparable harm.”
K.T., supra at 1109-10. Plainly, A.H.’s parental bond lies with Custodians,
whose care she has enjoyed for the virtual entirety of her life, from the age of
approximately four months. See N.T., 12/22/22, at 148. By Mother’s own
actions and omissions regarding the proposed visitation agreement concerning
drug testing, Mother has had no contact with A.H. since CYS ended supervision
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in October 2021. During this same time period, by contrast, Custodians have
been attentive to A.H.’s needs and development. In particular, L.H.C. testified
extensively regarding her close bond with A.H. See id. at 146-49.
Overall, we find the orphans’ court’s summary to be apt: “[Custodians]
have been the people [A.H.] turns to for love and comfort. [Custodians] have
shown that they are reliable and present for the child; where Mother has been
unprepared to assume the responsibilities of parenthood.” Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 6/12/23, at 18. Phrased differently, considering this matter from the
child’s perspective pursuant to K.T., supra at 105, it is apparent that the bond
between A.H. and Custodians should be preserved as serving the
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of A.H. In contrast,
as we discussed in relation to § 2511(a)(8), the certified record is replete with
examples of how Mother minimized A.H.’s interests in favor of her own, and
it is apparent that Mother is not equipped to attend to her daughter’s needs.
For all the foregoing reasons, we find no abuse of discretion or error of
law in the orphans’ court’s needs-and-welfare analysis pursuant to § 2511(b).
Accordingly, we affirm the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights
to A.H. pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b).
Order affirmed.
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DATE: 02/09/2024
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