In Re Agelon Ramon Ashby and Lindzie Justina Ashby v. the State of Texas

Opinion

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-26-00809-CV

In re Agelon Ramon Ashby and Lindzie Justina Ashby

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM HAYS COUNTY

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this original proceeding, pro se relators Agelon Ramon Ashby and Lindzie Justina Ashby complain of the trial court’s failure to rule on their various motions filed on May 28, June 23, June 25, and July 12, 2026.

To obtain mandamus relief based on a trial court’s failure to rule on a properly filed motion, the relator must establish that a ruling on the motion was requested and that the trial court has either refused to rule on the motion or failed to rule within a reasonable time. In re Noureddine, No. 03-24-00303-CV, 2024 WL 3187656, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin June 27, 2024, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). Here, relators have not established that the trial court has failed to rule within a reasonable period of time. See In re Whitfield, No. 03-18-00564-CV, 2018 WL 4140735, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 29, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“[T]hree months does not ordinarily constitute an unreasonable length of time for a motion to remain pending.”); In re Halley, No. 03-15-00310-CV, 2015 WL 4448831, at *2 (Tex. App.— Austin July 14, 2015, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (“[a]bsent a showing that the particular

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circumstances of the case demand a more expeditious ruling,” delay of “four months or six months” did not “constitute[] an unreasonable length of time for the motion to remain pending”).

Additionally, nothing in the record indicates that their motions were brought to the attention of the trial court. See In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 662 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding) (“The trial court is not required to consider a motion unless it is called to the court’s attention.”). Relators contend that they brought their motions to the trial court’s attention by filing additional motions with the district clerk on June 23, June 25, and July 12, 2026, that specifically requested a ruling on their motions. But “[s]howing that a motion was filed with the court clerk does not constitute proof that the motion was brought to the trial court’s attention or presented to the trial court with a request for a ruling.” Id.; see In re Dong Sheng Huang, 491 S.W.3d 383, 385 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (“Filing a request for a ruling is insufficient to call the matter to the judge’s attention because a judge may be unaware of the request.”). When a motion is filed with the district clerk, it is “incumbent upon [relator] to illustrate that the clerk informed the trial court of the motion or that the trial court otherwise obtained knowledge of it.” In re Chavez, 62 S.W.3d 225, 228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig. proceeding); In re Hearn, 137 S.W.3d 681, 686 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, orig. proceeding) (explaining that request for ruling on motion should be communicated specifically to trial court, but because district clerk was forwarding notices of relator’s filed requests for ruling to trial court, requests were brought to trial court’s attention). Here, relators have not shown that their motions were brought to the trial court’s attention.

On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s failure to rule is an abuse of discretion. The petition for writ of mandamus is therefore denied.

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Maggie Ellis, Justice

Before Justices Triana, Crump, and Ellis Filed: September 3, 2026