In re A.F. CA2/5

Opinion

Filed 8/19/26 In re A.F. CA2/5 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re A.F., a Person Coming B350100 Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. AND FAMILY SERVICES, 24CCJP02673A)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.F.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Lucia J. Murillo, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Jacob I. Olson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Assistant County Counsel and Courtney Fisher Senior Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A.F. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s October 16, 2025, finding at a 12-month review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.22, subdivision (f), that defendant and respondent Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) had provided him with reasonable reunification services.1 We affirm.

The parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history, and our opinion does not meet the criteria for publication. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c).) We therefore resolve this appeal by memorandum opinion pursuant to Standard 8.1 of the Standards of Judicial Administration and consistent with constitutional principles (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14 [“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated”]; Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1263, fn. omitted [three-paragraph discussion of issue on appeal satisfies constitutional requirement because “an opinion is not a brief in reply to counsel’s arguments. [Citation.] In order to state the reasons, grounds, or principles upon which a decision is based, [an appellate court] need not discuss every case or fact raised by counsel in support of the parties’ positions”].)

Father appeals the court’s reasonable services finding at the 12-month review hearing, arguing that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to facilitate visitation with minor

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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(then six years old) as a core reunification tool.2 According to father, although the court in May 2025 ordered the Department to assess liberalizing father’s visits, the Department delayed granting him unmonitored visits despite father consistently testing negative for drugs and alcohol through his treatment program at the Altadena Recovery Center (the Center). Father argues that the Department did not substantiate its position that the Center’s testing was not an acceptable substitute for testing at a Department-approved site. Further, father argues that even after he was forced to seek court intervention and the court ordered the Department to provide father with unmonitored visits, the Department then imposed additional hurdles, such as requiring 24-hour notice and for visits to occur at a neutral location.

“When a finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we review it for substantial evidence.” (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.) “When applying the substantial evidence test, however, we bear in mind the heightened burden of proof. [Citation.] ‘Under this burden of

2 We note that at the same hearing, the court ordered minor returned to parental custody under court supervision. For purposes of this appeal, however, we will assume that father was aggrieved by the reasonable services finding. (See In re A.O. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1058–1061 [reasonable services finding is appealable because parent is aggrieved by an erroneous finding]; see also In re Damian L. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357, 376 [after initial removal, statutory periods for services are “not reset if the parent regains custody at some point during the time period”].) Even if he was not aggrieved, for father’s benefit, we explain why his challenge to the reasonable services finding lacks merit. (In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.)

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proof, “evidence must be so clear as to leave no substantial doubt. It must be sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Alvin R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 971.) “The adequacy of the reunification plan and of the [D]epartment’s efforts to provide suitable services is judged according to the circumstances of the particular case.” (In re Taylor J. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1446, 1451.) “The [D]epartment must make a ‘ “ ‘good faith effort’ ” ’ to provide reasonable services responsive to the unique needs of each family.” (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Earl L. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1490, 1504.) “We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the [D]epartment and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the order.” (Ibid.; accord, In re Monica C. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 296, 306.)

To promote reunification, visitation must be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Visitation requirements exist “[i]n order to maintain ties between the parent . . . and the child, and to provide information relevant to deciding if, and when, to return a child to the custody of his or her parent[.]” (Id., subd. (a).) “While visitation is a key element of reunification, the court must focus on the best interests of the children ‘and on the elimination of conditions which led to the juvenile court’s finding that the child has suffered, or is at risk of suffering, harm . . . .’ ” (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50.) To that end, subdivision (a)(1)(B) of section 362.1 mandates that “[n]o visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child.”

The record on appeal supports the juvenile court’s finding

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that the Department made reasonable efforts to assist father in his efforts to reunify with minor. Father had monitored visits with minor from the outset of the case, and the Department accommodated father after he was injured in September 2024, permitting visits to take place at a rehabilitation center until it was brought to the Department’s attention that the court had ordered monitored visits at the Department offices. Subsequently, paternal grandparents, who were minor’s caregivers, monitored father’s visits three times a week for three hours a visit. We recognize that father did not appeal from the court’s reasonable services finding from the first reunification period, which ran from February through August 2025, but we note the consistency of father’s monitored visits as evidence that any delay in commencing unmonitored visits—regardless of the cause of delay—did not pose an obstacle to father’s opportunity to have meaningful contact and interaction with minor.

Turning to the key question of the timing for commencing father’s unmonitored visits, the Department consistently reached out to father and communicated with him about the need to demonstrate that he was no longer using drugs or alcohol by being tested at a Department-approved testing site. The Department consistently provided testing dates at a Department- approved site from March through September of 2025, and during that time, father only completed a Department-approved drug test twice: once on August 1 and a second time on September 24, 2025. Throughout this time period, father and his attorney pointed to the fact that father was testing negative for drugs and alcohol through his treatment program, but the record also includes evidence that the program manager acknowledged testing is only for their program and its purpose is not to satisfy

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the Department’s testing requirements. The program manager was aware that father had been advised that the Center’s drug testing was not equivalent to the Department’s approved testing, and she encouraged all of her clients to test at a Department- approved testing site and to comply with court orders. In other words, the delay for commencing unmonitored visits was not caused by the Department, but by father’s unwillingness to satisfy reasonable drug testing requirements.

Father began his unmonitored visits on October 1, 2025, and despite a court order authorizing the Department to drop in on the unmonitored visits unannounced, father consistently failed to comply with the common-sense requirement that he provide the Department with at least one day notice of when and where his visits would take place.

Although father argues on appeal that services were not reasonable because unmonitored visits would have permitted him to maintain a closer relationship with minor, he does not point to any evidence that the monitored visits in any way impeded his ability to maintain his relationship with minor, or that the Department unreasonably failed to assist father in accessing approved testing. Considering the circumstances under which minor came to the Department’s attention, father and mother’s histories of substance abuse, and the fact that by the 12-month hearing from which father appeals, the court ordered minor’s placement to be home of father in the paternal grandparents’ home, we find substantial evidence supported the court’s reasonable services finding.

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DISPOSITION

The October 16, 2025 order is affirmed. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MOOR, J.

I CONCUR:

KIM (D.), J.

In re A.F. B350100

BAKER, Acting P. J., Dissenting

The only issue in this appeal is whether the juvenile court properly found that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services provided A.F. (Father) with reasonable reunification services at the time of the 12-month dependency review hearing. The majority resolves that claim on the merits. I would not. The majority reveals—in a footnote— that the juvenile court returned the child in question to Father’s custody at the very same 12-month hearing. In other words, they were reunified. So this appeal should be dismissed because Father cannot have been aggrieved by the court’s reasonable reunification services finding. The contrary notion, that Father was aggrieved because at some future point he might again lose custody of the child and seek additional reunification services, is both too speculative and seemingly irrelevant insofar as In re Damian L. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 357 is correctly decided. I would dismiss the appeal. (In re K.C. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236.)

BAKER, Acting P. J.