[Cite as In re Adoption of W.M.J., 2025-Ohio-3166.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION : OF W.M.J., A MINOR : C.A. No. 30444 : : Trial Court Case No. 2024 ADP 00084 : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- : Probate Division) : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & : OPINION
...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on September 5, 2025, the judgments
of the trial court are affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
TUCKER, J., concurs and HUFFMAN, J., concurs in judgment only. -2- OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30444
ARVIN S. MILLER, Attorney for Appellant KENT J. DEPOORTER, Attorney for Appellee
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} This case is before us on the appeal of the biological mother, V.J. (“Mother”),
from two judgments of the probate division of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court
(“probate court”) concerning the adoption of her minor child, W.M.J. One judgment found
the probate court had jurisdiction over the adoption petition filed by A.J. (“Stepmother”); the
other determined that Mother’s consent to the adoption of W.M.J. was not needed.
According to Mother, the probate court lacked jurisdiction over the adoption proceeding
because neither Stepmother nor the biological father, J.J. (“Father”), physically lived in
Montgomery County, Ohio, when the adoption petition was filed.
{¶ 2} After reviewing the record and applicable law, we find no legal error or abuse of
discretion in the probate court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the adoption petition. The court
properly considered Stepmother’s status as a military spouse and her intention about her
legal residence. The court found the testimony of Stepmother and Father credible
concerning their intent to return to Montgomery County upon the conclusion of Father’s
military service. We defer to a trial court’s credibility determinations and find the court’s
decision was supported by sufficient evidence. Accordingly, the judgments of the probate
court are affirmed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 3} On July 11, 2024, Stepmother filed a petition with the probate court seeking to
adopt W.M.J., a minor child. The petition alleged that Father had full custody of W.M.J. and -3- had consented to the adoption. It further alleged that Mother’s consent was not required
because, for at least one year before the petition was filed, Mother had failed without
justifiable cause to have contact with W.M.J. or to provide maintenance or support for him.
The court scheduled a hearing on the adoption before a magistrate in October 2024 and
assigned an investigator. After Mother was served in July 2024, she did not file a written
objection to the adoption. However, she appeared at the October hearing and orally
objected.
{¶ 4} On October 29, 2024, the magistrate issued a decision finding that Mother was
lawfully served with notice but failed to file an objection within 14 days of service as required
by the Revised Code. The magistrate concluded that Mother’s consent to the adoption was
not required. Mother failed to object to the magistrate’s decision, and the trial court adopted
the decision on December 4, 2024. The court scheduled a non-contested trial on consent
and contested trial on the child’s best interests. Although the court issued a final appealable
order, Mother did not appeal.
{¶ 5} Counsel entered an appearance on Mother’s behalf and filed an objection to the
adoption contending that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition. The
court set a hearing for April 1, 2025, to address Mother’s jurisdictional claim and whether
her consent to the adoption was necessary.
{¶ 6} The hearing took place as scheduled, and the court received testimony from
Stepmother and Father. Mother did not appear, although her counsel attended the hearing.
On April 4, 2025, the court entered its decision finding it had jurisdiction over the case and
that Mother’s consent to the adoption was not needed. Mother’s timely appeal from the
decision followed. -4- II. Jurisdiction
A. Introduction
{¶ 7} Mother’s assignment of error states:
The trial court errored [sic] when it determined it had jurisdiction over
the adoption of a child by his stepmother when the child, stepmother, and
father do not reside in Montgomery County, Ohio.
{¶ 8} Mother contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction because W.M.J., Stepmother,
and Father did not physically reside in Montgomery County, Ohio, as ostensibly required by
R.C. 3107.04. Mother further argues that even if we were to conclude that physical presence
had not been required based on Stepmother’s status as a military spouse, Father and
Stepmother failed to provide sufficient evidence that they were domiciled in Montgomery
County, “residing” there for the purposes of the statute. In response, Stepmother asserts the
trial court applied the correct legal standards in concluding it had jurisdiction. She notes
Mother made no effort to refute the evidence presented at the hearing.
{¶ 9} As a preliminary point, Mother’s notice of appeal indicates she is appealing from
two decisions: (1) the decision finding jurisdiction; and (2) the prior order adopting the
magistrate’s decision that Mother’s consent to adoption was not required. Mother’s brief,
however, addresses only the jurisdictional issue. As a result, we consider only that matter.
{¶ 10} In its decision on the jurisdictional question, the probate court considered the
testimony of Stepmother and Father and found they were credible. The court noted that
because Stepmother was married to Father, who was in the military, the jurisdictional
analysis differed from that applied to non-military members and spouses. Specifically, their
physical location was not the result of their own volition, and the residency analysis was a
question of intent. Based on the uncontroverted evidence, the court found that Stepmother -5- had met her burden of proving residency, and the court had jurisdiction over the adoption
petition.
{¶ 11} “A trial court's decision as to whether it has jurisdiction is a legal determination,
which is reviewed on appeal de novo; its weighing of the evidence as to a party's intent to
establish a domiciliary residence in the state is a factual question, which we review for an
abuse of discretion.” Freels v. Powers-Freels, 2015-Ohio-3915, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). De novo
review is independent, and appellate courts do not defer to trial court decisions. Jackson v.
Internatl. Fiber, 2006-Ohio-5799, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing State ex rel. AFSCME v. Taft, 2004-
Ohio-493, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.).
{¶ 12} Abuse of discretion “implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary
or unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). “[M]ost
instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather
than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary.” AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place
Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). Decisions are
unreasonable if they are not supported by a sound reasoning process. Id.
{¶ 13} When we consider evidentiary findings, we “must always be mindful of the
presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21. “The
decision whether, and to what extent, to credit the testimony of particular witnesses is within
the peculiar competence of the factfinder, who has seen and heard the witness.” State v.
Lawson, 1997 WL 476684, *4 (2d Dist. Aug. 22, 1997).
B. Analysis of R.C. 3107.04
{¶ 14} “Original and exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings is vested
specifically in the Probate Court pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3107.” State ex rel. Portage Cty.
Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 38 Ohio St.2d 144 (1974), paragraph two of the syllabus. See -6- also R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(ff) (giving probate courts exclusive jurisdiction over adoption,
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law,” as enacted by 2025 Sub.H.B. No. 5, effective March
20, 2025); In re Adoption of Biddle, 168 Ohio St. 209 (1958) (involving R.C. 3107.02, the
predecessor of R.C. 3107.04).
{¶ 15} R.C. 3107.04 provides in relevant part:
(A) A petition for adoption shall be filed in the court in the county in
which the person to be adopted was born, or in which, at the time of filing the
petition, the petitioner or the person to be adopted or parent of the person to
be adopted resides, or in which the petitioner is stationed in military service,
or in which the agency having the permanent custody of the person to be
adopted is located.
(B) If the court finds in the interest of justice that the case should be
heard in another forum, the court may stay the proceedings or dismiss the
petition in whole or in part on any conditions that are just, or certify the case to
another court.
{¶ 16} According to Mother, the term “resides” in R.C. 3107.04 is unambiguous and
requires applicants to physically reside in the county where the petition is filed. Mother
argues that “resides” is not the same as “resident,” “residence,” or “domicile,” which have
different meanings. Mother asserts that if the legislature had wanted to expand the definition
of “resides” to include intent to make a place one’s home, it could have done so. Neither
side has cited any cases interpreting R.C. 3107.04 in the specific context of military
members or their spouses, nor has our research disclosed any such cases.
{¶ 17} R.C. 3107.04 does not define the term “resides,” nor is the term included in
the definition section for adoption proceedings. See R.C. 3107.01(A)-(S). R.C. 3107.04 was -7- enacted in 1976, and court decisions following its enactment shed no light on the precise
issue in this case. R.C. 3107.04 has been amended only once, in 2024, as part of a bill to
modernize probate laws. See 2025 Sub.H.B. No. 5. Though the General Assembly
substantively amended provisions of the State’s adoption laws, the bill made only a minor
grammatical change to R.C. 3107.04. Id. See Legislative Service Commission Bill Analysis,
135th General Assembly, H.B. No. 5: Final Analysis.
{¶ 18} “If ‘the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear
and definite meaning there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory interpretation,’
because ‘an unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted.’” Jacobson v. Kaforey,
2016-Ohio-8434, ¶ 8, quoting Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312 (1944), paragraph five of
the syllabus. However, “If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of
the legislature, may consider among other matters: (A) The object sought to be attained; (B)
The circumstances under which the statute was enacted; (C) The legislative history; (D) The
common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects;
(E) The consequences of a particular construction; [and] (F) The administrative construction
of the statute.” R.C. 1.49.
{¶ 19} “Ohio's first adoption statute was passed in 1859.” Adoption of Wedl,
114 N.E.2d 311, 312 (C.P. 1952), citing 56 Ohio Laws 82. After various amendments and
changes, including the Probate Act of 1931, the adoption statutes were enacted under
G.C. 10512-9 to 10512-23. Kirsheman v. Paulin, 155 Ohio St. 137, 140 (1951); In re Privette,
45 Ohio App. 51, 52 (2d Dist. 1932). “In 1953, the adoption statutes were codified in
R.C. Chapter 3107. On January 1, 1977, the legislature repealed R.C. 3107.01 through
3107.14 and enacted R.C. 3107.01 to R.C. 3107.19.” In re Adoption of Koszycki, 133 Ohio
App.3d 434, 438 (1st Dist. 1999). -8- {¶ 20} Our review has encompassed the foregoing statutes and applicable case law.
The first mention of “military” in the context of adoption petitions filed in probate court
occurred in 1979. See In the Matter of McDermitt, 1979 WL 209113, *5 (10th Dist.
June 14, 1979). This tracks the effective date of R.C. 3107.04 in 1977. See 1976 H.B. No.
156. As enacted, R.C. 3107.04(A) included a reference to a petitioner stationed in military
service. Id. But the case law involving this statute and its predecessors is sparse and lacks
any discussion that is relevant to this matter.
{¶ 21} Generally, there is inconsistency and ambiguity in the legislative use of the
term “reside,” as well as in the related terms “resident” and “domicile” and how these terms
are interpreted by Ohio courts. “The term ‘resident’ appears in many sections of the Ohio
Revised Code.” Prouse, Dash & Crouch, L.L.P. v. DiMarco, 2007-Ohio-5753, ¶ 6. “Despite
these many uses of the term ‘resident,’ the term itself is not defined generally in the Revised
Code. It seems obvious . . . that the General Assembly intentionally did not define the term
‘resident’ because of the many different uses to which the term is put.” Id. at ¶ 7. In Prouse,
the Supreme Court remarked that it had “defined the term ‘resident’ when the term was used
in a statute that did not define the term. For example, ‘as used in R.C. 3105.03,’ which relates
to divorces and annulments, ‘[t]he word “resident” * * * means one who possesses a
domiciliary residence, a residence accompanied by an intention to make the state of Ohio a
permanent home.’” Id., quoting Coleman v. Coleman, 32 Ohio St.2d 155 (1972). In criminal
law under the self-defense statute, “residence” is defined as “a dwelling in which a person
resides either temporarily or permanently or is visiting as a guest.” R.C. 2901.05(D)(3).
Again, meaning can vary with context.
{¶ 22} “Domicile has been defined as a place where a person lives, or has his home,
a place where an individual has his true, fixed, permanent home and principal residence -9- established, a place to which the individual intends to return whenever he is absent, and
from which he has no present intent to move.” E. Cleveland v. Landingham, 97 Ohio App.3d
385, 389 (8th Dist. 1994), citing Sturgeon v. Korte, 34 Ohio St. 525 (1878). In Landingham,
the appellant was challenging a judgment for delinquent taxes, and the ordinance in question
defined a “resident” as “‘an individual domiciled in the City of East Cleveland.’” Id. at 389.
However, “residence” and “domicile” have also been held to mean different things because
individuals may have only one domicile but may have more than one residence. Bd. of Ed.
of City School Dist. of City of Oakwood v. Dille, 109 Ohio App. 344, 348 (2d Dist. 1959).
{¶ 23} “Reside” also appears in hundreds of places in the Ohio Revised Code, and
there are few, if any, statutory definitions. In fact, a broad search resulted in only one
definition. See R.C. 4710.01(C) (stating for purposes of a chapter dealing with debt-adjusting
that “‘[r]esides’ means to live in a particular place on a temporary or a permanent basis.”).
Cases offer varying definitions of the term. It has been defined to mean to “‘occupy a place
as one's legal domicile.’” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Fockler, 75 Ohio App.3d 587, 592 (6th Dist.
1991), quoting Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1990). “Reside” has also been
defined as “the fixed place of habitation to which the person intends to return when absent.”
State v. Barnes, 2008-Ohio-2092, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.) Additionally, “reside” has been defined as
“‘to live in a place on an ongoing basis.’” State v. Sims, 2006-Ohio-6285, ¶ 19, fn. 9
(1st Dist.), quoting Ohio Jury Instructions, CR § 519.25(12). The terms “resident” and
“resides” have also been used interchangeably in statutes. E.g., R.C. 3956.01(L) (“Resident”
means any person who resides in this state at the time a member insurer is determined to
be an impaired or insolvent insurer); R.C. 3721.60(E) (“‘Resident’ means an individual who
resides in a long-term care facility”). (Emphasis added.) Clearly, the meaning of “resides”
can differ depending on context, just like the other terms we have discussed. -10- {¶ 24} The Supreme Court of Ohio has said that “[t]he case law, statutes, and rules
are in accord that the intention of a person is a significant factor in determining where he or
she legally resides.” (Emphasis added.) Prouse, 2007-Ohio-5753, at ¶ 10, citing Barth v.
Barth, 2007-Ohio-973, ¶ 12-16. The matter, therefore, is not without ambiguity, and we
attach no particular significance to the fact that the legislature chose to use the word
“resides” rather than resident, residence, or domicile. These words have been used
interchangeably and inconsistently.
{¶ 25} Considering the ambiguity, it is appropriate to consider the unique
circumstances of military personnel relative to civilians in interpreting the statute, as the
General Assembly has done in other contexts. For example, R.C. 4757.52 ratified the “Social
Work Licensure Compact” to “facilitate interstate practice of Regulated Social Workers.” One
objective, among others, was to support military families. See id., Section 1(F). Under
Section 8 of the Compact, active military members or their spouses may designate a home
state where they have a multistate license and may retain this designation while the service
member is on active duty. Furthermore, Ohio law provides public school tuition waivers to
children placed with people other than parents under military powers of attorney when
parents are on duty assignments away from their residences. See R.C. 3313.64(F)(14).
Accommodating the needs of military personnel and their families is sound public policy, as
active-duty service members are required to relocate to wherever their orders may send
them.
{¶ 26} Although not strictly applicable here, we also note, as Stepmother indicates,
that for purposes of paying bonuses for persons who had active-duty service in war zones,
“[a] legal resident of Ohio is an individual for whom Ohio was the state of domicile and who
did not claim legal residence in any other state for any purpose. A service member's legal -11- residence in Ohio is not changed by virtue of military assignment to another state.”
Adm.Code 5902-4-06(D). This is consistent with the treatment afforded to military service
members in other contexts.
{¶ 27} We considered Mother’s reliance on In re Adoption of Murphy, 53 Ohio App.3d
14 (6th Dist. 1988) in support of her claim that Father and Stepmother did not reside in
Montgomery County. In Murphy, an unwed mother filed an application to place an unborn
child for adoption and her consent to adoption in the Wood County probate court. Id. at 14.
The application was granted the same day as the filing of the consent to adoption. Id. A few
weeks later, the mother gave birth to the child in Toledo and then filed a second consent in
Wood County. Id. The unnamed, prospective adoptive parents then filed a petition for
adoption in Wood County a few months later, and placement in their home was approved.
Id. Several months after the adoption, the Lucas County Juvenile Court adjudged the
appellant as the child’s father. Id. at 15. He intervened in the action and requested that any
adoption orders be set aside, or alternatively, for the case to be transferred to Lucas County.
Id. at 14-15. The Wood County Probate Court found it had jurisdiction and that the father’s
consent was not required, and the father appealed. Id. at 15.
{¶ 28} The private adoption statute under which the probate court had allowed the
child’s placement required, in relevant part, that “the parent or parents of the child personally
have applied to, and appeared before, the probate court of the county in which the parent or
parents reside, or in which the person seeking to adopt the child resides, for approval of the
proposed placement specified in the application. . . .” Murphy at 16, quoting
R.C. 5103.16(D)(1). In considering the matter, the Sixth District did not discuss the meaning
of “resides.” However, the court found that “residence” was not the same as “domicile,” and
had “‘been defined as simply meaning ‘a place of dwelling.’’” Id. at 17, quoting LeSueur v. -12- Robinson, 53 Ohio App.3d 9, 12 (6th Dist.). The court further stated that “[i]n determining
residence, the intention combined with the acts of the party must be considered; mere
intention, without acts to support it, is not controlling.” Id., citing Baraket v. Baraket, 25 Ohio
Law Abs. 641, 643 (C.P. 1937).
{¶ 29} The Sixth District found the mother, who had stayed at a residence for two
weeks in Wood County, had not demonstrated intent to become a “resident.” Murphy at 17.
The court reasoned that the mother had maintained her apartment in Lucas County, had
admitted that her stay was only temporary and that she would return to her apartment, had
not changed her mailing address, and had not moved any furniture—even a television—to
her temporary residence. Id. The court concluded the mother was forum shopping. Id. The
court found actionable fraud and voided the entire proceedings under R.C. 5103.16. Murphy
at 17-19.
{¶ 30} The father’s appeal also addressed R.C. 3107.04. Emphasizing the statutory
text’s focus on the time of the adoption petition was filed, the Sixth District reasoned that
none of the parties could have properly filed in Wood County because they all lived in Lucas
County at that time. Murphy at 19. Consequently, the Wood County court lacked jurisdiction.
Id. Murphy did not address the residency status of a military service member under
R.C. 3107.04 or any other provision of Ohio law. It has no bearing on this case.
{¶ 31} The consequences of the statute’s interpretation factor in our analysis.
R.C. 1.49(E). In domestic relations cases, we have recognized the relevance of a person’s
active-duty status to determining domicile and a trial court’s jurisdiction. We previously
reversed a trial court’s dismissal of a divorce case for lack of jurisdiction because the record
revealed no intention of the military service member plaintiff’s intent “to abandon Ohio as his
pre-enlistment domiciliary residence.” Holtz v. Holtz, 2006-Ohio-1812, ¶ 3 (2d Dist.). In Holtz, -13- the plaintiff had lived in Ohio until he enlisted in the military in 1997 and relocated to a
California military base. Id. at ¶ 4. The plaintiff married his wife in California in 2001, they
had a son, and in 2003, they moved to England upon the plaintiff’s military orders. Id.
Plaintiff’s wife later moved back to California. Id. at ¶ 5. The plaintiff brought his son to stay
with the child’s paternal grandmother in Greene County. Id. at ¶ 6. The plaintiff then filed for
divorce in Greene County while still stationed in England. Id. at ¶ 7.
{¶ 32} After the wife was served, she challenged the court’s jurisdiction, and the court
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Holtz at ¶ 7. The statute in question, R.C. 3105.03,
provided: “‘The plaintiff in actions for divorce and annulment shall have been a resident of
the state at least six months immediately before filing the complaint.’” Id. at ¶ 18. As with the
statute at issue in this case, the statute did not mention domicile. We commented:
Generally, the word “residence,” when used in statutes conferring
jurisdiction in divorce actions, means domiciliary residence. . . . Every person
must have a domicile somewhere, and that domicile is not lost until a new one
is acquired. . . . A person abandons his old domicile and acquires a new one
only when he chooses a new domicile, establishes an actual residence in the
chosen domicile, and demonstrates a clear intent that the new domicile
become his primary and permanent residence.
(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 33} We noted that “[a] military service member's domicile remains as it was prior
to enlistment throughout the course of military service, unless a new domicile is voluntarily
selected.” Id. at ¶ 20, citing Heiney v. Heiney, 2004-Ohio-3453 (6th Dist.) We stressed that
“[t]he domiciliary residence of a person in the military is simply a question of intent,” and “[a]
military person's actual residence does not operate to change his pre-enlistment domiciliary -14- residence, because his actual residence is not the result of his own volition.” Id., citing Spires
v. Spires, 7 Ohio Misc. 197, 201 (C.P. 1966). Considering the evidence before the trial court
had established Ohio was the plaintiff’s domicile, we concluded the trial court erred in
dismissing the plaintiff’s divorce complaint. Id. at ¶ 21.
{¶ 34} We reached the same conclusion in Freels, 2015-Ohio-3915, another divorce
case involving an active-duty military plaintiff stationed outside Ohio. After reiterating the
analysis in Holtz, we concluded that based on the plaintiff’s “intent and his long-term and
ongoing connections to Clark County,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that it had jurisdiction over the case. Id. at ¶ 20. We emphasized that “[t]he
determination of the residence of a military service member may involve different
considerations than non-military individuals.” Id. at ¶ 19. We noted that the holdings in Holtz
“and other cases involving active-duty military service members recognize that the actual
physical residence of a military serviceperson does not necessarily align with his or her
domiciliary residence for jurisdictional purposes.” Id.
{¶ 35} Based on the foregoing, we conclude the correct focus here was the intent of
Stepmother and Father regarding their domiciliary residence, and the trial court did not err
in applying this standard. In this regard, we note that R.C. 3107.04(A) requires residence of
only one of the listed individuals, which include “the petitioner, or the person to be adopted
or parent of the person to be adopted.” Thus, the residence requirement could have been
met by either Stepmother or Father. In Heiney, the court remarked that “[t]he spouse of a
person in the military does not ordinarily change residence when living with that
serviceperson at a military posting.” Heiney, 2004-Ohio-3453, at ¶ 14, citing Dobson v.
Dobson, 1998 WL 519255 (5th Dist. May 18, 1998). We agree. As a result, the same intent
standard applied to Stepmother. -15- C. Review of Trial Court’s Application of R.C. 3107.04
{¶ 36} According to Mother, even if we decide physical presence in the county had
not been required, insufficient evidence supported the court's decision. However, we
disagree.
{¶ 37} The evidence presented at the hearing revealed the following facts. Father
was born in Haiti and enlisted in the Army Reserve in 2006 when he was in college and lived
in Florida. He provided his mother’s Florida address on his enlistment form because he was
living with her. In 2014, Father voluntarily moved to Ohio to take a job with Wright State
University, at which point he updated the military form to list his domicile as Ohio. He lived
in Montgomery County from 2014 until he was deployed in 2019, during which time he
earned a master’s degree in information systems at Wright State. It was Father’s intent to
stay in Ohio and remain domiciled there.
{¶ 38} W.M.J. was born in Florida. Prior to Father’s move to Ohio, he was involved in
custody proceedings involving W.M.J. in Pennsylvania. Following Father’s move to Ohio, he
was involved in a 2017 custody case concerning W.M.J. in the Montgomery County Juvenile
Court. In that proceeding, the court granted full custody of the child to Father, gave Mother
visitation, and ordered Mother to pay child support. No other court has since exercised
jurisdiction over the matter.
{¶ 39} When Father was assigned to active duty in 2019, he had intended his domicile
to be Ohio and that he would return to Ohio. Father’s intent remained the same through the
time of the hearing. On December 6, 2024, Father filed a statement of legal residence with
the military listing an address in Riverside, Ohio—his residence prior to deployment. Father
had updated the form because he had been unable to find the prior version from 2014. -16- Father’s Montgomery County address is the only domicile that Father has provided the
military since enlisting in 2006.
{¶ 40} Stepmother was born in Dayton, Ohio, in 1991, grew up in Ohio, and graduated
from high school in Clark County in 2009. From 2017 to 2019, Mother lived with Father at
the Riverside residence listed on Father’s military form. Stepmother’s 2018 tax return
indicated she was living with Father in Riverside. Stepmother obtained a marriage license
from the Montgomery County Probate Court and married Father in February 2019.
{¶ 41} Father and Stepmother moved to North Carolina in 2019 in connection with
Father’s assignment to active-duty service. In January 2021, Father was deployed to
Germany and then to Kuwait the following year. The deployment was for two years, with
Father’s home station being North Carolina. Father was then assigned to Kentucky, and the
family lived there for a year. In 2023, the family moved to New York, where Father was
stationed, and they were still living there at the time of the April 2025 hearing. Stepmother
testified that her intent has always been to return to Ohio once Father finished his military
service. She stated that her family is much larger than Father’s family, and the children
spend much more time with her family. At the time of the hearing, Stepmother and Father
had three children—W.M.J. and two children who had been born during their marriage. The
adoption petition was filed in Montgomery County, Ohio, because the custody proceeding
had been filed there, and Montgomery County is the place to which she and Father wanted
to return when Father’s military service ended.
{¶ 42} Father's tax returns between 2014 and 2018 listed his address in Montgomery
County, Ohio. The couple’s 2019 and 2020 tax returns stated a North Carolina address but
included Ohio tax returns. Stepmother started filing the couple’s tax returns in 2021 when
Father was deployed in Germany and then in Kuwait. Stepmother used her current -17- addresses for the couple’s 2022 and 2023 taxes because that was what they had always
done, and she had not known she could have claimed Ohio as their home state. Later,
Stepmother learned from a military website that they could claim Ohio as their home state.
Stepmother testified that she intended to claim Ohio as the couple’s home state for their
2024 taxes, which had not yet been filed at the time of the hearing.
{¶ 43} The trial court found both Father and Stepmother credible, and concluded
Stepmother had met her burden of proving residency. The court stressed that Mother failed
to present any conflicting evidence. Because the court observed the witnesses, we defer to
its credibility decisions. E.g., Head v. Head, 2024-Ohio-276, ¶ 46 (2d Dist.), citing In re J.Y.,
2008-Ohio-3485, ¶ 33 (2d Dist.). We agree with the probate court that sufficient evidence
existed to support its jurisdiction.
{¶ 44} The trial court did not err in finding that it had jurisdiction over the petition for
adoption. Mother’s assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 45} Mother’s assignment of error having been overruled, the judgments of the trial
.............
TUCKER, J., concurs and HUFFMAN, J., concurs in judgment only.