[Cite as In re Adoption of R.M.C.T., 2017-Ohio-5800.]
COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF R.M.C.T. : JUDGES: : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. K.S.-T and R.A.-T : Hon. John W. Wise, J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. Plaintiffs-Appellants : : -vs- : : T.B. : Case No. 17-CA-13 : Defendant-Appellee : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, Case No. 20160039
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: July 10, 2017
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs-Appellants For Defendant-Appellee
DORIAN KEITH BAUM T.B., Pro Se Baum Law Offices, LLC 41 N. 40th St. B2 123 South Broad St., Suite 314 Newark, Ohio 43055 Lancaster, Ohio 43130 Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants K.S.-T and R.A.-T appeal from the February 8, 2017
Entry of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, holding that
appellee T.B.’s consent to the adoption of R.M.C.T. was required and dismissing their
petition to adopt R.M.C.T.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} R.M.C.T. was born on June 12, 2015 and is the biological son of appellee
T.B. At the time of R.M.C.T.’s birth, appellee was in prison. In November of 2015,
R.M.C.T.’s mother left him with appellants. Appellants have cared for R.M.C.T. since such
time without any financial assistance, support or maintenance from appellee.
{¶3} On August 23, 2016, appellants filed a petition seeking to adopt R.M.C.T.
The child’s mother consented to the adoption, but appellee objected. An evidentiary
hearing was held on November 23, 2016. At the hearing, there was testimony that
appellee had been in prison from June of 2015 until January 22, 2016 for felony theft and
then again from February 14, 2016 until April 19, 2016 for felony attempted robbery.
Appellee visited with the child in June of 2015 and October of 2015 and several other
times before when the child’s mother brought him to visit appellee while he was in prison.
{¶4} At the hearing, appellee testified that, after his release from prison on
January 22, 2016, he contacted appellant K.S.-T by phone seeking visitation with his son.
She told him that she was busy and would contact him later, but never did. Appellee
testified that he tried calling again, but there was no answer. He further testified that he
was then told by the child’s mother to leave appellants alone. Appellee learned that he
was blocked on Facebook from contacting appellants. Appellee admitted at the hearing Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 3
that he did not provide any money to appellants for his son’s care, but testified that he
had been unable to do so because he had no income while in jail and since he could not
get in contact with appellants. Appellee never contacted child support.
{¶5} In June of 2016, appellee obtained employment that he had maintained as
to the date of the hearing. On August 5, 2016, he filed a pro se complaint for parentage,
seeking reasonable parenting time. On the same date, he filed an affidavit of income and
expenses indicating that he made approximately $14,000.00 a year and had no housing
monthly expenses. At the time, appellee was residing with his grandfather. Appellee
agreed that he did not pay any support between June of 2016 and August 5, 2016.
{¶6} At the hearing, appellee’s mother testified that she had tried to make contact
with appellant K.S.-T. to see her grandson, but her messages were not returned and/or
her calls were not accepted.
{¶7} At the hearing, appellants denied that either appellee or his family had
contacted them.
{¶8} The trial court, in an Entry filed on February 8, 2017, found, in part, that
appellee’s consent to the adoption was required because appellants had failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to R.C. 3107.07 that appellee failed without
justifiable cause to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor for a period of
at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition. The trial court
dismissed the petition based on appellee’s objection.
{¶9} Appellants now raise the following assignment of error on appeal:
{¶10} I. THE PROBATE COURT’S DECISION THAT APPELLANT’S (SIC)
CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF THE SUBJECT MINOR CHILD WAS NECESSARY Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 4
IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
I
{¶11} Appellants, in their first assignment of error, argue that the trial court erred
in finding that appellee’s consent to the adoption of R.M.C.T. was necessary. Appellants
specifically contend that the trial court erred in finding that appellee’s undisputed failure
to provide support and maintenance for the minor child during the one year period prior
to the filing of the adoption petition did not rise to the level of abandonment.
{¶12} The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that natural
parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their
children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). A
parent's right to raise a child is an essential civil right. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155,
556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990). An adoption permanently terminates the parental rights of a
natural parent. In re Adoption of Reams, 52 Ohio App.3d 52, 557 N.E.2d 159 (10th
Dist.1989). Thus, courts must afford the natural parent every procedural and substantive
protection allowed by law before depriving the parent of the right to consent to the
adoption of his child. In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997).
{¶13} The termination of a natural parent's right to object to the adoption of his or
her child requires strict adherence to the controlling statutes. In re Adoption of Kuhlmann,
99 Ohio App.3d 44, 649 N.E.2d 1279 (1994). Ordinarily, the written consent of a minor
child's natural parents is required prior to adoption. R .C. 3107.07 provides exceptions to
this requirement.
{¶14} R.C. 3107.07(A) states that consent to adoption is not required of: Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 5
A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption petition and
the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to
provide more than de minimus contact with the minor or to provide for the
maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree
for a period of at least one year immediately preceding either the filing of
the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the
petitioner.
{¶15} Appellants have the burden of proof in this action. With regard to support,
the relevant inquiry is not whether the parent provided support as would be expected, “but
whether the parent's failure to support * * * is of such magnitude as to be the equivalent
of abandonment.” Gorski v. Myer, 5th Dist. Stark No.2005CA00033, 2005–Ohio–2604 at
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[Cite as In re Adoption of R.M.C.T., 2017-Ohio-5800.]
COURT OF APPEALS FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
IN RE: THE ADOPTION OF R.M.C.T. : JUDGES: : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. K.S.-T and R.A.-T : Hon. John W. Wise, J. : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. Plaintiffs-Appellants : : -vs- : : T.B. : Case No. 17-CA-13 : Defendant-Appellee : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, Case No. 20160039
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: July 10, 2017
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs-Appellants For Defendant-Appellee
DORIAN KEITH BAUM T.B., Pro Se Baum Law Offices, LLC 41 N. 40th St. B2 123 South Broad St., Suite 314 Newark, Ohio 43055 Lancaster, Ohio 43130 Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 2
Baldwin, J.
{¶1} Plaintiffs-appellants K.S.-T and R.A.-T appeal from the February 8, 2017
Entry of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, holding that
appellee T.B.’s consent to the adoption of R.M.C.T. was required and dismissing their
petition to adopt R.M.C.T.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} R.M.C.T. was born on June 12, 2015 and is the biological son of appellee
T.B. At the time of R.M.C.T.’s birth, appellee was in prison. In November of 2015,
R.M.C.T.’s mother left him with appellants. Appellants have cared for R.M.C.T. since such
time without any financial assistance, support or maintenance from appellee.
{¶3} On August 23, 2016, appellants filed a petition seeking to adopt R.M.C.T.
The child’s mother consented to the adoption, but appellee objected. An evidentiary
hearing was held on November 23, 2016. At the hearing, there was testimony that
appellee had been in prison from June of 2015 until January 22, 2016 for felony theft and
then again from February 14, 2016 until April 19, 2016 for felony attempted robbery.
Appellee visited with the child in June of 2015 and October of 2015 and several other
times before when the child’s mother brought him to visit appellee while he was in prison.
{¶4} At the hearing, appellee testified that, after his release from prison on
January 22, 2016, he contacted appellant K.S.-T by phone seeking visitation with his son.
She told him that she was busy and would contact him later, but never did. Appellee
testified that he tried calling again, but there was no answer. He further testified that he
was then told by the child’s mother to leave appellants alone. Appellee learned that he
was blocked on Facebook from contacting appellants. Appellee admitted at the hearing Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 3
that he did not provide any money to appellants for his son’s care, but testified that he
had been unable to do so because he had no income while in jail and since he could not
get in contact with appellants. Appellee never contacted child support.
{¶5} In June of 2016, appellee obtained employment that he had maintained as
to the date of the hearing. On August 5, 2016, he filed a pro se complaint for parentage,
seeking reasonable parenting time. On the same date, he filed an affidavit of income and
expenses indicating that he made approximately $14,000.00 a year and had no housing
monthly expenses. At the time, appellee was residing with his grandfather. Appellee
agreed that he did not pay any support between June of 2016 and August 5, 2016.
{¶6} At the hearing, appellee’s mother testified that she had tried to make contact
with appellant K.S.-T. to see her grandson, but her messages were not returned and/or
her calls were not accepted.
{¶7} At the hearing, appellants denied that either appellee or his family had
contacted them.
{¶8} The trial court, in an Entry filed on February 8, 2017, found, in part, that
appellee’s consent to the adoption was required because appellants had failed to prove
by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to R.C. 3107.07 that appellee failed without
justifiable cause to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor for a period of
at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition. The trial court
dismissed the petition based on appellee’s objection.
{¶9} Appellants now raise the following assignment of error on appeal:
{¶10} I. THE PROBATE COURT’S DECISION THAT APPELLANT’S (SIC)
CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF THE SUBJECT MINOR CHILD WAS NECESSARY Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 4
IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE.
I
{¶11} Appellants, in their first assignment of error, argue that the trial court erred
in finding that appellee’s consent to the adoption of R.M.C.T. was necessary. Appellants
specifically contend that the trial court erred in finding that appellee’s undisputed failure
to provide support and maintenance for the minor child during the one year period prior
to the filing of the adoption petition did not rise to the level of abandonment.
{¶12} The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that natural
parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their
children. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972). A
parent's right to raise a child is an essential civil right. In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155,
556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990). An adoption permanently terminates the parental rights of a
natural parent. In re Adoption of Reams, 52 Ohio App.3d 52, 557 N.E.2d 159 (10th
Dist.1989). Thus, courts must afford the natural parent every procedural and substantive
protection allowed by law before depriving the parent of the right to consent to the
adoption of his child. In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997).
{¶13} The termination of a natural parent's right to object to the adoption of his or
her child requires strict adherence to the controlling statutes. In re Adoption of Kuhlmann,
99 Ohio App.3d 44, 649 N.E.2d 1279 (1994). Ordinarily, the written consent of a minor
child's natural parents is required prior to adoption. R .C. 3107.07 provides exceptions to
this requirement.
{¶14} R.C. 3107.07(A) states that consent to adoption is not required of: Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 5
A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption petition and
the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable cause to
provide more than de minimus contact with the minor or to provide for the
maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree
for a period of at least one year immediately preceding either the filing of
the adoption petition or the placement of the minor in the home of the
petitioner.
{¶15} Appellants have the burden of proof in this action. With regard to support,
the relevant inquiry is not whether the parent provided support as would be expected, “but
whether the parent's failure to support * * * is of such magnitude as to be the equivalent
of abandonment.” Gorski v. Myer, 5th Dist. Stark No.2005CA00033, 2005–Ohio–2604 at
paragraph 14. A probate judge has discretion to determine whether the biological parent
provided support as contemplated by R.C. 3107.07(A) “and his or her judgment should
not be tampered with absent an abuse of discretion.” In re Adoption of Bovett, 33 Ohio
St.3d 107, 515 N.E.2d 919 (1987).
{¶16} “Once the clear and convincing standard has been met to the satisfaction
of the probate court, the reviewing court must examine the record and determine if the
trier of fact had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy this burden of proof.” In re Adoption
of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 481 N.E.2d 613 (1985). The determination of the probate
court should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. Clear and convincing evidence is the “measure or degree of proof that will produce in
the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 6
established.” In re: Estate of Haynes, 25 Ohio St.3d 101, 495 N.E.2d 23 (1986) at
paragraph 24.
{¶17} With respect to a failure to support, the Ohio Supreme Court stated, “[t]he
question of whether justifiable cause for failure to pay child support has been proven by
clear and convincing evidence in a particular case is a determination for the probate court
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless such determination is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.” In re Adoption of M.B., 131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012–Ohio–236, 963
N.E.2d 142.
{¶18} Therefore, for appellants to prevail in this adoption proceeding without
appellee's consent, they must prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there has
been a failure of communication or support by appellee for the one-year period and (2)
the failure is unjustified.
{¶19} Appellants must also establish the failure to communicate or support was
without justifiable cause. If the petitioner meets his burden of proof, then the natural parent
has the burden of going forward with evidence to show some justifiable cause for his or
her failure to support or contact the child. However, the burden of proof never shifts from
the petitioner. In re Adoption of Bovett, 33 Ohio St.3d 102, 515 N.E.2d 919 (1987).
{¶20} In the case sub judice, the trial court found that appellee had
justifiable reasons for failing to provide support and maintenance. The trial court
noted that appellee had been incarcerated from August 23, 2015 until January 22,
2016 and then again from February 14, 2016 to April 19, 2016 and was unable to
pay support during such time. The trial court further found that after he was
released from prison and able to obtain employment in June of 2016, appellee tried Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 7
to contact appellants by telephone and Facebook, but that they did not answer his
calls and blocked him on Facebook. As noted by the trial court, appellants:
thus concealed not only [the child] from [appellee], but also themselves. In
order to visit with [the child] or provide support for [the child], [appellee] was
forced to avail himself of the judicial system. Therefore, he filed on August
5, 2016 a pro se Complaint for Parentage seeking a grant of reasonable
parenting time along with and (sic) Affidavit of Income and Expenses for
purposes of the court establishing a support order for [the child]. These are
not the actions of a parent abandoning his child.
{¶21} The trial court further emphasized that appellants had not sought support
from appellee either personally or otherwise.
{¶22} The trial court, as the trier of fact here, determines the weight and credibility
of the evidence. Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d
1273 (1984). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. Pons v. Ohio
State Medical Board, 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 614 N.E.2d 748 (1993). Here, the trial court
obviously chose to believe the testimony of appellee regarding why he did not support the
child. From his testimony, the trial court could conclude that his failure to support to the
child was justified due to significant discouragement of communication by appellants and,
for at least part of the time, due to lack of income. We find there is sufficient evidence to
support the trial court's decision.
{¶23} Appellants’ sole assignment of error is, therefore, overruled. Fairfield County, Case No. 17-CA-13 8
{¶24} Accordingly, the judgment of the Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas,
Probate Division, is affirmed.
By: Baldwin, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
John Wise, J. concur.