NOTICE 2019 IL App (4th) 190426-U This order was filed under Supreme FILED Court Rule 23 and may not be cited NO. 4-19-0426 November 15, 2019 as precedent by any party except in Carla Bender the limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re Adoption of J.J, a Minor, ) Appeal from the (Jack D. and Jodi D., ) Circuit Court of Petitioners-Appellees, ) Macon County v. ) No. 18AD13 John J., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) The Honorable ) Thomas E. Little, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court that terminated re- spondent’s parental rights because the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent, John J., is the father of J.J. (born February 2010) and G.J. (born July
2011). In October 2018, the trial court found respondent was an unfit parent, and in May 2019, it
found termination of respondent’s parental rights would be in the minors’ best interests. Re-
spondent appeals, arguing that the trial court’s (1) fitness determination and (2) best-interest de-
termination were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. The Petition for Adoption
¶5 In March 2018, petitioners Jodi D. and Jack D. filed a petition for adoption, which alleged (1) Jodi was the biological mother of J.J. and G.J., (2) Jodi had married Jack in August
2017, and (3) Jodi consented to his adoption of both children. The petition further alleged re-
spondent was the biological father of the children and was currently in the Macon County jail.
The petition asserted respondent was unfit and his parental rights should be terminated because
respondent had (1) abandoned the children and (2) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of in-
terest, concern, or responsibility as to the children’s welfare for a period in excess of two years.
¶6 Later in March 2018, respondent pro se filed an answer denying he was an unfit
parent or that his parental rights should be terminated. Subsequently, respondent sent a letter to
the trial court indicating (1) he was currently incarcerated in the Macon County jail and (2) he
desired an attorney but could not afford one. In May 2018, the trial court conducted a first ap-
pearance hearing. The court appointed an assistant public defender to represent respondent.
¶7 B. The Fitness Proceedings
¶8 In October 2018, the trial court conducted a termination hearing regarding re-
spondent’s parental fitness. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2016).
¶9 1. Petitioners’ Case
¶ 10 In petitioners’ case-in-chief, Jodi testified she was the mother of the minor chil-
dren, who were born in 2010 and 2011, and had been married to Jack since August 2017. She
was formerly married to respondent. She filed for divorce in 2013, and a circuit court entered a
judgment of dissolution of marriage in 2014 granting Jodi sole custody of both children and re-
serving the issue of visitation. Jodi stated she completed a “transparenting class as a part of that
case” and, to her knowledge, respondent did not, which is why the issue of visitation had to be
reserved. As far as she was aware, respondent never filed anything in the divorce case regarding
visitation, nor did anyone on his behalf.
-2- ¶ 11 Jodi further testified that she left respondent in January 2013 and took the chil-
dren with her. Since then, respondent had not (1) seen the children, (2) contacted Jodi to see the
children, (3) provided any financial or material support, or (4) sent the children letters, birthday
cards or gifts, or Christmas cards or gifts.
¶ 12 Jodi acknowledged that respondent visited J.J.’s school unannounced and met
with him in 2017. Jodi testified as follows:
“Last year [respondent] went to [J.J.]’s school because he had got [a] report [J.J.]
had a black eye he got from school. Whenever I went to the school, [J.J.] said he
had seen [respondent] and asked him who he was. He said he was his dad, and
[J.J.] said he turned around and went back to class because he was scared.”
¶ 13 Jodi testified that in 2015 she filed a petition for an order of protection and listed
herself and the children as protected parties. Respondent appeared and requested the children not
be included as protected parties because he wished to seek visitation. Jodi stated that the court in
that case informed respondent that he still needed to complete the parenting class, “and he would
have to file for visitation at another time and he still hasn’t done nothing.” Jodi further stated the
order of protection was extended in 2017 and she was unaware of any filing in that case in which
respondent sought visitation. Jodi said she had not heard from a lawyer or any third party con-
cerning visitation. She denied doing anything to prevent respondent from having visitation and
stated she had been living at the same address for the past four years.
¶ 14 Jodi testified that she was on Facebook but she had blocked respondent from be-
ing able to contact her because of the order of protection. However, Jodi was friends with re-
spondent’s sister and stated they communicated once every three to five months to talk about
how their children are doing. Jodi denied receiving any Facebook messages from anyone
-3- requesting respondent be allowed to see the children or for him to provide financial support for
them.
¶ 15 On cross-examination, Jodi acknowledged that the children were on the emer-
gency order of protection entered in the 2015 case and they were removed as protected parties a
little over six weeks later, after the plenary order of protection was entered. (The emergency or-
der of protection was entered on June 29, 2015, and the plenary order of protection was entered
on August 12, 2015.) Jodi agreed that the order of protection prevented respondent from contact-
ing her directly or indirectly about seeing the children, but she maintained he could have filed
documents with the court. Jodi stated she had not been contacted by respondent’s relatives, his
sister, his girlfriend, Ashley Fulk, or Jack about allowing visits with the children.
¶ 16 Following this testimony, petitioners rested.
¶ 17 2. Respondent’s Case
¶ 18 Ashley Fulk testified that she had been dating respondent since July 2015 and the
two had lived together in the past. Fulk stated she drove respondent to J.J.’s school when he
found out about the bruise on J.J.’s face. Fulk further stated respondent texted Jack about the sit-
uation but Jack told respondent “that Jodi said he wasn’t allowed to see the boys.”
¶ 19 On cross-examination, Fulk stated the text exchange occurred either in 2015 or
2016. Fulk acknowledged that respondent had been arrested for various felonies (most com-
monly aggravated battery of a pregnant person) in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. Fulk was the vic-
tim or a witness in several of those cases, at least one of which resulted in a plea agreement and
conviction.
¶ 20 Jack D. testified he was a petitioner in the case and believed he was a fit and
proper person to adopt the children. Jack admitted that he had been convicted of a felony in 2006
-4- and another in 1997. Jack further admitted he spent 61 days in prison in 2009. He testified that he
did not recall respondent ever trying to contact him. Jack indicated he did not remember Fulk’s
version of events regarding respondent’s efforts to contact Jack.
¶ 21 Respondent then asked the trial court to “take judicial notice of Macon County
case No. 13-F-34, more specifically the actions that occurred in that case on February 14 of 2013
and April the 1st of 2013.” The court stated as follows:
“I will take judicial notice of the contents of those two docket entries only.
On February 14, the docket entry reads: Plaintiff personally present pro se. De-
fendant personally present in custody of the sheriff. Motion by the plaintiff for a
continuance to seek counsel, motion allowed. Cause allotted for appearance of
counsel. Appearance of counsel set for April 1, 2013 at 9:00 in courtroom 3A.
And then on April 1, 2013: Plaintiff personally present in custody of the sheriff.
Defendant personally present pro se. Visitation shall be as follows: A) plaintiff to
have children every other weekend commencing Friday 6:00 p.m. to Sunday 6:00
p.m. April 26, 2013; B) plaintiff to have children every Thursday commencing
May 2, 2013, 7:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. That’s the contents of both of those entries.”
¶ 22 Respondent testified that prior to the entry of the divorce decree, he had been
granted visitation in Macon County case No. 13-F-34. Thereafter, a divorce decree was entered
that reserved the issue of visitation. Respondent stated he subsequently filed a motion in the 13-
F-34 case asking for further visitation. Respondent offered, and the trial court received, a copy of
that motion into evidence in the instant adoption case. Respondent stated that at the time he filed
the motion (which is dated August 3, 2017) in the 13-F-34 case, he was not allowed to have con-
tact with Jodi. The motion requested that the clerk send a copy of the motion to Jodi.
-5- ¶ 23 On cross-examination, respondent acknowledged he was in the Macon County jail
at the time he filed the motion. He stated he thought filing the motion was enough to get Jodi a
copy and to have a hearing. Respondent admitted he had been in prison since the motion was
filed. He further admitted he had never taken the required parenting class.
¶ 24 Respondent admitted he had been in and out of prison since 2013 for various of-
fenses. He explained that the periods of time that he was out were short and he did not have the
money to pay the fee for the class, and that was why he did not complete it. Respondent
acknowledged he was served in the divorce case and he never filed any motions seeking visita-
tion in that case. Respondent stated the motion admitted into evidence was the only thing he
filed.
¶ 25 Respondent admitted he had not seen G.J. since 2013 and he had only seen J.J.
once since 2013. Respondent stated the reason he had not seen them was because Jodi would not
let him. Respondent further stated he tried to send clothes and money to the children by giving
them to his sister to deliver. Respondent said Jodi’s “response to my sister was we don’t want
nothing from him.” He explained he chose that method of trying to contact his children because
Jodi had an order of protection against him and his children were seven and eight years old. Re-
spondent stated “[t]hat happened in 2015 and then periodically from time to time I have mes-
saged Jack asking if I could see my kids, if he could talk to her, and every time it’s—it went no-
where.”
¶ 26 On redirect, respondent stated he made “[a]t least seven” attempts to contact Jack
to see the children since 2015. Respondent rested.
¶ 27 Petitioners argued that they had proven respondent was unfit for failing to main-
tain a reasonable degree of interest or concern in the children. Respondent had not really made
-6- any effort to maintain contact or a relationship with the children and had only filed a single mo-
tion in 2017 in an attempt to get visitation. Petitioners acknowledged respondent was in and out
of prison, but they contended this demonstrated respondent had spent his time out of jail commit-
ting crimes instead of trying to have a relationship with his children.
¶ 28 Respondent argued that he had maintained a degree of interest and his efforts to
have a relationship had been effectively frustrated by Jodi. Respondent received a visitation or-
der in the 13-F-34 case, but the court entered an order reserving the issue of visitation just a year
later while respondent was in prison. Additionally, Jodi’s 2015 order of protection essentially
prevented him from contacting the children or setting up visitation because the children were so
young. Respondent acknowledged he only filed the one motion for visitation while in prison, but
he maintained his lack of legal sophistication was the reason.
¶ 29 3. The Trial Court’s Findings
¶ 30 The trial court began by noting that petitioners had the burden of proving by clear
and convincing evidence either one of the two grounds of unfitness alleged. The court stated that
paragraph seven of the petition alleged respondent was unfit for (1) abandoning the children and
(2) “failing to maintain any reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the
children’s welfare for a period in excess of two years.” The court then stated as follows:
“Court finds that *** the petitioners have proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the [respondent] is an unfit parent for the reasons set forth in paragraph
7 of the petition.
In support of my decision, I do find the testimony of [Jodi] to be credible.
He’s had almost no contact with these kids for years. I don’t find based on the tes-
timony that I heard that although there was an order of protection that this in any
-7- way prohibited him from seeing these children.
He could have gone through the court. The fact that he was in and out of
[prison] is a matter of his own creation so I do find that he is an unfit parent.”
¶ 31 C. The Best-Interests Proceedings
¶ 32 In May 2019, the trial court conducted proceedings regarding whether it was in
the minor children’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Jodi testified consist-
ently with her prior testimony regarding the amount of contact respondent had with the children.
That is, Jodi testified respondent had essentially never contacted the children either personally or
through another person since he last saw them in 2013. Jodi testified that the children were one
and two when respondent last saw them.
¶ 33 Jodi further testified that she began dating Jack in January 2014. She introduced
the children to him gradually, beginning two months after they began dating. Jack moved in with
Jodi in April 2014, and the two were married in August 2017.
¶ 34 Jodi stated Jack and the children had formed a bond since they have been residing
together. Jack takes the children on bike rides, to the park, and regularly visits them at school.
Jodi reported Jack had “never missed any student parent teacher conferences. He’s always there
with the [children].” Jodi stated the children refer to Jack as “dad” and agreed they had a “genu-
ine loving bond and close connection.” Based on her observations of their interactions, Jodi had
no concerns and believed they loved each other.
¶ 35 Regarding respondent, Jodi testified the children do not ask to see him or how he
is doing. The last time either boy asked about respondent was when respondent unexpectedly
showed up at J.J.’s school. Jodi explained that J.J. did not recognize respondent and asked her
who he was. Jodi “told him that [respondent] was his biological father, and [J.J.] said he was
-8- scared and he just turned around and went back to class.”
¶ 36 On cross-examination, Jodi admitted respondent obtained an order for visitation
in 2013, but she repeatedly denied that she had prevented respondent from having visitation or
from contacting the children. She also admitted she obtained an order of protection in 2015 that
included the children, but she explained the children were subsequently removed and respondent
could have (1) filed something in court or (2) contacted the children through Jack or his sister.
Jodi denied that respondent’s sister had ever spoken to her about respondent seeing the children
other than telling Jodi “it’s best that [respondent] doesn’t see the kids.”
¶ 37 Jack testified that the children were “[l]ike they’re my own. It didn’t start out that
way but here recently—well, the last four or five years we’ve gotten better, you know I’m more
daddy than I am Jack.” He stated the children originally called him “Jack” but naturally, over
time, they started calling him “dad.” Jack testified that he taught the boys how to ride bikes, he
takes them fishing and to the park, and they do “just everything my dad did with me.” Jack stated
he and Jodi had a four-year-old girl together and he treats J.J. and G.J. the same way he treats his
biological daughter.
¶ 38 Jack further testified that he had never received any mail, letters, cards, or pack-
ages addressed to the children from respondent or anyone in respondent’s family in the five years
he lived with Jodi. Jack stated he had spoken with the children about his adopting them and they
were excited to change their last names and wanted to be adopted.
¶ 39 Nina Walker testified she was in a relationship with Jodi’s father and had lived
with him for the past four years. Based upon that relationship, Walker had become familiar with
Jodi, Jack, and their children. Walker stated she sees them about once a week be it at each
other’s houses or in public. Walker testified J.J. and G.J. have a father-son relationship with Jack
-9- and they call him “dad.” The children and Jack display affection towards each other, and Walker
believed they had a “close loving relationship.” Walker had seen Jack discipline the children but
never saw any inappropriate or concerning behavior. Walker had never heard the children speak
about respondent.
¶ 40 Ruby Henderson was the last witness to testify for petitioners. Henderson testified
she was the director of the after-school program for the YMCA in Decatur, Illinois, and had
worked in that capacity for 25 years. She knew petitioners and the children, who had been in the
program for the past two years. Henderson stated she was surprised when she was asked to tes-
tify in the case because she did not realize Jack was not the children’s biological father.
¶ 41 Henderson testified that Jack picks the kids up daily and they are always “ex-
cited” to see each other. Henderson stated she or other staff at the YMCA have had to inform
Jack when the children have misbehaved and Jack has contacted them about behavior problems.
Jack was receptive when informed of any incidents. Henderson stated she had seen Jack interact
with the children when they got in trouble. Henderson explained that the children did not have
“tremendous behavior problems,” and were in fact “happy, well-behaved, well-adjusted little
kids.” Henderson stated she was a “mandated reporter” and had never seen anything that gave
her concerns or made her feel like she should contact DCFS or law enforcement.
¶ 42 Respondent testified on his own behalf. He testified that he lived with Jodi for be-
tween three and four years after the children were born. Respondent acknowledged that he was
arrested and spent a few months in county jail for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI),
after the children were born, but he did not spend time in prison. He and Jodi separated before he
went to prison and got divorced while he was in prison.
¶ 43 Respondent stated he did not contest the divorce and believed that the issue of
- 10 - custody had been set aside. The first time after the divorce that visitation came up was during the
order of protection proceedings. Respondent was in prison between January 2013 and July 2015.
During that time, Jodi never brought the children to see him. Respondent stated he wrote Jodi
once a month asking about the children but she did not respond.
¶ 44 Respondent explained that he had filed for custody of the children in 2013 before
he went to jail. However, he went to jail for a DUI during the proceedings. Nonetheless, while he
was in jail, he was able to get an order for visitation in the custody case. In May 2013, respond-
ent went from jail to prison, which was in a different county. Jodi never honored the visitation
order, nor did she respond to his several requests for her to bring the children to see him.
¶ 45 Respondent testified that between 2013 and 2014, he spoke with his children on
the phone when they were visiting respondent’s father on the weekends, which occurred fre-
quently. Respondent also sent them Christmas gifts and birthday cards. In 2015, he asked his sis-
ter to speak with Jodi, but his sister reported back that Jodi told her “she didn’t want nothing to
do with” respondent. Respondent explained that he was trying to find out the children’s shoe and
clothing size so he could purchase them clothes, but he could not speak with Jodi because she
had filed for an order of protection. Respondent stated he was served with the order of protection
the day before he was released.
¶ 46 Respondent stated he was present in August 2015 when the children were re-
moved from the order of protection, but Jodi never let him see the children. Respondent ex-
plained he did not try to enforce the visitation order he had in place because he did not know it
was still in effect. Respondent stated he asked to see the children several times and spoke with
Jack. Respondent tried to call Jack and contact him on Facebook.
¶ 47 Respondent testified that his plan was to save money for an attorney to help him
- 11 - get visitation but he ended up getting arrested. Respondent said he went back to prison in No-
vember 2015 for domestic battery. He was released in March 2016 but went back for domestic
battery. Respondent stated he filed a motion for visitation in 2017. He explained he did not know
he had to do anything else to get a hearing until he appeared in the instant adoption case. Re-
spondent was expecting to be released in February 2020.
¶ 48 On cross-examination, respondent admitted he was guilty of DUI but denied that
he had committed any of the domestic violence offenses. Respondent admitted he pleaded guilty,
but he claimed he did so because his attorney advised him he would receive a longer sentence if
he went to trial. Respondent claimed the victim in those cases, a mother of a different one of re-
spondent’s children, lied because he was cheating on her. Respondent stated that he cared about
his children and he loved them. He stated that if he did not care, he would have ignored the adop-
tion case and would not have bothered to fight it.
¶ 49 The trial court found that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate re-
spondent’s parental rights. The court explained that it found the petitioners’ witnesses, including
the petitioners themselves, to be credible. The court stated it had reviewed the factors listed in
705 ILCS 405/1-3 (4.05) (West 2016). The court stated it found the most applicable factors to be
“the children’s sense of attachment, where they feel a sense of love, being valued, their sense of
security, their sense of familiarity and continuity, and the least disruptive placement for the chil-
dren.” The court also considered the “children’s need for permanence including their need for
stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives”
to be particularly important.
¶ 50 The court noted that the testimony presented by the petitioners particularly re-
flected that terminating respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. The court
- 12 - found those witnesses to be credible and found that they all testified that Jack had a strong bond
with the children and acted as their father. The court noted Jack and Jodi had a daughter and Jack
treated the children the same as his biological child. The court found Henderson to be “very
credible” and noted she testified that they children were “very happy and well-adjusted.”
¶ 51 The trial court also noted that it believed that respondent was sincere and telling
the truth that he loved his children and cared about them. The court also did not believe his crim-
inal history was particularly relevant to the issue before the court. Nonetheless, the court be-
lieved respondent had not established that there was much of a “sound and stable relationship”
between respondent and the children. Accordingly, the court found it was in J.J. and G.J.’s best
interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 52 This appeal followed.
¶ 53 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 54 Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court’s (1) fitness determination and
(2) best-interest determination were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 55 A. Appellees’ Failure To File a Brief
¶ 56 We initially note that petitioners have not filed a brief in this appeal. A reviewing
court will not act as an advocate for a party who fails to file an appellate brief. Diane P. v. M.R.,
2016 IL App (3d) 150312, ¶ 9, 55 N.E.3d 208. However, when the record is clear and the claimed
errors can be decided without the aid of an appellate brief, a reviewing court should decide the
appeal on the merits. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128,
133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976). Because these criteria apply here, this court will proceed to the
merits of this case.
- 13 - ¶ 57 B. The Fitness Determination
¶ 58 Respondent argues the trial court’s findings that petitioners proved both grounds
of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
It is well settled that “[a]s the grounds for unfitness are independent, the trial court’s judgment
may be affirmed if the evidence supports the finding of unfitness on any one of the alleged statu-
tory grounds.” In re H.D., 343 Ill. App. 3d 483, 493, 797 N.E.2d 1112, 1120 (2003). Based on
our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s finding that respondent failed to main-
tain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the welfare of the children was
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we discuss only that finding.
¶ 59 1. The Standard of Review
¶ 60 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility de-
terminations that the trial court is in the best position to make. In re Richard H., 376 Ill. App. 3d
162, 165, 875 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (2007). A trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be
reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 417,
752 N.E.2d 1112, 1119 (2001). A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence when
the opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result. In re Nylani M., 2016 IL App (1st) 152262,
¶ 48, 51 N.E.3d 1067.
¶ 61 2. Reasonable Progress
¶ 62 The adoption of a minor child generally requires the consent of both parents. 750
ILCS 50/8(a) (West 2016). However, consent is not required if the trial court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, a parent to be an unfit person, as defined by the Adoption Act. Id. The bur-
den is on those petitioning for adoption to prove parental unfitness. In re Adoption of L.T.M., 214
Ill. 2d 60, 67-68, 824 N.E.2d 221, 226 (2005). Section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act defines an
- 14 - unfit person as a parent who fails “to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or respon-
sibility as to the child’s welfare.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2016). “Unfitness by reason of
failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the child’s wel-
fare is self-explanatory, and it is the parent’s efforts to carry out parental responsibilities, rather
than their success, which should be considered.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Adop-
tion of C.A.P., 373 Ill. App. 3d 423, 428, 869 N.E.2d 214, 219 (2007). “The parent may be found
unfit for failing to maintain either interest, or concern, or responsibility; proof of all three is not
required.” In re Richard H., 376 Ill. App. 3d at 166.
¶ 63 The First District, relying on the supreme court’s decision in In re Adoption of
Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 562 N.E.2d 174 (1990), has set forth the circumstances to consider when
determining whether a parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest or concern as
follows:
“[T]he parent’s difficulty in obtaining transportation to the child’s residence, the
parent’s poverty, the actions and statements of others that hinder or discourage
visitation, and whether the parent’s failure to visit the child was motivated by a
need to cope with other aspects of his or her life or by true indifference. Syck, 138
Ill. 2d at 279, 562 N.E.2d 185. ‘If personal visits with the child are somehow im-
practical, letters, telephone calls, and gifts to the child or those caring for the child
may demonstrate a reasonable degree of concern, interest and responsibility, de-
pending on the content, tone and frequency of those contacts under the circum-
stances.’ Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at 279, 562 N.E.2d 185.” C.A.P., 373 Ill. App. 3d at
428.
Cases of parental unfitness are sui generis; however, comparison to similar cases is a valid
- 15 - consideration. Id. “Such a comparison reveals that ‘where the courts of our State have upheld the
finding of a parent’s unfitness on the ground of failure to maintain a reasonable degree of inter-
est, concern, or responsibility as to a child’s welfare, or in cases where a contrary finding has
been reversed, the parents involved have made comparatively fewer attempts to contact their
children over comparatively longer periods’ ” Id. (quoting Davis v. Bughdadi, 120 Ill. App. 3d
236, 243, 458 N.E.2d 177, 181 (1983)).
¶ 64 3. The Trial Court’s Finding in This Case
¶ 65 Here, the trial court found Jodi’s testimony to be credible. Jodi testified that re-
spondent had not seen G.J. at all since 2013 and only saw J.J. once, when he unexpectedly ap-
peared at school. Even then, J.J. did not know who respondent was and was afraid of him. Fur-
ther, Jodi testified that respondent had not sent gifts, letters, cards, or other financial assistance to
the children since she left in January 2013. Although respondent testified that he attempted to
contact the children through Jack and attempted to give them clothes and money through his sis-
ter, Jodi and Jack denied such attempts were ever made. The trial court believed Jodi that no ef-
forts were made, and respondent’s failure to present any evidence corroborating his efforts sup-
ports her statements. Nothing in the record suggests the trial court’s decision to credit petition-
ers’ testimony was improper.
¶ 66 Further, although petitioners bore the burden of proof by clear and convincing ev-
idence, the trial court clearly could have believed (and did) that they met that burden and ac-
cepted Jodi, Jack, and Fulk’s testimony as true. Fulk testified to only two instances of contact by
respondent: (1) the school visit and (2) texts to Jack. Even if the trial court believed respondent,
by his own admission, he testified that he attempted to contact Jack just seven times since 2015.
He only asked his sister one time to give clothes and money to his kids via Jodi. The trial court
- 16 - specifically found “[respondent has] had almost no contact with these kids for years.” In short,
irrespective of the fact that his attempts at communication were unsuccessful, his sheer lack of
attempts demonstrates a lack of reasonable degree of interest.
¶ 67 Additionally, although respondent had obstacles that made maintaining an interest
in his children more difficult, those obstacles were not insurmountable or unrelated to his own
behavior. The trial court also specifically found that the order of protection did not “in any way
prohibit[ ] him from seeing these children,” because respondent “could have gone through the
court.” The court also noted that “[t]he fact that he was in and out of [prison] is a matter of his
own creation.” These findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Although
respondent could not visit the children in person, he could have attempted other forms of com-
munication such as written correspondence and phone calls. To the extent he needed court assis-
tance to establish these methods of communication, he could have filed motions in his divorce
case, which the court that entered the order of protection told him was a necessary step to receive
visitation. Respondent also filed a motion for visitation in the 2013 family case. However, he
filed the motion only in 2017 and never followed up to ensure the matter was heard. Although
prison is not an easy place to live, respondent had plenty of time to write the children and figure
out the proper legal mechanism for obtaining visitation or regular communication.
¶ 68 Based upon the foregoing, we conclude the trial court’s determination that re-
spondent failed to maintain a reasonable level of interest or concern for J.J. and G.J.’s welfare
was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 69 C. The Best-Interest Determination
¶ 70 1. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 71 At the best-interest stage of a termination proceeding, the State bears the burden
- 17 - of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s
best interest. In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071, 918 N.E.2d 284, 290-91 (2009). In
reaching a best-interest determination, the trial court must consider, within the context of the
child’s age and developmental needs, the following factors:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s
identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties;
(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continu-
ity of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s
wishes and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need
for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships
with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child;
(9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person avail-
able to care for the child.” In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072, 859
N.E.2d 123, 141 (2006); see also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2016).
¶ 72 A reviewing court affords great deference to a trial court’s best-interest finding
because the trial court is in the superior position to view the witnesses and judge their credibility.
In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1070. An appellate court “will not reverse the trial court’s best-
interest determination unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. at 1071. A
best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly
demonstrate that the trial court should have reached the opposite result. Id.
¶ 73 2. This Case
¶ 74 The evidence presented at the best interest hearing (and summarized by the court
in its oral ruling) clearly supports a finding that it was in J.J. and G.J.’s best interest to terminate
- 18 - respondent’s parental rights. Jodi testified that the children called Jack “dad” and that he was the
only dad they had known. She stated that they had lived together for four years and had estab-
lished a loving relationship. Jack was actively involved in the children’s lives. Jack testified sim-
ilarly and stated he did everything with J.J. and G.J. that his father had done with him. Moreover,
as the trial court noted, Jodi and Jack had a four-year-old daughter together and Jack treated J.J.
and G.J. the same way he treated his biological child.
¶ 75 Walker testified she was in a long-term relationship with Jodi’s father and saw pe-
titioners and the children regularly. Walker noted that the children never spoke of respondent and
treated Jack as their father. Henderson testified that she was surprised to learn Jack was not the
children’s biological father. He always picked them up, was involved in their care and discipline,
and the children had happy, healthy, and normal lives. Henderson also noted she was required by
law to report certain types of conduct to DCFS and law enforcement, had been director of the af-
ter-school program for 25 years, and had no reservations about the way Jack interacted with the
children.
¶ 76 By contrast, respondent had spent the vast majority of his children’s lives in
prison. Although it is true Jodi got an order of protection against respondent in 2015, his children
were only included in the order for six weeks. He had not seen the children at all since 2013 and
only saw J.J. once when he unexpectedly showed up at school and J.J. did not recognize him. Re-
spondent testified he sent cards and gifts to the children in 2013 and 2014 and requested Jodi
bring them to visit him in prison but she refused. In short, even given the context that it was ad-
mittedly difficult for respondent to maintain contact with the children, the undisputed record
shows that he had no ongoing relationship with them at all. Accordingly, we conclude the trial
court’s finding that it was in J.J. and G.J.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights
- 19 - was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 77 We thank the trial court for its careful consideration of the testimony and detailed
oral findings, which this court found particularly helpful to the resolution of this case.
¶ 78 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 79 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 80 Affirmed.
- 20 -