In re Adoption of G.A.J.
Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
DEFIANCE COUNTY
IN RE: CASE NO. 4-23-15 THE ADOPTION OF:
G.A.J.
OPINION
[JACOB J. - APPELLANT]
Appeal from Defiance County Common Pleas Court Probate Division
Trial Court No. 2063
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: April 9, 2024
APPEARANCES:
W. Alex Smith for Appellant Danny A. Hill, II for Appellee
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Respondent-appellant, Jacob J. (“Jacob”), appeals the decision of the Defiance County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, (“Defiance County Probate Court”) concluding that his consent to Petitioner-appellee, Derek F.’s (“Derek”) petition to adopt G.A.J. was not necessary. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} G.A.J. was born in March 2014 to Rebecca J. (“Rebecca”) and Jacob.
Rebecca and Jacob were formerly married to each other, and Jacob is listed as G.A.J.’s father on the birth certificate.
{¶3} On May 5, 2023, Derek filed a petition for adoption of G.A.J. in the Defiance County Probate Court together with Rebecca’s consent to the adoption. In his petition, Derek asserts that Jacob’s consent to the adoption is not necessary because “[Jacob] failed without justifiable cause to provide for the maintenance and support of [G.A.J.] as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the adoption petition [].” (Doc. No. 4). The one-year “look back” period as to Jacob’s support of G.A.J. in this adoption is May 5, 2022 to May 6, 2023.
{¶4} The Defiance County Probate Court scheduled the matter for a “consent not required” hearing on June 10, 2023, which was later continued until August 2, 2023.
{¶5} On July 21, 2023, Derek filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the adoption petition had been served on Jacob on June 14, 2023, and that Jacob had not filed his objection within the 14-day period for objections pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(K).
{¶6} Thereafter, the trial court appointed an attorney to represent Jacob who promptly filed an objection to the petition for adoption on August 10, 2023. In his objection, Jacob argued that he had not unjustifiably failed to provide maintenance and support for G.A.J. He further objected to the lack of the required language contained in the notice under R.C. 3107.11.1
{¶7} On August 15, 2023, Derek filed an amended petition for adoption of G.A.J. (Doc. No. 29). In his amended petition, Derek asserted two additional grounds as to why Jacob’s consent was not required in addition to Jacob’s failure to provide maintenance and support for G.A.J. Specifically, Derek averred that Jacob failed to “timely register[] pursuant to R.C. 3107.062 as a putative father of [G.A.J.]” and that he “failed to timely file an objection to the adoption petition pursuant to R.C. 3107.07(K) [].” (Doc. No. 29).
{¶8} On August 16, 2023, the Clerk of Court filed a second “Notice of Hearing on Petition for Adoption” (Form 18.2), which contained a certification by
1 The Defiance County Probate Court utilized a form with language from a prior version of R.C. 3107.11 effective from April 7, 2009 to September 29, 2021, and thus, said form was missing the following statutory language set forth in current version R.C. 3107.11, effective September 30, 2021, “WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DIVISION (A)(1)(b) OF SECTION 3107.15 OF THE REVISED CODE”.
the deputy clerk that the notice was sent by certified mail to Jacob at the same Napoleon address as the prior notice. This notice contained the current statutory language in R.C. 3107.11, effective September 30, 2021.
{¶9} Jacob’s attorney filed an objection to the amended petition for adoption.
In his objection, Jacob argued that he does provide maintenance and support for G.A.J. including health insurance; that his failure to file within the 14-day period is excusable since he argues that the notice was insufficient (on its face) because it lacked the statutory language required under R.C. 3107.11; and that he was not required to register with the Putative Father Registry since he was married to Rebecca at the time G.A.J. was born.
{¶10} On September 7, 2023, the trial court issued its judgment entry determining that Jacob failed to object to the adoption petition within the 14-day period for objections required by R.C. 3107.07(K). Then, the “consent not required” hearing was vacated, and the matter was scheduled for a “best interests” hearing on the petition for adoption. Thereafter, the trial court vacated the “best interest” hearing pending the outcome of this appeal.
{¶11} Jacob filed a timely notice of appeal raising one assignment of error for our review.
Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by granting adoption applicant’s summary judgment motion.
{¶12} In his assignment of error, Jacob argues that the trial court erred by granting Derek’s motion for summary judgment. In particular, he challenges the trial court’s determination that his consent to Derek’s petition for adoption is not required because the notice he received from the trial court was defective on its face.
Standard of Review
{¶13} We review a decision to grant summary judgment de novo. Doe v.
Shaffer, 90 Ohio St.3d 388, 390 (2000). “De novo review is independent and without deference to the trial court's determination.” ISHA, Inc. v. Risser, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-12-47, 2013-Ohio-2149, ¶ 25. Summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable minds can reach but one conclusion when viewing the evidence in favor of the non-moving party, and the conclusion is adverse to the non-moving party. State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1994). Material facts are those facts “‘that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’” Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340 (1993), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). “Whether a genuine issue exists is answered by the following inquiry: [d]oes the evidence present ‘a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury’ or is it ‘so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law[?]’” Id., quoting Anderson at 251-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
{¶14} “The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of producing some evidence which demonstrates the lack of a genuine issue of material fact.” Carnes v. Siferd, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-88, 2011-Ohio-4467, ¶ 13, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). “In doing so, the moving party is not required to produce any affirmative evidence, but must identify those portions of the record which affirmatively support his argument.” Id., citing Dresher at 292. “The non-moving party must then rebut with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine triable issue; he may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Id., citing Dresher at 292 and Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶15} Material facts are those facts “that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Turner v. Turner, 67 Ohio St.3d 337, 340 (1993) citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986). “Whether a genuine issue exists is answered by the following inquiry: Does the evidence present ‘a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury’ or is it ‘so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law[?]’” Id., citing Anderson at 251-252.
Consent to Adoption
{¶16} Certain persons and entities must consent to an adoption, including the father of the minor child. In re Adoption of N.F., 3d Dist. Logan Nos. 8-19-39 and 8-19-40, 2019-Ohio-5380, ¶ 8, citing In re T.L.S., 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2012-
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