NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250392-U FILED This Order was filed under October 28, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-0392 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re Adoption of D.G., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (Case M. and Brittney M., ) Ford County Petitioners-Appellees, ) No. 24AD1 v. ) Cory G., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Matthew J. Fitton, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and Grischow concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: (1) Respondent was not denied his right to counsel; (2) the unfitness finding was not erroneous; and (3) any error in failing to bifurcate the fitness and best-interest hearings was harmless.
¶2 Respondent Cory G. appeals from a judgment of the trial court terminating his
parental rights and allowing his son D.G. to be adopted by petitioner Case M., D.G.’s stepfather.
Respondent argues that (1) he was denied his right to counsel where appointed counsel did not
communicate with him and the court denied a continuance for him to retain counsel, (2) the
unfitness finding was erroneous, and (3) the court erred in failing to bifurcate the fitness and
best-interest portions of the hearing. Petitioners argue that this court lacks jurisdiction. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 D.G. was born to petitioner Brittney M. and respondent in 2018. The two were
never married, but respondent was listed on the birth certificate as D.G.’s father. Subsequently, respondent was incarcerated, and Brittney married petitioner Case M.
¶5 In February 2024, Brittney and Case (collectively petitioners) filed a petition for
adoption requesting that the trial court terminate respondent’s parental rights and allow Case to
become D.G.’s adoptive father. The petition alleged that respondent was an unfit parent pursuant
to section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2024)) because he was
depraved (1) in that he had been convicted of at least three felonies, with at least one of those
convictions occurring in the last five years, and (2) due to an ongoing course of conduct, including
the aforementioned convictions, as well as a pattern of domestic abuse evidenced by numerous
orders of protection and violations of those same orders.
¶6 In March 2024, respondent, pro se, filed responsive pleadings that requested,
among other things, the appointment of counsel. Attorney Harvey Welch of the Ford County
Public Defender’s Office was appointed as respondent’s counsel.
¶7 Afterwards, a pleading from respondent was filed that was evidently mailed on
December 4, 2024, and file-stamped by the clerk on January 6, 2025. The pleading stated that
respondent had previously filed a request for substitution of counsel in November 2024 due to
appointed counsel’s alleged conflict of interest and ineffective assistance. Further, it asserted, “[I]n
no way is Harvey Welch permitted to represent [respondent] and is fired/barred from doing so.”
Respondent then requested that his pending pleadings be “heard pro-se or adopted *** [and] heard
*** with appropriate counsel.” The record does not reflect a November 2024 filing for substitution
of counsel, but we take judicial notice that there is a filing in the related Ford County case No. 20-
OP-22, dated November 18, 2024, stating, “Entry of appearance for counsel PRO SE.”
¶8 An order of habeas corpus issued for respondent’s appearance, and on February
20, 2025, the trial court held a hearing on the adoption petition with respondent in court.
-2- Respondent informed the court that he did not want his appointed counsel to represent him, citing
alleged issues in a previous matter. Welch confirmed respondent’s representation that the two had
not spoken about this case, noting that his office had received communication that respondent did
not wish to be represented by him. The court found no basis to conclude that appointed counsel
was incompetent or incapable of handling the matter. Respondent sought a three-to-four-month
continuance to obtain private counsel, but he admitted that he had not previously contacted any
attorneys about possibly representing him. The court denied the request. Respondent waived
appointed counsel and proceeded pro se. Throughout the proceedings, respondent continuously
objected, and the court repeatedly overruled, the denial of his request for a continuance to seek
private counsel.
¶9 During the hearing, petitioners submitted evidence of respondent’s prior
convictions. This included a (1) certified sentencing order following respondent’s guilty plea to a
violation of an order of protection (a Class 4 felony) in Ford County case No. 20-CF-40;
(2) certified copy of a conditions of probation order for criminal trespass to residence (a Class 4
felony) in Peoria County case No. 14-CF-106; and (3) certified copy of the bills of indictment and
sentencing order following a jury’s finding of guilt for (a) home invasion (a Class X felony);
(b) domestic battery (a Class 4 felony); and (c) violation of an order of protection (a Class 4 felony)
in Peoria County case No. 21-CF-824. Respondent objected on the basis that there was a pending
appeal in case No. 21-CF-824, but that objection was overruled. Also introduced were a certified
probation order for unlawful possession of a converted motor vehicle (a Class 2 felony) in
Tazewell County case No. 14-CF-494 and a certified sentencing order for criminal trespass,
domestic violence (a Class 6 felony under Arizona law) in Pima County, Arizona, case No.
CR20151041-001. Additionally, petitioners submitted multiple orders of protection that had been
-3- entered against respondent over the years and an inmate status lookup on the Illinois Department
of Corrections’ website for respondent that showed his projected parole date as January 17, 2035.
¶ 10 After both petitioners and respondent testified, the trial court gave its ruling. It
considered the exhibits and testimony and found that both the statutory and common-law
definitions of depravity had been proven. The court granted the petition and stated that it would
make a docket entry of its judgment but asked petitioners’ counsel to draft and submit a written
order. Counsel for petitioners stated he would see if he had an order that “works.” The hearing
concluded with the court commenting on petitioners’ counsel using “White Out” and whether he
needed a pen. The docket sheet in the record contains an entry dated February 24, 2025, that states
“Judgment of Adoption entered, See judgment.” The docket entry does not indicate that the
judgment had already been filed.
¶ 11 This appeal followed.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, respondent argues that (1) he was denied his right to counsel where
appointed counsel did not communicate with him and the trial court denied his request for a
continuance to retain substitute counsel, (2) the unfitness finding was erroneous, and (3) the court
erred in failing to bifurcate the fitness and best-interest portions of the hearing. Petitioners argue
that this court lacks jurisdiction.
¶ 14 A. Jurisdiction
¶ 15 We first address petitioners’ jurisdictional argument. See R.W. Dunteman Co. v.
C/G Enterprises, Inc., 181 Ill. 2d 153, 159 (1998) (“A reviewing court must be certain of its
jurisdiction prior to proceeding in a cause of action.”). Appellate jurisdiction is a question of law
that we review de novo. People v. Salem, 2016 IL 118693, ¶ 11.
-4- ¶ 16 Petitioners object to the timeliness of the notice of appeal filed by respondent’s
appellate counsel on March 25, 2025. The timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory and
jurisdictional. Village of Chatham v. Springfield Airport Authority, 2025 IL App (4th) 241112,
¶ 15. A notice of appeal is timely when it is filed “within 30 days after the entry of the final
judgment appealed from.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017). Because the trial court here
required the submission of a draft judgment order when announcing judgment, “the judgment
[became] final only when the signed judgment [wa]s filed.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 272 (eff. Jan. 1, 2018).
As such, the parties’ dispute turns on whether “entry of the final judgment” occurred on February
20, 2025 (the date reflected on the file stamp of the judgment order itself), or February 24, 2025
(the date reflected on the court docket).
¶ 17 Petitioners have this to say about the discrepancy:
“Appellant’s Statement of Jurisdiction is falsified and wrongful. Appellant
states ‘The circuit clerk entered a final appealable order terminating respondent’s
parental rights on February 24, 2025. [Citation.] This statement is false as the
Circuit Clerk entered and file-stamped the Judgment of Adoption on February 20,
2025, NOT February 24, 2025. [Citation.] Appellant’s citation to the Record at C2
is to the Common Law Record created by himself and including the same
falsehood.” (Emphasis in original.)
¶ 18 Petitioners’ accusation that the common-law record was “created by [respondent]”
is itself factually incorrect; the common-law record was prepared and certified as accurate by the
circuit clerk. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 324 (eff. July 1, 2017). And while the record on appeal is presumed
to be true and correct, that presumption can be rebutted when the record is contradictory, given
that no system of recordkeeping is foolproof. Ill. S. Ct. R. 329 (eff. July 1, 2017) (providing for
-5- the correction of the record); see People v. Wear, 371 Ill. App. 3d 517, 525 (2007), aff’d, 229 Ill.
2d 545 (2008) (noting that an inaccuracy in the record can be corrected by reference to another
part of the record).
¶ 19 Here, in addition to the file-stamped judgment of adoption, the record includes the
February 24, 2025, docket entry stating, “Judgment of Adoption entered,” as well as the table of
contents, which identifies the filing date of the judgment as February 24, 2025. See Supreme Court
of Illinois, Standards and Requirements for Electronic Filing the Record on Appeal (eff. Jan. 1,
2021) (providing that the table of contents was required to “identify the filing date of each
document”). Given the conflicting information we have received from the circuit clerk, this may
present the exceptional situation where the file stamp fails to reflect the date the order was actually
placed in the court file and therefore entered as a matter of public record under the
public-expression doctrine. See People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927, ¶ 20 (citing Commonwealth
Loan Co. v. Baker, 67 Ill. App. 2d 359 (1966)). As such, respondent’s claim that the circuit clerk
entered the judgment on this date cannot be described as “falsified” or “wrongful.”
¶ 20 Where the evidentiary support for our jurisdiction is conflicting, it can be
appropriate to remand for the trial court to resolve the uncertainty. Ill. S. Ct. R. 329 (eff. July 1,
2017); People v. Jones, 2025 IL App (2d) 250003, ¶ 26 (remanding under Rule 329 to resolve a
material contradiction between a written order and corresponding docket entry). Under the
circumstances of this case, however, a remand is unnecessary because we agree with the alternative
basis for jurisdiction advanced in respondent’s reply brief.
¶ 21 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides that “[t]he notice
of appeal may be filed by any party or by any attorney representing the party appealing, regardless
of whether that attorney has filed an appearance in the circuit court case being appealed.”
-6- (Emphasis added.) Respondent was a self-represented party before the trial court and was
incarcerated and exempt from e-filing (Ill. S. Ct. R. 9(d)(1)(A) (eff. Sept. 1, 2024)), so “the time
of mailing” his notice of appeal “shall be deemed the time of filing,” even though the circuit clerk
did not receive the notice of appeal until April 2, 2025, i.e., after the due date. Ill. S. Ct. R. 373
(eff. Feb. 1, 2024). Because respondent mailed his notice of appeal on March 10, 2025, and
included a certificate that complied with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(6) (eff. July 1, 2017),
his notice of appeal was timely and sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this court whether the
judgment of adoption was entered on February 20 or 24, 2025. People v. English, 2023 IL 128077,
¶ 36. As such, we will consider respondent’s arguments on the merits.
¶ 22 We do pause to note that this decision was due “within 150 days after the filing of
the notice of appeal” absent a finding of good cause. Ill. S. Ct. R. 311(a) (eff. July 1, 2018). In this
case, it is not immediately clear whether the 150-day clock started on March 10, March 25, or
April 2, 2025. Assuming without deciding that this decision is overdue, we nevertheless find good
cause for the delay because technical issues prevented this court from receiving either notice of
appeal from the circuit clerk until April 23, 2025.
¶ 23 B. Right to Counsel
¶ 24 Next, we address respondent’s contentions that he was denied his right to counsel.
¶ 25 1. The Right to Appointed Counsel Under the Adoption Act
¶ 26 The United States Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amendment does not
“require[ ] the appointment of counsel in every parental termination proceeding” brought by the
State, but “due process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination
proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate
review.” Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
-7- ¶ 27 However, section 1-5(1) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act)
(705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2024)) provides that any indigent parent who is alleged to be unfit by
the State has the right to appointed counsel on request. This blanket right exists “not because the
due process clause of the Illinois or United States Constitutions mandates it, but because the
legislature has chosen to guarantee the assistance of counsel to indigent parents rather than
requiring courts to engage in the case-by-case determination” of whether the appointment of
counsel is necessary as a matter of due process. In re Adoption of K.L.P., 198 Ill. 2d 448, 461
(2002); see Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31 (explaining that the trial court must ordinarily weigh the
competing interests of the parent and the State under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
¶ 28 Despite a discrepancy between the language of the Juvenile Court Act and the
Adoption Act, we have employed the same analysis to the right to appointed counsel under both.
See In re Adoption of L.T.M., 214 Ill. 2d 60, 78 (2005) (finding the right to “appointed counsel
under the Adoption Act as well”); see also 750 ILCS 50/2.1 (West 2024) (providing that the acts
“shall be construed in concert”). Furthermore, because “the statutory right to counsel in
proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act *** is closely linked to its constitutional counterpart” in
criminal cases, we often look to criminal cases as a guide for our analysis. In re Br. M., 2021 IL
125969, ¶ 42.
¶ 29 2. Respondent’s Right to Counsel
¶ 30 Respondent argues as follows:
“The failure of appointed counsel to communicate with the respondent
rendered that representation ineffective, and the trial court’s refusal to continue the
matter to permit respondent to obtain *** a private attorney, or to allow more time
for his appointed attorney to communicate with him, violated both the letter and the
-8- spirit of section 1-5(1). Proceeding under these circumstances was error.”
¶ 31 We first address the lack of communication between respondent and Welch, then
we address the trial court’s refusal grant a continuance so that respondent could retain a private
attorney.
¶ 32 a. Appointed Counsel
¶ 33 Under the Juvenile Court Act, the right to the assistance of counsel implies the
effective assistance of counsel. Id. In criminal cases, courts have sometimes found that an
irretrievable breakdown in attorney-client communications resulted in a denial of the effective
assistance of counsel, “even where the breakdown [wa]s a result of the defendant’s refusal to speak
to counsel, unless the defendant’s refusal to cooperate demonstrate[d] ‘unreasonable
contumacy.’ ” Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181, 1198 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Brown v.
Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1169 (9th Cir. 1970)); see United States v. Volpentesta, 727 F.3d 666, 673
(7th Cir. 2013) (explaining that a denial of the sixth amendment right to counsel will be found only
upon a showing of prejudice attributable to an attorney-client conflict “so great that it resulted in
a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense”).
¶ 34 Irrespective of whether or how that principle should apply in this context, however,
we disagree with respondent’s contention that the trial court refused to allow him more time to
communicate with Welch. The court expressly offered respondent an opportunity to meet with
Welch on the day of the hearing, and we must presume that if their conversation revealed a
legitimate reason for the court to appoint a replacement for Welch or delay the hearing so that
Welch could prepare respondent’s defense, the court would have appropriately exercised its
discretion to grant a continuance if necessary. See Bicek v. Quitter, 38 Ill. App. 3d 1027, 1030
(1976) (“It is well settled that there is no presumption of abuse of discretion by a trial court.”).
-9- ¶ 35 Consequently, the question is not whether Welch was ineffective for a lack of
communication with respondent but whether respondent waived his right to the effective assistance
of appointed counsel by refusing the trial court’s offer to meet with Welch. In a similar context,
the supreme court explained: “Commensurate with Illinois’s statutory right to appointed counsel
in postconviction proceedings is a defendant’s ability to waive that right, so long as [his] waiver
is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” People v. Lesley, 2018 IL 122100, ¶ 50. “[S]o long as the
circuit court has given the defendant sufficient opportunity to have the assistance of appointed
counsel, defendant’s actions that have the effect of depriving [him] of appointed counsel will
establish a knowing and intentional choice.” Id. ¶ 52. We believe the same principle should apply
to the statutory right to counsel under the Juvenile Court Act. See In re Davion R., 2019 IL App
(1st) 170426, ¶ 69 (noting that the Juvenile Court Act allows for a waiver of counsel in general).
¶ 36 We find that the trial court gave respondent sufficient opportunity to have the
assistance of appointed counsel. Respondent requested and was appointed counsel, who he then
“fired” approximately four months prior to the hearing at issue. Even with the prior “firing” of
appointed counsel, the court at the hearing offered respondent the opportunity to speak with
counsel prior to proceeding. Respondent declined this opportunity, and the court informed
respondent of the consequences of his discharge of counsel. As such, we find that respondent’s
refusal to meet with appointed counsel and proceed pro se was a knowing and intelligent choice.
Because respondent validly waived his right to appointed counsel, he was not denied his right to
effective assistance.
¶ 37 b. Retained Counsel
¶ 38 Respondent also takes issue with the trial court’s refusal to grant a continuance so
that he could retain private counsel. When applying the sixth amendment right to counsel, the
- 10 - supreme court has explained:
“The determination whether to grant a continuance for substitution of counsel is a
matter left to the discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned absent an
abuse of that discretion. [Citations.] The factors to be considered in evaluating a
trial court’s exercise of its discretion include [(1)] the diligence of the movant,
[(2)] the right of the defendant to a speedy, fair and impartial trial, and [(3)] the
interests of justice. [Citations.] However, it is well established that a trial court will
not be found to have abused its discretion in denying a motion for substitution of
counsel in the absence of ready and willing substitute counsel.” People v.
Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 245 (2000).
¶ 39 “ ‘ “An abuse of discretion will be found only where the court’s ruling is arbitrary,
fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial
court.” ’ ” People v. Baez, 241 Ill. 2d 44, 106 (2011) (quoting People v. Patrick, 233 Ill. 2d 62, 68
(2009), quoting People v. Hall, 195 Ill.2d 1, 20 (2000)); see Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1983) (“[B]road discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances; only an
unreasoning and arbitrary ‘insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for
delay’ violates the right to the assistance of counsel.”) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575,
589 (1964)). Because this analytical framework is adequate to protect a criminal defendant’s sixth
amendment right to counsel, we conclude that it is also adequate to protect a respondent’s statutory
right to counsel. Cf. Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 43.
¶ 40 In Segoviano, the supreme court found no abuse of discretion when the trial court
denied defense “counsel’s pretrial motion to withdraw from the case and obtain a 21-day
continuance to seek substitute counsel” because “the motion did not even contain a representation
- 11 - that substitute counsel had been secured, much less an averment that such substitute counsel was
ready and willing to enter an appearance in the case.” Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d at 245. However, the
circumstances of this case are slightly different; the court here allowed Welch to withdraw but
nevertheless denied respondent an extended continuance of three to four months to seek substitute
counsel. It is not clear from Segoviano whether the absence of ready and willing substitute counsel
is automatically sufficient to refuse a continuance in these circumstances, but turning to the three
enumerated factors, we find no abuse of discretion.
¶ 41 On the first factor, respondent’s lack of diligence is clear. According to his own
filings, he was aware as soon as November 2024 that he would not allow Welch to represent him;
nevertheless, he did not reach out to any private attorneys before the hearing on February 20, 2025,
and he told the trial court that he would not be able to retain an attorney for another three to four
months.
¶ 42 On the second factor, our concern in this context is not with the constitutional right
of a criminal defendant to a speedy, fair, and impartial trial as guaranteed by the sixth amendment
(U.S. Const., amend. VI; accord Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8) or the interest of the public in the
prompt resolution of criminal prosecutions (see Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528 n.28 (1972)).
Rather, in this context, we are concerned with the rights and interests of all parties to the case,
including the D.G., as well as the interest of the public in the efficient administration of
proceedings involving the rights of minors. See 750 ILCS 50/20a (West 2024). Here, the trial court
correctly noted that D.G. was six years old and that the case had already been pending for just shy
of one year; the court reasonably concluded that a further continuance of three to four months
would be unacceptable.
¶ 43 On the third and final factor, there is no indication that the interests of justice would
- 12 - have been served by a continuance in this case, where respondent was intimately familiar with
petitioners’ allegations, had ample time to prepare, cross-examined the only witness against him,
and testified on his own behalf.
¶ 44 As an aside, we note that appointed counsel failed to file and serve a written motion
to withdraw his appearance pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 13(c) (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) after
he was “fired” by respondent. However, any noncompliance with the formal requirements of Rule
13(c) in this case was harmless because of the previously filed and served motion that informed
the trial court and the parties that respondent had fired appointed counsel and would proceed
pro se. See In re S.W., 2015 IL App (3d) 140981, ¶ 33 (declining to find error when it was apparent
from the record that the respondent had fired appointed counsel); Davion R., 2019 IL App (1st)
170426, ¶ 73 (same). Nonetheless, while a party who fires his attorney obviously has notice of that
fact, the court and the other parties of record may not; here, it appears that the court went into the
hearing without knowing that its appointment of Welch had been rejected by respondent. Counsel,
however, was aware of respondent’s dissatisfaction; had he filed a prompt Rule 13(c) motion in
advance of the hearing, the court might have been given a better opportunity to address whether
counsel’s withdrawal “would delay the trial of the case, or would otherwise be inequitable.” Ill. S.
Ct. R. 13(c)(3) (eff. Jan. 1, 2023); see, e.g., People ex rel. Burris v. Maraviglia, 264 Ill. App. 3d
392, 399-400 (1993) (upholding a trial court’s denial of an unpaid attorney’s motion to withdraw
on the basis that granting the motion would be inequitable). To that end, a discharged attorney’s
prompt compliance with the formal requirements of Rule 13(c), whenever possible, is preferable.
¶ 45 C. Unfitness Finding
¶ 46 We now turn to respondent’s arguments challenging the trial court’s finding that he
was unfit. In order to establish the presumption of depravity, petitioners were required to show
- 13 - that respondent had been “criminally convicted of at least 3 felonies under the laws of this State
or any other state, *** and at least one of these convictions took place within 5 years of the filing
of the petition *** seeking termination of parental rights.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West 2024). For
purposes of our analysis, it is sufficient to note that petitioners would be entitled to the presumption
if they could prove that (1) respondent was convicted of an Illinois felony in Peoria County case
No. 14-CF-106, (2) respondent was convicted of an Illinois felony in Tazewell County case No.
14-CF-494, and (3) respondent was convicted of an Illinois felony in Ford County case No.
20-CF-40 on July 14, 2020, which was within 5 years of the filing of the petition for adoption on
February 23, 2024.
¶ 47 Petitioners sought to prove these facts by introducing certified copies of the three
judgments of conviction and asking the trial court to take judicial notice of the fact that respondent
had been convicted. On appeal, respondent argues that court’s findings are against the manifest
weight of the evidence, relying on the following authority:
“The traditional rule in Illinois has long been that a prior conviction can be
proved only by the record or an authenticated copy showing the caption, return of
the indictment in open court by the grand jury, the indictment and arraignment of
the defendant, paneling of the jury, and the final judgment of the court.” People v.
Slaughter, 84 Ill. App. 3d 88, 95 (1980) (citing People v. Lane, 400 Ill. 170, 173
(1948)).
Properly construed, the parties’ dispute is not about the persuasive weight of the evidence in this
case but whether a certified copy of a respondent’s judgment of conviction is categorically
inadequate to prove the conviction. This presents a question of law that we review de novo. Cf.
People v. Currie, 2022 IL App (4th) 210598, ¶ 62 (“Whether certified copies of conviction[s] alone
- 14 - are an acceptable method of introducing other-crimes evidence *** is a question of law that we
review de novo.”).
¶ 48 While respondent did raise contemporaneous objections to the trial court’s
consideration of the certified copies of his convictions, those objections were not specific enough
to avoid forfeiture of the issue he now seeks to raise on appeal, which would ordinarily limit our
review to plain error. Ill. R. Evid. 103(a)(1), (b)(1), (e) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). Nevertheless,
petitioners have not argued forfeiture on appeal, and we are mindful that “a reviewing court should
not easily declare forfeiture of an argument directed at a decision to terminate [parental] rights,”
so we will consider the merits. Br. M., 2021 IL 125969, ¶ 40.
¶ 49 The traditional rule cited in Slaughter, and relied upon by respondent, originated in
Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill. 601 (1882). There, the supreme court distinguished between “a
certified copy of the judgment” and “a copy of the record of conviction” that would have included
“the caption, returning of the indictment into open court by the grand jury, the indictment and
arraignment of the defendant,” which the court said were “as indispensable parts of the record as
the judgment of conviction.” Id. at 609. The supreme court subsequently added that “the record of
the impaneling and verdict of the jury, in the waivers of the jury [sic],” were also indispensable,
finding that the trial court erred in admitting only “the final judgment order imposing punishment.”
Kirby v. People, 123 Ill. 436, 438 (1888); accord Lane, 400 Ill. at 173.
¶ 50 However, Lane applied this common-law rule “[i]n the absence of any statutory
provision as to what [wa]s necessary to prove prior conviction.” Lane, 400 Ill. at 173. The Illinois
Rules of Evidence now provide that in at least some circumstances, “[e]vidence of a final
judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty,” is admissible “to prove any fact essential
to sustain the judgment.” Ill. R. Evid. 803(22) (eff. Jan. 25, 2023) (establishing this as an exception
- 15 - to the rule against hearsay). And even before the rules of evidence were enacted, Lane’s
precedential value was questionable, given that the supreme court appears to have viewed “a
certified copy of [a] conviction from the circuit court” as sufficient “proof of [the] defendant’s
prior felony conviction” to sustain a conviction for unlawful use of weapons by a felon. People v.
Smith, 148 Ill. 2d 454, 465 (1992).
¶ 51 In any event, we need not resolve whether the traditional rule retains its vitality
because respondent’s argument fails on its own terms. At the time Slaughter was decided, the
supreme court had already recognized the limitations on its line of precedent suggesting that formal
proof of a conviction was required:
“To the extent that these and similar holdings may be thought to create an inflexible
rule requiring formal proof of earlier court records only by authenticated or certified
copies of those records and proof [of] identity, they are incompatible with
considerations of judicial economy and efficiency essential to the disposition of
present-day caseloads. Nor do such procedures provide any necessary or useful
safeguards to the defendants in cases such as this where the fact that the prior
conviction had occurred has never been denied.” People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157,
164 (1976).
See Ill. R. Evid. 201(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 2011) (providing for judicial notice of a fact “not subject to
reasonable dispute in that it is *** capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned).
¶ 52 This is a case, like Davis, where respondent has never denied that the convictions
actually occurred; he has merely attempted to collaterally invalidate those convictions based on
alleged improprieties in the proceedings. However, he has not demonstrated one of the extremely
- 16 - narrow grounds for a successful collateral attack. See People v. Castleberry, 2015 IL 116916, ¶ 15
(lack of personal or subject-matter jurisdiction); In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 58 (conviction
pursuant to a facially unconstitutional statute). Ultimately, formal proof of respondent’s
convictions beyond the certified copies of the judgments of conviction would not have “provide[d]
any necessary or useful safeguards *** in [this] case.” Davis, 65 Ill. 2d at 164.
¶ 53 Accordingly, the certified copies of respondent’s judgments of conviction were
sufficient to prove the convictions.
¶ 54 D. Failure to Bifurcate the Hearing
¶ 55 Finally, respondent argues, and petitioners concede, that the trial court erred by
conducting a combined hearing on unfitness and D.G.’s best interest rather than bifurcating the
hearing. See In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 277 (1990); see also 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1)
(West 2024). The supreme court explained in Syck that “the trial court is initially to determine the
parental unfitness, basing that determination on any evidence relevant to the particular grounds of
unfitness alleged” at the first step; it is only at the second step when the court may consider whether
the child’s best interest “would be served by [his] adoption by the petitioners.” Syck, 138 Ill. 2d at
276-77. At the second step, “it is the parent’s past conduct in the then-existing circumstances that
is under scrutiny.” Id. at 276.
¶ 56 “A single hearing consolidating issues of unfitness and best interests carries a risk
of prejudice from considering evidence irrelevant to the unfitness question before determining that
issue.” In re V.S., 285 Ill. App. 3d 372, 375 (1996). However, in order for this error to warrant
reversal and remand for a bifurcated hearing, respondent must establish (1) a timely objection was
made below; (2) a reason to believe that the trial court considered improper evidence in its
unfitness determination; and (3) “that the erroneous commingling of evidence of the parent’s
- 17 - unfitness and the child’s best interests was not *** harmless.” Id. at 375-76. In the present case, it
is undisputed that respondent did not make a timely objection.
¶ 57 Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the trial court considered
inadmissible evidence in its unfitness determination. Respondent’s past criminal activity is what
created the then-existing circumstances, i.e., his imprisonment, which showed both his lack of
rehabilitation and his complete inability to provide for D.G.’s needs for the foreseeable future. See
In re M.C., 2018 IL App (4th) 180144, ¶ 38; see also In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 362 (2005)
(recognizing that incarceration prevents a parent from providing financial support). The court
clearly articulated that the “first step” was “whether or not [respondent] is an unfit parent.” Any
arguable commingling of the evidence about D.G.’s well-being with that of respondent’s unfitness
was harmless.
¶ 58 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 59 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 60 Affirmed.
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