[Cite as In re Adoption of A.R.M.R., 2019-Ohio-253.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 106969
IN RE: ADOPTION OF A.R.M.R. A Minor Child
[Appeal by J.J., Mother]
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Probate Division Case No. 2017 ADP 09087
BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, J., E.A. Gallagher,P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 24, 2019 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Cara L. Santosuosso Rachel P. Kareha Laubacher & Company Westgate Towers, Suite #626 20525 Center Ridge Road Rocky River, Ohio 44116
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Patrick Dichiro Law Office of Patrick Dichiro 6300 Rockside Road, Suite 302 Seven Hills, Ohio 44131
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶1} Appellant-Mother, J.J. (“Mother”), appeals the probate court’s determination that
the adoption of the minor child, A.R.M.R., to the child’s stepmother could be completed without
Mother’s consent based on her failure to support the child without justifiable cause. Mother
raises the following assignments of error:
1. The decision of the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
2. The trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a reasonable continuance so that the parties could conduct adequate discovery prior to a full hearing.
{¶2} After careful review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Procedural and Factual History
{¶3} A.R.M.R. is the biological son of Mother and D.R. (“Father”). Petitioner-appellee,
T.R., is A.R.M.R.’s stepmother (“petitioner”). On November 21, 2017, the petitioner filed a petition for the adoption of A.R.M.R. At that time, A.R.M.R. was seven years old and Mother
was subject to an order of the juvenile court that required her to pay $95 per month, plus a two
percent processing fee, in child support. The petition alleged that Mother’s consent to the
adoption was not required because she failed, without justifiable cause, to provide for the
maintenance and support of A.R.M.R. during the year preceding the filing of the adoption
petition. The petition was accompanied by a certified copy of Mother’s child support payment
history from the Cuyahoga County Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”), which
reflected that no child support payments had been made by Mother from November 1, 2016, to
November 14, 2017.
{¶4} A hearing on the petition for adoption was scheduled for January 4, 2018. On
December 7, 2017, Mother received notice of the hearing. The notice provided that if Mother
wanted to contest the adoption, she was required to file an objection to the petition within 14
days of service and appear at the scheduled hearing.
{¶5} Mother did not file written objections within 14 days of receiving notice. Instead,
Mother appeared, pro se, at the January 4, 2018 hearing with the intent to make oral objections to
the petition for adoption. The trial court granted Mother leave to file written objections to the
adoption petition. Later that day, Mother filed her written objections, and the trial court
scheduled a hearing for February 12, 2018, to determine whether Mother’s consent to the
adoption was necessary. On January 5, 2018, the trial court sent notice of the hearing to Mother.
{¶6} On January 22, 2018, Mother contacted counsel to represent her in connection with
the adoption petition. On February 12, 2018, the parties appeared before the court for the
consent hearing. Before the hearing began, however, counsel for Mother objected to the hearing
going forward without a reasonable continuance. Counsel indicated that she had just been retained, did not have the opportunity to review the case file or relevant documents, and was
under the impression the hearing “was just a pretrial hearing” and not “the fully contested
[consent hearing].” Counsel stated that someone from her office had contacted the court on
February 6, 2018, in an effort to gain access to the case documents and was told that, due to the
confidentiality of the case information, counsel needed to file a notice of appearance before she
would be given access. Mother’s counsel explained that she attempted to file a notice of
appearance the following day, but that for some reason it was not filed. Thus, counsel’s notice
of appearance was made on the day of the consent hearing.
{¶7} After consideration, the court denied the motion for continuance. The court noted
that it had already given Mother an extension of the deadline to file objections to the adoption
petition, that the case had already been set for hearing for more than a month, and that the notice
clearly indicated that the case had been set for a hearing— not a pretrial conference — on a
“fairly simple” issue of nonsupport. Accordingly, the probate court proceeded with the consent
hearing, and the following testimony was adduced.
{¶8} Father testified that he has custody of A.R.M.R. and that, prior to the filing of the
adoption petition, Mother’s last child support payment was made on May 4, 2016. At the time
of the hearing, Mother owed approximately $1,360.91 in outstanding child support. Father
stated that he did not know whether Mother had been working during the period of November 21,
2016, through November 21, 2017.
{¶9} Mother testified that she understood her support obligations under the juvenile court
child-support order, but maintained that she was not always able to pay child support. Mother
stated that she had been employed at Shining Star Learning Center from February 15, 2014, to
November 30, 2016. However, she voluntarily left that position after she began attending school to become a dental assistant. She explained that the hours she was required to work at the
daycare center conflicted with her school schedule, which required her to attend classes from
8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Monday through Friday.
{¶10} On May 4, 2016, Mother made a $140 child support payment. Her next support
payment of $41 was not made until December 29, 2017. Mother made additional child support
payments of $200 on January 16, 2018, and $53.67 on February 5, 2018. Mother stated that she
had been subject to a child support income holding order while she worked at Shining Star
Learning Center and could not explain why none of her income was withheld to pay child
support from May 2016 to November 2016.
{¶11} Mother testified that after she left Shining Star Learning Center, she attempted to
find part-time employment while she attended school. Throughout the hearing, Mother admitted
that she did not produce any documentary evidence to support her attempts to obtain employment
during the relevant time period. Nevertheless, she testified that during her period of
unemployment from 2016 to 2017, she applied for “ten to six jobs a day” online, and used a
temporary service agency in Lakewood, Ohio, to apply for various factory and warehouse
positions. Mother stated that she received a call-back regarding a position she applied for at
FedEx, but that the position was filled before she responded. Mother also admitted that she
received a job offer for a position in Columbus, Ohio, but that she did not accept the position
because it was too far away. In addition, Mother testified that she applied for dental assistant
positions on “professional site[s]” once she graduated from the dental assistant program in July
2017. However, Mother testified that she did not receive any legitimate job offers from
November 2016 to November 14, 2017. Mother is currently working three part-time jobs — at a
snack bar in a bowling alley, at a McDonald’s restaurant, and as a dental assistant. {¶12} With respect to Mother’s finances while she attended school, Mother testified that
she obtained a grant to pay for her tuition and books, relied on public assistance programs, and
lived with friends who “put [her] up for periods of time” in exchange for cooking, cleaning, and
child care. She stated that she had no other money coming in from November 2016 to
November 2017, and that no friends or family would give her money to help her pay child
support.
{¶13} Mother did not dispute that in April 2015, the juvenile court held her in contempt
for failure to pay child support. She explained that she never filed a motion to modify her child
support obligation because she “had no idea that [she] could change that.” Mother testified that
it was her belief that she was “obligated by law to pay that regardless of [her] position in any
way, shape or form.” She further stated that she has a learning disability that precluded her from
fully comprehending the court proceedings.
{¶14} A.R.M.R.’s maternal grandmother testified that from November 2016 to November
2017, she gave Mother money for bus passes and a disposable camera to take photographs of
A.R.M.R. She stated that she did not know with whom Mother was living from November 2016
to November 2017, or whether Mother was employed during that time period. The grandmother
testified that Mother had never stated that she was unwilling to pay child support and that she
believed Mother wanted to comply with her support obligations because “[s]he didn’t get it from
her father, so she knows what it’s like.” Grandmother testified that Mother had never asked for
assistance in paying her child support obligation.
{¶15} At the conclusion of the hearing, counsel for Mother reiterated her continuing
objection to the court’s decision to go forward with the full hearing.
{¶16} On February 23, 2018, the probate court issued a decision, finding that Mother’s consent was not required to proceed with the petition for adoption. The court stated, in relevant
part:
The court finds that [Mother] was subject to a child support order that required her to pay $95.00 per month for support of the minor child and further finds that [Mother] was aware of and understood that she had a child support obligation. The court finds that no support was paid for the minor child for the one year proceeding the filing of the adoption petition. This court further finds that [Mother] voluntarily terminated her employment in November 2016 and did not resume working until one year later. In light of [Mother]’s ability to work, her work history and her voluntary termination of employment, she is unable to establish justifiable cause for her failure to pay support.
{¶17} Mother now appeals the trial court’s judgment.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Consent to Adoption
{¶18} Pursuant to R.C. 3107.06(A), a petition to adopt a minor may be granted only if
written consent to the adoption has been executed by the mother of the minor unless consent is
not required under R.C. 3107.07. Under R.C. 3107.07, “[c]onsent to adoption” is not required
of any of the following:
(A) A parent of a minor, when it is alleged in the adoption petition and the court, after proper service of notice and hearing, finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has failed without justifiable cause * * * to provide for the maintenance and support of the minor as required by law or judicial decree for a period of at least one year immediately preceding either the filing of the adoption petition * * *.
{¶19} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held, “[p]ursuant to R.C. 3107.07(A), the
petitioner for adoption has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, both (1) that
the natural parent has failed to support the child for the requisite one-year period, and (2) that this
failure was without justifiable cause.” In re Adoption of Bovett, 33 Ohio St.3d 102, 104, 515
N.E.2d 919 (1987). However, a natural parent may not simply remain mute while the petitioner is forced to demonstrate why the parent’s failure to provide support is unjustifiable. Rather, once the petitioner has established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the natural parent has failed to support the child for at least the requisite one-year period, the burden of going forward with the evidence is on the natural parent to show some facially justifiable cause for such failure. The burden of proof, however, remains with the petitioner.
Id.
{¶20} When applying the foregoing statutes, it is essential to recognize that “the right of a
natural parent to the care and custody of his children is one of the most precious and fundamental
in law.” In re Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163, 165, 492 N.E.2d 140 (1986), citing
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Adoption
terminates those fundamental rights. For this reason, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that
“[a]ny exception to the requirement of parental consent [to adoption] must be strictly construed
so as to protect the right of natural parents to raise and nurture their children.” Id., citing In re
Adoption of Schoeppner, 46 Ohio St.2d 21, 24, 345 N.E.2d 608 (1976).
B. Motion for Continuance
{¶21} For the ease of discussion, we address Mother’s assignments of error out of order.
In her second assignment of error, Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
grant a reasonable continuance so that the parties could conduct adequate discovery.
{¶22} The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court. State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981). An
abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
{¶23} In Unger, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that “[t]here are no mechanical tests for
deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to
the trial judge at the time the request is denied.” Unger at 67. The Supreme Court identified
certain factors a court should consider in evaluating a motion for a continuance. These factors
include:
the length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have been requested and received, the inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case.
Id. at 67-68.
{¶24} In this case, Mother did not file a motion for continuance in advance of the hearing
date. Rather, counsel objected to the hearing going forward based on counsel’s belief that the
hearing was a pretrial conference and not the full evidentiary hearing on the issue of consent.
As stated, counsel explained that she had been recently retained, had just filed a notice of
appearance on the day of the hearing, and did not have the opportunity to review the case file or
relevant documents prior to the hearing.
{¶25} On appeal, Mother argues the trial court’s judgment amounted to an abuse of
discretion because it denied her the opportunity to review the CSEA documents submitted by the
petitioner. In addition, Mother contends that by failing to afford counsel the opportunity to
prepare and conduct meaningful discovery, the trial court’s judgment “placed [Mother] at a
significant disadvantage” by limiting her ability to demonstrate some facially justifiable cause for
the nonpayment of her child support obligation.
{¶26} Regarding counsel’s inability to review the relevant evidence of Mother’s
child-support payment history, the petitioner correctly states that Mother has not disputed the fact that she did not make child support payments in the year preceding the adoption petition.
Moreover, the record reflects that the only document introduced by the petitioner at the hearing
was a printout of Mother’s child support payment history from CSEA — a certified copy that
was previously submitted with the adoption petition. Under these circumstances, we are unable
to conclude that counsel’s inability to review the CSEA document prior to the consent hearing
infringed upon Mother’s constitutional due process rights.
{¶27} Accordingly, resolution of this assigned error relies on the circumstances
encompassing Mother’s representation at the consent hearing and whether the trial court’s
judgment prejudicially affected Mother’s substantial rights. As stated, Mother does not dispute
that she failed to make mandatory child support payments from November 2016 through
November 2017. Thus, whether Mother’s failure to provide for the maintenance and support of
A.R.M.R. was justifiable was a paramount determination in this case.
{¶28} Ohio courts have recognized that in addition to its legal connotations, the term
“justifiable” also contains a moral component. In re Adoption of B.I., 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
C-170064, 2017-Ohio-9116, ¶ 10, citing Black’s Law Dictionary 882 (8th Ed.2004). To this
end, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that in assessing whether the failure to support a child is
justified, a distinction is made between a parent who is unwilling but financially able to support,
and a parent who is willing to support but financially unable to do so. In re: Adoption of Masa,
23 Ohio St.3d 163, 166, 492 N.E.2d 140 (1986). “The latter could constitute justification.”
Id. Thus, it reasonably follows that evidence demonstrating a parent’s inability to obtain gainful
employment during the relevant one-year time period, despite his or her best efforts, would be a
significant factor in assessing whether the parent was willing, but financially unable to comply
with a child support obligation. {¶29} After careful review, we find the trial court’s denial of the motion for continuance
effectively prevented Mother from having a reasonable opportunity to satisfy her burden of proof
on this highly relevant and contested issue. Here, the record reflects that counsel for Mother
received access to her client’s case file on the day of the consent hearing, and was required to
actively access evidence and relevant testimony for the first time as it was being introduced. In
essence, Mother was placed in a position where she had to defend her right to have a continued
relationship with her minor child without counsel’s full grasp of the circumstances alleged in the
petition and without the opportunity to present evidence to corroborate her testimony. Without
evidentiary quality documents to support her attempts to gain employment while attending
school, Mother’s sole evidence supporting her justifiable cause was her own testimony — the
credibility of which was impeached by the absence of corroborating evidence. Given the
magnitude of the rights involved and the potential to forever terminate Mother’s parental rights,
we believe due process required a continuance.
{¶30} The significance of Mother’s limited access to discovery and her failure to
introduce evidence at the consent hearing has not been lost on the petitioner. On appeal, the
petitioner asserts that Mother’s failure to produce evidence to corroborate her efforts to obtain
employment during the relevant time period suggests that her credibility “was shaky at best.”
Similarly, counsel for petitioner continuously raised Mother’s failure to produce documentary
evidence during the consent hearing. For instance, counsel for the petitioner noted that Mother
did not produce paychecks evidencing her wage withholdings while employed by the daycare
center. Counsel also disputed the alleged justifiable cause supporting Mother’s nonpayment
and had Mother admit during her cross-examination that she did not produce any evidence to
support her testimony that she actively pursued employment while attending school, “like applications, or copies of an e-mail.”
{¶31} In addition, it’s necessary to note that issues relating to Mother’s visitation rights
and her unfavorable history in the juvenile court case were extensively raised in appellee’s merit
brief, seemingly in an effort to disparage Mother’s credibility. While such factors may be
relevant during a best-interests stage of an adoption petition, the adequacy of a natural parents
past behavior and relationship with his or her child are not issues for the probate court to
consider when assessing the financial requirements of R.C. 3107.07(A).
{¶32} Under these unique circumstances, we find the trial court abused its discretion by
denying counsel’s request for a continuance. Based upon the substantial barriers placed before
Mother in her effort to demonstrate a facially justifiable cause, we find the potential prejudice
suffered by Mother far outweighed any inconvenience that may have resulted from a brief
continuance. Contrary to petitioner’s petition on appeal, the reasons supporting the request for
a continuance were not merely dilatory, contrived, or a frivolous attempt to delay. Rather, the
request for continuance was made following counsel’s good faith misunderstanding of the
proceedings and the realization that Mother’s fundamental rights could not be effectively
defended without meaningful discovery or prepared counsel. Moreover, we are unable to
conclude that counsel’s unpreparedness was avoidable where Mother’s case file was not released
to counsel until the day of the consent hearing due to issues of confidentiality. While counsel
may have had a miscommunication with the court concerning her notice of appearance, we are
unwilling to hold counsel’s misunderstandings against Mother where the termination of her
parental rights was on the line.
{¶33} In finding an abuse of discretion, we recognize the trial court previously went to
great lengths to provide Mother with additional time to file written objections to the petition for adoption. We further recognize that counsel for Mother did not expressly raise the inadequacy
of discovery at the time she requested the continuance. However, viewing the record in its
entirety, it is evident that counsel’s failure to directly reference discovery or potential evidence
supporting Mother’s justifiable cause merely highlights the unfavorable position Mother was
placed in by having to go forward in a proceeding with counsel who only obtained access to the
case file moments before the hearing was scheduled to begin. Without a comprehensive
understanding of the case, counsel had no opportunity to formulate a detailed basis for the
continuance and reasonably asserted that a continuance was necessary under such circumstances.
{¶34} While the trial court characterized the hearing as a fairly simple issue, its
implications were far reaching and significant to all parties involved. Thus, resolution of the
contested issues should be predicated on the review of all relevant and available evidence
following adequate discovery and the opportunity to prepare.
{¶35} Mother’s second assignment of error is sustained.
{¶36} Mother’s first assignment of error is rendered moot. Judgment reversed and
remanded for a new hearing in order to provide Mother with the opportunity to present evidence
documenting her pursuit of employment during the relevant time period.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. The court finds
there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
court, probate division, to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure. EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCURS; EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE OPINION
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., DISSENTING
{¶37} I respectfully dissent. Based on the record before us, I would affirm the trial
court’s decision that Mother’s consent to the adoption of A.R.M.R. was not required under R.C.
3107.07(A).
{¶38} First, although the majority raises a number of important, legitimate concerns
related to the protection of Mother’s fundamental rights, I do not agree, under the particular facts
and circumstances here, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s request for a
continuance. Abuse of discretion is a very high standard. Reversal of a trial court’s decision
for abuse of discretion requires a showing that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or
unconscionably. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983).
When reviewing a matter for abuse of discretion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court. State ex rel. Duncan v. Chippewa Twp. Trustees, 73 Ohio St.3d 728, 732, 654
N.E.2d 1254 (1995). On the record before us, I do not believe the requisite showing has been
made.
{¶39} The majority concludes that “due process required a continuance” and that the trial
court, therefore, abused its discretion in denying Mother’s request for a continuance because
Mother “was placed in a position where she had to defend her right to have a continued
relationship with her minor child without counsel’s full grasp of the circumstances alleged in the
petition and without the opportunity to present evidence to corroborate her testimony.” However, on appeal, Mother asserts only that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her
motion for continuance because she was denied an opportunity to conduct discovery. Her
second assignment of error — the assignment of error addressing the trial court’s denial of her
motion for continuance — states: “The trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant a
reasonable continuance so that the parties could conduct adequate discovery prior to a full
hearing.” In support of this assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court’s refusal “to
allow for the exchanging of discovery” with petitioner violated her right to due process and that
“[w]ithout having the ability to conduct discovery, Mother was placed at a significant
disadvantage, and was unable to adequately prepare for trial in this matter.”
{¶40} However, Mother’s counsel did not mention a need for discovery when she
requested a continuance at the hearing.1 As a general matter, a party cannot raise new arguments
on appeal that were not presented below, and a trial court cannot be said to have abused its
discretion by failing to consider arguments that were never presented to it. See, e.g., State v.
D.K., 8th Dist. 106539, 2018-Ohio-2522, ¶ 17; Glendell-Grant v. Grant, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
105895, 2018-Ohio-1094, ¶ 11.
{¶41} Further, Mother has not identified any discovery she contends she needed in order
to properly prepare for the hearing. Although Mother argues that she was disadvantaged by the
parties’ inability to exchange discovery “because every single document presented by Petitioner
during the trial on the matter was unseen by counsel for Respondent before the trial,” the only
document petitioner introduced at the hearing was a printout of Mother’s child support payment
history from CSEA — a certified copy of which had been previously submitted with the petition
1 Although Mother asserts in her brief that her counsel asked the trial court, when arguing for a continuance, that “she please be provided with an opportunity to conduct discovery on the matter,” the transcript of the hearing and the prehearing discussions relating to counsel’s request for a continuance do not reflect this. for adoption.
{¶42} Mother did not dispute that she did not make any child support payments during
the year preceding the filing of the adoption petition. Thus, the only issue to be decided at the
hearing was whether justifiable cause existed for Mother’s failure to support A.R.M.R. during
this time period — a determination that turned on Mother’s efforts to obtain employment. Any
evidence related to that issue would have been within Mother’s custody and control and not
dependent on any discovery to be obtained from petitioner (or anyone else). Accordingly, I
would overrule Mother’s second assignment of error.
{¶43} I would also overrule Mother’s first assignment of error. In her first assignment of
error, Mother challenges the probate court’s finding that her consent to the adoption of A.R.M.R.
was not required under R.C. 3107.07(A) because she failed, without justifiable cause, to support
A.R.M.R. for the year prior to the filing of the petition for adoption.
{¶44} “‘The question of whether justifiable cause for failure to pay child support has been
proven by clear and convincing evidence in a particular case is a determination for the probate
court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless such determination is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.’” In re Adoption of M.B., 131 Ohio St.3d 186, 2012-Ohio-236, 963
N.E.2d 142, ¶ 24, quoting In re Adoption of Bovett, 33 Ohio St.3d 102, 515 N.E.2d 919 (1987),
paragraph four of the syllabus; see also In re Adoption of L.C.F., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos.
101798 and 101799, 2015-Ohio-1545, ¶ 10. On a manifest weight of the evidence challenge, an
appellate court weighs the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility
of witnesses and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact
“‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice’” that reversal of the trial
court’s judgment is required. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983); Eastley v.
Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 20; see also In re Adoption of
K.N.W., 4th Dist. Athens Nos. 15CA36, 15CA37, ¶ 27.
{¶45} As the majority observes, in determining whether a failure to support a child is
justifiable, there is a distinction between a parent who is unwilling but able to financially support
a child, and a parent who is willing to provide financial support but unable to do so. In re
Adoption of Masa, 23 Ohio St.3d 163, 166-167, 492 N.E.2d 140 (1986). When determining
whether justifiable cause exists for a parent’s failure to support, the trial court “weigh[s] the
evidence of the natural parent’s circumstances for the statutory period for which he or she failed
to provide support.” Bovett at paragraph three of the syllabus. To preserve the right to consent
to adoption, a biological parent “must justify his or her failure to support for substantially the
entire one-year period.” In re Adoption of Tyler K. Kilbane & Ashley Kilbane, 130 Ohio App.3d
203, 207, 719 N.E.2d 1012 (8th Dist.1998), quoting In re Adoption of Kessler, 87 Ohio App.3d
317, 321-322, 622 N.E.2d 354 (6th Dist.1993). “‘It is not enough to show that a failure to
support was justified for some time during the year; rather, it must be demonstrated that no
modicum of support reasonably could have been provided at any time during the year.’”
Kilbane at 207, quoting Kessler at 321-322; see also Bovett at paragraph three of the syllabus
(“Under R.C. 3107.07(A), the probate court shall determine * * * whether the parent’s failure to
support the child for that period as a whole (and not just a portion thereof) was without justifiable
cause.”) (Emphasis deleted.)
{¶46} Mother argues that justifiable cause existed for her failure to support A.R.M.R.
during the relevant time period because she was attending a dental assistant program and could
not find a job that would accommodate her school schedule. {¶47} Although unemployment and a lack of income may constitute justification for a
failure to support — see, e.g., In re Adoption of S.A.H., 4th Dist. Ross No. 07CA2947,
2007-Ohio-3710, ¶ 20 (“It is axiomatic that a natural parent’s failure to support her child is
justified when that parent’s financial condition is such that she is unable to do so.”) — a parent’s
“voluntary unemployment” does not excuse a failure to support a child. See, e.g., In re Adoption
of J.A.C., 4th Dist. Scioto No. 14CA3654, 2015-Ohio-1662, ¶ 2, 17-22; see also In Re Adoption
of Deems, 91 Ohio App.3d 552, 556-557, 632 N.E.2d 1347 (3d Dist.1993) (“[T]he law does not
sanction [a parent’s] voluntary termination of gainful employment as a justification or excuse for
not contributing to the support of his children.”); In re LaFave, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 17697,
1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 3714, 11-12 (Aug. 13, 1999) (A parent’s “[v]oluntary unemployment,
for whatever good and worthy reasons (such as being a role model for her children [by seeking
higher education]) is not by itself sufficient justifiable cause for failure to meet even any small
part of court-required child support payments.”); In re Adoption of Christopher James Dutton,
7th Dist. Mahoning No. 83 C.A. 141, 1984 Ohio App. LEXIS 10905, 6-8 (Sept. 25, 1984) (where
father “opted to give up a good job and attend school while living on his mother’s financial
assistance and ultimately welfare,” his failure to support his child was “self-imposed and not
justifiable”).
{¶48} In this case, Mother’s testimony regarding her efforts to seek employment and her
willingness to support her son was not credible. Mother testified that after she left her
employment at Shining Star on November 30, 2016, she applied for “ten to six jobs a day” online
and through a temporary service in Lakewood, but was not called back regarding any jobs —
except one in Columbus and one at FedEx that was filled before she called back. Mother stated
that she had no documentation of her efforts to find employment during this time period. {¶49} Although Mother claimed that she was willing to pay child support when she was
able to do so, she had been previously held in contempt for failing to pay child support. She also
did not make any child support payments during the last six months she worked at Shining Star.
Although Mother testified that she had been subject to a child support income holding order
when she worked at Shining Star and could not explain why none of her income at Shining Star
had been withheld to pay child support from May 2016 to November 2016, she also indicated
that she knew child support was not being withheld from her paychecks during that time period
and talked to her employer “several times about it.” Although Mother graduated from the dental
assistant program on July 6, 2017, she was not employed again until November 14, 2017 — more
than four months later. Mother offered no explanation as to why she did not return to work
immediately after she completed the dental assistant program.
{¶50} Following a thorough review of the record, I believe that the trial court’s
determination that Mother failed, without justifiable cause, to support A.R.M.R. for the year
preceding the filing of the adoption petition, is supported by clear and convincing evidence and is
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, I would overrule Mother’s first
assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s decision that Mother’s consent to the adoption
was not required under R.C. 3107.07(A).2
2 Although I believe the facts and law require affirmance of the trial court’s decision, I believe it is also important to note that adoption is a two-step process. Even where a probate court makes a determination that a biological parent’s consent to adoption is not required, the court must still determine that adoption is in the best interest of the child before an adoption can proceed. See, e.g., L.C.F., 2015-Ohio-1545, at ¶ 7. If, as Mother contends, she has a close, meaningful relationship with her son, it may be that adoption by petitioner would not be in A.R.M.R.’s best interest.