J-A07038-24
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: A.L.R.H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA : : APPEAL OF: R.L.R., MOTHER : : : : : No. 1552 MDA 2023
Appeal from the Decree Entered October 12, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2023-0120a
BEFORE: STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: MAY 6, 2024
R.L.R. (“Mother”), appeals from the October 12, 2023, decree granting
the petition of York County Offices of Children, Youth and Families (“the
Agency”) and involuntarily terminating her parental rights to her daughter,
A.L.R.H. (“Child”), born in June 2006, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 After review, we affirm.
We glean the following factual and procedural history of this case from
the certified record.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 By separate decree dated and entered September 25, 2023, the orphans’
court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, D.L.H. (“Father”). Father did not file an appeal or participate in the instant appeal. Father’s whereabouts had been unknown to the Agency since the time of adjudication. Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 9/25/23, at 26. J-A07038-24
...
6. An Application for Emergency Protective Custody was filed by the Agency on December 7, 2020. . . . [I]t was alleged that the Agency has received numerous referrals regarding [C]hild and family.2 On or about November 24, 2020, the Agency received a referral regarding [C]hild] due to allegations of environmental concerns. The home [in which] the family was residing was condemned. The family was believed to be residing in [a] Red Roof Inn but they often move from place to place. Mother routinely permits indicated perpetrators of abuse to come in and out of the home and interact with [C]hild unsupervised. [] Father is indicated for sexual abuse; there are concerns and allegations that [C]hild has been [a] victim of sexual abuse by [] Father. [C]hild gave birth to a son on December 3, 2020. There is concern that Mother allowed a 24 year old man to have a sexual relationship with [C]hild who was 14 years of age and that [Child]’s son is the result of this relationship. [C]hild reports that she has not attended school in the 2020/2021 school year. There are concerns regarding [] Mother’s ability to care for [C]hild due to the unstable housing and environment. The Agency has concerns regarding the safety and wellbeing of [C]hild should she remain in the parents’ custody. . . .
7. In an Order for Emergency Protective Custody dated December 7, 2020, sufficient evidence was presented to prove that continuation or return of [C]hild to the home of Mother and Father was not in the best interest of [C]hild. Legal and physical custody of [C]hild was transferred to the Agency. . . .
2 The record reveals that Child is the youngest of seven children born to Mother. See CYS Exhibit 7 (parenting capacity assessment) at 1 (unpaginated). Mother’s older children are not subjects of the underlying proceedings or the instant appeal.
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Stipulation of Counsel, 9/15/23, at ¶¶ 6, 7. Child was placed, along with her
infant child, and has remained in care since.3
The court adjudicated Child dependent on January 27, 2021, and
established a permanency goal of return to parent or guardian. See id. at ¶
10; see also N.T., 9/25/23, at 23. In furtherance of reunification, the Agency
instituted family service plans which were forwarded to Mother, the goals of
which remained consistent throughout the dependency proceedings.4 See id.
at ¶ 13; see also Agency Exhibits 1 through 5 (family service plans); N.T.,
9/25/23, at 20-22, 47-48. Mother failed to raise any objection or take
exception to any of her family service plan goals. See N.T., 9/25/23, at 22-
23. Her primary goals were to maintain Child’s safety, cooperate with provider
services, and address Child’s truancy. See id. at 24.
Throughout the ensuing dependency proceedings, the court conducted
regular review hearings at which it maintained Child’s commitment and
placement. The court consistently characterized Mother’s compliance with the
permanency plan and progress towards alleviating the circumstances which
3 At the time of the subject proceedings, Child, then over seventeen years old,
and her minor child, then over two and half years old, had been placed in their current pre-adoptive, kinship care home for over a year. See Order Modifying Placement, 7/28/22; N.T., 9/25/23, at 31.
4 We note that the Agency had previously been involved with this family and,
as such, the initial family service plan dates back to August 2018. See CYS Exhibit 1 (family service plan); see also N.T., 9/25/23, at 20-21.
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necessitated placement as moderate. See Stipulation of Counsel, 9/15/23, at
¶¶ 14-18.
Ultimately, on May 18, 2023, the court changed Child’s permanency goal
to adoption with a concurrent goal of permanent legal custody (non-relative).
See id. at ¶¶ 18, 19; see also N.T., 9/25/23, at 23.
On July 11, 2023, the Agency filed a petition for the involuntary
termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511
(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The orphans’ court held an evidentiary hearing
on September 25, 2023. At the time, Child, then seventeen years old, was
represented by a separate guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and legal counsel.5 See
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a). Mother, who was represented by counsel, was not
present. Upon request of the Agency, the orphans’’ court incorporated the
dependency record and granted judicial notice of all applications, petitions,
motions, and orders as docketed with the Clerk of Courts in the dependency
action.6 See N.T., 9/25/23, at 5-6. The Agency presented the testimony of
Pressley Ridge parent educator, Regina Fike; and Agency caseworker, Family
5 Both the GAL and legal counsel argued in favor of termination at the conclusion of the September 25th hearing. See N.T., 9/25/23, at 56-57. The GAL likewise submitted a letter in lieu of brief to this Court in support of termination. See Letter, 1/23/24.
6 A stipulation of counsel had additionally been filed on September 15, 2023.
See Stipulation of Counsel, 9/15/23.
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Preservation Unit, Aubree Dedrick.7 The Agency additionally proffered exhibits
which were admitted without objection. See id. at 5. By decree dated and
entered September 25, 2023, the court involuntarily terminated Mother’s
parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),
and (b).8
Subsequent to the filing of a timely petition, pursuant to order of
October 4, 2023, the orphans’ court vacated the termination decree as to
Mother and reopened the record to allow for additional testimony, including
that of Mother.9 The court convened a continued hearing on October 12, 2023,
wherein Mother testified on her own behalf. On the same date, the court
entered its decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to Child
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).10
Thereafter, on November 13, 2023, Mother filed a timely notice of
appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
7 Ms. Dedrick testified that she had been the assigned caseworker for approximately one year and two months. N.T., 9/25/23, at 20.
8 Pursuant to order of the same date, the court memorialized its reasoning as
placed on the record at the conclusion of the hearing. See Order, 9/25/23.
9 The court found that Mother failed to appear at the September 25th hearing
for credible reasons. See N.T., 10/12/23 at 21; see also id. at 24.
10 Pursuant to order of the same date, the court memorialized its reasoning
as placed on the record at the conclusion of the hearing. See Order, 10/12/23.
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pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).11 The orphans’ court filed a Rule
1925(a) opinion on November 27, 2023, which referenced and incorporated
its reasoning placed on the record on September 25, 2023, and October 12,
2023.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review, “Did the
[orphans’ court] abuse its discretion and err as a matter of law in finding that
the Agency met its burden to terminate Mother’s parental rights under 23
Pa.C.S.A. Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and 2511(b)?” Mother’s Brief at
5.
Our standard of review in this context is well-established:
In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.
An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the ____________________________________________
11 We note that Mother’s time in which to file a timely appeal with respect to
the orphans’ court’s decrees technically fell on November 11, 2023. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Since that day was a Saturday, however, Mother’s time in which to appeal was extended until Monday, November 13, 2023, by operation of statute. See Pa.R.J.A. 107(a)-(b) (relating to the computation of time and setting forth a rule of construction that excludes the last day of any period that falls upon a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday); Pa.R.A.P. 107 (incorporating by reference the rules of construction set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration with respect to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903, cmt.
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facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill- will. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings.
In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’ court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up).
The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed at statute by
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. See
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. The trial court must initially determine whether the
conduct of the parent warrants termination under one of the eleven
enumerated grounds set forth at Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the petitioner has established grounds for termination under
Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under Section
2511(b), which focuses upon the child’s needs and welfare. See In re T.S.M.,
602 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). To involuntarily terminate
parental rights, the petitioner must satisfy both Section 2511(a) and (b) by
clear and convincing evidence, which is evidence that is so “clear, direct,
weighty, and convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear
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conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 359 (Pa. 2021).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). To affirm the
underlying decrees, however, we need only agree with the court’s decision as
to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), along with Section 2511(b). See
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). As such, we
limit our discussion to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well- being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
To prove the applicability of subsection (a)(2), the party petitioning for
termination must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused
the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3)
that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot and will not
be remedied. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa. Super.
2021). Subsection (a)(2) emphasizes the child’s present and future needs,
not the parent’s refusal to perform their duties and thus “should not be read
to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable home and strong
continuous parental ties. . . . This is particularly so where disruption of
the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable prospect
for reuniting it.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Section 2511(a)(2) grounds are not
limited to affirmative misconduct; they may also include acts of refusal and
incapacity to perform parental duties. See In re S.C., 247 A.3d 1097, 1104
(Pa. Super. 2021), abrogated on other grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d
1085, 1110 n.23 (Pa. 2023). We have long recognized that a parent is
required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption
of full parental responsibilities. See In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d 434, 443 (Pa.
Super. 2017).
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With respect to the orphans’ court’s findings of incapacity pursuant to
subsection (a)(2), Mother argues that she
is able to provide essential parental care for [C]hild now. Mother is able to provide a stable home for [C]hild. Again, this is not saying that Mother does not have certain limitations; however, they do not warrant termination of parental rights and therefore the Lower Court erred as a matter of law.
Mother’s Brief at 20. We disagree.
Contrary to Mother’s arguments, the record supports the orphans’
court’s finding of an ongoing lack of parental capacity which persisted and was
denied by Mother. The orphans’ court stated:
The court would note that the record establishes that [Mother], while engaged in some services during the course of adjudication of dependency of her daughter, never progressed to the point to which she was able to adequately address the very real concerns regarding her protective capacity as it relates to [Child], as well as advance and demonstrate appropriate understanding and implementation of proper parenting. The testimony established that [Mother] did not believe she needed additional parenting, training, or assistance. . . .
N.T., 10/12/23, at 29; see also N.T., 9/25/23 at 65-66 (noting, in part,
“[M]other’s overall protective capacity and ability to properly parent [Child]
remains a very significant concern for the [c]ourt.”). We agree.
Jonathan Gransee, Psy.D., licensed psychologist, conducted a parenting
capacity assessment of Mother dated May 5, 2021, which was admitted
without objection as CYS Exhibit 7. See N.T., 9/25/23, at 4-5. Dr. Gransee
expressed “serious concerns regarding [Mother’s] ability to ensure the safety
of her children.” CYS Exhibit 7 (parenting capacity evaluation), at 9 ¶ 2
(unpaginated). Following testing, including testing related to Mother’s IQ, he
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found that Mother suffered from intellectual disability. See id. at 7. He
explained that, not only would this result in academic difficulty, but
individuals with this level of intelligence often have issues with regards to judgment, and they tend to make mistakes in thinking, because of their limited cognitive abilities. They may also try to disguise their limited cognitive abilities, which can make it seem as if they are being non-compliant, rather than that they simply do not understand.
Id. Dr. Gransee therefore concluded, “At this point it does not appear that
she is capable of safely parenting her child, and it is not clear that that will
change.” Id. at 10. As such, he recommended, inter alia, “ongoing parenting
support in terms of learning additional parenting skills.” Id.
While Mother engaged in parent education with Child through Pressley
Ridge, Ms. Fike, the Pressley Ridge parent educator, testified that Mother was
“noncompliant and continued to be resistant to the idea that she could benefit
from parent education services.” N.T., 9/25/23, at 12. She continued,
Mother was very resistant is perhaps the better way to discuss this. Mother was -- we were doing the visits concurrently with parent education. So[,] a parent education session would occur and then the visit. Mother frequently would be late or would not – say that she couldn’t stay after the visit. Mother was also very vocal about telling me that she felt this was an inappropriate request that was being made of her and she was generally not supportive of it.
Id. at 12-13. Ms. Fike acknowledged that Mother had cognitive limitations
but “never felt that [she] didn’t understand . . . . She understood the concepts
that were being presented to the extent that she could relay them back to me.
She did not ever reach a threshold where she felt that any of those things
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applied to her.” Id. at 13. Parent education services were therefore closed
without Mother completing the program successfully. See id. at 16; see also
CYS Exhibit 6 (Pressley Ridge closing summary).
Similarly, Ms. Dedrick confirmed that Mother had not successfully
engaged in parent education services. Id. at 33. She further testified, “It’s
my impression that [Mother] believes she doesn’t need parent[] education.
She, in the time that I’ve been assigned the case, has never expressed the
desire for any services from the agency besides visitation. . . .” Id. at 38. As
a result, Ms. Dedrick opined that Mother was not prepared to care for and
meet the needs of Child due to her cognitive limitations and denial of parent
education. Id. at 37-38. Ms. Dedrick expressed concern about Mother’s
ability to meet her own needs, as well as Child’s, and concern for Mother’s
ability to care for Child and Child’s child. See id. at 33, 40, 42. Specifically,
as to visitation, Ms. Dedrick noted Mother’s inability to parent and correct Child
and her inability to manage Child without supervision. See id. at 42. In
addition, she noted Mother’s failure to comprehend the circumstances
surrounding Child’s conception of her child. She stated, “[Mother]’s in denial
of the circumstances.” Id. at 43.
Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court
in concluding the evidence warranted termination pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2). The record substantiates the conclusion that Mother’s repeated
and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused Child to be
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without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for her
physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the Mother. See
A.H., 247 A.3d at 443. After over two and a half years, Mother had yet to
remedy her continuing diminished protective capacity and rejected efforts at
parent education. As the court stated:
It was more than two years ago when Dr. Gransee identified that [Mother] was not capable of safely parenting [Child]. Mother has had more than two years to address the concerns raised by Dr. Gransee’s evaluation. The [c]ourt finds that [M]other has failed to in any way be proactive in addressing Dr. Gransee’s concerns and demonstrate that she is able to safely parent [Child].
N.T., 9/25/23, at 70. Significantly, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance
while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s
need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope
for the future.” In re R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Having found sufficient grounds for termination pursuant to Section
2511(a)(2), we next must determine whether termination was proper under
Section 2511(b), which affords “primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(b). “[T]he determination of the child’s ‘needs and welfare’ requires
consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child. The
‘utmost attention’ should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond.” See T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628, 71
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A.3d at 267 (internal citations omitted). As our Supreme Court recently
explained in Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (Pa. 2023):
[A] court conducting a Section 2511(b) analysis must consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond. We emphasize analysis of the parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection (b) analysis, which includes a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.
K.T., supra (emphasis added).
The evaluation of a child’s respective bonds is not always an easy task.
“In cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and
child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond
analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular
case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted).
In addition, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must
also include consideration of other important factors.” Id. While not inventing
an exhaustive list of considerations, the Court explained that the inquiry must
consider and weigh certain evidence if it is present in the record,
including, but not limited, “the child’s need for permanency and the length of
time in foster care [. . .]; whether the child is in a pre[-]adoptive home and
bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including intangible needs of
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love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.” Id. (footnote omitted); see
also id. at n.28 (emphasis in original).
As to Section 2511(b), Mother argues that termination does not serve
Child’s best interests, pointing to a mutually desired relationship between she
and Child. Mother states:
[T]ermination of Mother’s parental rights does not serve the best needs of [C]hild. Throughout the case, it was stated that [C]hild wanted a relationship with [] Mother and Mother wanted a relationship with [C]hild. It is argued that terminating Mother’s rights do not help [C]hild in anyway. With [C]hild’s age, theoretically she could continue to live outside of Mother’s home by agreement without terminating parental rights.
Mother’s Brief 24-25. Mother further asserts that a Section 2511(b) analysis
is not even warranted. “As stated previously in this brief, the [c]ourt does not
even get to a [Section] 2511(b) analysis if sufficient grounds do not exist
under Section 2511(a). It is argued that in this case, there is no reason to
move to an analysis under [Section] 2511(b).” Id. at 25. We disagree.
As noted above, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not abuse its
discretion or legally err in concluding that sufficient grounds for termination
existed pursuant to Section 2511(a). In determining that termination was
additionally proper under Section 2511(b), the orphans’ court found that Child
does not share a parent-child bond with Mother, but instead shares such a
bond with her kinship parents. The court stated as follows:
As it relates to any bond between [Child] and [M]other, the [c]ourt finds that there is a bond, but it is not a parental bond. The [c]ourt finds that based on the testimony here today, and the [c]ourt’s lengthy involvement with both [Child] and [M]other
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throughout the course of adjudication of dependency, that [M]other has in essence a friend bond with [Child]. The [c]ourt finds that the strongest and, at this point, only parental bond with [Child], is between [Child] and her resource parents, who are identified a[s] pre-adoptive parents for [Child].
Testimony established that [Child] looks to her [kinship] parents as her parental figures. The [c]ourt notes in assessing the bond that exists between the parents and [Child], the court is to assess whether the bond that does exist is necessary and beneficial to the child in order for the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare to be properly met. The [c]ourt finds that [Child]’s [kinship] parents are the ones who are providing a bond to [Child] that is allowing her to meet her developmental, physical, and emotional needs.
The [c]ourt finds by clear and convincing evidence that the bond that exists between [Mother] and [Child] is not necessary for [C]hild’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs to be met, and, in fact, is not beneficial to her meeting those needs.
N.T., 10/12/23, at 68-69; see also N.T., 9/25/23, at 31 (“The [c]ourt
reaffirms that there’s a bond between Mother . . . and [Child]. However, that
bond is not an appropriate parental bond but more of a friend bond. . . . [T]he
termination of her parental rights . . . best serves the needs and welfare of
[Child], and . . . will allow her to move forward and achieve permanency.”).
We discern no abuse of discretion.
Indeed, while Mother maintained visitation with Child, such visitation
remained supervised and never progressed. See N.T., 9/25/23, at 11-12, 28.
Ms. Fike expressed concerns for Child’s emotional safety, describing the visits
as traumatic. See id. at 12-14. She explained, “I spent a fair amount time
with [C]hild. . . . She was noticeably different in the visits with [M]other. I
felt that she was a bit more hypervigilant, a bit more aware, seemed very
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concerned when mom would say things that might ring as inappropriate. She
just seemed generally stressed in that environment. . . .” Id. at 14. Then,
clarifying that the negativity emanated from the parent education sessions
that were held in connection with visitation, Ms. Fike continued, “I can’t say
the visits themselves had a negative impact, but us doing parent education
appeared to raise issues and subject matter that that caused some anxiety, I
believe for [Child]. That was my impression.” Id. at 17. Moreover, the court
ceased phone contact between Mother and Child, and there was no indication
of any contact via mail or social media. See id. at 29, 50. Thus, although
Ms. Dedrick recognized a bond between Mother and Child, it was not a parental
bond. See id. at 30, 38 (“I would not call it parental, but they do have a
bond.”). She labelled the relationship as “more of a friendship.” Id. at 38.
Rather, Ms. Dedrick recognized that Child shares a parental bond with
her kinship parents. See id. at 30-31. Ms. Dedrick testified:
Q. [C]ould you comment upon what type of parental bond the minor child has with the [kinship] family?
A. [Kinship] parents have stepped in to provide that parental relationship for [Child]. They correct her when needed. They guide her with parenting her own child. They give her that stability that a parent should give her.
Q. Would you conclude that she views them as parental type figures?
A. Yes.
Id. at 31. Her child likewise has a positive relationship with Child’s kinship
parents. He “calls [kinship parents] Meme and Popop. So he does view them
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as grandparents figures. All interaction I’ve seen have been positive.” Id. at
31.
Ms. Dedrick confirmed that Child is doing “exceedingly well” in the
kinship home, which is pre-adoptive. Id. at 40-41. She indicated that Child
has an IEP and is doing “exceptional” in school. Id. at 39. In fact, Ms. Dedrick
observed, “All of her grades are fantastic.” Id. She also reported that Child
is involved in marching band. See id. at 40.
Ms. Fike stated that Child expressed a desire for permanency in her
kinship home. She testified:
Q. During your visits -- excuse me -- and work with [Child], did she express her views to you regarding her permanency?
A. She did.
Q. And what were those?
A. Over the amount of time that I spent with her, she moved from a position of being very, very concerned that she not heard from [M]other to articulating a belief that it was not in her best interest or her son’s best interest to return to [M]other, and from that point expressed a desire to have permanency in her current home.
Id. at 14-15. Likewise, Ms. Dedrick stated that Child indicated that she wants
“to be adopted.” Id. at 41-42. As such, Ms. Dedrick opined that termination
was in Child’s best interests. She explained, “Once termination of parental
rights occurs, [Child] would be able to have permanency that she desires and
deserves in [her kinship home].” Id. She further predicted no long-term
negative impact as a result of termination. Id.
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Hence, the record corroborates the orphans’ court’s determination that
termination of Mother’s parental rights best serves Child’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). As
such, we do not disturb the orphans’ court’s determination.
As Mother has failed to show that the orphans’ court abused its
discretion in finding grounds for termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2)
and that termination of her parental rights favors the Child’s needs and welfare
pursuant to Section 2511(b), she is due no relief. For the foregoing reasons,
we affirm the termination decree.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 5/6/2024
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