In Re: Adopt of: S.W.C. Appeal of: R.L.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

In Re: Adopt of: S.W.C. Appeal of: R.L.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania·Decided November 12, 2014·No. 951 MDA 2014·Unpublished

Opinion

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.W.C., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.L., MOTHER, Appellant No. 963 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered May 5, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000103-2012

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: S.W.C., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.L., Appellant No. 951 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree May 5, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0119

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and STABILE, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2014 R.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the contemporaneous order and decree entered on May 5, 2014, wherein the trial court changed S.W.C.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption and terminated Mother’s parental rights to the child. As the appeals flow from identical facts and

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Mother combined both of her arguments into a single brief, we address the appeals collectively and affirm.1 S.W.C. was born during May 2009 of an ongoing relationship between Mother and C.B.C. (“Father”). York County Office of Children and Youth, Services (“CYS”) became involved with the family during May of 2012 due to allegations that Father sexually abused S.W.C.’s older half-sister over a four- year period. Father was determined to be an indicated perpetrator of abuse. On June 4, 2012, the victim, S.W.C., and another half-sibling, who subsequently leveled allegations of abuse against Father, were placed together in emergency shelter care. The latter allegations of abuse were also substantiated. On June 12, 2012, the juvenile court adjudicated the three children dependent. The children remained together in the foster home, which is now a pre-adoptive resource. The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights to S.W.C.’s half-sisters. Mother did not appeal those orders, and their birth father relinquished his parental rights and consented to the adoption by the foster parents.

The original permanency goal for all of the children was reunification with Mother. In order to achieve that goal, CYS crafted a family service plan (“FSP”) that directed Mother to maintain contact with CYS, complete a non- offending parenting class and a parental education program, obtain a

1 On the same date, the trial court terminated the parental rights of C.B.C., S.W.C.’s birth father. We address the appeal from that order separately.

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psychological evaluation and comply with treatment recommendations, and maintain a safe home. The FSP was subsequently amended to include a requirement that Mother and her then-paramour and now husband, N.L., complete evaluations to address past criminal history, including N.L.’s convictions for statutory sexual assault and corruption of minors. Mother was directed to attend weekly therapy at Pressley Ridge and cooperate with separate in-home services provided by Pressley Ridge. Additionally, Mother and N.L. were directed to comply with the visitation schedule.

Initially, Mother complied with the FSP. She attended a psychiatric evaluation, finished the intake portion of a non-offenders parenting class, and completed general parenting classes at Family Child Resources. Likewise, early in the process, Mother maintained consistent supervised visitation with S.W.C., and CYS moved the supervised visitations from the agency into Mother’s home. However, during the dependency process, S.W.C.’s behavior during the visitations became erratic in that he displayed aggression and defiance and engaged in tantrums. Mother struggled to redirect the child’s activities and often countered his behavior with excessively long time-outs. By the time that CYS ultimately sought to change the child’s permanency goal, he no longer wanted to visit Mother.

Within three months of S.W.C.’s dependency adjudication, Mother still failed to initiate the therapy recommended following her psychiatric evaluation. Similarly, by February 2013, Pressley Ridge sought to terminate its in-home-service component because Mother required intensive services

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beyond its capabilities. For example, while Mother was delinquent on her bills, she rejected attempts by the in-home service team to formulate a budget. Moreover, N.L.’s sex-offense evaluations remained pending at that time. Pressley Ridge characterized the family’s prognosis as “very guarded” due to the level of trauma and the level of effort required to mend the family relationship and develop appropriate parenting skills. CYF Exhibit 5, Pressley Ridge Closing Summary, at 4. It recommended that Mother continue with regular outpatient counseling services. Id. at 3.

Later, during April 2013, Mother’s therapist reported that Mother struggled to recognize how her traumatic history with sexual abuse affected her parenting abilities. She reported that Mother missed at least sixteen of the fifty-three scheduled therapeutic sessions. N.L. completed some components of his evaluation, but neither he nor Mother had finished their respective risk assessments at that point. Likewise, the court-appointed child advocate (“CASA”) reported that Mother started serially misinforming S.W.C. and his sisters that she had become pregnant and suffered a miscarriages. However, since Mother had a tubal ligation during July 2012, her claims of pregnancy were untrue. In the ensuing months, Mother’s therapist reported that Mother’s attendance had become more inconsistent. At one juncture, Mother missed fourteen of twenty-four sessions.

On October 30, 2013, CYS filed a petition to change S.W.C.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption and filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. CASA concurred in CYS’s

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decision and, on January 7, 2014, it issued a comprehensive report concluding that it was in the best interests of S.W.C. and his two siblings to change their permanency goal to adoption and terminate Mother’s parental rights. The court convened evidentiary hearings on January 10 and February 27, 2014. CYS presented testimony from the case worker assigned to the family and from the family advocate who was associated with Catholic Charities. Mother testified on her own behalf.

On May 5, 2014, the trial court granted CYS’s petitions, terminated Mother’s parental rights, and change S.W.C.’s permanency goal to adoption. These timely appeals followed. Mother filed a Rule 1925(b) statement asserting three issues that she reiterates on appeal as follows:

I. Whether the trial court erred changing the goal from reunification to adoption.

II. Whether the trial court erred in terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to [§] 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) of the Adoption Act.

III. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the children pursuant to [§] 2511(b) of the Adoption Act.

Mother’s brief at 5.

Mother challenges the trial court’s decision to change S.W.C.’s permanency goal to adoption and its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). While the court’s determinations are related factually, the two decisions implicate

J-A31006-14 & J-A31007-14

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J-A31006-14 & J-A31007-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: S.W.C., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.L., MOTHER, Appellant No. 963 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Entered May 5, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-67-DP-0000103-2012

IN RE: ADOPTION OF: S.W.C., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: R.L., Appellant No. 951 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Decree May 5, 2014 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Orphans' Court at No(s): 2013-0119

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT, and STABILE, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 12, 2014 R.L. (“Mother”) appeals from the contemporaneous order and decree entered on May 5, 2014, wherein the trial court changed S.W.C.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption and terminated Mother’s parental rights to the child. As the appeals flow from identical facts and

J-A31006-14 & J-A31007-14

Mother combined both of her arguments into a single brief, we address the appeals collectively and affirm.1 S.W.C. was born during May 2009 of an ongoing relationship between Mother and C.B.C. (“Father”). York County Office of Children and Youth, Services (“CYS”) became involved with the family during May of 2012 due to allegations that Father sexually abused S.W.C.’s older half-sister over a four- year period. Father was determined to be an indicated perpetrator of abuse. On June 4, 2012, the victim, S.W.C., and another half-sibling, who subsequently leveled allegations of abuse against Father, were placed together in emergency shelter care. The latter allegations of abuse were also substantiated. On June 12, 2012, the juvenile court adjudicated the three children dependent. The children remained together in the foster home, which is now a pre-adoptive resource. The trial court also terminated Mother’s parental rights to S.W.C.’s half-sisters. Mother did not appeal those orders, and their birth father relinquished his parental rights and consented to the adoption by the foster parents.

The original permanency goal for all of the children was reunification with Mother. In order to achieve that goal, CYS crafted a family service plan (“FSP”) that directed Mother to maintain contact with CYS, complete a non- offending parenting class and a parental education program, obtain a

1 On the same date, the trial court terminated the parental rights of C.B.C., S.W.C.’s birth father. We address the appeal from that order separately.

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psychological evaluation and comply with treatment recommendations, and maintain a safe home. The FSP was subsequently amended to include a requirement that Mother and her then-paramour and now husband, N.L., complete evaluations to address past criminal history, including N.L.’s convictions for statutory sexual assault and corruption of minors. Mother was directed to attend weekly therapy at Pressley Ridge and cooperate with separate in-home services provided by Pressley Ridge. Additionally, Mother and N.L. were directed to comply with the visitation schedule.

Initially, Mother complied with the FSP. She attended a psychiatric evaluation, finished the intake portion of a non-offenders parenting class, and completed general parenting classes at Family Child Resources. Likewise, early in the process, Mother maintained consistent supervised visitation with S.W.C., and CYS moved the supervised visitations from the agency into Mother’s home. However, during the dependency process, S.W.C.’s behavior during the visitations became erratic in that he displayed aggression and defiance and engaged in tantrums. Mother struggled to redirect the child’s activities and often countered his behavior with excessively long time-outs. By the time that CYS ultimately sought to change the child’s permanency goal, he no longer wanted to visit Mother.

Within three months of S.W.C.’s dependency adjudication, Mother still failed to initiate the therapy recommended following her psychiatric evaluation. Similarly, by February 2013, Pressley Ridge sought to terminate its in-home-service component because Mother required intensive services

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beyond its capabilities. For example, while Mother was delinquent on her bills, she rejected attempts by the in-home service team to formulate a budget. Moreover, N.L.’s sex-offense evaluations remained pending at that time. Pressley Ridge characterized the family’s prognosis as “very guarded” due to the level of trauma and the level of effort required to mend the family relationship and develop appropriate parenting skills. CYF Exhibit 5, Pressley Ridge Closing Summary, at 4. It recommended that Mother continue with regular outpatient counseling services. Id. at 3.

Later, during April 2013, Mother’s therapist reported that Mother struggled to recognize how her traumatic history with sexual abuse affected her parenting abilities. She reported that Mother missed at least sixteen of the fifty-three scheduled therapeutic sessions. N.L. completed some components of his evaluation, but neither he nor Mother had finished their respective risk assessments at that point. Likewise, the court-appointed child advocate (“CASA”) reported that Mother started serially misinforming S.W.C. and his sisters that she had become pregnant and suffered a miscarriages. However, since Mother had a tubal ligation during July 2012, her claims of pregnancy were untrue. In the ensuing months, Mother’s therapist reported that Mother’s attendance had become more inconsistent. At one juncture, Mother missed fourteen of twenty-four sessions.

On October 30, 2013, CYS filed a petition to change S.W.C.’s permanency goal from reunification to adoption and filed a petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. CASA concurred in CYS’s

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decision and, on January 7, 2014, it issued a comprehensive report concluding that it was in the best interests of S.W.C. and his two siblings to change their permanency goal to adoption and terminate Mother’s parental rights. The court convened evidentiary hearings on January 10 and February 27, 2014. CYS presented testimony from the case worker assigned to the family and from the family advocate who was associated with Catholic Charities. Mother testified on her own behalf.

On May 5, 2014, the trial court granted CYS’s petitions, terminated Mother’s parental rights, and change S.W.C.’s permanency goal to adoption. These timely appeals followed. Mother filed a Rule 1925(b) statement asserting three issues that she reiterates on appeal as follows:

I. Whether the trial court erred changing the goal from reunification to adoption.

II. Whether the trial court erred in terminating the parental rights of Mother . . . pursuant to [§] 2511(a)(1), (2), (5) and (8) of the Adoption Act.

III. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the children pursuant to [§] 2511(b) of the Adoption Act.

Mother’s brief at 5.

Mother challenges the trial court’s decision to change S.W.C.’s permanency goal to adoption and its decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). While the court’s determinations are related factually, the two decisions implicate

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different considerations. See In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 339-340 (Pa.Super. 2002) (“the issues and purposes of the proceedings before the Juvenile Court and the Orphans’ Court are wholly distinct”). Indeed, unlike involuntary termination proceedings, which concentrates principally upon a parent’s action and inaction,2 the focus of dependency proceedings is “on the children’s safety, permanency, and well-being,” and not on the parent’s conduct. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822-823 (Pa.Super. 2006); In re K.J., 27 A.3d 236, 241 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citations omitted) (Juvenile Act’s mandate clearly places trial court's focus on best interests of child).

First, we review the trial court order changing the permanency goals from reunification to adoption. The following principles are relevant to our review:

In cases involving a court’s order changing the [court-ordered]

goal . . . to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. To hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine its judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the court disregarded the law, or that its action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While this Court is bound by the facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the court’s inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a responsibility to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record. Therefore, our scope of review is broad.

2 Only after clear and convincing evidence is presented to establish that a parent’s action or inaction satisfies the statutory grounds for termination pursuant to § 2511(a) will the trial court consider the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare under § 2511(b).

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In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations omitted); see also In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010).

This issue is controlled by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301-6375, which was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), 42 U.S.C. § 671-679. In In re M.S., 980 A.2d 612, 615 (Pa.Super. 2009) citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1), we explained,

Both statutes are compatible pieces of legislation seeking to benefit the best interest of the child, not the parent. . . . ASFA promotes the reunification of foster care children with their natural parents when feasible. . . . Pennsylvania’s Juvenile Act focuses upon reunification of the family, which means that the unity of the family shall be preserved “whenever possible.”

As such, child welfare agencies are required to make reasonable efforts to

return a foster child to his or her biological parent. In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa.Super. 2006). When those efforts fail, the agency “must redirect its efforts toward placing the child in an adoptive home.” Id.

During permanency review hearings, trial courts must address the following considerations relevant to the child’s wellbeing.

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—

At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance with the permanency plan developed for the child.

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(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the permanency plan in effect.

(6) Whether the child is safe.

....

(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last 22 months or the court has determined that aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve and reunify the family need not be made or continue to be made, whether the county agency has filed or sought to join a petition to terminate parental rights and to identify, recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the child[.]

(f.1) Additional determination.--Based upon the determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be returned to the child's parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the return of the child is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and the county agency will file for termination of parental rights in cases where return to the child's parent, guardian or custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

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42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)-(6) and (9), (f.1) (1) and (2) (emphasis added). As we have indicated, “[t]hese statutory mandates clearly place the trial court’s focus on the best interests of the child.” In re S.B., supra at 978 (citation omitted). Importantly, “[s]afety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take precedence over all other considerations.” Id. (citation omitted; emphasis in original). Moreover, the burden is on the child welfare agency “to prove the change in goal would be in the child’s best interest.” In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2009).

Instantly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in changing S.W.C.’s goal from reunification to adoption. After a thorough review of the parties’ briefs, pertinent law and the certified record, we conclude that the trial court cogently and accurately addressed this aspect of Mother’s argument in its well-reasoned opinion entered on May 6, 2014. Therefore we affirm the the order changing S.W.C.’s permanency goal on the basis of that opinion.3

3 The relevant analysis starts on page eighteen of the trial court opinion and concludes on page twenty-three. In addition to adopting the trial court’s analysis, we specifically reject Mother’s argument that the trial court was preoccupied with the threat that N.L. would pose to S.W.C.’s sisters if the family was reunified. Mother asserts that the trial court improperly transferred those concerns to the case at bar. This position permeates each issue raised in her brief. However, notwithstanding Mother’s protestations to the contrary, the trial court’s consideration of the genuine risk that N.L. posed to the children related to the quality of Mother’s decision-making ability generally insofar as she would willingly expose her adolescent daughters to a convicted sex offender with a predilection for pubescent girls. (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Next, we address whether the trial court erred in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and (b). We apply the following standard of review of an order terminating parental rights:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, our review is limited to a determination of whether the decree of the termination court is supported by competent evidence. Adoption of B.D.S., 494 Pa. 171, 431 A.2d 203, 207 (1981). The party petitioning for termination “must prove the statutory criteria for that termination by at least clear and convincing evidence.” In re T.R., 502 Pa. 165, 465 A.2d 642, 644 (1983). Clear and convincing evidence is defined as “testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Matter of Sylvester, 521 Pa. 300, 555 A.2d 1202, 1203–04 (1989).

In re Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098, 1107 (Pa. 2011). As the ultimate trier of fact, the trial court is empowered to make all determinations of credibility, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 477 (Pa.Super. 2010). “If competent evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” Id.

Requests to involuntarily terminate a biological parent’s parental rights are governed by 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

(Footnote Continued)

Hence, the trial court’s reference to any potential for abuse by N.L. is an indictment of Mother’s parenting rather than a finding that N.L. is a direct threat to S.W.C.

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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.

....

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

....

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

....

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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.

The test for terminating parental rights consists of two parts. In In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007), we explained:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such bond.

We need only agree with the orphans’ court’s decision as to one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) and the subsection (b) analysis in order to affirm the termination of parental rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Herein, the certified record supports the orphans’ court’s determination that CYS established the statutory grounds to

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terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). Hence, we do not address the remaining statutory grounds.

We have explained our review of the evidence pursuant to § 2511(a)(8), as follows:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(a)(8), the following factors must be demonstrated: (1)

The child has been removed from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist; and (3)

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

In Re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-1276 (Pa.Super. 2003).

Thus, in order to satisfy the requirements of § 2511(a)(8) in the case at bar, CYS was required to produce clear and convincing evidence that: (1) S.W.C. has been removed from Mother for at least twelve months; (2) the conditions which led to the child’s removal continue to exist; and (3) involuntary termination of parental rights would best serve S.W.C.’s needs and welfare. See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa.Super. 2006). “Notably, termination under Section 2511(a)(8), does not require an evaluation of Mother's willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that led to placement of her children.” Id. at 511 (emphasis in original).

First, we observe that S.W.C. has been in CYS’s care since June 4, 2012, based upon the substantiated allegations of sexual abuse perpetrated by Father against S.W.C.’s adolescent half-siblings. As CYS did not file its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights until October 30, 2013,

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approximately seventeen months later, CYS satisfied the threshold requirement of § 2511(a)(8), which mandates that the child be removed from Mother for at least twelve months. Next, the certified record reveals that the condition that led to S.W.C.’s removal from Mother’s care in June 2012, Mother’s inability to provide her son a safe and secure environment continued to exist, and that terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve S.W.C.’s needs and welfare.

During the evidentiary hearing, Karen Beard, the CYS caseworker assigned to the family since June 2013, testified that she was the current custodian of the family’s file. N.T., 2/10/14, at 11. Ms. Beard indicated that, prior to the agency’s involvement with the family during June 2012, Mother was involved with the child service agency in Blair County that resulted in the termination of her parental rights of another child. Id. at 13. Similarly, she explained that, prior to the sexual abuse that is the genesis of the instant case, Father was identified as an indicated perpetrator of sexual abuse and was listed on the Child Line abuse registry in Cumberland County. Id. Additionally, in the weeks proceeding the underlying report that Father had sexually abused S.W.C.’s half-sister for the previous four years, Father was found to be in contempt for violating a protection from abuse order based upon his surreptitious residence at Mother’s home. Id. Father parked in the rear of the property to avoid detection. Id. However, the children confirmed Father’s presence in the home during the relevant time. Id.

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Ms. Beard expounded, “Mother failed to assure the safety of the children by allowing [Father] to reside in the residence and have ongoing contact with the children.” Id. at 13-14.

Ms. Beard also testified about Mother’s current living situation. At the date of the hearing, Mother resided with her current husband, N.L., in a rental home in York. Id. at 21, 23. Since the adjudication of dependency, Mother source of income was limited to SSI disability insurance. Id. at 25- 26. She receives $720 per month due to her diagnosis of major depressive disorder. Id. at 27. Mother has not been employed outside of the home for approximately ten years. Id. at 25-26. N.L. works part-time as a cook at Buffalo Wild Wings.

Ms. Beard indicated that Mother’s residence was unsafe. Id. at 22. It reeked of dog waste and had issues with mold due to ceiling leaks. Id. While Mother apparently “scraped” the mold off the walls, the wall paneling was bowed and remained wet to the touch. Id. Portions of tile were missing from the kitchen walls and floor. Id. Approximately one-third of the tiles were missing from the bathroom ceiling due to the leaks, and the third-floor ceiling was cracked. Id. at 22-23. Additionally, portions of the floor was unstable and yielded to Ms. Beard’s weight when she walked on it. She opined that the physical state of the residence was not appropriate for the return of S.W.C. and his half-sisters. Moreover, Mother was in the

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process of being evicted from the residence for failure to pay rent. Id. at 23.

As it relates to visitation, Ms. Beard testified that Mother consistently participated in the twice-a-week supervised visitations with S.W.C. and his sisters. Id. at 28-29. The visitations lasted one and one-half hours on Mondays and Wednesday. Id. at 28. CYS briefly contemplated removing supervision, but Mother refused to prevent the children’s contact with N.L., a convicted sex offender. The supervision was re-imposed within two weeks. Id. at 29-30. Ms. Beard testified that Mother was unable to interact effectively with all three children at the same time. Id. at 31. She explained that S.W.C.’s behavioral issues required that she focus her attention on disciplining that child to the exclusion of the other children. Id. at 32. However, Mother never requested separate visitations. Id.

In relation to the mental health component, Ms. Beard reported that Mother submitted to a psychiatric evaluation and participated in two of the three types of recommended therapy. Id. at 37-38. However, Mother did not fully comply with the additional recommendations outlined in a report authored by Suzanne Ashwood for the Commonwealth Clinical Group. Id. at 38. Likewise, Ms. Beard noted that Mother was discharged from Pressley Ridge in-home services due to slow progress and the improbability of reunification. Id. at 39. CYS never refused any services that Mother requested. Id. at 40.

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Ms. Beard concluded that it was in S.W.C.’s best interest to prepare the child for adoption because issues existed regarding Mother’s ability to protect the children from harm. She recommended terminating Mother’s parental rights “so that [S.W.C.] would have a safe and stable home with family members that can provide adequate care and protection.” Id. at 58. Ms. Beard stated that, as it relates to the children’s safety and the issues that Mother and her partners had as respective victims and perpetrators of sexual abuse, Mother is in the identical place that she was when S.W.C. and his sisters were removed from her care in June of 2012. Id. at 59. Stated simply, other than visitation, Mother failed to make progress toward addressing the issues that caused S.W.C.’s placement, i.e., his safety. Id. at 57. Ms. Beard effectively recognized that there were many outstanding concerns that Mother needed to address, and stated that she could not see a light at the end of the tunnel. Id. at 59. Thus, she believed that Mother was not close to accomplishing her parenting goals.

Furthermore, as Ms. Beard observed, the services that Mother utilized were not sufficient to facilitate reunification. Id. at 58. Ms. Beard highlighted that Mother often indicates an understanding of the importance of protecting S.W.C. and his sisters only to behave in a manner that leads the agency to question her actual ability to protect them from harm. Id. at 41. Critically, Ms. Beard testified that CYS is concerned that Mother fails to comprehend how her choices regarding N.L. affect her children and how

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those choices are interpreted as failing to protect them from a convicted child abuser. Id. at 51-52. As it relates to Mother’s inability to perceive potential threats to her children generally, Ms. Beard proffered the following illustration regarding N.L.:

Our agency just has concerns with [N.L.’s] charges[.] . . .

[W]e met with Dr. Turner who reviewed [N.L.’s] . . . sexual history polygraph [examination], and the polygraph revealed an interest . . . in, like, 13 to 18 year old[s], but he was also recommended for like treatment within that time span, but [T.H.’s] 11 so she’s – that’s where our concerns lie.

Id. at 52. She continued that, even though N.L. is attending counseling, he failed to implement the various recommendations from his sex-offender evaluations. Id. at 53. The agency is worried by the fact that, despite N.L.’s history with sex abuse of adolescent girls and the direct harm that he poses to her daughters’ safety, Mother dismisses the potential danger. Id. at 54. Indeed, Mother, herself a victim of sexual abuse, informed Ms. Beard that her daughters “should move on [and] get over” the sexual abuse they endured. Id. at 55. Moreover, Mother not only knew of N.L.’s sexual predilections before she married him, she minimized the issues even though the children had been removed from her care due to Father’s sexual abuse of the girls. Id. Rather than insulate her children from this potential threat, Mother encouraged S.W.C. and his sisters to refer to N.L. as “daddy” and the children acquiesced. Id. at 56. Mother’s lack of empathy for her daughters’ prior victimization in this regard evidences her inability to appreciate the risks of harm posed to all of the children, including S.W.C. Id. at 67.

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Emily Verschoor’s testimony was consistent with Ms. Beard.

Ms. Verschoor was the family advocate that Catholic Charities assigned to this matter. Id. at 138-139. She was involved with the case between July 2013 and December 2013. Id. at 138. Her duties were to assist with reunification, provide parenting and life skills, supervise visitations, and support CYS generally. Id. at 139. She supervised Mother’s bi-weekly visitations with S.W.C. and his sisters and conducted parenting lessons for Mother. She testified that she supervised thirty-three visitations. Id. at 140.

In relation to the supervised visitations, Ms. Verschoor stated that S.W.C. initially resisted contact with Mother, but “after a few months,” he attend visitations without opposition. Id. at 141. S.W.C. never revealed why he objected to the visitations, but his sisters vocalized to their foster mother that they feared Mother would not protect them from N.L. Id. at 150, 152-153. Moreover, the quality of the visitations was poor. Id. Mother struggled to apply the tactics and strategies that she learned in parenting classes. Id. Ms. Verschoor explained that, with prompting, Mother applied her training during the first visitation following the lesson; however, she could not retain the information and apply it later. Id. at 145, 147. At other times, Mother become frustrated and overwhelmed. Id. at 156.

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When Ms. Verschoor attempted to conduct visitation in the community, the visits turned chaotic. Id. at 158. Mother was simply unable to control the three children in public. Id. at 158-159. Ms. Verschoor further explained, “They would not listen to her. They did not respect what she was saying.” Id. at 160-161. On one occasion during a community visitation at the York Galleria Mall, S.W.C. eloped. Id. at 172. While Mother was searching for S.W.C., the older children wandered away from her and began to run through the stores. Id. While Ms. Verschoor could see the children playing in the stores, Mother was clueless about their location. Ms. Verschoor stated that the incident was only one example of her concerns over Mother’s ability to exercise appropriate supervision.

Additionally, Ms. Verschoor testified that she attempted to address with Mother the effect of her relationship with N.L. However, Mother remained largely unconcerned about her husband’s history of sex offenses, and she was incapable of appreciating the risk of harm. Id. at 156. Ms. Verschoor reported that Mother “would say that she didn’t think there was a safety risk as far as her children but then there are other times that we would talk about it, and she said . . . that she was still very cautious when he was around the girls.” Id. For example, Ms. Verschoor pointed out that despite Mother’s reassuring statements that she trusted N.L. with the children, and her ostensive confidence that the children were safe in his presence, Mother was on edge during the visitations that N.L. attended, and

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she was preoccupied with her husband’s interactions with the children. Id. at 166-167.

Ms. Verschoor explained that, while Mother improved some components of her parenting skills over the thirty-three visitations that she had with the children, she struggled continually with other components, such as doling out appropriate discipline. Id. at 148. Similarly, she made minimal progress with independent parenting and required consistent prompting to apply the required strategies. Id. at 149. Nonetheless, Mother resisted Ms. Verschoor’s attempts to assist her with disciplining the children. Id. at 161-162.

The forgoing evidence sustains the trial court’s determination that CYS proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds to terminate Mother’s parental rights to S.W.C. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8). Mother’s failure to address her mental health issues stemming from the sexual assaults that she endured as a child, rectify her parenting shortcomings, and erect safeguards to protect S.W.C. from the convicted sex-offender whom she married, despite the obvious danger and the agency’s opposition, illustrates that she is unable to care for her son. Thus, as highlighted by the testimony Ms. Beard and Ms. Verschoor presented, CYS adduced clear and convincing evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights. S.W.C. has been removed from Mother for at least twelve months; the conditions that led to S.W.C.’s removal continue to exist; and, as discussed infra, involuntary

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termination of parental rights would best serve S.W.C.’s needs and welfare. Accordingly, we find that the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that CYS satisfied the statutory requirements to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8). See In re Adoption of R.J.S., supra.

Next, we address whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that CYS presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that terminating Mother’s parental rights and permanently severing the existing bond between her and S.W.C. would best serve the child’s needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b). While the Adoption Act does not mandate that the trial court consider the effect of permanently severing parental bonds, our case law requires it where a bond exists to some extent. See In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993).

The extent of the trial court’s bond-effect analysis depends upon the circumstances of a particular case. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa.Super. 2008). We have emphasized that, while a parent’s emotional bond with his child is a major aspect of the § 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the trial court when determining what is in the best interest of the child. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535-536 (Pa.Super. 2008). Indeed, the mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate

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parental rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond against parents’ inability to serve needs of child).

As we explained in In re K.Z.S., supra at 763 (emphasis omitted),

In addition to a bond examination, the court may equally emphasize the safety needs of the child under subsection (b), particularly in cases involving physical or sexual abuse, severe child neglect or abandonment, or children with special needs.

The trial court should also examine the intangibles such as the love, comfort, security and stability the child might have with the foster parent. Another consideration is the importance of continuity of relationships to the child and whether the parent child bond, if it exists, can be severed without detrimental effects on the child. All of these factors can contribute to the inquiry about the needs and welfare of the child.

See also In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa.Super. 2010) (orphans’ court can emphasize safety needs, consider intangibles, such as love, comfort, security, and stability child might have with the foster parent, and importance of continuity of existing relationships).

Herein, the trial court concluded that severing the parental bond and freeing S.W.C. for adoption was in the child’s best interest because the parental bond that nurtures safety, security, and permanency exists between S.W.C. and his foster parents rather than with Mother. See Trial Court Opinion, 5/6/14, at 32. Our review of the certified record confirms the trial court’s conclusion.

In addition to discussing the duration of S.W.C.’s placement and Mother’s inability to remedy the conditions that led to his removal from Mother’s care, Ms. Beard’s testimony also addressed S.W.C.’s development

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in foster care. Ms. Beard testified that S.W.C. was four years old as of the date of the evidentiary hearing. N.T., 1/10/14, at 44. He was diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder (“ODD”) and adjustment disorder with anxiety. Id. at 46. Due to his negative behaviors, there is a concern that he may have attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”), but his scheduled neuropsychological evaluation had not occurred when the evidence was presented. Id. S.W.C. was referred for play therapy but remains on a waiting list. He has been in a Head Start program since September 2013. Id. at 44. He is excelling in the classroom; however, he still experiences disruptive outbursts. N.T., 2/27/14, at 12.

As it relates to S.W.C.’s relationship with Mother, Ms. Beard testified that he generally refers to her as “mom,” but has also addressed Mother by her Christian name. N.T., 1/10/14, at 32. She also noted that the child was problematic during the visitations and often challenged Mother’s authority. Id. at 34. In contrast to that behavior, however, S.W.C. is respectful to his foster parents, and he appears more comfortable in their presence. Id. at 34.

Since she has been assigned to this family, Ms. Beard visited S.W.C.

and his half-sisters in the foster family once per month. Id. at 33. She indicated that S.W.C. is particularly attached to his half-sisters, especially the younger girl, and the foster parents are committed to adopting all three children. Id. at 36, 49-50. Similarly, Ms. Beard testified that S.W.C.

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bonded with all of the members of the foster family, and he is very happy in the home. Id. at 33. Ms. Beard added that S.W.C. enjoyed a particularly close relationship with his foster father, and that he followed appropriate parenting prompts. Id. at 35.

Noting that S.W.C. has never inquired about Mother during the caseworker’s visits to the foster home, Ms. Beard opined the child’s bonds were comparatively stronger with his foster parents and that he would not suffer any long-term negative impacts if the court terminates Mother’s parental rights. Id. at 36, 59, 126, 130. Specifically, she testified, “although [the children] have visits . . . with mom, they spend [the] majority of the time with the foster family. So I feel like they have bonded more with the foster family over the past 19 months. They appear to be included in th[e] family and the family[’s] activities. They’re viewed as part of their family.” Id. at 119.

Similarly, Ms. Verschoor testified that S.W.C. loves his foster family and when the visitations with Mother ended, he was excited to return to the foster home. Id. at 154. He did not cling to Mother during the visitations, and when the visitations end, he simply hugs her, says “good-bye”, and gets in the van to return home with his foster family. Id. at 170. He never acted out or rebelled for being separated from her. Id. Ms. Verschoor opined that, although S.W.C. shares a bond with Mother, the bond he enjoys with his foster parents is stronger. Id. at 155.

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As highlighted by the forgoing evidence, the certified record supports the trial court’s needs and welfare analysis pursuant to § 2511(b). No meaningful bond exists between S.W.C. and Mother that would be detrimental to sever. The evidence confirms that S.W.C.’s primary attachment is to his pre-adoptive foster parents and his two half-siblings whose adoption into the same family is pending. Those relationships reveal the hallmarks of healthy parent-child and sibling relationships, including closeness, security and emotional attachment. In contrast, Mother has not cultivated any bond with her son beyond visitation. The fact that S.W.C’s primary emotional attachment is with his foster parents rather than Mother is a significant factor in evaluating his developmental and emotional needs and welfare. See In re K.Z.S., supra (“the bond between [the child] and [foster mother] is the primary bond to protect, given [the child’s] young age and his very limited contact with Mother”).

Thus, mindful of the additional factors that should be emphasized during the needs-and-welfare analysis in In re K.Z.S., supra at 763, such as “the love, comfort, security and stability the child might have with the foster parent” and the importance of continuing that beneficial relationship, we find that the record confirms that terminating Mother’s parental rights best satisfies S.W.C.’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare. We emphasize that it is highly beneficial that S.W.C and his half- sisters share the same pre-adoptive foster home.

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For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court order changing S.W.C.’s permanency goal and the decree terminating Mother’s parental rights to S.W.C. pursuant to § 2511(a)(8) and (b).

Order and decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/12/2014

Circulated 10/31/2014 04:47 PM

In Re: Adopt of: S.W.C. Appeal of: R.L., (Pa. Ct. App. 2014).

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In Re: Adopt of: S.W.C. Appeal of: R.L. (In Re: Adopt of: S.W.C. Appeal of: R.L.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Opinion

I. Whether the trial court erred changing the goal from reunification to adoption.

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