In Re Adkins

121 B.R. 393, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2457, 1990 WL 181599
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Oklahoma
DecidedNovember 21, 1990
Docket19-10398
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 121 B.R. 393 (In Re Adkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Adkins, 121 B.R. 393, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2457, 1990 WL 181599 (Okla. 1990).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

STEPHEN J. COVEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

Upon the motion of David Harold Adkins and Margaret Ann Adkins (“Debtors”) to avoid lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) 1 and the objection thereto, filed by Blazer Finance (“Creditor”), the Court finds the lien upon the Debtors’ three televisions, VCR, stereo, two speakers, phonograph, guitar and lawn mower (“Property”) is avoidable and the Property exempt for the following reasons.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Debtors filed a motion to avoid lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f) on August 27, 1990. The Debtors alleged the Creditor had a nonpossessory, nonpurchase money security interest in the Property held primarily for the personal, family and household use of the Debtors.

The Creditor filed its objection to the Debtors’ motion on September 17, 1990. In support of its motion the Creditor cited cases from the United States Bankruptcy Courts for the Northern, Eastern and Western Districts of Oklahoma, the Oklahoma Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. These decisions will be discussed further in this Court’s analysis. The Debtors filed their authorities and response to the Creditor’s objection on September 27, 1990. They mainly rely upon In re Fisher, 11 B.R. 666 (Bankr.W.D.Okl.1981) to support their contention that the lien may be avoided on all the Property.

The Debtor’s testimony at the hearing on October 26, 1990, reflected that one of the televisions was disposed of on or before filing bankruptcy because it was inoperative. The rest of the Property was located in the family home and held for primarily personal, family and household use. It was undisputed that the security agreement of the creditor was nonpossessory and nonpurchase money.

ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS

The Oklahoma Exemption Statute, 31 O.S. § 1(A)(3) states as follows.

(A) Except as otherwise provided in this title and notwithstanding subsection (B) of this section, the following property shall be reserved to every person residing in the state, exempt from attachment or execution and every other species of forced sale for the payment of debts, except as herein provided:
(3) all household and kitchen furniture held primarily for the personal, family or household use of such person or a dependent of such person; ...

The issue to be decided is whether the property is exempt under Oklahoma law. The Court first finds that all the property in question qualifies as furniture under the Oklahoma exemption statute. Furniture is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, 608 (5th ed. 1979), as follows:

This term includes that which furnishes, or with which anything is furnished or supplied; whatever must be supplied to a house, a room, place of business, or public building or the like, to make it habitable, convenient, or agreeable; goods, vessels, utensils, and other appendages necessary or convenient for housekeeping; whatever is added to the interior of a house or apartment, for use or convenience.

Under this definition, the only articles that might not be considered furniture are the lawn mower and guitar. However, both of these are used to make the home *395 more habitable, convenient and agreeable and, therefore, can be classified as furniture. Also in Cook v. Fuller, 35 Okl. 339, 130 P. 140 (1913) and In re Johnson, 101 B.R. 280 (Bankr.W.D.Okl.1989) a piano and fire alarm system were respectively found to be furniture.

The key issue to be decided is whether the Property, which is held primarily for personal, family and household use, must also be a “necessity of life.”

The issue of lien avoidance has been addressed by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma in In re McKaskle, 117 B.R. 671 (Bankr.N.D.Okl.1990), and by the Tenth Circuit in In re Reid, 757 F.2d 230 (10th Cir.1985). The Western District addressed the issue in In re Michalak, 101 B.R. 276 (W.D.Okl.1988), and In re Fisher, 11 B.R. 666 (Bankr.W.D.Okl.1981), and the Eastern District in In re Wade, Case No. 88-0048 (Bankr.E.D.Okl.1988), and In re Miller, 101 B.R. 713 (Bankr.E.D.Okl.1989).

In the McKaskle case, the debtor sought to avoid the creditor’s nonpossessory, non-purchase money security interest in the debtor’s three televisions, VCR, stereo, two speakers, phonograph, lawn mower, hedge trimmer, video game system, calculator and antiques. Relying upon an Oklahoma Supreme Court case, Security Building & Loan Association v. Ward, 174 Okl. 238, 50 P.2d 651 (1935), for the definition of “household and kitchen furniture”, the court found only one television and the antiques were exempt. The other items were found nonexempt because none fit the strict definition of furniture or was a “necessity of life.”

The Security Building & Loan Association case involved a debtor with a twelve room home which he had divided into three apartments. The debtor and his family were, in fact, only using one of those apartments for their personal, family and household use. The other two apartments were leased to tenants. The house and its furniture burned in a fire. Before the insurance company could pay the proceeds, Security Building & Loan Association (“Security”) issued a garnishment naming the insurance company garnishee. The dispute arose as to whether the debtor or Security was entitled to the proceeds payable because of the fire damage to the furniture. This turned upon whether the furniture was exempt from claims of creditors.

The court held that the furniture used by the debtors in their apartment was household furniture held primarily for family or household use and was, therefore, exempt. The court further held that the furniture in the tenants’ apartments was being used for commercial purposes and not household or family purposes and, therefore, nonexempt. The proceeds were divided accordingly.

In its opinion the court stated as follows:

The purposes of the exemption statute are to prevent improvident debtors from becoming subjects of charity by preserving to them sufficient definitely classified property that they may maintain a home for themselves, and to prevent inconsiderate creditors from depriving them of the necessities of life. It is the duty of the court to so apply these exemption statutes as to accomplish these purposes....
While we do not approve all of the language used in the foregoing decisions from other jurisdictions, we conclude, upon consideration thereof in connection with our own statute, that the household and kitchen furniture of the head of a family who is a resident of this state, which is being used for maintaining the home or which is intended to be so used and reasonably necessary for such use, is exempt by law from levy on execution or attachment (emphasis added).

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Related

In re Payne
215 B.R. 889 (N.D. Oklahoma, 1997)
In Re Hall
169 B.R. 732 (N.D. Oklahoma, 1994)
In Re Davis
134 B.R. 34 (W.D. Oklahoma, 1991)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
121 B.R. 393, 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2457, 1990 WL 181599, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-adkins-oknb-1990.