In Re Adams

12 B.R. 540, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1054, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3366, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 78
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah
DecidedJuly 15, 1981
Docket19-02026
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 12 B.R. 540 (In Re Adams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Utah primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1054, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3366, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 78 (Utah 1981).

Opinion

*541 RALPH R. MABEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

The issue arising in this case concerns the extent of “property of the estate” in a Chapter 13 case. Where there exists a non-dischargeable obligation for alimony and support under § 523(a)(5), its collection, under § 362(b)(2), is excepted from the automatic stay insofar as satisfaction is sought from “property that is not property of the estate.” Out of what property, then, can such a debt be satisfied once a Chapter 13 petition has been filed?

The facts of this case are as follows. The debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition and obtained confirmation of his Chapter 13 plan. Subsequent to the confirmation, the debtor’s former spouse proceeded in state court to obtain judgment and thereafter collect upon a debt for past alimony and child support. The debtor brought an order to show cause against his ex-spouse for violation of the automatic stay. The parties stipulated at the hearing on the order to show cause that the sum of $550 per month constituted a nondischargeable debt under Section 523(a)(5). The question then arose as to what property, if any, was not property of the Chapter 13 estate and, therefore, was available for satisfaction of this nondischargeable debt.

Upon the filing of a petition in Chapter 13, an estate is created pursuant to Section 1306. This section defines property of the estate in a Chapter 13 case to include all property specified in Section 541 as well as

(1) all property of the kind specified in such section [Section 541] that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7 or 11 of this title whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7 or 11 of this title, whichever occurs first.

Taking this definition in conjunction with the expansive wording of Section 541 which includes, among other enumerated categories, “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property” as property of the estate, it would appear at first glance that virtually no property remains as “property of the debtor” in Chapter 13 out of which a debt, such as the one at hand, could be satisfied. However, upon consideration of the effect confirmation of a plan under Chapter 13 has on the breadth of “property of the estate,” and upon further consideration of the effect the exemption provisions found in Section 522 have in Chapter 13, an asset line can be drawn, subsequent to confirmation, between “property of the estate” and “property of the debtor” which may fairly protect the rights of debtor and his dependents.

The expansive definition of Section 1306 defines “property of the estate” as it exists upon the filing of a petition. At that point there is virtually no property of the debtor available to the ex-spouse attempting to collect a debt for support under the exception of Section 362(b)(2). Even though post-petition wages and other property normally remain in the possession and control of the debtor prior to confirmation under Section 1306(b), that property remains “property of the estate” under Section 1306(a). In contrast to former law, even exempt property passes to the estate. 1

Circumstances change, however, upon the confirmation of a plan. In most cases, which do not involve businesses or complicated claims to property, confirmation is achieved, if at all, usually soon after the petition is filed. Section 1322(bX9) allows the plan to vest property of the estate in the debtor or other entity at confirmation or anytime thereafter. Even if the plan does not so provide, under Section 1327(b), unless the plan or order of confirmation provides otherwise, “the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate *542 in the debtor.” 2 Furthermore, under subsection (c) of Section 1327, except as is provided in the plan or the order of confirmation, “the property vesting in the debtor under subsection (b) of this section is free and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan.”

Under these provisions, the expansive definition of “property of the estate” found in Section 1306 is pruned dramatically at confirmation. Any property which has not been designated in the plan or order of confirmation as necessary for the execution of the plan revests in the debtor, under Section 1327(b), to become “property of the debtor.” 3 Thus, all wages over and above those paid to the trustee or creditors under a plan, and any property which the debtor does not propose to use in funding his plan returns to the debtor and becomes subject to the reach of his ex-spouse under Section 362(b)(2). Therefore, although the ex-spouse’s collection action is initially held at bay by the breadth of the Section 1306 estate, once confirmation occurs, a more equitable balance is struck between the needs of the debtor to rehabilitate himself and those of his dependents seeking lawful support.

A more complicated question arises as to the treatment of property claimed as exempt in a Chapter 13. Under Section 522(c)(1), property claimed by the debtor as exempt, in the absence of objection, becomes exempt. Thus, although all property of the debtor, including property claimed as exempt, initially passes to the estate, once that property claimed as exempt becomes exempt under Section 522(c)(1), it returns to the debtor and becomes “property of the debtor.” 4 This property would ordinarily then be subject to the nondischargeable claim of the ex-spouse for alimony and support.

In Chapter 13, however, property, even though claimed as exempt, can in effect remain property of the estate if the debtor proposes to fund his plan in part through the use of exempt property. Section 1322(b)(8) specifically allows the debtor to propose payment of “all or any part of a claim against the debtor from .. . property of the debtor”. 5 The debtor can, in effect, waive his exemptions and use exempt property in repaying creditors under a plan. If this occurs, the property is not subject to the ex-spouse’s claim, for when it is designated to fund a confirmed plan, the exemption is waived and the property remains property of the estate. Thus, it would appear that the ex-spouse does not have an absolute right in a Chapter 13 to go after *543 property claimed by the debtor as exempt: until confirmation or at least the proposal of a plan, the question of what property claimed as exempt by the debtor actually becomes “property of the debtor” is not settled. Therefore, although the ex-spouse is given an expedited right to proceed against property of the debtor that “is not property of the estate” under Section 362(b)(2), where the debtor has filed a Chapter 13 case, the spouse may be prohibited from proceeding to collect until at least a plan is proposed, and the distinction between what is property of the debtor, by virtue of his claimed exemptions, and what is property of the estate has been clearly drawn.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
12 B.R. 540, 4 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 1054, 1981 Bankr. LEXIS 3366, 8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 78, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-adams-utb-1981.