NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250092-U This Order was filed under FILED May 20, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-25-0092, 4-25-0093 cons. Carla Bender not precedent except in the th 4 District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re A.D. and I.D., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Winnebago County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 23JA104 v. ) 23JA105 Rebecca C., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Francis M. Martinez, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Harris and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights.
¶2 In October 2024, the State filed petitions to terminate the parental rights of
respondent, Rebecca C., to her minor children, A.D. (born June 2022) and I.D. (born January
2021). Following the fitness and best interest hearings, the trial court granted the State’s petition
and terminated respondent’s parental rights. (The parental rights of the minors’ father were also
terminated; however, he is not a party to this appeal.) Respondent timely filed a notice of appeal,
and counsel was appointed to represent her. Appellate counsel now moves to withdraw pursuant
to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), contending there are no meritorious issues of
procedure or substance to be raised on appeal which would warrant relief. We agree, grant
counsel’s motion to withdraw, and affirm the court’s judgment. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In March 2023, the State filed separate neglect petitions for the minors pursuant to
section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-2(1)(b)
(West 2022)), contending the minors’ environment was injurious to their welfare. Relevant to this
appeal, the petitions alleged respondent (1) had a history of engaging in acts of domestic violence,
which placed the minors at a risk of harm, and (2) had a history of substance abuse preventing her
from properly parenting, thereby also placing the minors at a risk of harm. Following a shelter care
hearing, the trial court entered a temporary custody order placing the minors in the custody of the
Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶5 In June 2023, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding both minors
neglected after respondent stipulated to the domestic violence allegations. In August 2023, the
court entered a dispositional order making the minors wards of the court after finding respondent
unfit or unable for reasons other than financial circumstances to properly care for the minors.
Custody and guardianship of the minors was placed with DCFS, and respondent was ordered to
cooperate with DCFS’s directives.
¶6 In October 2024, the State filed petitions to terminate respondent’s parental rights,
alleging in each petition she was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of
the minors to her care within any nine-month period following the neglect adjudication (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)). The relevant nine-month periods were June 20, 2023, to March 20,
2024, and November 14, 2023, to August 14, 2024.
¶7 A. Fitness Hearing
¶8 A fitness hearing was held in November 2024. Jaimi Kitchen, a DCFS caseworker,
testified she was assigned to this case in May 2023. She stated respondent was required to
-2- cooperate with DCFS, attend supervised visits with the minors, complete a parenting course, and
complete an assessment and any recommended treatment for mental health, substance abuse, and
domestic violence. Kitchen explained respondent continually denied any mental health issues but
would often exhibit threatening, “erratic[,] and volatile” communication with DCFS and other
service providers. After respondent’s initial mental health assessment, she was not recommended
to complete any treatment because, according to Kitchen, respondent denied having any mental
health issues. Respondent was referred to a different provider for a subsequent mental health
assessment, who recommended counseling. Respondent was also referred for a psychological
assessment and subsequent psychiatric services.
¶9 Kitchen stated respondent opted to find her own physician for psychiatric services.
However, Kitchen later learned the first physician was a primary care provider, not a psychiatrist.
Respondent then attempted to receive psychiatric services from a pediatric physician and then a
physician licensed out-of-state. Eventually, respondent began receiving psychiatric care from Aunt
Martha’s Health & Wellness in April 2024. Kitchen concluded respondent had not successfully
completed mental health services due to “attendance issues,” as she had “never been discharged.”
Kitchen testified she had not observed any improvement in respondent’s mental health. She stated
respondent continued to be “very volatile” and “argumentative.” She said respondent failed to
understand why the minors were removed from her care and, ultimately, blamed DCFS. Kitchen
also noted respondent had “yelled, sworn, had to be escorted out of our building and escorted from
visits.” She stated respondent’s counseling reports indicated respondent did not comprehend the
extent of her mental health issues or how to properly treat them.
¶ 10 Regarding domestic violence services, Kitchen stated respondent had a history of
both perpetrating and being the victim of domestic violence. She noted respondent completed a
-3- partner abuse intervention program in May 2024. However, the agency continued to have concerns
because respondent interacted in an “aggressive and threatening manner” with DCFS and service
providers. Kitchen referenced two incidents: one from December 2023, wherein respondent was
involved in an altercation, and another in July 2024, which involved respondent’s parents. The
agency sought to address these incidents with counseling, but, according to Kitchen, respondent
“missed several sessions.”
¶ 11 Regarding substance abuse issues, Kitchen explained I.D. “was born exposed to
cocaine.” Respondent had missed several drug tests and tested positive for cannabis on completed
tests. Kitchen stated respondent completed “maybe 50, 60[%]” of the ordered drug tests.
¶ 12 Regarding parenting services, Kitchen stated respondent’s supervised visits with
the minors were often terminated early because respondent displayed “unstable emotions”
becoming “visibly upset and agitated, frustrated.” Respondent was referred to parenting classes
but was unsuccessfully discharged in August 2023. As part of the unsuccessful discharge,
respondent was recommended for anger management and psychiatric services.
¶ 13 According to Kitchen, respondent missed some visits with the minors and, at some
of the visits she attended, respondent discussed the issues of the case, “yelling, screaming, [and]
getting upset.” This caused the visits to end early. At a visit at the courthouse, respondent abruptly
began yelling at a case aid “for looking at her the wrong way.” She accused a caseworker of
“hurting her son,” referencing a “line on his leg from [a] Pull-up [diaper].” However, staff observed
no injuries to the child. Kitchen reported respondent had failed to safely secure and supervise one
of the minors on a diaper changing table and had failed to properly secure one of the minors in
their car seat after a visit. Kitchen also reported staff had to tell respondent it was “inappropriate”
to attempt to take a photo of A.D.’s “vaginal area.” Finally, Kitchen said, during a visit, A.D. “was
-4- shrinking back and shivering in fear.” Respondent told A.D., “ ‘Stop shivering. It’s not cold in
here.’ ” According to Kitchen, “the professionals observed that the child was fearful of
[respondent.]”
¶ 14 Kitchen explained the minors’ therapist observed respondent’s visits and
subsequently recommended they be suspended. The agency attempted to modify the visits to
permit respondent to interact with the minors in the presence of a parenting coach. However, this
was unsuccessful, and the agency suspended respondent’s visits in December 2023.
¶ 15 Kitchen stated, after respondent’s doctor prescribed an antidepressant in January
2024, she had observed some improvement in respondent’s behavior. Kitchen said, “[Respondent]
ha[d] not [engaged in] yelling and screaming and [being] visibly red and upset like she used to,
but we still [were] seeing a lot of volatile aggressive communication.” According to Kitchen,
respondent still needed to “work with a psychiatrist and a counselor to be able to demonstrate an
understanding of her mental health and demonstrate stabilization of that.” Additionally, according
to Kitchen, respondent needed to reenroll in parenting classes, continue parent coaching, complete
a parent capacity assessment, and successfully complete a substance abuse intensive outpatient
program. Kitchen summarized she did not believe respondent could safely parent because
respondent had failed to understand why the children were in protective care or the reasons for the
various recommended services.
¶ 16 Prior to cross-examination, the trial court admitted without objection respondent’s
November 2023 psychological evaluation by Dr. Mary Gardner. Gardner had diagnosed
respondent with “Schizoaffective Disorders, Bipolar Type.” Kitchen did not recall whether she or
her staff had requested records from Dr. Gopinath Gorthy, who had diagnosed respondent with an
impulse control disorder.
-5- ¶ 17 During cross-examination by the guardian ad litem (GAL), Kitchen stated
respondent had not been honest about her residence or who had been living with her.
¶ 18 On redirect examination, Kitchen confirmed the agency was less concerned about
respondent’s diagnosis and more concerned about respondent’s treatment and outcomes from
recommended services.
¶ 19 Dr. Gorthy testified on respondent’s behalf. He testified he was a board-certified
psychiatrist and had begun working for Aunt Martha’s Health & Wellness in December 2023. He
began treating respondent in April 2024. Dr. Gorthy stated respondent’s medical history did not
support a schizoaffective disorder diagnosis. Instead, in his opinion, an impulse control disorder
diagnosis was more appropriate. Dr. Gorthy noted respondent had already been taking an
antidepressant prior to coming under his care and he did not prescribe any new medications. Dr.
Gorthy agreed with Dr. Gardner’s previous recommendations for respondent to obtain a parent
capacity evaluation, individual psychotherapy, and anger management classes.
¶ 20 April Moore also testified on respondent’s behalf. Moore was assigned as
respondent’s DCFS caseworker in November or December 2023. Moore stated she did not contact
Dr. Gorthy. On cross-examination, Moore stated she did not learn about Dr. Gorthy until July 2024
and had not inquired further because respondent indicated she was transferring to a different
provider at Rosecrance.
¶ 21 Respondent testified she successfully completed the partner abuse intervention
program in May 2024. She admitted she was unsuccessfully discharged from parenting classes. To
resume parenting classes, she was required to obtain a psychological assessment, which she
obtained from Dr. Gardner in October 2023. She met with her caseworker in December 2023, at
which time DCFS suspended her visits with the minors and instructed her to find her own
-6- psychiatric provider. Respondent stated she did not explicitly say she intended to find a new
provider at Rosecrance, but she was interested in finding a new provider.
¶ 22 On cross-examination, respondent clarified she only suggested she would see a new
psychiatric provider at Rosecrance. She admitted she told Dr. Gorthy she was going to seek
treatment at Rosecrance.
¶ 23 Moore testified again for the State’s rebuttal evidence. Moore stated respondent’s
psychological exam by Dr. Gardner was discussed during the same meeting in December 2023
that her visitations with the minors were suspended. Moore stated responded was told repeatedly
she needed to obtain follow-up psychiatric care in order for visits to resume. Moore said the agency
recommended several psychiatrists, but respondent indicated she “had somebody in mind already.”
¶ 24 During cross-examination by the GAL, Moore clarified she did not reach out to Dr.
Gorthy because respondent had already expressed a desire to see a new psychiatrist.
¶ 25 The parties presented their closing arguments, and the trial court took the matter
under advisement. The parties reconvened in January 2025, wherein the court rendered its decision
as to respondent’s fitness.
¶ 26 The trial court stated the “main concern throughout this entire case has been
[respondent’s] mental health.” The court noted Kitchen’s testimony clearly established respondent
began mental health treatment several times but never completed the treatment, stating, “At no
point is there evidence that [respondent] completed any mental health program or came closer to
reunification.” The court noted a significant amount of testimony concerned respondent’s
interactions with DCFS and providers, but the testimony concerned respondent’s efforts, not
progress. The court found respondent’s efforts were reasonable, but she had failed to make any
objective progress toward reunification with the minors. The court stated respondent was “actually
-7- farther away” from reunification than when the case had begun. The court concluded the State had
met its burden by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 27 B. Best Interest Hearing
¶ 28 The matter proceeded directly to a best interest hearing. The trial court took judicial
notice of the prior proceedings and the best interest report, which stated the minors’ physical needs
and welfare were being met by their foster parents. The minors had developed a bond with their
foster parents, who continued to maintain a relationship with the minors’ biological grandmother.
The minors received their “comfort, support, love, and *** basic needs” from their foster parents,
who had indicated a desire to adopt them.
¶ 29 Respondent testified on her own behalf. She stated, prior to visitations being
suspended, the minors had referred to her as their mother. She maintained communication with the
minors’ therapist after visitation was suspended to remain involved in their lives. After her visits
were suspended, she said she had prepared a scrapbook of photographs for them.
¶ 30 When considering the statutory best interest factors (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West
2022)), the trial court noted it was clear from the best interest report the minors were “integrated”
into their foster home. The court found the minors had “thrived” in their foster placement from the
“tremendous support” provided by their foster parents. Because visitation between respondent and
the minors had not resumed since December 2023, the court was doubtful reunification was on the
horizon. Accordingly, the court found the State had met its burden of proving it was in the best
interest of the minors to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 31 Respondent timely filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed counsel to
represent her. Appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders and a supporting
brief providing a statement of facts, a list of potential issues, and arguments as to why those issues
-8- lack arguable merit. See In re J.P., 2016 IL App (1st) 161518, ¶ 8 (finding Anders applies when
counsel seeks to withdraw from representation on direct appeal from orders affecting parental
rights under the Juvenile Court Act). Appellate counsel provided proof of service of her motion
and a memorandum on respondent, and this court granted respondent the opportunity to file a
response. Respondent failed to respond.
¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 Appellate counsel seeks to withdraw, contending there are no meritorious claims
for review. Counsel indicated she considered whether the trial court’s fitness and best interest
findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Believing they were not, counsel opined
any arguments presented to the contrary would be frivolous and patently without merit. After
reviewing the record, we agree with counsel and conclude there are no meritorious arguments to
be considered on appeal.
¶ 34 A. Findings of Parental Unfitness
¶ 35 Parental rights may not be terminated without the parent’s consent unless the trial
court first determines, by clear and convincing evidence, the parent is unfit under section 1(D) of
the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 354 (2005).
Pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act, a parent may be found unfit if she fails “to
make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any [nine]-month
period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West
2022). Illinois courts have defined “reasonable progress” as “demonstrable movement toward the
goal of reunification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d 1036,
1046 (2007). This court has explained reasonable progress exists when a trial court
“can conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to
-9- order the child returned to parental custody. The court will be able
to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future
because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the
directives previously given to the parent in order to regain custody
of the child.” (Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d
444, 461 (1991).
We have also emphasized “ ‘reasonable progress’ is an ‘objective standard.’ ” In re F.P., 2014 IL
App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88 (quoting L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461). “A trial court’s determination
that a parent’s unfitness has been established by clear and convincing evidence will not be
disturbed on review unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.” Gwynne P., 215
Ill. 2d at 354.
¶ 36 In the case sub judice, the trial court correctly noted much of the testimony at the
fitness hearing concerned respondent’s efforts to find psychiatric care rather than her progress
toward completing ordered services, which would subsequently lead toward reunifying her with
the minors. Despite the parties’ conflicting evidence about which doctor’s mental health diagnosis
was correct, the evidentiary issues did not home in on whether respondent had demonstrated
objectively reasonable progress toward reunification. As the court indicated, much of the emphasis
regarding respondent’s progress centered around mental health treatment. Prior to respondent ever
consulting with Drs. Gardner or Gorthy, she had already begun taking an antidepressant
medication. Neither doctor changed her prescribed medication. In fact, Dr. Gorthy largely agreed
with Dr. Gardner’s treatment recommendations. The only difference between the two was what
the ultimate psychiatric diagnosis should have been. Thus, the question was whether respondent
had progressed with the treatment recommendations of any of her psychiatric providers. The
- 10 - answer was she had not. The evidence showed respondent continued to struggle with completing
recommended services and communicating constructively with DCFS. Furthermore, respondent
repeatedly demonstrated an inability to control her emotions and outbursts, leading to her visits
with the minors being suspended. When a parent’s visits are suspended in the midst of a pending
neglect case for the welfare of the children, the very opposite of progress has occurred.
¶ 37 Based on the evidence presented, we agree with appellate counsel any argument the
trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence would be
meritless. The court’s determination respondent was an unfit parent is supported by the record and
not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 38 B. Best Interest Determination
¶ 39 After a trial court finds a parent is unfit, “the court then determines whether it is in
the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352
(2004). The trial court’s best interest determination will not be reversed unless it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. “A best-interest
determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the facts clearly demonstrate
that the trial court should have reached the opposite result.” Id.
¶ 40 At the best interest hearing, the State must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 367.
The trial court must consider the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act.
See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022). However, the court is not required to make a specific
reference to each factor in its findings. In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. These
statutory factors include:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of
- 11 - the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including
familial, cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments,
including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and
the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes;
(6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence,
including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with
parental figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and
child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences
of the persons available to care for the child.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill.
App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009) (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West
2008)).
¶ 41 In this case, the evidence demonstrated the minors’ needs were being met by their
current foster parents. They had developed a bond and were flourishing. The foster parents
indicated a willingness to adopt them. Additionally, the trial court noted any reunification with
respondent was further away at the best interest hearing than it had been when the case opened.
¶ 42 As a reviewing court, we afford great deference to a trial court’s best interest
findings because it sits in a superior position to observe the witnesses, judge credibility, and assess
the evidence. In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. Based on our review of the evidence,
we agree with appellate counsel any argument it was not in the minors’ best interest to terminate
respondent’s parental rights would be meritless. The court’s best interest findings were based on
an appropriate consideration of the statutory factors. Accordingly, we conclude the court’s best
interest determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
- 12 - ¶ 43 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 44 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 45 Affirmed.
- 13 -