In re A.C.

Opinion

[Cite as In re A.C., 2026-Ohio-1661.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE A.C., ET AL. : : No. 115887 Minor Children : : [Appeal by Mother, A.K.] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 7, 2026

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case Nos. AD24903140 and AD24911853

Appearances:

Patrick S. Lavelle, for appellant.

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:

A.K. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s decision terminating her

parental rights and awarding permanent custody of two of her children, A.C. (d.o.b.

1/15/2023) and B.B.K. (d.o.b. 11/5/2024) to the Cuyahoga County Division of

Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”). After reviewing the facts of the case and

pertinent law, we affirm the juvenile court’s judgment. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A.C. is the daughter of Mother and D.C. B.B.K. is Mother and D.C.’s

son. In addition to A.C. and B.B.K., Mother has three other children: two girls

(d.o.b. 9/22/2017 and 12/24/2018) and a boy (d.o.b. 12/18/2019) (collectively the

“Older Children”). The father of the Older Children — a man other than D.C. — was

married to Mother; they were later divorced. Though the custody of the Older

Children is not the subject of this appeal, their custodial history is pertinent.

A. Background

In early 2024, the two older girls revealed that D.C. had been sexually

molesting them. CCDCFS investigated and removed the Older Children and A.C. on

March 27, 2024, pursuant to an ex parte order.

The next day, March 28, 2024, CCDCFS filed a complaint in juvenile

court alleging that the two older girls were victims of sexual abuse and that Mother

minimized the sexual-abuse allegations and failed to demonstrate protective

capacity to ensure a safe home. CCDCFS also alleged Mother used excessive physical

discipline on the Older Children, including beating them with a belt and cutting one

child with a knife. According to CCDCFS, Mother also failed to provide appropriate

medical care for the children, including that A.C. had severe diaper rash and that the

oldest girl suffered from eczema.

CCDCFS sought and obtained predispositional temporary custody of

the Older Children and A.C. A.C. was placed in the predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS on March 28, 2024.1 The Older Children were entrusted to the

care of their father.

On October 23, 2024, a grand jury indicted Mother and D.C. on six

counts of endangering children. These charges arose under R.C. 2919.22(B)(3), for

excessive discipline that created a risk of serious physical harm for the Older

Children, and R.C. 2919.22(B)(4), for unwarranted disciplinary measures that

created a substantial risk of impairing the Older Children’s mental health and

development. The grand jury also indicted Mother for three counts of intimidation

of victim or witness (the Older Children) in a criminal case, under

R.C. 2921.04(B)(1), and three counts of retaliation, under R.C. 2921.05(B), against

the Older Children.

CCDCFS filed an amended complaint on October 25, 2024,

reiterating the allegations of sexual abuse and adding allegations that the older son

witnessed the sexual abuse. The amended complaint also added allegations that

Mother intimidated her children to prevent them from disclosing the abuse and that

Mother and D.C. locked the Older Children and A.C. in the basement as part of the

excessive discipline.

On November 5, 2024, Mother gave birth to B.B.K. CCDCFS took

emergency-temporary care and custody of him the next day.

1 B.B.K. was not born until November of 2024 and, thus, was not included in the

March 28, 2024 predispositional temporary custody order. The court found A.C. to be abused, neglected, and dependent and

awarded temporary custody to CCDCFS on January 9, 2025. The court found B.B.K.

to be dependent and committed him to the temporary custody of CCDCFS on

March 31, 2025. On April 3, 2025, the court extended temporary custody of A.C.

and B.B.K. to September 30, 2025.

In Mother’s criminal case, on August 14, 2025, the trial court found

Mother guilty of the three counts of endangering children for excessive discipline

that created a substantial risk of serious harm to each of the three Older Children.

The trial court also found her guilty of the three counts of retaliation. The trial court

found Mother not guilty of the three counts of endangering children for

unwarranted discipline that created a substantial risk of serious impairment of the

child’s mental health or development and granted Mother’s Crim.R. 29 motion

dismissing the three counts of intimidation. The court imposed a total aggregate

prison sentence of 27 months.2 Mother is expected to be released from prison in

early November 2027.3

2 The court found D.C. guilty of two counts of child endangering against the two

older girls and sentenced him to one-year consecutive terms of imprisonment on each of those two counts.

3 Mother appealed her convictions. That matter is pending as of the time of this opinion. B. Permanent-Custody Trial Proceedings

CCDCFS moved for permanent custody of A.C. and B.B.K. on

September 13, 2025. On October 8, 2025, Mother moved for a second extension of

temporary custody or, in the alternative, for legal custody to Maternal Grandmother.

At the November 14, 2025 trial, the court heard testimony from the

CCDCFS social worker assigned to the case, Kina Crowder (“Crowder”) and the

maternal grandmother of A.C. and B.B.K. (“Maternal Grandmother”). After those

witnesses testified, the guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for both A.C. and B.B.K. provided

his recommendation. Before closing arguments, the foster father for A.C. and B.B.K.

gave a statement. The court also admitted into evidence exhibits including certified

copies of court journal entries, Mother’s treatment history, and photographs and

videos of the Older Children and A.C.

1. CCDCFS Worker Testimony

CCDCFS called Crowder as its only witness. Crowder testified that

she has been assigned to this matter since the summer of 2024. A.C. came to the

attention of CCDCFS due to concerns that she was not being properly supervised by

Mother and that she was not being properly cared for by Mother. CCDCFS had

received calls raising concerns of abuse and neglect. A.C. was in the home at the

time of the alleged sexual abuse of the two older sisters. B.B.K. came to the attention

of CCDCFS as a result of ongoing concerns about the parents being able to protect

him. According to Crowder, Mother was convicted of child endangering and was

incarcerated at the time of trial. She was sentenced to 27 months in prison in August 2025. According a trial court journal entry, D.C. was also convicted of child

endangering and was also sentenced in August 2025. His sentence was two years.

Crowder explained that both A.C. and B.B.K. have been in the custody

of CCDCFS since their initial removals.

A case plan was developed for Mother, with the permanency plan of

reunification. The objectives for the case plan included that Mother complete a

mental-health assessment, complete parenting and domestic-violence services and

maintain her basic needs, specifically housing. Regarding the mental-health

assessment, Crowder explained that referrals were made to Mother to assist her in

completing her case plan. Mother preferred to continue with mental-health services

she had been receiving through Ohio Guidestone. Crowder reported that Mother

was compliant with mental-health services. Although Mother had not consented to

share her records with CCDCFS, Crowder had gained access to them after Mother

was incarcerated. Mother also completed services regarding parenting. Crowder

explained that Mother was appropriate during her visits with her children. Crowder

described Mother as “nurturing to both children.” Mother did not miss any of the

scheduled visits. Mother engaged in services for domestic violence and successfully

completed the course. As relates to basic needs and stable housing, Crowder

testified that Mother had been sentenced to 27 months of incarceration on

August 14, 2025, and that Crowder did not know what Mother’s housing situation

would be upon her release from prison. Crowder reported that Mother had been

engaging in services while she has been incarcerated. Crowder described A.C. and B.B.K. as bonded with their current

caregivers. She explained that A.C. is “transitioning very well. She’s adjusting.”

Initially there were some behavioral issues with A.C., in the form of some aggression,

which Crowder described as “expected” as A.C. “transitioned being away from [her]

. . . family.” When Crowder visits the foster home for her monthly visit, she sees “no

fear. [A.C.] is very friendly, very relaxed and calm.” She noted that A.C. is receiving

therapy for adjustment issues, to assist her with regulating her emotions. B.B.K. is

“very active around the household . . . . [He’s v]ery calm . . . . No issues” as of trial.

Crowder was aware that Maternal Grandmother was seeking legal

custody of both A.C. and B.B.K. One relative of D.C.’s had been identified as a

potential relative who could care for the children. Crowder’s efforts to contact that

individual were unsuccessful. She received no response. Mother provided the name

of another person, but efforts to connect with that person were also not successful.

Maternal Grandmother had been investigated by CCDCFS to consider

her appropriateness for placement. According to Crowder, there were “a lot of

inconsistencies and concerns with the grandmother.” Crowder explained that

Maternal Grandmother had expressed that she did not believe that Mother had done

the things of which she had been accused, even though the allegations had been

substantiated. Specifically, Crowder testified that “[t]hese are now younger children

who [are] unable to self-protect, unable to provide a narrative as how . . . their

siblings did in regards to the acts that had occurred.” Further, Maternal

Grandmother had not reached out to Crowder to inquire into the well-being of her grandchildren. Maternal Grandmother was denied twice as a placement by

CCDCFS.

Asked whether Mother had remedied the conditions that led to the

removal of A.C. and B.B.K., Crowder opined that she had not. She noted that both

Mother and D.C. were incarcerated at the time of trial. At that time, they had only

recently been incarcerated and it was too early to determine whether they had

remedied. Crowder did not believe that either parent could provide a safe, stable,

and permanent home for A.C. and B.B.K. at the time of trial.

On cross-examination, Crowder testified that before Mother was

incarcerated and during visits, Mother had a bond with A.C. and B.B.K. She was

attentive towards the children. She brought them food and utilized resources in the

library when visits occurred there. She attended every weekly visitation session.

Mother was “very passionate about her kids.” At times, Mother was not receptive to

suggestions from the parenting coach who was present during the visits. Overall,

Crowder described Mother as having made significant progress during the CCDCFS

case, notwithstanding her incarceration. According to Crowder, Mother had

informed her that she was appealing her conviction and that she would pursue early

judicial release.

Crowder testified that in addition to the services identified during

direct examination, Mother was also involved with Family Promise before the

children’s removal, as well as after. Mother complied with all Family Promise

program requirements to successfully complete programs related to housing and “RRH Programs.” Moreover, Mother was participating in and engaged with

programming regarding parenting while incarcerated.

Crowder clarified that she had never personally spoken with Maternal

Grandmother. She explained that CCDCFS had “made the decision not to move

forward with the grandmother as a placement.” Being approved as to appropriate

space for children and no criminal background, as Maternal Grandmother was, does

not equate to being approved as a placement. According to Crowder, the main

concern regarding Maternal Grandmother was her inconsistency regarding Agency

involvement. She explained that Maternal Grandmother has expressed that she

does not believe the charges against Mother are valid which raises a concern that

when Mother is released from prison, Maternal Grandmother will “give the children

right back to mom, which is putting these children back into danger.” The concern

is that Maternal Grandmother would not protect the children.

2. Maternal Grandmother

Mother called Maternal Grandmother as her only witness. Maternal

Grandmother testified that before Mother was incarcerated she would see her

grandchildren, other than B.B.K., roughly once every two weeks. Maternal

Grandmother was with Mother in the hospital when B.B.K. was born, but was not

permitted to bond with B.B.K.

Maternal Grandmother denied that she had disbelieved the Older

Children when they alleged abuse. Maternal Grandmother testified that she

accepted the verdicts of the court finding Mother guilty of child endangering and retaliation and that she would protect the children from harm. Specifically,

Maternal Grandmother testified that she accepts the verdicts against Mother as well

as Mother’s responsibility in them.

When asked how she would protect A.C. and B.B.K. after Mother was

released from prison if she was awarded custody, Maternal Grandmother testified

that if Mother was not allowed to be around the children, then “[t]he cops will be

called.” Maternal Grandmother testified regarding photographs and videos of her

grandchildren, other than B.B.K., taken at her house when they were visiting her

and on holidays showing the children smiling and appearing happy.

Maternal Grandmother explained that she is seeking legal custody

because she believes the children should be with a family member. She reiterated

that they would be protected.

Maternal Grandmother explained that she had contacted CCDCFS to

have a visit with her grandchildren. She was not able to participate in a visit that

had been scheduled for Mother and D.C. because CCDCFS told her she could not

join the visit. Grandmother did not make any further attempts to see A.C. and B.B.K.

after she was told no, “because they wouldn’t grant me to come to even those visits

— those supervised visits.” Maternal Grandmother did talk with A.C. on the phone

while Mother was visiting with her. B.B.K. was too young. Maternal Grandmother

testified that she was working with Trumbull County where she lives to secure

visitation rights for the Older Children. On cross-examination Maternal Grandmother testified that she had

never said that she did not believe that her daughter whipped the Older Children

with a belt. When shown her testimony from a previous hearing where she testified

that she did not believe her daughter beat the children with a belt, she explained that

she did not believe Mother beat her children “all over,” but that she did believe it

was a possibility Mother used a belt on their thighs or butts. Maternal Grandmother

further testified, as she had previously, that she did not believe Mother cut one of

the Older Children with a knife. Maternal Grandmother reviewed her prior

testimony that she did not believe Mother had punished her children by locking

them in the basement. Maternal Grandmother then testified that as of the day of

trial, she did believe that the children were locked in the basement because it was

proven.

Maternal Grandmother testified that she believes Mother is guilty of

child endangerment. She claimed she never felt otherwise. However, she explained

that the prosecutor had accused Mother of “the butcher knife and the kids being

soaked in urine” which were false accusations or there was no proof. An audio

recording of a phone call with Mother after Mother was convicted of child

endangerment was played. In the recording, after Mother told Maternal

Grandmother that she was convicted of child endangerment, Maternal

Grandmother responded that there was no proof of child endangerment. Maternal

Grandmother explained at trial that she subsequently spoke with Mother’s lawyer and that after her conversation with the lawyer, she believed there was proof of child

endangerment.

3. The GAL

The GAL recommended granting permanent custody to CCDCFS

because it was in the children’s best interest. According to the GAL, granting a

second extension of temporary custody related to A.C. and a first extension for B.B.K

would not achieve the goal of reunification with Mother because her prison release

date would not occur until more than a year after that extension expired. Further,

the GAL opined that the request for legal custody to Maternal Grandmother was not

well taken. The GAL explained that he had interviewed her on several occasions and

that her prior testimony indicated that she “has been inconsistent regarding her

belief as to the children being abused and/or neglected.” According to the GAL, as

recently as October 2025 he had a conversation with Maternal Grandmother in

which she told him that she did not believe that her daughter was guilty. Moreover,

Maternal Grandmother had not had any contact with A.C. or B.B.K. for over a year

prior to trial.

The court asked the GAL to confirm that neither A.C. nor B.B.K. was

old enough to understand the proceedings or express their wishes. The GAL

confirmed that the court was correct.

4. Statement of the Caregiver

The foster father who was caring for A.C. for almost two years and

B.B.K. for a year stated that it was an incredible blessing to love and care for these two beautiful children. The foster father explained that A.C. and B.B.K. had become

part of the family.

5. The Trial Court’s Journal Entry

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights, granted

permanent custody of both A.C. and B.B.K. to CCDCFS, and denied Mother’s motion

for an extension of temporary custody or, in the alternative, motion for legal custody

to Maternal Grandmother.

Mother timely appealed, raising the following three assignments of

error.

1. The trial court’s award of permanent custody to DCFS, despite DCFS’s failure to make reasonable efforts to eliminate the continued removal of the children from their home and to return the children to their home, violated state law and appellant’s right to due process of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

2. The trial court’s decision to award permanent custody to DCFS was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

3. The trial court’s failure to discuss the wishes of the children and their relationship with their mother, A.K. in determining the best interests of the children constitutes reversible error.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

For ease of analysis, we address Mother’s assignments of error out of

order.

A. Manifest Weight of the Evidence

With her second assignment of error, Mother challenges the

termination of her parental rights under a manifest-weight standard. Mother claims the record lacks competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s findings

that “the child cannot be placed with [Mother] or a family caregiver within a

reasonable time or should not be placed with her or a family caregiver, and further

that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.” We disagree.

When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20.

“An appellate court will not reverse a juvenile court’s termination of

parental rights and award of permanent custody to an agency if the judgment is

supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re M.J., 2013-Ohio-5440, ¶ 24 (8th

Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court recently clarified this standard in In re Z.C. holding

that when reviewing a court’s award of permanent custody and termination of

parental rights, “the proper appellate standards of review to apply . . . are the

sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards, as

appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the

parties,” rather than the abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at ¶ 18.

“Courts apply a two-pronged test when ruling on permanent custody

motions.” In re De.D. 2020-Ohio-906, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).

To grant the motion, courts first must find that any of the factors in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e) apply. Second, courts must determine that terminating parental rights and granting permanent custody to CCDCFS is in the best interest of the child or children using the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D).

Id.

1. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and (E) Factors

Under the first prong of the analysis, regarding A.C., the trial court

found that a permanent-custody order was appropriate under

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). The statute provides that

the court may grant permanent custody of a child to a movant if the court determines . . . by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to [CCDCFS] and that any of the following [(a) through (e) factors] apply:

...

(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of [CCDCFS] for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period . . . .

For purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be considered to have entered the temporary custody of the an agency on the earlier of the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code or the date that is sixty days after the removal of the child from the home.

A.C. entered temporary custody and was removed from the home on

March 28, 2024. CCDCFS filed its motion for permanent custody on September 13,

2025, approximately 16 months after A.C. entered CCDCFS’ temporary custody.

Thus, the trial court properly found that A.C. had been in Agency custody for at least

twelve months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, under

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), supporting a permanent-custody order.

Regarding both A.C. and B.B.K., the court found that a permanent-

custody order was also appropriate under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). The statute provides that, if granting permanent custody is also in the best interest of a child,

the court may do so upon also finding:

(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

(Emphasis added.)

R.C. 2151.414(E) requires a court to consider all relevant evidence to

determine whether a child “cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable

period of time or should not be placed with the parents.”4 The statute enumerates

factors for a court to consider in making this determination. See

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1)-(16). If the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence,

that one or more of the factors enumerated in division (E) applies, the court is

instructed to enter a finding that the child “cannot be placed with either parent

within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent.”

R.C. 2151.414(E).

4 We note that in challenging the trial court’s analysis, Mother inserts words into

division (E) that do not appear in the statute. Mother argues that the record lacks competent credible evidence to support the trial court’s findings that “the child cannot be placed with [Mother] or a family caregiver within a reasonable time or should not be placed with her or a family caregiver, and further that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.” R.C. 2151.414(E) makes no mention of “family caregivers.” It only addresses parents. Our analysis is limited to the plain language of the statute. In reviewing a court’s determination that a child cannot be placed

with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either

parent, we need not address each factor that the court considered. The court is

instructed to make a “cannot or should not” finding if even one of the factors

enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(E) applies. See R.C. 2151.414(E); see also In re A.E.,

2025-Ohio-1466 (8th Dist.).

Here, the trial court concluded that neither child could be placed with

Mother or D.C. within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent

after considering the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (4), (5), (12), (14), and

(16). As we are not required to address every factor supporting a permanent-custody

order, we discuss only the court’s determinations under R.C. 2151.414(E)(5) and

(12). We find each to be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

In support of the permanent-custody order, the trial court found that

Mother had been incarcerated for an offense committed against the child or a sibling

of the child, citing R.C. 2151.414(E)(5). The evidence presented at trial included

certified copies of the sentencing journal entries for both Mother and D.C. reflecting

both the trial court’s findings of guilt and their sentences. Our review of the record

reveals undisputed evidence that Mother and D.C. were, at the time of trial,

incarcerated for endangering children, specifically at least one sibling of A.C. and

B.B.K. This finding alone is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that

A.C. and B.B.K. cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or

should not be placed with either parent. Moreover, the trial court found that “the parent is incarcerated at the

time of the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing

of the child and will not be available to care for the child for at least eighteen months

after the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the dispositional hearing,”

citing R.C. 2151.414(E)(12). The evidence demonstrates that both Mother and D.C.

were sentenced to imprisonment on August 14, 2025. Mother was sentenced to an

aggregate prison term of 27 months, and D.C. was sentenced to an aggregate prison

term of two years. CCDCFS’s motion for permanent custody was filed on

September 13, 2025, and the dispositional hearing was held on November 14, 2025,

three months after Mother and D.C. were sentenced. Thus, the evidence at trial

shows that neither Mother nor D.C. will be available to care for A.C. and B.B.K. for

more than 18 months after the filing of the motion for permanent custody or the

hearing. Again, this finding alone is sufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion

that A.C. and B.B.K. cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or

should not be placed with either parent.

In light of the foregoing, Mother did not demonstrate that the finder

of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered. See In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703,

at ¶ 14, citing Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 20. Rather, the manifest weight of the

evidence supports the trial court’s decisions that A.C. and B.B.K. cannot be placed

with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either

parent. 2. R.C. 2151.414(D) Best-Interest Factors

Again, after finding one or more factors under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)

applies, a court may order permanent custody only upon finding that doing so is in

the best interest of the child. In re De.D., 2020-Ohio-906, at ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). In

determining the best interest of the children, the trial court is required to “consider

all relevant factors including but not limited to” five factors enumerated in R.C.

2151.414(D)(1). See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e). “R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not

require a juvenile court to expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors . . . .

Consideration is all the statute requires.” In re A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 31.

Nevertheless, the trial court not only considered the factors under R.C.

2151.414(D)(1) but also identified specific evidence in the record related to the

factors.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) calls for the court to consider the “interaction

and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster

caregivers and out-or-home providers, and any other person who may significantly

affect the child.” The trial court noted that the children were bonded with their

caregiver, with Mother, and with each other. B.B.K. did not have a bond with the

Maternal Grandmother, but A.C. did interact with the Maternal Grandmother prior

to removal. The court’s findings were supported by the record. Crowder testified

that the children were bonded with their current caregivers and Mother. Regarding

Maternal Grandmother, the GAL testified that she had not had any contact with A.C.

or B.B.K. for over a year prior to trial. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) instructs the juvenile court to consider the

wishes of the children as expressed by the children or by the GAL, “with due regard

for the maturity of the child.” The trial court found that the children were too young

to express their wishes, but the GAL recommended permanent custody. Our review

of the record confirms that this was the GAL’s recommendation.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c) instructs the court to consider the children’s

custodial history, including whether they had been in temporary custody for twelve

or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period. The trial court noted

that A.C. had spent most of her life in the care of CCDCFS and that B.B.K. had been

in CCDCFS custody since birth. As discussed above, the evidence at trial showed

that A.C. had been in CCDCFS custody since March 28, 2024, when she was 14

months old, and that B.B.K. had been in CCDCFS custody since the day after his

birth in November 2024.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) requires consideration of a child’s need for a

safe and stable home. The trial court found that a safe and stable home could not be

achieved with either parent because, at the time of trial, both parents were

incarcerated for two years for abuse perpetrated on A.C. and B.B.K.’s siblings. We

note that R.C. 2151.415(D)(4) prevents a court from ordering temporary custody to

continue beyond two years after the date on which the complaint was filed. Again,

the evidence demonstrated that Mother was not scheduled to be released from

prison until November 2027, almost four years after A.C. entered CCDCFS custody

and three years after B.B.K. entered CCDCFS custody. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) also mandates consideration of whether a

legally secure permanent placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent

custody. Here, the trial court considered the possible alternative of granting

Maternal Grandmother legal custody of the children. The trial court explained that

it did not believe doing so was in the best interest of A.C. or B.B.K. because the court

did not find Maternal Grandmother credible, “as she has previously testified and

stated on jail calls that she does not believe that the children’s siblings were abused

by [Mother] . . . . Therefore, the court has concerns with [Maternal Grandmother’s]

ability to keep the [children] safe.” Ohio courts consistently hold that the factfinder

is “in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses who testified at trial”

and is free to believe all, part of none of each witness’ testimony. State v. Jones,

2020-Ohio-3367, ¶ 85 (8th Dist.). See also State v. Sheline, 2019-Ohio-528, ¶ 100

(8th Dist.) (The factfinder is in the “best position to view the witnesses and observe

their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections that are critical observations in

determining the credibility of a witness and his or her testimony.”). In light of

Maternal Grandmother’s previous statements and statements at trial, the trial

court’s findings are supported by the record. The trial court did not lose its way and

its decision not to grant Maternal Grandmother legal custody was not against the

weight of the evidence.

Last, the trial court acknowledged that it considered whether any of

the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) applied, as set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e). As demonstrated by the court’s analysis of divisions (E)(1), (4), (5), (12), (14) and

(16), none of the identified factors applied here.

Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial court clearly lost its way

and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be

reversed and a new trial ordered. See In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14, citing

Eastley, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 20.

Accordingly, Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled.

B. Reasonable-Effort Findings

In her first assignment of error, Mother argues that, although the trial

court concluded that CCDCFS had made reasonable efforts at reunification, it had

failed to make “sufficient factual findings” relating to those efforts. Specifically,

Mother argues that the court did not “explain why those services did not enable the

children to return safely home.” We disagree.

“R.C. 2151.419 requires the court to determine whether the public

children services agency that filed the complaint in the case has made reasonable

efforts to make it possible for the child to return safely home.” In re C.N., 2003-

Ohio-2048, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.). The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized, however, that

R.C. 2151.419 “does not apply in a hearing on a motion for permanent custody filed

pursuant to R.C. 2151.413.” In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 43. CCDCFS’s motion to

modify temporary custody to permanent custody in this case was filed pursuant to

R.C. 2151.413, so compliance with R.C. 2151.419 was not required. Nonetheless, in

In re C.F., the Ohio Supreme Court held that “the state must still make reasonable efforts to reunify the family during the child-custody proceedings prior to the

termination of parental rights.” Id.

The record establishes that the CCDCFS provided Mother with a plan

for reunification, which included mental-health assessment, parent-nurturing

programs, and programs to address domestic violence. Crowder testified that

Mother complied with the plan and that she was appropriate and nurturing during

her visits with the children.

However, the overriding fact of this case is that Mother was

incarcerated for having abused the Older Children through excessive discipline such

that she was convicted of three counts of child endangering and that she also

retaliated against the Older Children, resulting in three more convictions. Mother

was not scheduled to be released from prison until November 2027 — two years after

the trial on CCDCFS’ permanent custody motion. Accordingly, notwithstanding the

case plan put into place for Mother, as discussed, Mother’s incarceration prevented

her from achieving reunification with the children within the statutorily permissible

timeframes under R.C. 2151.415(D)(4).

Similarly, as discussed, the trial court found Maternal Grandmother’s

testimony not credible. That conclusion supports the trial court’s denial of the

motion for legal custody to the Maternal Grandmother. The trial court made

sufficient factual findings and those findings were supported by the record.

Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled. C. Wishes of the Children and Their Relationship with Mother

In her third assignment of error, Mother argues that the trial court

did not consider the wishes of the children or her relationship with them as required

by R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). Again, we disagree.

At the time of the November 14, 2025 hearing, A.C. was two-years and

ten-months old, and B.B.K. had just turned one year old. The trial court found that

the children were too young to express their wishes and looked to the GAL for

guidance, as is appropriate. See In re I.A.-W., 2022-Ohio-1766, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.) (In

considering a motion for permanent custody, juvenile courts appropriately consider

the GAL’s recommendation when the children are too young to express their

wishes.). See also In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 60. The GAL recommended

permanent custody be granted to CCDCFS. The trial court specifically identified

that it considered this recommendation in its best interest analysis.

Despite Mother’s claims that the trial court did not consider her

relationship with her children, the trial court specifically found that both A.C. and

B.B.K. have a bond with Mother. However, the court found that other

considerations supported a permanent-custody order, including that both A.C. and

B.B.K. “deserve[] a safe and stable home environment where [their] needs can be

met and [they] can thrive[,]” which “cannot be achieved with either parent as they

are incarcerated for 2 years for abuse perpetrated on the [children’s] sibling.”

Evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s conclusion. As addressed, the trial court’s judgment is supported by the manifest

weight of the evidence, including the trial court’s determination that awarding

permanent custody to CCDCFS is in the best interest of both A.C. and B.B.K.

Mother’s third assignment of error is overruled.

III. CONCLUSION

Upon review, we find that clear and convincing evidence in the record

supports the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B), (D), and (E). Moreover,

the trial court’s reasonable-efforts findings pursuant to the requirements of In re

C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, and R.C. 2151.419 are supported by the record. Accordingly,

the trial court did not err in terminating Mother’s parental rights and granting

permanent custody of the children to CCDCFS. Mother’s three assignments of error

are overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

____________________________ LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR