An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA25-100
Filed 21 January 2026
Watauga County, No. 23JB000005-940
IN THE MATTER OF: A.B.T.
Appeal by Juvenile from Orders entered 27 August 2024 by Judge Matthew J.
Rupp in Watauga County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 24 September
2025.
Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Carolyn McLain, for the State.
Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Aaron Thomas Johnson, for Respondent Juvenile-Appellant.
HAMPSON, Judge.
Factual and Procedural Background IN RE: A.B.T.
Opinion of the Court
Annie1 appeals from Adjudication and Disposition Orders finding her guilty of
Disorderly Conduct and from an Order on Motions for Review concluding she violated
the conditions of her probation. The Record before us tends to reflect the following:
On 7 May 2024, the State filed a Juvenile Petition alleging Annie committed
the delinquent act of Disorderly Conduct in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
288.4(a)(6) following an incident where Annie allegedly yelled profanities and
“aggressively gesticulate[ed]” at faculty members at Watauga High School. The
Petition alleged Annie “screamed profanity directed at Assistant Principals Erin
White and Ashley Winkler[,]” “gesticulat[ed] with her arms and hands while
continuing to yell and scream[,]” and “curs[ed] each adult present saying, ‘fuck you’
to each of them and displaying the middle finger.” The Petition further alleged “[t]he
staff in the adjacent offices were cleared out of their workspaces due to the juvenile’s
disruptive behavior.” Additionally, because Annie was subject to a Probation Order
at the time of the incident which required that she, among other things, remain on
good behavior and not violate any laws, the State filed two Motions for Review
alleging Annie had violated the conditions of her probation.2
Prior to the Adjudication hearing, Annie, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Petition on the basis that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6) is
1 A pseudonym agreed upon by the parties. 2 Discussion of the underlying events which gave rise to the entry of that Probation Order is
not necessary for disposition of the issue at bar.
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unconstitutionally vague. The sole witness to testify at the 26 August 2024
Adjudication hearing was Assistant Principal Ashley Winkler (AP Winkler). AP
Winkler testified that on the morning of 25 April 2024, Annie was brought into the
office of Assistant Principal Erin White (AP White) and questioned about whether
she had made the statement “I am glad that I wasn’t at school on time this morning
because I’m glad I didn’t get searched.”3 Annie allegedly responded by saying, “I don’t
have anything on me. You can F-ing search me. Search my bag, I don’t F-ing have
anything[.]”
AP Winkler “stepped forward” to move several items from the corner of AP
White’s desk, including a bottle of soda belonging to Annie. AP Winkler took the cap
off the soda, smelled it, said “[i]t smells like Dr. Pepper[,]” and asked Annie if she
would like it back. Annie responded she did not “want it after you’ve had your nasty
A [sic] nose in it.” Annie allegedly “snatched” the soda from AP Winkler while AP
Winkler was giving it back to her. At this point, the head principal joined the
assistant principals in AP White’s office.
According to AP Winkler, Annie’s voice “went up in register[ ]” and became
“elevated in terms of her tone.” Annie remained seated, although she did “scoot[ ]
forward in her chair.” The school resource officer then “stepped into the doorway”
and indicated he would have to intervene if Annie did not calm down. AP Winkler
3 Some kind of contraband search had apparently been conducted on members of the student
body earlier that morning, the details of which are not disclosed in the Record before us.
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testified “two receptionists” were then “cleared out” of the front office and Annie “just
repeatedly said, ‘You can F-ing search me, I don’t have anything.’ ” The incident
concluded at some point after that.4
At the close of the State’s evidence, counsel for Annie moved to dismiss the
charge for insufficient evidence. The trial court denied the Motion. Annie then
declined to put on evidence.
The trial court concluded Annie was guilty of “conduct which disturbed the
peace, order or discipline at a public educational institution[.]” In rendering its
decision, the trial court noted: “[Annie’s] actions were so elevated and aggressive in
tone it caused a school resource officer and the principal to respond and two school
administrators, who are typically in the front office, to leave their duties where they
normally are situated.”
In the resulting Disposition Order, the trial court placed Annie on twelve
months of probation. The trial court also ordered Annie to comply with an 8:00 p.m.
curfew, not go “[a]nywhere deemed inappropriate by the Court Counsel or parent[,]”
and cooperate with placement in a residential treatment facility. Additionally, the
trial court found the allegations in the Motions for Review, which alleged Annie had
violated the conditions of her existing Probation Order, had been proven by the
4 No testimony was offered regarding the immediate resolution or aftermath of the incident.
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greater weight of the evidence. The trial court stated its resolution of the Motions for
Review would be to order Annie to comply with the terms in the Disposition Order.
Annie gave oral Notice of Appeal from the Adjudication Order, Disposition
Order, and Order on Motions for Review in open court and filed written Notice of
Appeal the following day.
Issue
The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying
Annie’s Motion to Dismiss for insufficient evidence.
Analysis
“This Court reviews the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo.”
State v. Smith, 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007) (citation omitted).
“Upon [a] defendant’s motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether
there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or
of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant’s being the perpetrator of
such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373,
378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984) (citation
omitted).
“In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence
admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State,
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giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any
contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223
(1994) (citation omitted). “Whether the State has offered such substantial evidence
is a question of law for the trial court.” State v. McKinney, 288 N.C. 113, 119, 215
S.E.2d 578, 583 (1975) (citations omitted).
“Evidence in the record supporting a contrary inference is not determinative
on a motion to dismiss.” State v. Scott, 356 N.C. 591, 598, 573 S.E.2d 866, 870 (2002)
(citing Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 382, 526 S.E.2d at 457). However, “[i]f the evidence is
sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the
offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it, the motion should be
allowed.” State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980) (citations
omitted). “This is true even [where] the suspicion so aroused by the evidence is
strong.” Id. (citations omitted).
In the instant case, Annie argues there is insufficient evidence to support the
Adjudication for Disorderly Conduct. Under our General Statutes, “disorderly
conduct” is
a public disturbance intentionally caused by any person who . . . [d]isrupts, disturbs or interferes with the teaching of students at any public or private educational institution or engages in conduct which disturbs the peace, order or discipline at any public or private educational institution or on the grounds adjacent thereto.
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N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (2023). “Our Supreme Court has held that the
conduct must cause ‘a substantial interference with, disruption of and confusion of
the operation of the school in its program of instruction and training of students there
enrolled.’ ” In re Pineault, 152 N.C. App. 196, 199, 566 S.E.2d 854, 857 (2002) (quoting
State v. Wiggins, 272 N.C. 147, 154, 158 S.E.2d 37, 42 (1967)), disc. review denied,
356 N.C. 302, 570 S.E.2d 728 (2002); see also In re Grubb, 103 N.C. App. 452, 454,
405 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1991) (“The conduct in question must substantially interfere
with the operation of school.”).
“There is no ‘bright line’ test for what constitutes ‘substantial interference’
with a school.” In re S.M., 190 N.C. App. 579, 583, 660 S.E.2d 653, 656 (2008). Our
appellate courts “have tended to uphold juvenile adjudications for disorderly conduct
in school when there is evidence of, e.g., (1) the use of vulgar language by the student;
(2) aggressive or violent behavior by the juvenile; or (3) disruptive behavior serious
enough to require the student’s teacher to leave her class unattended in order to
discipline the student.” Id. at 583-84, 660 S.E.2d at 656. “However, an interference
has been found not to be substantial when the interference was not extended or
significant, and required little intervention to remedy.” State v. Humphreys, 275 N.C.
App. 788, 794, 853 S.E.2d 789, 793 (2020) (citing In re Grubb, 103 N.C. App. at 452-
53, 405 S.E.2d at 797, In re Eller, 331 N.C. 714, 716, 417 S.E.2d 479, 481-82 (1992),
In re Brown, 150 N.C. App. 127, 127-28, 562 S.E.2d 583, 584-85 (2002), and In re
S.M., 190 N.C. App. at 585, 660 S.E.2d at 657).
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As a threshold matter, we note the State does not assert Annie’s conduct
interfered with the teaching of students. Thus, our analysis is centered on whether
Annie’s conduct caused a substantial interference with “the peace, order or discipline”
at the high school. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6) (2023). The State argues
there is sufficient evidence to support the Adjudication because Annie (1) used vulgar
language, (2) committed aggressive behavior by “snatching” her soda from AP
Winkler, and (3) “caused two school administrators to flee their duties in the front
office.”
In cases where the student has used “vulgar language,” there has also been
evidence of some other disruption. For example, in In re M.G., the Court affirmed an
adjudication for disorderly conduct based on evidence that a teacher had heard the
respondent-juvenile yell “ ‘shut the f--ck up’ to a group of students” and resultantly
“was away from his assigned duties for at least several minutes[ ]” in order to escort
the respondent-juvenile to the school’s detention center. 156 N.C. App. 414, 417, 576
S.E.2d 398, 400-01 (2003) (likening the facts of the case to In re Pineault).
Similarly, in In re Pineault, when the respondent-juvenile used profanity
toward a teacher, the teacher “was required to stop teaching the class and escort
respondent to the principal’s office.” 152 N.C. App. at 199, 566 S.E.2d at 857. The
teacher “was away from the classroom for more than several minutes[,]” and the
respondent-juvenile twice said “ ‘f--k you, b---h’ ” to the teacher. Id. The Court held,
“given the severity and nature of respondent’s language, coupled with the fact that
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[the teacher] was required to stop teaching her class for at least several minutes, that
respondent’s actions substantially interfered with the operation of [the teacher’s]
classroom[.]” Id.
In the instant case, the State points to evidence that two receptionists left the
front office at some point during Annie’s outburst. The State argues the two
receptionists “fled” the front office because Annie was yelling; however, at the
hearing, AP Winkler testified the receptionists had been “cleared out” of the office.
Ultimately, the Record is unclear as to whether the staff was asked to leave, left
voluntarily, or left for reasons entirely unrelated to Annie’s behavior. Importantly,
aside from AP Winkler’s testimony that it was “abnormal” for the receptionists to be
absent, there was no evidence admitted showing whether the receptionists’
temporary absence affected the school’s operations in any way.
On this issue, we believe the facts of In re Brown are instructive. There, the
respondent-juvenile was reprimanded for talking during a test. 150 N.C. App. at 127,
562 S.E.2d at 584. The respondent-juvenile was moved to a different classroom to
finish taking his exam; however, his teacher later found him again talking to another
student. Id. at 128, 562 S.E.2d at 584. The teacher “reminded respondent that she
could give him a zero, to which he replied, ‘Well give me a zero.’ ” Id. The respondent-
juvenile “headed back to the classroom and slammed the door behind him[,] . . . really
loud right in [the teacher’s] face.” Id. When the teacher “began to write a ‘referral
slip’ to send respondent to the office[,]” the respondent-juvenile “began begging the
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teacher not to send him to the office.” Id. The respondent-juvenile physically held
the teacher’s arm in his attempt to block her, and “[h]is actions were described as
‘kind of throwing a temper tantrum.’ ” Id. The Court noted that although the
respondent-juvenile’s behavior likely distracted multiple students and caused the
class to be without its teacher for several minutes, this was “insufficient to show a
substantial interference with the operation of the school.” Id. at 131, 562 S.E.2d at
586.
Similarly, in In re Grubb, the respondent-juvenile “was talking to another
student in a loud and disruptive voice[ ]” and refused to stop talking when asked by
her teacher. 103 N.C. App. at 452-53, 405 S.E.2d at 797. Although the respondent-
juvenile’s conduct distracted other students, this Court held this was insufficient to
support an adjudication for disorderly conduct because the respondent-juvenile
“stopped talking after being asked a second time and the class was only momentarily
disrupted.” Id. at 455, 405 S.E.2d at 799. Likewise, in In re Eller, our Supreme Court
reversed an adjudication of delinquency for disorderly conduct despite evidence
showing the juvenile “[made] a move toward another student[ ]” while holding a nail
in his hand and, in a separate incident, repeatedly struck a radiator, causing “a
rattling, metallic noise” that distracted the other students. 331 N.C. at 715-16, 417
S.E.2d at 480-81.
We believe Annie’s behavior in the present case was at least less egregious
than the respondent-juvenile’s behavior in In re Brown. Although Annie used vulgar
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language like the student in In re Pineault, she did not physically accost a teacher
like the respondent-juvenile in In re Brown. Moreover, the respondent-juvenile’s
behavior in In re Brown caused his teacher to have to temporarily abandon her
classroom, but this was not sufficient to show a substantial interference with the
operation of the school. In re Brown, 150 N.C. App. at 131, 562 S.E.2d at 586. Here,
even if we presume Annie’s behavior caused the two receptionists to temporarily
“flee” the front office, we are constrained by our holding in In re Brown to conclude
this is insufficient to hold Annie’s behavior substantially interfered with the
operation of the high school—particularly in light of the fact that no evidence was
admitted to show any disruption in the school’s operations as a result of the
receptionists’ absence. See Powell, 299 N.C. at 98, 261 S.E.2d at 117 (“If the evidence
is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to . . . the commission of the
offense . . . , the motion [to dismiss] should be allowed.” (citations omitted)).
Here, as in the aforementioned cases, there was no evidence suggesting the
incident was extended, significant, or required serious intervention to handle. Cf.
Humphreys, 275 N.C. App. at 794, 853 S.E.2d at 793 (citations omitted). As the State
concedes, no evidence was admitted as to the length of the incident at issue.
Presuming the incident lasted no more than several minutes, as this Court did in In
re Brown, there is a lack of evidence tending to show Annie caused a substantial
interference with the operation of the school. 150 N.C. App. at 131, 562 S.E.2d at
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The State argues Annie’s conduct “merited significant intervention from three
school principals and a school resource officer[,]” but AP Winkler and AP White were
already speaking with Annie prior to the conduct at issue. The head principal entered
AP White’s office and repeatedly told Annie to calm down, but there was no evidence
that Annie’s behavior required that she be restrained or detained, as in In re Pineault;
to the contrary, the uncontroverted evidence shows Annie remained seated
throughout the duration of the incident. Further, although a third assistant principal
stepped in AP White’s office to see what was going on, he left when he saw the other
administrators were present. Notably, every administrator involved held an office
near or adjacent to where the incident took place, and the assistant principals—and
presumably the school resource officer—each handle student discipline as part of
their administrative duties.
Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and giving
the State the benefit of every reasonable inference, Rose, 339 N.C. at 192, 451 S.E.2d
at 223 (citation omitted), the evidence is insufficient to show Annie committed a
substantial interference with the operation of the school. Rather, Annie’s conduct
resembles what this Court has described as a “momentary lapse[ ] in behavior[,]” as
opposed to behavior warranting a conviction for Disorderly Conduct. In re Brown,
150 N.C. App. at 131, 562 S.E.2d at 586. Based on the limited set of facts before us,
we cannot say the evidence shows Annie’s behavior was “more than ordinary
misbehavior or rule-breaking.” In re S.M., 190 N.C. App. at 584, 660 S.E.2d at 656.
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Thus, there was insufficient evidence Annie’s conduct caused a substantial
interference with or disruption of the operation of the school. Therefore, there was
insufficient evidence Annie disturbed the peace, order, or discipline at the school.
Consequently, the evidence was insufficient to support the Adjudication for
Disorderly Conduct.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we reverse the Adjudication and
Disposition Orders.5 Additionally, we vacate the Order on Motions for Review and
remand for a new hearing on the Motions for Review in light of our conclusion that
there was insufficient evidence to support the Adjudication for Disorderly Conduct.
REVERSED IN PART; VACATED IN PART.
Judges ZACHARY and WOOD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
5 Because we determine there is insufficient evidence to support the Adjudication, we do not
address Annie’s arguments as to whether N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(a)(6) is unconstitutionally vague or whether the trial court failed to make sufficient findings in the Disposition Order.
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