2022 IL App (4th) 220181-U
NOS. 4-22-0181, 4-22-0182, 4-22-0183, 4-22-0184, 4-22-0185 cons.
IN THE APPELLATE COURT NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under July 21, 2022 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is OF ILLINOIS Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed FOURTH DISTRICT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1).
In re Abr. B.-F., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Peoria County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 19JA135 v. (No. 4-22-0181) ) 19JA136 Brian F., ) 19JA137 Respondent-Appellant). ) 19JA138 ) 20JA138 ) In re Abl. B.-F., a Minor ) ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-22-0182) ) Brian F., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) ) ) In re At. B.-F., a Minor ) ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-22-0183) ) Brian F., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) ) ) In re Ar. B.-F., a Minor ) ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-22-0184) ) Brian F., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) ) ) ) In re Ak. B.-F., a Minor ) ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) Honorable v. (No. 4-22-0185) ) Derek G. Asbury, Brian F., ) Judge Presiding. Respondent-Appellant). )
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the judgments of the trial court terminating respondent’s parental rights because the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent, Brian F., is the father of Abr. B.-F. (born April 2016), Abl. B.-F.
(born April 2017), At. B.-F. (born March 2019), Ar. B.-F. (born March 2019), and Ak. B.-F.
(born March 2020). (We note that At. B.-F. and Ar. B.-F. are twins.) In February 2022, the trial
court found respondent was an unfit parent and termination of respondent’s parental rights would
be in the minor children’s best interest. Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court’s fitness
and best-interest determinations as to each child were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. We disagree and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. The Proceedings Relating to Abr. B.-F., Abl. B.-F., At. B.-F., and Ar. B.-F.
¶5 In May 2019, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship for Abr. B.-F.,
Abl. B.-F., At. B.-F., and Ar. B.-F., alleging the children were neglected in that the children lived
in an environment injurious to their welfare when living with respondent and their mother
because they engaged in acts of domestic violence in front of the minor children. See 705 ILCS
405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018). On the same day the petitions were filed, the trial court conducted a
-2- shelter care hearing and placed temporary custody and guardianship of all four children with the
guardianship administrator of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). In
August 2019, the trial court adjudicated the children neglected minors.
¶6 In October 2019, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing at which it
entered a written order making Abr. B.-F., Abl. B.-F., At. B.-F., and Ar. B.-F. wards of the court
and finding respondent unfit for reasons other than financial circumstances alone to care for,
protect, train, educate, supervise, or discipline the minors, and it was in the best interest of the
minors to be made wards of the court. The court placed guardianship and custody of the minors
with the guardianship administrator of DCFS. The written order also stated, “The parents are
admonished that they must cooperate with the Department of Children and Family Services,
comply with the terms of the service plans, and correct the conditions which require the
child[ren] to be in care, or risk termination of parental rights.”
¶7 B. The Proceedings Regarding Ak. B.-F.
¶8 In March 2020, when Ak. B.-F. was born, the State filed a petition for
adjudication of wardship, alleging that Ak. B.-F. was a neglected minor in that he lived in an
environment injurious to his welfare in that respondent had been found unfit in Abr. B.-F.,
Abl. B.-F., At. B.-F., and Ar. B.-F.’s cases, among others, and “there has been no subsequent
finding of fitness.” The petition further alleged respondent had not completed services that would
result in a finding of fitness or a return home of Ak. B.-F.’s siblings. At the shelter care hearing
conducted the same day the petition was filed, the trial court placed temporary custody and
guardianship of Ak. B.-F. with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.
¶9 In August 2020, the trial court adjudicated Ak. B.-F. a neglected minor.
Immediately after the adjudicatory hearing, the court conducted a dispositional hearing at which
-3- it (1) adjudicated Ak. B.-F. a ward of the court, (2) found respondent unfit for reasons other than
financial circumstances alone to care for Ak. B.-F., and (3) placed guardianship of Ak. B.-F. with
the guardianship administrator of DCFS.
¶ 10 C. The Termination Hearings
¶ 11 In July 2021, the State filed petitions to terminate respondent’s parental rights as
to each of the minor children. The State alleged respondent was an unfit parent within the
meaning of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2020)) because he failed to make
reasonable progress toward the children’s return to him during the nine-month period of October
2020 to July 2021. Id. § 1(D)(m)(ii).
¶ 12 In February 2022, the trial court conducted a bifurcated termination hearing on
the State’s petitions.
¶ 13 1. The Proceedings Addressing Respondent’s Parental Fitness
¶ 14 The guardian ad litem (GAL) asked the trial court to take judicial notice of its
prior orders and the permanency hearing reports filed with the court. The court responded, “[A]s
it relates to judicial notice given that the burden of proof is different, it’s what’s considered
preponderance versus clear and convincing. It’s for benchmark purposes as to what ongoing
services were.”
¶ 15 The permanency reports showed that respondent was required to engage in the
following services: (1) individual counseling, (2) domestic violence counseling, (3) parenting
classes, and (4) psychological evaluations.
¶ 16 a. Justin Sangalli
¶ 17 Justin Sangalli testified that he worked for “FamilyCore” and was the caseworker
for all of the children from October 2020 through July 2021.
-4- ¶ 18 Sangalli testified that in the spring of 2021, the domestic violence service
provider informed him that “both parents possessed the capabilities, possessed the tools, had
reached their limit of service time, basically, of information that could be provided them. But
they showed a lack of ability to apply those services when needed.” Sangalli explained that
respondent and the children’s mother had “domestic violence incidents that took place in their
home” which caused them to be unsuccessfully discharged from domestic violence services.
Sangalli further explained that he could not get respondent services through another provider
“based upon a previous issue of [respondent’s]. So, there w[ere] just no other options for
referrals to get him into domestic violence.”
¶ 19 Regarding individual counseling, Sangalli testified that respondent initially
attended marital counseling with the mother. However, the provider recommended switching to
individual counseling after just a few sessions. Respondent attended individual counseling but
was unsuccessfully discharged in March or April 2021 for lack of attendance.
¶ 20 Regarding visitation, Sangalli testified that both parents participated in visitation
consistently until May 2021. Up until the end of May 2021, the parents had visits with the kids
for “four hours in the[ir] home weekly, supervised by the agency.” In May 2021, Sangalli
received a call from a case aide reporting that the parents would not let the aide into the home for
the scheduled visit. Sangalli went to the parents’ home to see what was going on. When he
arrived, the parents explained to Sangalli that “they did not know that case aide, did not trust that
case aide and w[ere] not going to allow them to enter their home.” Sangalli testified that the
conversation “escalated” and he perceived “a little more aggression from both parents towards
[him].” Sangalli left, called his supervisor, and informed the supervisor of the situation. Sangalli
said they made the decision to shorten visits to two hours per week and to conduct them at the
-5- agency.
¶ 21 In the months that followed, the parents began to miss visits with the children and
were less cooperative. Because of marital problems between respondent and the mother, the
agency separated them for visits, meaning each parent saw the children for one hour. Sangalli
testified that respondent missed one visit because he was in jail. Sangalli testified he never felt it
was safe to return the children home at any point to either parent.
¶ 22 On cross-examination, Sangalli testified that when he went to the parents’ home
in May 2021, respondent was speaking calmly and not yelling when Sangalli first arrived.
Sangalli further stated that the case aide was not present when he arrived and he did not observe
respondent refuse to let the case aide in the home.
¶ 23 b. Respondent’s Testimony
¶ 24 Respondent testified that he attended counseling and domestic violence services
beginning in October 2020. He explained that he and his wife initially received marital and
domestic violence counseling together but that ended when their service provider completed his
internship. Thereafter, respondent attended individual counseling and obtained domestic violence
services from a different service provider. Regarding counseling, respondent stated that he
attended one session of marital counseling with the children’s mother but the provider
recommended individual counseling and discharged the parents from couples’ counseling.
Respondent said he was told the discharge would be considered “neutral” not unsuccessful.
¶ 25 Respondent acknowledged that he was discharged from individual counseling
because he missed too many sessions in the spring of 2021. He explained that he missed the
sessions because of work, his financial situation, and the other services he was required to attend.
Respondent stated he had a very busy schedule with multiple services and struggled to maintain
-6- enough hours at his job to afford his home.
¶ 26 Regarding domestic violence, respondent testified that he learned many skills
from the domestic violence services he received and he used them. On cross-examination,
respondent described one incident during the winter of 2020 and 2021 during which he got into a
verbal argument with his spouse and applied the techniques he had learned. He testified that the
techniques did not work with her. Respondent explained that he tried to communicate calmly and
when that did not work, he “stepped back for a little bit, gave [her] a breather.” When he
attempted to reinitiate communication, she “flared up further.”
¶ 27 Respondent testified he then decided to go outside and smoke a cigarette to “calm
down and just let it go and breathe easy.” Respondent said when he went back inside, his spouse
was still very upset and was escalating things. Respondent began to pack his things and told her
he was going to take a “time-out away from this.” She escalated the conflict by “pushing things
or storm[ing] into the room.” Respondent said he made a mistake by following his spouse to
continue a heated conversation even though he was trying to calm her down. Respondent also
acknowledged he blocked a doorway. His spouse called the police after respondent began to
follow her.
¶ 28 The State then asked respondent, “What about the allegations about punching her
back window of the van and slashing her tires?” Respondent stated the tires were never slashed
and explained the broken window as follows. Respondent got in the car and his spouse came to
get him out. Respondent stepped out of the vehicle and walked around to the back of the vehicle.
As he did so, she began to back up into him. Respondent did not know if she was aware he was
there, so he tapped on the back window and began to back away. When the van kept coming
towards him, he hit the window to stop her from running him over.
-7- ¶ 29 c. The Trial Court’s Parental Fitness Findings
¶ 30 Before issuing its ruling, the trial court reiterated that it was only considering the
court orders and reports that it earlier took judicial notice of for “benchmark purposes and
identifying services from which progress would be measured.”
¶ 31 The trial court determined that the State had proved the allegations regarding lack
of reasonable progress. The court explained that it found Sangalli’s testimony credible and
respondent’s testimony questionable. The court stated it believed respondent was downplaying
his involvement in the two domestic violence incidents about which he testified, particularly
when respondent discussed breaking the car window. However, even assuming respondent was
telling the truth, the court noted that during the nine-month period alleged in the petitions,
respondent (1) chose to continue living with a partner who was provoking or instigating domestic
violence incidents and (2) was not able to successfully implement what he learned in domestic
violence classes to create a safe environment so the children could be returned home.
¶ 32 The trial court further noted that visits did not progress to unsupervised at any
point and Sangalli never believed it was safe to return the children. The court also observed that
respondent did not complete any of his services and was unsuccessfully discharged, regardless of
the reasons therefor. Accordingly, the court found the State proved by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children
during the relevant nine-month period.
¶ 33 2. The Proceedings Addressing the Children’s Best Interest
¶ 34 Immediately after the fitness proceedings concluded, the trial court conducted a
hearing on the issue of whether terminating respondent’s parental rights was in the children’s
best interests.
-8- ¶ 35 Sangalli testified that Abr. B.-F. and Abl. B.-F. were placed together in a fictive
kin placement. At. B.-F. and Ar. B.-F., the twins, were placed together in a traditional foster
home, and Ak. B.-F. was in a separate traditional foster placement. Sangalli testified that the
placements were currently providing each of the children with all of their material, educational,
and emotional needs. The children had established strong bonds with their foster parents, and the
younger three children had spent more time living at their current placements than with
respondent. Sangalli opined that the two older children, Abr. B.-F. and Abl. B.-F., had a stronger
bond with their foster parents than with the biological parents based on where those children
went to seek emotional support and stability. Sangalli further testified that the foster parents
provided safe, loving, stable homes for the children and all wished to provide permanency
through adoption.
¶ 36 Respondent testified that he was living by himself in a house that was large
enough to accommodate all of the children. Respondent stated he was willing and able to provide
food, shelter, and clothing for the children and was fully capable of caring for the children.
Respondent said he was bonded to all of his children but particularly to Abr. B.-F. because he
was older. Respondent said that words could not describe the bond he had with Abr. B.-F. but
characterized it as “unbreakable.” Respondent stated that when he had in-home visits with the
children, he played with them, fed them, and did many different activities with them. Respondent
testified, “I got kind of comfortable with feeling like for those few hours my family was intact.
*** [I]t’s what I could picture everyday life being. It’s happy.” Respondent also emphasized that
the children had a close relationship with his family and friends, including his two older children.
¶ 37 The trial court found termination of respondent’s parental rights to be in the
children’s best interests. The court noted that even though respondent had a bond with his
-9- children, the children had a stronger bond with their foster parents. The court noted that the
children had spent the majority of their lives in their current placements where their needs were
being met on a daily basis. The court concluded that the children were “very well-bonded” with
the foster parents, who were doing the “heavy lifting” of day-to-day care. Accordingly, the court
terminated respondent’s parental rights as to all five children.
¶ 38 This appeal followed.
¶ 39 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 40 Respondent appeals, arguing that the trial court’s fitness and best-interest
determinations as to each child were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree
and affirm.
¶ 41 A. The Fitness Determinations
¶ 42 1. The Applicable Law
¶ 43 The State must prove unfitness as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020)) by clear and convincing evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939,
¶ 28, 115 N.E.3d 102. Section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act defines an unfit person as a
parent who fails to make “reasonable progress toward the return of the child” during any
nine-month period following an adjudication of neglect or abuse. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West
2020). Reasonable progress is an objective review of the steps the parent has taken toward the
goal of reunification and examines the demonstrability and quality of those steps. In re Ta.T.,
2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 51, 187 N.E.3d 763. Reasonable progress exists when the trial court
can conclude that, in the near future, it will be able to order the children returned to parental
custody. Id.
¶ 44 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility
- 10 - determinations that the trial court is in the best position to make. In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232,
¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69. Accordingly, a trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29. A decision
is against the manifest weight of the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.
Id.
¶ 45 2. This Case
¶ 46 Here, Sangalli testified that respondent was engaged in individual counseling and
domestic violence counseling but was unsuccessfully discharged from both because respondent
(1) missed sessions and (2) failed to implement what was being taught. Regarding domestic
violence, Sangalli stated the service provider believed it could not teach respondent anything
further. Sangalli also mentioned that respondent had instances of domestic violence during the
nine-month period in which respondent was supposed to be making measurable progress toward
the safe return home of his children. Sangalli testified that after the incident during which
respondent and the mother would not let a case aide into the home for supervised visits, Sangalli
and his supervisor made the decision to decrease visiting time to two hours, supervised at the
agency. Sangalli further testified that respondent and the mother could no longer attend visits
together due to their relationship issues.
¶ 47 Respondent, in large part, testified similarly to Sangalli. Respondent provided
justifications for why he was unsuccessfully discharged that could have minimized his fault.
However, the trial court found his credibility questionable, and even after taking respondent at
his word, the court believed the two instances of domestic violence about which respondent
testified demonstrated that the home environment was still unsafe for the children. The court
noted that (1) Sangalli never believed it was safe to return the children home, (2) respondent
- 11 - chose to continue living with the mother during the nine-month period, and (3) visits never
progressed to unsupervised. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court’s findings that
respondent was unfit for failing to make reasonable progress were well supported by the record.
¶ 48 B. The Best-Interest Determinations
¶ 49 1. The Applicable Law and Standard of Review
¶ 50 At the best-interest stage of termination proceedings, the State bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best
interest. In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71, 145 N.E.3d 605. In reaching a best-interest
determination, the trial court must consider, within the context of the child’s age and
developmental needs, the following factors:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s
identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties;
(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity
of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes
and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for
permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with
parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the
risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to
care for the child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th)
190537, ¶ 32, 147 N.E.3d 953; see also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020).
¶ 51 A reviewing court affords great deference to a trial court’s best-interest finding
because the trial court is in a superior position to view the witnesses and judge their credibility.
C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. An appellate court “will not disturb the trial court’s decision
- 12 - regarding a child’s best interests *** unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Id.
¶ 68. A best-interest determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the
opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result. Id.
¶ 52 2. This Case
¶ 53 At the best interest hearing, the State essentially used the statutory “best interest
factors” (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020)) as a guide for its direct examination, asking
Sangalli if the foster parents were providing each factor for the children. And, as to each factor,
Sangalli invariably answered in the affirmative. As the trial court noted, the children had spent
the majority of their lives in their current placements and were well-bonded with the foster
parents who were providing day-to-day care and meeting the children’s needs. In particular, the
children looked to their foster parents for emotional support and stability. As Sangalli explained,
the children knew the foster parents “[are] there for them regardless.” The children were attached
to their current placements and foster parents, all of whom wished to provide permanency
through adoption. We conclude the trial court’s findings that termination was in the children’s
best interests were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 54 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 55 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.
¶ 56 Affirmed.
- 13 -