2023 IL App (1st) 221538 FIFTH DIVISION
June 23, 2023
No. 1-22-1538 ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ In re A.A., a Minor ) Appeal from the (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County. Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 21 JD 122 ) A.A., ) Honorable ) Patricia Mendoza, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Mitchell and Navarro concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 After a bench trial, minor respondent A.A. was adjudicated delinquent of vehicular
hijacking and aggravated battery, and sentenced to 24 months of probation and 30 days of
supervision. She appeals, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict because the
victim’s identification of her was unreliable. She also claims that, even conceding the State’s facts,
her conduct did not constitute a “taking” per the statute. Finally, she contends that the court did No. 1-22-1538
not properly credit her for time spent in custody. We affirm her conviction but amend her mittimus
to reflect the proper time credit.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On January 28, 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship against A.A.,
charging her with vehicular hijacking (720 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 2020)) and aggravated battery (id.
§ 12-3.05(d)(1)) related to a January 27, 2021, incident. The record shows A.A. spent 56 days in
pretrial custody, including 28 days of electronic monitoring.
¶4 At A.A.’s bench trial, Kenneth Wolin, 72 years old, testified that on January 27, 2021, at
around 10:30 a.m., he was working as a Lyft driver. The weather was clear, but there was snow on
the ground. He drove to the 2900 block of West Walton Street in Chicago to pick up a fare. When
he arrived, two “girls” entered his vehicle. He saw them “[v]ery briefly” before they entered, but
noted they were dressed in “winter clothing.” Wolin identified A.A. in court as one of the
passengers.
¶5 Wolin drove the passengers to a destination near the 1400 block of Douglas Boulevard in
Chicago. When he arrived and stopped the vehicle, the “taller” of the two girls, seated directly
behind him, reached over the headrest and choked him for one to two minutes. The passengers
then instructed Wolin to exit the vehicle, and he complied. While exiting, he noticed one of the
passengers enter the driver’s seat of the vehicle. He then saw A.A. exit the vehicle, approach him,
and ask for the key fob for the vehicle. Wolin instead gave A.A. the key fob for his girlfriend’s
vehicle, which he also happened to have on him at the time. A.A. walked back towards Wolin’s
vehicle.
¶6 Wolin walked to a nearby school, told a security guard what happened, and asked the guard
to call the police. Chicago police officers arrived shortly thereafter and drove Wolin back to his
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vehicle. Upon arrival, Wolin noticed a cell phone in the back seat that did not belong to him, along
with his girlfriend’s key fob. While on scene, Wolin identified A.A. to the officers during a show-
up procedure.
¶7 Wolin testified as follows regarding the show-up:
“Q. And was this identification procedure done with the minor respondent?
A. Yes.
Q. And where was the minor respondent located as this identification procedure
took place?
A. I was asked the first time they were over by the parkway and then the other one
was behind the car by another squad car.
Q. So specifically for this minor respondent, where was the minor respondent
during the identification procedure?
A. The first one was by the detective that was by the parkway.
Q. And did you identify anybody during that identification procedure?
A. I did.
Q. And was the same person that you identified during that identification procedure
the minor respondent that you pointed out in court today?
A. Well, she was the shorter of the two if I recall. One was around five-foot-one.
The other one was about five-foot-four and I believe it was the one that was five-foot-
one that was talking to the officer, the little bit shorter one. *** and the other one then
came later was about five-foot-four and she was—I identified her by the other car.
Q. So was the first person that you identified this minor respondent?
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A. I don’t know. I can’t—it looks like her, yes. It does appear to be her. She
appears to be the little bit taller one which was by the other car.”
¶8 Wolin affirmed that, before testifying, he reviewed police-recorded video of the show-up,
which accurately depicted the events. The State entered the video, People’s exhibit 1, into
evidence, and published it to the court. The video, included in the record on appeal, depicts the
interior of a police vehicle. Two voices are audible, one an officer who enters the front seat, and
the second apparently from Wolin, originating from the back seat. The officer states that other
officers will show Wolin someone and that Wolin should do the best he can. Wolin asks if the
officers will show him pictures, to which the officer responds that Wolin will be shown a “person,
the actual person.” Shortly thereafter, a second officer approaches the driver’s side window and
tells the first officer to instruct Wolin to look out of the back window of the police vehicle, which
the first officer does. The officer then asks, “can you see her?,” and continues, while confirming
an inaudible response from Wolin, “that looks like one of them?” The officer then continues, “I
don’t know if you can see black pants on, but black puffy coat?,” to which Wolin responds in the
affirmative.
¶9 Wolin confirmed that when he saw A.A. during the identification procedure, she wore the
same clothing as when he first picked her up.
¶ 10 On cross-examination, Wolin agreed that both passengers wore black jackets. He agreed
that the video did not depict him mentioning either passenger’s height but did not recall if he told
officers on scene anything about their height. Wolin believed the passengers were teenagers based
on his experience as a high school counselor. The initial ride lasted around 10 to 15 minutes, during
which he did not hear any conversation between the passengers. He paid attention to the road
during the ride. In response to the question, “So you did not give a description about hair. You did
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not give a description about weight?,” Wolin responded, “They had heavy jackets on. I really
couldn’t tell.” Defense counsel inquired about A.A.’s alleged location during the show-up, to
which Wolin replied, “The one was standing on the street talking to one of the detectives over by
the park side and the other one was not initially there. I don’t know where she came back from,
but eventually she was there.” Wolin stated A.A. was speaking to “one detective” at the time he
identified her at the show-up. He did not recall officers saying the person he viewed would likely
be the offender.
¶ 11 On redirect, Wolin confirmed that A.A. was the offender who spoke to Wolin on the street
after he exited the vehicle. At that time, Wolin could see portions of her face.
¶ 12 Chicago police detective Andrew Kovac testified that he responded to the incident on
January 27, 2021, at around 10:50 a.m. There, he met and spoke to Wolin, along with other officers
already on the scene. While on the scene, two women approached Kovac and pointed someone
out. Kovac identified A.A. in court as the person the women pointed out. Later, at the police
station, Kovac learned A.A.’s home address was on the 2900 block of West Walton.
¶ 13 The State rested, and A.A.’s counsel moved for a directed verdict, which the juvenile court
denied. A.A. then rested. During closing arguments, the State argued in relevant part that Wolin
identified A.A. as the offender who demanded the key fob from him and also emphasized the
show-up identification. Defense counsel argued that Wolin’s identification was suspect, in part
because he only described the offenders as “taller and shorter,” and did not testify clearly regarding
whether A.A. was the taller or shorter offender. Counsel also emphasized Wolin’s lack of
specificity in the description he provided to the officers. Finally, counsel argued that the video
indicated the show-up was overly suggestive.
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¶ 14 The court found A.A. liable on both counts and adjudged her delinquent. In so finding, the
court noted that the State could have introduced other evidence and found it “frustrating” that it
had failed to do so. The court continued that it found A.A. liable of vehicular hijacking because
the incident happened in a short period of time, and A.A. was detained near the scene, where Wolin
identified her. The court also noted that because A.A. demanded the key fob, “it would be hard to
say that there is no common plan or design” with her co-offender regarding the aggravated battery
charge, even if A.A. was not the offender who choked Wolin. The court sentenced A.A. to 24
months’ probation and 30 days in the juvenile detention center, which the court stayed. This appeal
followed.
¶ 15 ANALYSIS
¶ 16 A.A. raises three arguments on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient because Wolin’s
identification was unreliable; (2) even conceding the identification, her conduct did not satisfy the
taking element of a vehicular hijacking charge; and (3) her mittimus should be corrected to reflect
her proper time credit. We first address the sufficiency of the evidence.
¶ 17 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court construes the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational fact finder could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453,
¶ 37. The reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the fact finder regarding the
witness credibility or the weight of evidence. Id. Reversal based on insufficient evidence is only
appropriate where “the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify
a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 18 A.A. bases her sufficiency claim on the alleged unreliability of Wolin’s identification. In
assessing the reliability of an identification, the reviewing court considers the factors described by
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the United States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). See People v. Slim, 127
Ill. 2d 302, 307 (1989). Identification testimony from a single witness, if found reliable, may be
enough to sustain a conviction. Id. The Biggers factors include (1) the witness’s opportunity to
view, (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of prior descriptions, (4) the witness’s
level of certainty at the time of confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and
confrontation. Id. at 308. Opportunity to view is the most important factor, though none is
determinative. See In re O.F., 2020 IL App (1st) 190662, ¶ 32 (citing Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-
200).
¶ 19 Applying the Biggers factors, we find that a rational fact finder could have found Wolin’s
identification reliable and based A.A.’s guilt thereon. First, Wolin’s opportunity to view, the first
and most important Biggers factor, favors reliability. Wolin identified A.A. as the offender who
exited the vehicle, approached him, and demanded his key fob. The weather was clear, and there
is no evidence of visibility issues. This is a specific interaction with only one of the passengers,
lowering the likelihood that Wolin might have confused one passenger with another or another
individual with A.A. While the length of this interaction is not in the record, it was at least
sufficiently long for Wolin to look at A.A, receive a verbal instruction from her, and then comply
with that instruction. This may not have lasted minutes but was sufficiently long to support his
identification as reliable. See People v. Davila, 2022 IL App (1st) 190882, ¶ 40 (opportunity to
view factor favored reliability where “although [the witness] viewed defendant for only a short
period,” the “lighting conditions” and positions of the witness and defendant provided “a clear and
unobstructed opportunity to view”).
¶ 20 A.A. argues that Wolin’s opportunity to view was minimal because the initial interaction,
when the passengers first entered his vehicle, was brief and her clothing would have made it
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difficult for Wolin to identify her. This argument fails because while the record indicates the
passengers wore heavy winter clothing, Wolin testified that A.A.’s face was at least partially
visible during their interaction on the street, during which he had direct interaction with A.A. only,
and he further testified that when he identified A.A., she was wearing the same clothing as when
he picked her up.
¶ 21 Regarding the second Biggers factor, we find that Wolin’s level of attention during the
interaction on the street also favors reliability. A.A. again emphasizes Wolin’s low level of
engagement with the passengers during the initial pickup and travel portion of the incident, but
this argument fails because it does not account for the subsequent interaction Wolin and A.A. had
on the street. This interaction occurred after the attack, during which time Wolin had the presence
of mind to give her the wrong key fob. These circumstances support a finding that his level of
attention was high, favoring reliability.
¶ 22 The third factor, the accuracy of Wolin’s prior description, weighs against reliability here.
Wolin’s description to the officers was vague, apparently consisting only of the offenders’ race
and clothing. Other courts have found similar descriptions too generic to support reliability. See
People v. White, 2017 IL App (1st) 142358, ¶ 18. This factor, however, does not outweigh the
others to render the identification generally unreliable, particularly when considered alongside the
final two factors. Wolin’s level of certainty at the show-up identification, as well as the time
between incident and confrontation, both favor reliability. Neither party disputes that the time lapse
supports reliability—Wolin identified A.A. at the show-up, still on-scene and only shortly after
the incident. Compare this scenario to the facts in White, where the defendant was arrested two
days after the incident, based on a generic description, but this still did not defeat reliability because
the witness identified the offender, with certainty, at a photo array identification just three hours
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after the incident. Id. ¶ 19; see In re J.J., 2016 IL App (1st) 160379, ¶ 32. The facts here are
stronger than those in White. The level of certainty demonstrated by Wolin on the video also favors
reliability, particularly when considered in tandem with his testimony that he identified A.A. at
the show-up as one of the offenders.
¶ 23 We reject A.A.’s argument that the show-up was overly suggestive. The video is clear that
the officer does not suggest the person Wolin will view is likely the offender; instead, the officer
clarifies to Wolin that it will be an actual human, not a photograph, the officers will show him.
¶ 24 A.A. generally attempts to discount the value of Wolin’s identification by emphasizing his
apparent confusion at trial regarding whether A.A. was the “taller” or “shorter” offender and where
she stood during the show-up. This passage is admittedly concerning, but it does not render his
entire testimony invalid such that no rational fact finder could have credited it. Most importantly,
Wolin’s testimony identifying A.A. as the offender who exited the vehicle and requested his key
fob is direct, clear, and distinct from that passage. Moreover, while Wolin did not testify clearly
regarding where A.A. stood on the scene during the show-up, his testimony is clear and certain
that he identified A.A. while on scene. The juvenile court was better positioned to consider the
impact the confused portion of Wolin’s testimony had on his credibility as a whole, and his
testimony, taken as a whole, was not so obviously unreliable or incredible that we may substitute
our judgment for that of the court on this issue, even if we were inclined to do so. See Hardman,
2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37; People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 283 (2004).
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¶ 25 Additionally, there was other evidence against A.A. that supported the court’s finding aside
from Wolin’s identification, most importantly the fact that A.A. gave as her home address the same
address from which Wolin testified he picked up the passengers. 1
¶ 26 In sum, Wolin directly identified A.A. in court as the offender who exited the vehicle to
demand the key fob. Based on this interaction, Wolin had the opportunity to view A.A., while
training his focus on her, and he then later identified her shortly thereafter while on scene. On this
record, along with the other evidence indicative of A.A.’s guilt, we find a rational fact finder could
have found Wolin’s identification of A.A. reliable. Thus, A.A.’s sufficiency of the evidence claim
fails.
¶ 27 A.A. next argues that even conceding the State’s evidence, her conduct as alleged did not
satisfy the elements for a vehicular hijacking charge because she did not “take” Wolin’s vehicle. 2
Specifically, she contends that because Wolin gave her the wrong key fob, neither she nor her co-
offender had the ability to operate the vehicle and thus could not “take” it.
¶ 28 We note that neither party satisfactorily stated the standard of review applicable to this issue.
A.A. appears to contend this is an issue reviewed for the sufficiency of the evidence, and the State
does not contest that characterization. However, we find that this is not a sufficiency issue. For
purposes of this claim, A.A. cedes identification and only challenges whether her conduct as
alleged satisfied the statute. In other words, both parties agree on the facts but dispute whether
those facts establish the charge. This presents a purely legal issue of statutory interpretation, which
we review de novo. People v. Hutt, 2023 IL 128170, ¶ 41.
1 A.A. complains that this testimony was objected to at trial. The court overruled the objection. She does not argue this ruling was error on appeal, however. 2 We note A.A. did not raise this argument at any point in the trial proceedings, but the State does not argue forfeiture before this court, and thus we may consider the claim. See People v. Bahena, 2020 IL App (1st) 180197, ¶¶ 28-29. 10 No. 1-22-1538
¶ 29 When interpreting a statute, a court’s goal is to give effect to the legislature’s intent, the
most reliable indicator of which “is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary
meaning.” People v. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 30. A statute cannot be interpreted to lead to absurd
results. Id. If a statute’s language is ambiguous such that the legislature’s intent is not apparent
from its face, the interpreting court may use tools of statutory construction to help determine
legislative intent. Palos Community Hospital v. Humana Insurance Co., 2021 IL 126008, ¶ 24.
Those tools include legislative history and the rules of statutory construction, including expressio
unius est exclusio alterius (expressio unius) and the rule of lenity. Expressio unius maintains that
if the legislature explicitly includes certain language in one statutory section, the exclusion of that
language in another section can be interpreted as intentional. People v. Foster, 2021 IL App (2d)
190116, ¶ 11. Under the rule of lenity, when legislative intent cannot be satisfactorily determined
from a criminal statute’s language or through the tools of statutory construction, the court should
construe the statute to favor defendants. People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶¶ 12, 43.
¶ 30 Vehicular hijacking occurs when a defendant, “knowingly takes a motor vehicle from the
person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or by threatening the imminent
use of force.” 720 ILCS 5/18-3 (West 2020). “[T]akes” is undefined by the statute. 3 We note that
both parties discuss the meaning of “possession” and “take” in the context of other statutes that
predated vehicular hijacking, including possession of a stolen motor vehicle (People v. Rivera, 141
Ill. 2d 528 (1990)) and armed robbery (People v. Strickland, 154 Ill. 2d 489 (1992)), but neither
framework is instructive here. The legislature passed vehicular hijacking as a new, specifically
3 Defendant inaccurately cites Reese for the proposition that “actual physical possession” is required to demonstrate taking; in fact, the paragraph cited directly refutes that point, as does the fact that the phrase does not appear in the statute itself. See Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 1 (“We hold that the offense encompasses taking actual physical possession of a vehicle but may also be committed when a defendant exercises control of the vehicle by use of force or threat of force with the victim still present.”). 11 No. 1-22-1538
defined crime, separate from the crimes discussed in Rivera and Strickland. See Reese, 2017 IL
120011, ¶ 40 (“in creating the new offense of vehicular hijacking, the legislature plainly intended
to address criminal conduct distinct from robbery of a motor vehicle,” though the new crime does
“encompass situations when a victim is actually dispossessed of a vehicle”).
¶ 31 We agree with the parties that whether the State must show an offender either operated the
vehicle at issue, or had the capability to do so, to demonstrate taking is not clear from the face of
the statute. This leads to an ambiguity we may resolve through the tools of statutory interpretation.
Palos, 2021 IL 126008, ¶ 24. That analysis leads us to the conclusion that A.A.’s conduct here
satisfied the taking element.
¶ 32 First, as other courts have emphasized, the legislative history of the vehicular hijacking
statute reveals the legislature’s focus was on protecting a vehicle’s driver and other occupants. In
People v. Cooksey, 309 Ill. App. 3d 839 (1999), the court stated, after reviewing the Senate
proceedings regarding the statute, “[I]t is clear that the vehicular hijacking statute was enacted to
combat the tragedies *** of car hijacking where someone armed or unarmed attacks a car, and ***
snatches the driver out.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 847. Echoing this sentiment, a
panel of this court in People v. Pryor, 372 Ill. App. 3d 422 (2007), explained that vehicular
hijacking’s legislative history shows the statute “has more to do with the injury to the victim than
the taking of property.” Id. at 437. Based on this history and the intent it reveals, we believe the
statute covers A.A.’s conduct here. The legislature’s primary concern in enacting the vehicular
hijacking statute was to prevent offenders from using force or threat to cause drivers to relinquish
their vehicles; whatever use that offender might then put the vehicle to after the fact is not relevant
to that concern.
12 No. 1-22-1538
¶ 33 Here, the record shows A.A. and her co-offender used force against Wolin, specifically by
choking him, then ordered Wolin out of the vehicle, an order with which he complied. One
offender then stayed with the vehicle while Wolin left the scene, and his vehicle, behind. This
conduct completed the elements of the statute, and the fact that A.A. and her co-offender were then
unable to drive the vehicle away from the scene is irrelevant. In so holding, we do not attempt to
define specifically what “take” means or does not mean in any conceivable scenario under the
statute; only that it does constitute a taking in situations where, as here, a driver is removed from
their vehicle by force, thus leaving it in the possession of the offender, regardless of whatever use
the offenders then make of the vehicle.
¶ 34 In light of this history, we are further persuaded that A.A.’s conduct is covered by the statute
through consideration of the general principle that we must not interpret a statute to lead to absurd
results. Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 30. Should we accept A.A.’s interpretation, many circumstances
where an offender uses force to dispossess a driver of their vehicle would not constitute vehicular
hijacking, an absurd result because it would run directly counter to the legislature’s intent behind
the statute. Consider, for instance, the situation where an offender uses force to remove a vehicle’s
owner from the vehicle but cannot then operate the vehicle because of a mechanical issue or lack
of gas. Similarly, under A.A.’s conception, it might not constitute vehicular hijacking if, after the
offender uses force to remove the driver from a vehicle, that offender then causes the vehicle to be
towed to another location, instead of operating the vehicle themselves. And what of a victim who
was not fortunate enough to receive aid from police officers shortly after the incident, but instead
is forced away from the scene entirely, while the offender remains with the vehicle until a new key
is generated? Is a vehicular hijacking not accomplished until said key is used to start the vehicle
and drive it away? These hypotheticals illustrate that the specific use, if any, the offender puts a
13 No. 1-22-1538
vehicle to after using force to remove a driver should not be relevant to a vehicular hijacking
charge, and thus A.A. should not escape guilt here because of her good fortune regarding the key
fob.
¶ 35 We are also guided by the expressio unius tool of statutory construction in reaching this
conclusion. Specifically, the Illinois criminal trespass to vehicles statute explicitly contains a term
regarding operation of a vehicle: “A person commits criminal trespass to vehicles when he or she
knowingly and without authority enters any part of or operates any vehicle ***.” 720 ILCS 5/21-
2 (West 2020). Based on this language, we may conclude that when the legislature intends
operation to be an element of a criminal statute involving vehicles, it knows how to accomplish
that with direct language, and thus the lack of an operation element in the vehicular hijacking
statute can be construed as intentional. See Foster, 2021 IL App (2d) 190116, ¶ 15 (in context of
whether a statute included attempt offenses, court found it did not because in other statutes, “when
the legislature wanted to include attempts in a list of included offenses, it has done so expressly”);
see also Vestrup v. Du Page County Election Comm’n, 335 Ill. App. 3d 156, 164 (2002) (the
absence of a term in one section of a statute, “despite its presence elsewhere,” suggests exclusion
was purposeful). 4
¶ 36 A.A. argues that we should look to the driving under the influence (DUI) statute, and
accompanying jurisprudence, to guide our interpretation of vehicular hijacking. Specifically, she
points to the fact that Illinois DUI law allows for conviction of an offender who is not currently
driving only if the offender is in “actual physical control” of a vehicle. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)
4 We note that other jurisdictions have made explicit reference to whether statutes similar to vehicular hijacking in Illinois require that the offender then operate the vehicle. See Harper v. State, 121 A.3d 24, 31-32 (Del. 2015) (Delaware statute states that it is not a defense if offender does not physically drive or operate the vehicle); Harris v. State, 728 A.2d 180, 189 (Md. 1999) (explaining that Maryland law does not require “movement or asportation”). 14 No. 1-22-1538
(West 2020). Actual physical control “is determined on a case-by-case basis” through
consideration of factors including whether a defendant possesses the ignition key or has the
physical ability to operate the vehicle. See People v. Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130152, ¶ 17. She
contends this definition should be applied to the “taking” language in the vehicular hijacking
statute. We disagree.
¶ 37 The legislative intent behind the DUI statute is to prevent intoxicated individuals from
operating a vehicle; the operation is the harmful act. See City of Naperville v. Watson, 175 Ill. 2d
399, 405 (1997) (explaining that a goal of DUI law to encourage “those who plan to drink at a
party or tavern to arrange lodging or safe transportation home before they set out”). It is for this
reason that “actual physical control” of a vehicle in the DUI context generally requires the
capability to operate the vehicle, such as access to the keys. See Morris, 2014 IL App (1st) 130512,
¶¶ 17-18. Conversely, as explained above, the vehicular hijacking statute concerns conduct
separate from operation. We therefore distinguish “take” in the vehicular hijacking context from
“actual physical control” in the DUI context; these are separate provisions intended to apply to
separate conduct, and should be interpreted accordingly.
¶ 38 Finally, A.A. contends that the rule of lenity requires us to rule in her favor here because
the definition of “take” is ambiguous. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12. The rule of lenity, however,
does not apply here, because that rule is generally “subordinate to our obligation to determine
legislative intent. Id. Because we hold the legislature’s intent regarding this statute leads to the
conclusion that A.A.’s conduct would satisfy the taking element, the rule of lenity does not operate
to tilt the scales in A.A.’s favor. See id. ¶ 33 (“when the meaning of a statute becomes clear through
normal rules of statutory interpretation, resort to the rule of lenity is not required”).
15 No. 1-22-1538
¶ 39 A.A.’s final claim is that the juvenile court erred in calculating her time credit. Specifically,
she contends the court’s sentence of 30 days of detention did not include an offset for her time
spent in pretrial custody. The State agrees.
¶ 40 Under section 5-710(1)(a)(v), (b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-
710(1)(a)(v), (b) (West 2020)), minor offenders are entitled to day-for-day credit for presentence
custody, including time on electronic monitoring. See In re Montrell S., 2015 IL App (4th) 150205,
¶¶ 63-65; In re Jarquan B., 2016 IL App (1st) 161180, ¶ 33. The record here shows A.A. was in
custody for a total of 56 days, but her mittimus does not reflect any credit for this time.
Accordingly, we agree with the parties here, and pursuant to our power under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967), we amend her mittimus to reflect her proper time credit.
¶ 41 CONCLUSION
¶ 42 A rational fact finder could have found A.A. guilty based on Wolin’s identification
testimony, and the legislative intent behind the vehicular hijacking statute reveals that her conduct
here satisfied the taking element of the charge. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s finding
of guilt and adjudication of A.A. as delinquent. Additionally, we amend her mittimus to reflect her
proper time credit, which satisfied the 30-day custody portion of her sentence.
¶ 43 Affirmed as modified.
16 No. 1-22-1538
In re A.A., 2023 IL App (1st) 221538
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 21-JD-122; the Hon. Patricia Mendoza, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys James E. Chadd, Douglas R. Hoff, and Jonathan Krieger, of State for Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Enrique for Abraham, Joseph Alexander, and Taylor K. Santell, Assistant Appellee: State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.