NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2022 IL App (3d) 220248-U
Order filed November 14, 2022 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
In re A.A., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the 12th Judicial Circuit, a Minor ) Will County, Illinois, ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) ) Appeal No. 3-22-0248 Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit No. 18-JA-153 ) v. ) ) Mohammed A., ) Honorable ) John J. Pavich, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HAUPTMAN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice O’Brien and Justice McDade concurred in the judgement ____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s unfitness and best interest findings are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Respondent received due process of law during the parental rights termination proceedings.
¶2 Respondent, Mohammed A., appeals from the Will County circuit court’s order
terminating his parental rights to A.A. Respondent argues: (1) the court’s unfitness finding was
against the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the court’s finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of A.A. was contrary to the manifest weight
of the evidence; and (3) his due process rights were violated. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On September 5, 2018, the State filed its original petition for adjudication of wardship
alleging A.A., born June 24, 2015, was neglected due to an environment injurious to her welfare
pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)
(West 2018)). The petition listed A.A.’s mother as Ravay M., and father as Eduardo D. The
petition alleged that there was “ongoing domestic violence in the home.” 1 That same day,
however, the State was granted leave to amend the petition on its face to name respondent as the
father. The amended petition was identical to the first except that Eduardo’s name was struck out
and respondent’s name was handwritten onto the petition. Also handwritten under the
“Residence” heading was “Florida” and the following notations located at the bottom of the first
page: “Not on BC” and “No VAP.” 2
¶5 The matter proceeded to a shelter care hearing. An order following the shelter care
hearing established that the court found probable cause to believe that A.A. was neglected and
her “parents have a history of domestic violence.” The order directed the parties to cooperate
with the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶6 On September 14, 2018, the State filed an affidavit to support notice by publication and a
notice of publication, which generally provided that upon diligent inquiry, respondent’s
whereabouts or place of residence was unknown, such that service in person or by mail was
1 A report from Lutheran Child and Family Services indicated that there was a physical altercation between Ravay and Eduardo. While in a car with the children, Eduardo hit and kicked Ravay. Ravay then broke a beer bottle over Eduardo’s head and stabbed him with the broken glass. Both parents required medical attention and were subsequently charged with domestic battery. 2 The parties seem to agree that these indicate that respondent was not on the birth certificate and had not voluntarily acknowledged paternity. 2 impossible. Respondent was provided notice by publication. On that same date, the court’s
docket reflects that the matter was before the court on a “Re-Shelter Care Hearing” and, by
stipulation of the parties, the court found probable cause for neglect and that the environment
was injurious to A.A.’s welfare.
¶7 On September 18, 2018, a summons, with an attached affidavit identifying a specific
address in Florida, was filed directing respondent to appear and answer the amended petition on
November 14, 2018. On September 21, 2018, a certificate of publication was filed, which
included copies of the published notice to respondent.
¶8 On November 14, 2018, the cause came before the court for status regarding service on
respondent. Though no transcript of the hearing is included in the record on appeal, the court
found respondent in default for failing to appear. The case was continued for an adjudicatory
hearing on December 11, 2018.
¶9 On that date, the court conducted an adjudicatory hearing. Although respondent was not
present, the court adjudicated A.A. neglected in that her environment was injurious to her
welfare due to a history of domestic violence between Ravay and Eduardo. The order provided
that respondent remained in default.
¶ 10 A dispositional report filed by Lutheran Child and Family Services (agency) on
December 26, 2018, by caseworker Erica Hall provided that respondent was A.A.’s biological
father. The report did not indicate what proof established respondent’s paternity. During an
October 11, 2018, telephone conversation, Hall informed respondent of his parental rights.
Respondent stated that he was aware of the juvenile proceeding and “was allowing [Ravay] to
handle the situation to get their [child] back in [Ravay’s] care.” Respondent asked how A.A. was
doing and if she was “safe with her current placement.” Hall told respondent that A.A. was doing
3 well. Respondent indicated that he “could not come to Illinois at this time.” According to Hall,
respondent declined to participate in an integrated assessment.
¶ 11 Hall attempted to reach respondent via telephone on three additional occasions in
November and December 2018 and left him voicemails. The report noted that little was known
about respondent’s parenting capacity, mental health, or other relevant factors as respondent was
not available to participate in the integrated assessment, was residing in Florida, and could not be
contacted at the time of the assessment.
¶ 12 On January 9, 2019, respondent failed to appear at a dispositional hearing where A.A.
became a ward of the court. The court stated that “[v]isitation by [respondent] is suspended until
such time as he presents himself either to the Court or to the agency to engage in services.” The
court’s written dispositional order further memorialized that respondent was not engaged in
services and remained in default.
¶ 13 An April 10, 2019, permanency review report stated that respondent had contacted Hall
on January 15, 2019, to inquire about A.A.’s wellbeing. At that time, respondent indicated that
he was not interested in being assessed for services so long as Ravay was working toward A.A.’s
return home. The report further provided that respondent was not currently participating in any
services or visitation. While a permanency hearing was held on April 25, 2019, respondent was
not present and the “Order Following Permanency Hearing” entered made no reference to
respondent.
¶ 14 An October 7, 2019, permanency review report stated that respondent contacted the
agency in June 2019, and expressed interest in working toward a goal of return home for A.A.
However, the conversation was hindered due to a language barrier. The report indicated that Hall
was attempting to obtain an interpreter for a second integrated assessment. Respondent said that
4 he planned on attending court on October 21, 2019, for the next scheduled permanency hearing.
Hall recommended that a DNA test be ordered because respondent was requesting visitation but
was not listed on A.A.’s birth certificate.
¶ 15 Respondent appeared in court for the first time on October 21, 2019, with his counsel
who had just been appointed at that court appearance. The court entered an “Order Following
Permanency Hearing” finding that respondent had not made reasonable efforts or progress and,
inter alia, continued the cause for status “on father [respondent] services, IA, DNA” to
November 22, 2019. The court also ordered that an Arabic interpreter be present for the next
hearing.
¶ 16 On November 22, 2019, the court ordered the “report & service plan” to be filed on April
14, 2020. Throughout 2020, the cause was continued several times for, inter alia, status on
respondent’s services, an integrated assessment, and DNA testing. During this period, no
integrated assessment or DNA testing was conducted and no services were recommended.
¶ 17 A June 25, 2020, permanency review report stated that the agency had yet to receive any
record that respondent completed a DNA test and had been unable to reschedule respondent’s
integrated assessment due to issues with contacting respondent. The report related that between
December 2019 and March 2020, five attempts were made to schedule an integrated assessment,
and that the agency had not heard from respondent since March 2020. Respondent was present at
a permanency review hearing that same day with counsel and an interpreter. Counsel explained
that no DNA test was ordered because respondent was instructed “to do it through family court.”
Counsel further explained that it was difficult for respondent to coordinate the DNA test because
A.A. did not currently reside in Will County and respondent resided in Florida. Respondent also
alleged that he attempted to contact the agency on many occasions to no avail. The court
5 deferred any finding regarding respondent’s progress as it appeared confusion existed as to
respondent’s contact with the agency.
¶ 18 On August 24, 2020, the State filed a motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights,
alleging respondent was the putative father. The motion alleged that respondent was unfit in that
he failed to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, and responsibility as to A.A.’s
welfare (750 ILCS 50/l(D)(b) (West 2020)); (2) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions
which were the basis for A.A.’s removal during the nine-month period from December 11, 2018,
through September 11, 2019 (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (3) make reasonable progress toward the
return following adjudication during the nine-month period from December 11, 2018, through
September 11, 2019 (id. § l(D)(m)(ii)). Multiple summonses were sent to respondent regarding
the motion to terminate, however, the certified mail was returned. Thereafter, the State filed an
“Affidavit to Support Notice by Publication” and on December 11, 2020, a certificate of
publication was filed.
¶ 19 A December 16, 2020, permanency review report provided that when respondent
appeared in court on June 25, 2020, he indicated he wanted to engage in services. Caseworker
Erik Morgan informed respondent that he still needed to complete the integrated assessment.
Morgan attempted to follow up with respondent after the hearing but never heard from him.
Though no transcript is included in the record on appeal, the court entered an order that same day
indicating that respondent was present at the permanency review hearing with counsel and an
interpreter. The court found that respondent had not made reasonable efforts or progress.
¶ 20 After several continuances, on June 11, 2021, the matter proceeded to the fitness portion
of the State’s motion to terminate parental rights. Respondent was present with counsel and was
assisted by an interpreter. The State called Morgan to testify. Morgan testified that during the
6 pendency of the case, there was periodic contact by telephone with respondent. Respondent did
not complete an integrated assessment between December 11, 2018, and September 11, 2019.
Despite the agency’s instructions to do so, respondent never took the requisite steps to establish
his paternity. Respondent had no contact with A.A. since the proceedings were initiated.
¶ 21 On cross-examination, Morgan testified that he became the assigned caseworker in
October 2020, though the proceedings began in September 2018. As such, portions of Morgan’s
testimony stemmed from his recollection of the casefile. Morgan agreed that he had contact with
both respondent and respondent’s counsel about obtaining a DNA test. Morgan had no
knowledge of any further effort on respondent’s behalf to obtain a test and stated that he would
have cooperated with obtaining A.A.’s DNA if counsel had petitioned for it. Respondent was
unable to have visitation with A.A. because he had not established paternity. Morgan
acknowledged that respondent’s difficulties with completing certain tasks were partially due his
out-of-state residency but noted “it’s been over two years.” Respondent obtained an integrated
assessment on January 4, 2020. The assessment did not recommend any services until respondent
established paternity, though Morgan recommended respondent have therapy with A.A. Morgan
was unaware of any problems respondent had with alcohol or domestic violence.
¶ 22 On re-direct examination, Morgan testified that respondent had offered no proof of any
attempt to establish his paternity during the period from December 11, 2018, through September
11, 2019. Morgan explained DCFS would not offer services to a purported father until paternity
was established. Respondent sent a text message to Morgan in January or February 2021 and
inquired about obtaining a DNA test. Morgan informed respondent that he needed to coordinate
with his attorney to obtain a DNA test. At the conclusion of Morgan’s testimony, the court took
judicial notice of the April 25, 2019, October 21, 2019, June 25, 2020, and December 16, 2020,
7 permanency review orders and its assessments of respondent’s progress on those dates.
Following argument, the court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 23 On June 17, 2021, the State filed a motion to reopen proofs, alleging several documents
were admitted during Ravay’s testimony at the June 11, 2021, fitness hearing that were never
tendered to the State. Additionally, the State requested that the agency supervisor, Natalie Bauer,
be allowed to testify. The court granted the State’s motion over objection.
¶ 24 A permanency review report filed on December 23, 2021, provided that while respondent
had completed an integrated assessment, he had not completed any services or verified his
paternity. On the same date, a DCFS family service plan was filed. The plan stated that
respondent failed to obtain a DNA test despite being advised in 2019 that he needed to petition
the family court for a test. The plan recommended that respondent engage in parent education
and coaching specific to A.A.’s mental health needs but that such services could not commence
until paternity was established.
¶ 25 On December 27, 2021, respondent filed a petition seeking temporary parenting time. On
January 27, 2022, respondent filed a petition to establish parentage and allocate parental
responsibilities. The petition alleged, inter alia, that respondent was A.A.’s father pursuant to the
attached voluntary acknowledgement of parentage.
¶ 26 On February 9, 2022, the parties resumed the termination proceeding. Respondent’s
counsel informed the court that since termination of parental rights was at issue, the record
should formally establish that respondent was A.A.’s father. Respondent was sworn in and
testified that A.A. had been born during his relationship with Ravay, though the couple never
married. Respondent admitted that he was A.A.’s biological father. The court accepted
respondent’s admission of paternity.
8 ¶ 27 Bauer testified that she had been involved in the case since September 2018. Bauer
indicated that the case originated based on “[a]llegation 60(b), which was risk of harm. There
was a domestic violence incident between *** Ravay, and [Eduardo].” The domestic violence
incident did not involve respondent. Respondent was asked to participate in an integrated
assessment at the beginning of the case but failed to do so, stating that he would let Ravay handle
the case. Respondent called the agency in January 2019 and wanted to know how Ravay was
progressing. Respondent was told the agency could not disclose information about Ravay and
was again offered an opportunity to participate in an integrated assessment and services.
Respondent was not interested at that time and did not contact the agency again until July 2019,
at which time he indicated a willingness to complete an integrated assessment. A caseworker
began an assessment with respondent but respondent stated that he could not continue because he
needed an interpreter. Thereafter, there was no communication with respondent until October
2019, when respondent appeared in court for the first time. At this time, the court informed
respondent of his need to establish parentage.
¶ 28 Bauer testified that she had to reschedule an integrated assessment to be completed in
December 2020. Thereafter, Bauer unsuccessfully tried to contact respondent to reschedule on
several occasions. Respondent called in March 2020 and arranged to participate in an integrated
assessment. However, when Bauer called respondent at the prearranged time, respondent did not
answer. When respondent called back, he told Bauer that he was at work and could not complete
the assessment. Bauer did not hear from respondent before the June 2020 court date.
¶ 29 On cross-examination, Bauer stated that there was no history of violence, criminal
activity, or drug and alcohol usage in respondent’s background, nor did respondent present A.A.
with an environment injurious to her welfare. Bauer noted that respondent did not indicate that
9 he wished to establish paternity until one year and two months into the case. Bauer opined that
respondent neglected A.A. by showing no interest in her case from September 2018 through July
2019, failing to call on birthdays and holidays, call the agency to check on her, or request to
speak to A.A.’s foster parents. During the relevant nine-month period, respondent made “very
minimal efforts” as far as facilitating A.A.’s return home. Bauer also noted that respondent did
not admit that he was A.A.’s father until the termination hearing, nearly four years after A.A.
was taken into shelter care.
¶ 30 Respondent’s counsel called Ravay to testify. Ravay stated that A.A. lived with
respondent in Florida from when she was born in 2015 until 2017. Ravay believed respondent
was a good parent but provided that respondent never said he wanted to have anything to do with
A.A. Respondent was able to tend to A.A.’s needs and sent monthly financial support payments.
Ravay opined that respondent was a fit parent that maintained a reasonable degree of interest in
A.A.’s wellbeing.
¶ 31 On cross-examination, Ravay clarified that she lived with respondent during the years
that A.A. resided in Florida. Ravay agreed she had lost custody of A.A. in September 2018 and
had no visits since 2019. Thus, anything she learned about A.A. since that time was through a
third-party source.
¶ 32 Respondent testified that he resided in Florida and was employed as a butcher.
Respondent believed his income was sufficient to support his household and testified that he
provided A.A. with financial support. Respondent provided for all of A.A.’s needs during the
first three years of her life. Respondent kept in daily contact with A.A when she moved with
Ravay. Respondent bought toys for A.A. and tried to give her an iPad so that they could share
photographs. However, the agency would not accept the gift. Respondent tried to see A.A., but
10 alleged the agency prevented him from doing so. Respondent testified that he never behaved in a
manner that would have rendered him an unfit parent during the relevant time period. However,
respondent, perhaps mistakenly, answered “[y]es” when asked whether he failed to maintain
interest or contact with A.A. during the relevant time period. Respondent subsequently indicated
that he maintained contact with A.A. when she and Ravay moved to Illinois. Respondent said
that he contacted A.A. via video and called Ravay “[e]very day” after they moved.
¶ 33 Respondent parroted much of Bauer’s testimony concerning the scheduling issues related
to his integrated assessment, though respondent maintained that he called the agency several
times per week but was unable to get through. Respondent left messages and voicemails that
were not always returned. Respondent claimed he was present at every court date. Respondent
wanted custody of A.A. and wished to provide for her financial and psychological needs.
Respondent was willing and prepared to complete court-ordered services.
¶ 34 On cross-examination, respondent testified that he had not seen A.A. in person since
2017. Respondent never traveled to Illinois to visit A.A. A caseworker informed respondent of
the instant proceedings at the inception of the case. Respondent claimed he reached out to A.A.’s
foster family to check on A.A. Despite being aware that a series of court dates would ensue after
September 2018, respondent did not attend court until June 2019. Respondent denied being
informed by the court that he needed a DNA test, instead testifying that the court told him the
opposite. Similarly, respondent stated that his attorney told him he needed a DNA test but
subsequently told respondent he did not.
¶ 35 The State recalled Bauer, who testified that agency personnel was always available for a
concerned parent regarding issues with their child’s case. Bauer recalled that respondent wanted
to give A.A. an iPad, but Bauer did not feel comfortable holding on to it to give to A.A. because
11 of how expensive it was. Bauer refuted respondent’s claims of his frequent attempts to contact
the agency.
¶ 36 Following the close of evidence and the arguments of the parties, the court took the
matter under advisement. On March 23, 2022, the court found by clear and convincing evidence
that respondent was unfit in that he failed to (1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest,
concern, and responsibility as to A.A.’s welfare, and (2) make reasonable progress toward A.A.’s
return during the relevant time period. The court reasoned that respondent failed to complete an
integrated assessment, maintain consistent contact with the agency, complete any services, take
steps to establish his paternity, and visit A.A. or call to check on her during the relevant time
period.
¶ 37 On May 12, 2022, the court conducted the best interest portion of the termination
proceeding. Child Appointed Special Advocates volunteer Sarabeth Butler testified that A.A.
was six years old at the time of the hearing. A.A. and her sibling were placed with foster parents
Luke and Alexa Bell. A.A. had been in the Bell’s home since July 2019. The Bell’s three
biological children also resided in the home. Butler observed A.A. within the home monthly and
described the home as loving and stable. A.A. had been diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and expressive language disorder. A.A. was in therapy and took
medication for the disorders. The Bells expressed interest in adopting A.A. Butler recommended
that A.A. be adopted by the Bells.
¶ 38 On cross-examination, Butler testified that she had visited A.A. approximately 24 times
and had not observed disciplinary issues. Butler had never been contacted by respondent in any
manner. Butler described the foster home as clean and A.A. as appropriately dressed. A.A. has
her own, well-furnished bedroom, and appropriate toys, books, and other items.
12 ¶ 39 Luke testified that A.A. had been with the family since July 2019. The Bells wished to
adopt A.A. and her sibling.
¶ 40 On cross-examination, Luke testified that he was employed as a teacher and made a
salary of approximately $56,000 per year in addition to Alexa’s comparable salary. The Bells
provide for A.A.’s physical needs, safety, and housing. Luke described A.A.’s special needs and
that he is actively involved in attending to her educational needs. A.A. expressed to the Bells that
she wanted to remain with the family permanently. Luke testified that A.A. has visits with her
other siblings sporadically. A.A. participates in tumbling, dance, and soccer, and attends a local
Christian church.
¶ 41 Morgan testified that he visited the Bell’s home every month. Morgan described the
home as loving and observed the children playing frequently. A.A. calls the Bells mom and dad.
The Bells treat A.A. the same as their biological children. Morgan did not believe A.A. was old
enough to opine on where she would like to be placed permanently.
¶ 42 Respondent’s counsel called respondent to testify. Respondent lived in Florida, where his
mother and sister also reside. Respondent said that his mother and sister are available to assist
respondent if he had custody of A.A. Respondent recounted his employment as a butcher and
described his residence as a two-bedroom apartment. Respondent had resided at the apartment
for four years. Respondent earned $1000 per week and testified that he was able to support A.A.
Respondent was a practicing Muslim and attended mosque weekly. Respondent stated that he
used neither drugs nor alcohol and had no criminal record.
¶ 43 Respondent recounted that A.A. lived with him from 2015 to 2017. Respondent did not
object to Ravay moving to Illinois with A.A. because he believed he would still see her. After
A.A. left, respondent saw A.A. on FaceTime weekly and came to Illinois to visit A.A. three or
13 four times prior to the instant case. Respondent testified that he traveled to Illinois 14 times to
participate in the instant proceedings. Respondent attempted to contact A.A.’s foster parents on
one occasion but the agency would not allow contact. Respondent also had difficulty contacting
the agency, stating that he called and tried to leave voicemails on more than 40 occasions.
¶ 44 Respondent wished for A.A. to reside with him and stated that he would take the requisite
steps to retain custody of A.A. Respondent would provide A.A. with a loving, stable home,
address A.A.’s special needs, ensure she received proper schooling, and foster A.A.’s religious
upbringing. Respondent would not consent to A.A.’s adoption. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 45 On May 18, 2022, the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that it was in
A.A.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The court found that while
respondent loved A.A., he had had minimal interaction with her over the last several years. In
contrast, the court found that a strong bond had developed between A.A. and her foster family
and that A.A. deserved the permanency of a loving and supporting family. The court appointed
DCFS as guardian and custodian of A.A. with the authority to consent to A.A.’s adoption.
Respondent appeals.
¶ 46 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 47 A. Fitness
¶ 48 Respondent argues that the circuit court’s unfitness finding was against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Respondent contends that the court did not enter an order adjudicating
A.A. neglected by respondent prior to the December 11, 2018, to September 11, 2019, time
frame cited in the State’s termination petition. Respondent further argues that Bauer testified that
he was never indicated for “[a]llegation 60(b), which was risk of harm. There was a domestic
14 violence incident between *** Ravay, and [Eduardo].” Additionally, respondent maintained a
reasonable degree of interest as to A.A., but his efforts were hindered by the agencies
supervising A.A.
¶ 49 Parental rights termination proceedings are initiated by the filing of a termination petition
pursuant to the provisions of the Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-13 (West 2020). Thereafter, a parent’s
rights may be terminated upon clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit under any of
the grounds enumerated in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 417
(2001); 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2020). To warrant an unfitness finding, the State must show
that the parent is unfit during any nine-month time period after an adjudication of abuse or
neglect. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2020). A court need only find one of the grounds alleged in
the State’s petition to find a parent unfit. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 349 (2005). A court’s
fitness determination will not be reversed on appeal unless the ruling is against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Id. A ruling is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the
opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Id.
¶ 50 In this case, the State alleged that respondent was unfit due to the following three
grounds: (1) failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to
A.A.’s welfare; (2) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis
for the removal of A.A. during the period of December 11, 2018, to September 11, 2019; and
(3) failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of A.A. within nine months after an
adjudication of neglected or abused minor, that period being December 11, 2018, to September
11, 2019. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b), (D)(m)(i), (D)(m(ii) (West 2020)).
¶ 51 From our review, the evidence at the unfitness hearing clearly and convincingly
established that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or
15 responsibility. Respondent testified that he had not had contact with A.A. since September 2018
and had not travelled to Illinois to visit A.A. since 2017. For nearly the first three years of this
case, respondent did not complete the integrated assessment, a necessary step to obtain his
service plan and make reasonable progress. Respondent also took no steps to establish paternity
before the 2022 termination hearing began. Instead, respondent originally showed disinterest in
the proceedings as he initially indicated to the agency that he did not want to participate because
he was allowing Ravay to handle the case. It was not until the October 21, 2019, hearing, more
than one year after the wardship petition was filed, that respondent attended a court hearing.
Notably, respondent did not attempt to establish paternity early on in the case to enable him to
obtain a service plan and possible visitation with A.A. As indicated by Bauer’s testimony and
numerous reports, respondent only inquired as to how A.A. was doing in her foster placement
twice—October 2018 and January 2019. Respondent did not attempt to contact A.A. or request
to speak with the Bells.
¶ 52 During the termination hearing, respondent testified that he had provided financial
support for A.A. after she and Ravay moved to Illinois from Florida. However, the record is
unclear as to the amount of financial support respondent provided. Additionally, there is no
indication that respondent continued to send financial support after the State filed the wardship
petition in September 2018. Instead, the only evidence that respondent provided financial support
or gifts for A.A. after the beginning of this case was his attempt to give to the agency an iPad to
enable him to communicate with A.A. Ultimately, the agency refused to accept this gift, and
respondent made no additional attempts to provide gifts through the agency for A.A. or other
financial support. Standing alone, respondent’s single attempt to give A.A. an iPad is insufficient
to establish a reasonable degree of interest or concern.
16 ¶ 53 We note that between September 2018 and October 2019, the record establishes that
respondent’s address and unfamiliarity with the English language were relatively unknown
barriers to his participation in the proceedings. These issues very likely created impediments to
respondent’s ability to exhibit concern and make progress. After all, the agency did not seek the
use of an Arabic language interpreter until after its June 2019 telephone call with respondent was
ended due to the language barrier. However, these impediments do not completely excuse
respondent’s general indifference. Importantly, during this period, respondent was able to ask
how A.A. was doing in October 2018 and January 2019. This was the extent of respondent’s
expressed concern about A.A. As noted above, respondent did not further inquire about A.A.,
seek to speak with A.A., or attempt to speak with A.A.’s foster family. Therefore, even after the
use of an interpreter, respondent demonstrated minimal concern for A.A.
¶ 54 Given respondent’s initial indifference, delay in establishing paternity and completing the
integrated assessment, and lack of expressed concern about A.A., the court’s unfitness finding on
this ground was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Having found that the
evidence clearly and convincingly established that respondent failed to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, we need not determine whether respondent made reasonable efforts or
progress.
¶ 55 B. Best Interest
¶ 56 Respondent argues the circuit court’s best interest finding was contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence. Respondent points to several of the best interest factors that disfavored
terminating his parental rights, including: (1) respondent wanted custody of A.A.; (2) he cared
for A.A. for the first two to three years of her life; (3) he has a home for A.A.; (4) he is employed
and makes enough money to support himself and A.A.; (5) his sister and mother live near him
17 and would be willing to help care for A.A.; (6) he is religious and attends mosque regularly;
(7) he is committed to making sure A.A. receives assistance and/or treatment for her ADHD and
language issues; and (8) he is A.A.’s biological father. Respondent also points out that the court
failed to consider the instability of the foster care system and that A.A. has been transferred
between several homes during the pendency of this case.
¶ 57 Following a finding of parental unfitness, the court’s focus must shift to the child’s
interest in “a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). At this stage, the
State’s burden of proof lessens to a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 366-67. When
considering whether the termination of parental rights serves the child’s best interest, courts
consider: (a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and
clothing; (b) the development of the child’s identity; (c) the child’s background and ties,
including familial, cultural, and religious; (d) the child’s sense of attachment; (e) the child’s
wishes and long-term goals; (f) the child’s community ties; (g) the child’s need for permanence;
(h) the uniqueness of every family and child; (i) the risks attendant to entering and being in
substitute care; and (j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS
405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020); In re A.F., 2012 IL App (2d) 111079, ¶ 45. A circuit court’s finding
that the termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest will not be disturbed on appeal
unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Parentage of J.W., 2013 IL
114817, ¶ 55.
¶ 58 Here, the evidence from the best interest hearing favored terminating respondent’s
parental rights. Specifically, A.A.’s foster parents, the Bells, had provided for A.A.’s safety and
welfare. A.A. had her own bedroom and was well provided for in the Bell’s home. A.A. had also
started to identify as a member of the Bell’s family. By all accounts, A.A. was happy and well-
18 adjusted to her foster family. She referred to the Bells as mom and dad and her foster siblings as
brother and sister. According to the caseworkers and Luke, A.A. had a strong bond with her
foster family, and the Bells expressed a desire to adopt A.A. and her sibling. A.A. had been with
the Bells since July 2019, nearly three years at the time of the termination hearing. A.A. had also
developed ties to the community through her school, church, and extracurricular activities. At
school, A.A. had an education plan designed to address her ADHD and learning disorder.
Finally, the permanence factor weighs heavily in favor of terminating respondent’s parental
rights. A.A. spent more than half of her life in foster placements during the pendency of the case.
For nearly three years she has been a part of the Bell family and they have expressed a
willingness to permanently make her a part of their family. In contrast, respondent has not had a
major role in A.A.’s life since she left Florida in 2017. Even before the case began, respondent
visited A.A. in Illinois only a couple of times. After the instant case began, respondent only
became somewhat involved after the proceedings had been ongoing for a year. Respondent’s on-
record participation in this case and testimony did not establish a strong interest in reestablishing
strong familial ties with A.A. As noted above, respondent rarely asked how A.A. was doing and
waited until very late in the case to seek visitation. Supra ¶ 51.
¶ 59 The only factor weighing against termination were the cultural differences between
respondent, a devout Muslim, and the Bells, who were taking A.A. to their Christian church.
However, there was no indication in the record that A.A. was being raised as a Muslim before
the case began. Therefore, the court’s best interest finding and termination of respondent’s
parental rights were not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 60 C. Due Process
¶ 61 Respondent raises a general argument that he was denied due process of law.
19 ¶ 62 Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a parental relationship with
their children. In re Vanessa C., 316 Ill. App. 3d 475, 481 (2000); In re J.J., 201 Ill. 2d 236, 267
(2002). However, in limited circumstances, the State may interfere with a parent’s fundamental
right when it becomes necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the children. In re
D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 23. Ultimately, due process is achieved in this context through
compliance with the Act and fundamental fairness. Id. “In juvenile proceedings, due process
requires adequate notice of the proceedings to a minor and his parents.” In re E.S., 324 Ill. App.
3d 661, 669 (2001). If a pleading fails to name and notify the necessary respondent, it fails to
invoke the jurisdiction of the court and renders its subsequent orders void. Id. Appellate courts
review potential due process violations de novo. In re J.M., 2020 IL App (2d) 190806, ¶ 37.
¶ 63 To the extent that respondent contends that the court violated his right to due process
when it found him in default for not appearing at the initial dispositional hearing on January 8,
2019, we find that we do not have jurisdiction to consider this issue. Because a dispositional
order is a final order (see In re M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d 649, 655 (2000)), respondent had 30 days
from the January 8, 2019, order to file a notice of appeal. As respondent did not file a notice of
appeal during this 30-day period, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider the circuit
court’s prior order. See In re Ay. D., 2020 IL App (3d) 200056, ¶ 38.
¶ 64 We further find that the court did not infringe on respondent’s right to procedural due
process. Procedural due process requires that respondent: (1) receive notice of the proceedings;
and (2) have an opportunity to be heard. In re D.M., 2020 IL App (1st) 200103, ¶ 39 (citing In re
D.P., 319 Ill. App. 3d 554, 558 (2001)). The record conclusively establishes that respondent
received notice of the proceedings as he was informed by the caseworker and was served with
summons. Approximately one year into the case, respondent appeared for a hearing. In total,
20 respondent appeared for 14 proceedings, including the termination hearings. Thus, respondent
received notice and was provide multiple opportunities to be heard during the proceedings.
¶ 65 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 66 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.
¶ 67 Affirmed.