In Interest of Hitt

312 N.W.2d 297, 209 Neb. 900, 1981 Neb. LEXIS 999
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 6, 1981
Docket44122
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 312 N.W.2d 297 (In Interest of Hitt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nebraska Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Interest of Hitt, 312 N.W.2d 297, 209 Neb. 900, 1981 Neb. LEXIS 999 (Neb. 1981).

Opinion

Krivosha, C.J.

Joy Della Hitt (mother), the natural mother of Kenny Eugene Hitt and Randy Alan Hitt, appeals from an order entered by the separate juvenile court of Douglas County, Nebraska, terminating her parental rights to her minor children. She assigns as error the fact that the trial court erred in ruling that the remarriage of short duration by appellant to the natural father of the children, who had been previously denied visitation rights with his children and whose parental rights were subsequently terminated, caused the children to come within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-209(2) (Reissue 1978) in that the mother has substantially and continuously or repeatedly neglected the children and refused to give them necessary parental care and protection. We agree with the position tendered by the mother and reverse the action of the separate juvenile court.

An order of the juvenile court terminating the parental rights under § 43-209 must be based on clear and convincing evidence or it must be reversed. See, In re Interest of Kimsey, 208 Neb. 193, 302 N.W.2d 707 (1981); In re Interest of Hiatt, ante p. 195, 307 N.W.2d 108 (1981).

Furthermore, the right of parents to maintain custody of their child is a natural right, subject only to the paramount interests which the public has in the protection of the rights of a child. See In re Interest of Kimsey, supra. A court of this state may not properly deprive a parent of the custody of a minor child unless it is affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit to perform the duties imposed by the relationship or has forfeited that right. In re Interest of D., ante p. 529, *902 308 N.W.2d 729 (1981).

Unfortunately, as is too often the situation in cases of this type, the in-court testimony by live witnesses is relatively scant. The bulk of the evidence was based on conclusionary letters from various agencies, which were not subject to cross-examination. We have previously indicated that if this court is to be able to examine the record de novo in order to determine that the evidence justifying the termination of parental rights is clear and convincing, something more than informal reports must be offered in evidence. Nevertheless, the evidence in this case, such as it is, is virtually without dispute.

Based upon our examination of the record, we are unable to conclude that either the best interests of the children require that the mother’s parental rights be terminated or that the evidence to support that position is clear and convincing.

The evidence discloses that the mother was, for some 5 years prior to April of 1980, a chronic alcoholic. For a period of several months in 1978 and 1979, after the mother was divorced from the father, the father, by arrangement with the rnother, had custody of the minor children. It was, in part at least, during that time, while the minor children were with the father, that the father committed a series of sexual assaults upon the children which ultimately resulted in the court terminating his parental rights to the children and sentencing him to the penitentiary for sexual assault on the children. On appeal to this court, the action in sentencing the father to the penitentiary was affirmed. See State v. Hitt, 207 Neb. 746, 301 N.W.2d 96 (1981).

Initially, a petition and motion seeking temporary custody of the children were filed by the county attorney against both the father and the mother alleging the father’s abuse and the mother’s failure to protect the children. A hearing on the petition seeking temporary custody was held on April 18, 1979, *903 and temporary custody was placed in the county. However, the mother was granted reasonable rights of visitation with the children, which she regularly exercised. A further hearing on the petition was held on November 5, 1979. Following that hearing the court, on December 27, 1979, found that grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of the father but not the mother. The court found that events which occurred prior to November 5, 1979, were insufficient to terminate the mother’s parental rights, though sufficient to find that the children were neglected and dependent. The court continued jurisdiction over the children and granted the mother continuing rights of visitation. On February 15, 1979, the court entered an order terminating the father’s parental rights. During all of this time, the mother was granted rights of visitation with the children, which she exercised at least in part.

The record further reflects that on January 11, 1980, while the mother was in the midst of a drinking bout, she remarried her former husband. It is unclear whether she ever lived with him following the remarriage. However, at no time during the entire brief remarriage were the children living with the mother or exposed to the father.

Nevertheless, based solely upon the fact that the mother had remarried, the county attorney filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother. Apparently, the action of the county attorney was not without effect. Upon learning of the action taken by the county attorney, the mother set about once and for all to attempt to rehabilitate herself. Sometime in April of 1980 she had herself admitted to the Cherokee Mental Health Institute to begin treatment for her alcoholism. There she remained and was rehabilitated.

A hearing on the motion to terminate was held on July 31, 1980. At that time the county attorney offered in evidence the marriage certificate, and rested.

At the disposition hearing on August 25, 1980, the *904 State offered several written reports. The State’s first exhibit was a report dated August 12, 1980, and signed by Dr. Beverly Mead, consulting psychiatrist. The report was solely with regard to Kenny and provided in part: “While it is not our custom to make recommendations, but to instead present only facts as they are documented in our files, it is felt that this particular case warrants special consideration due to Ken’s strong feelings and ties to his mother. Therefore, the staff at Saratoga 01, in consultation with Dr. Mead, make the following recommendations which should be considered as a unit or package:

“One: Ken should be placed in foster care as soon as a suitable placement can be found.

“Two: It is felt that for the above reasons Ken’s mother should retain visitation rights as allowed by the laws of Nebraska and the normal procedures of the foster care program.”

Exhibit 2 was a letter signed by Mr. Todd J. Bruett, coordinator, Child & Family Psychiatry Services. Among the recommendations was the following: “That both boys, if possible, be allowed to maintain some type of contact with their biological mother. Kenny’s attachment to his mother appears to be stronger than Randy’s but both would profit should Mrs. Hitt continue to progress.”

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Related

State v. C.M.
338 N.W.2d 764 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1983)
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338 N.W.2d 764 (Nebraska Supreme Court, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
312 N.W.2d 297, 209 Neb. 900, 1981 Neb. LEXIS 999, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-interest-of-hitt-neb-1981.