In Interest of AME

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: April 16, 2026
• Docket: 24CA0828
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA0828 In Interest of AME 04-16-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA0828 Douglas County District Court No. 08JV35 Honorable H. Clay Hurst, Judge

In the Interest of A.M.E., n/k/a A.M.H., a Child,

and Concerning J.L.E.,

Appellant,

and

J.J.H.,

Appellee.

APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, ORDERS AFFIRMED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE LUM Pawar and Martinez*, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 16, 2026

J.L.E., Pro Se

Jennifer Anntoinette Rivera, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 Mother, J.L.E., appeals three orders entered by the district

court on March 26, March 27, and April 9, 2024. We dismiss the

appeal in part, otherwise affirm the orders, and remand the case to

the district court.

I. Background

A. Procedural History and Prior Appeals

¶2 Mother and J.J.H. (father) have been engaged in a protracted

battle over child support arrearages since 2013.

¶3 In 2018, father moved for a satisfaction of judgment, asserting

that he had paid his outstanding child support arrearages. In

2021, after significant litigation, the magistrate entered an order

granting father’s motion (satisfaction of judgment order). In the

satisfaction of judgment order, the magistrate concluded that “there

are no outstanding child support arrearages”; entered a satisfaction

of judgment; and ordered mother to pay $15,000 of father’s attorney

fees under section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025. Mother petitioned for

review of this order (2021 petition for review), and father requested

that the district court award him an additional $3,500 in attorney

fees incurred in connection with the 2021 petition of review under

section 13-17-102.

1 ¶4 On March 17, 2022, the district court adopted the magistrate’s

satisfaction of judgment order. The court remanded the case to the

magistrate for a ruling on father’s attorney fees request. The

magistrate scheduled a hearing on attorney fees for November 23,

2022. (Meanwhile, mother appealed the district court’s adoption of

the magistrate’s satisfaction of judgment order, and a division of

this court affirmed. In Interest of A.M.E., (Colo. App. No. 22CA0728,

Mar. 9, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (A.M.E. I)).

¶5 On October 28, 2022, mother filed a motion to disqualify the

magistrate from presiding over all future proceedings in the case,

including the attorney fees hearing.

¶6 On November 23, 2022, the magistrate denied mother’s

motion to disqualify. We will refer to this order as the “November

23 order.” The attorney fees hearing proceeded as scheduled.

¶7 On November 30, 2022, the magistrate entered an order

finding that mother’s actions in filing the 2021 petition for review

lacked substantial justification. See § 13-17-102(4). The

magistrate awarded father $3,500 in attorney fees incurred in

connection with defending against the petition. We will refer to this

order as the “November 30 order.”

2 ¶8 Mother timely petitioned the district court for review of the

magistrate’s November 23 order. The district court adopted the

magistrate’s November 23 order on June 27, 2023.

¶9 Mother appealed the district court’s ruling. See In Interest of

A.M.E., (Colo. App. Nos. 23CA1375 & 23CA2187, Apr. 9, 2026) (not

published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (A.M.E. II). During that appeal,

a division of this court issued an order for the district court to settle

the record and determine whether mother had also timely filed a

petition for review of the magistrate’s November 30 order. The

district court concluded that she had, and it adopted the

magistrate’s November 30 order on April 9, 2025. Id., slip op. at

¶ 8. A.M.E. II resolved mother’s appeal of the district court orders

adopting the November 23 and November 30 orders.

B. March 26 and March 27 Orders

¶ 10 Before the A.M.E. II division issued its order to settle the

record, mother made several attempts to file or refile her petition for

review of the magistrate’s November 30 order. As relevant here,

mother refiled her petition for review on February 16, 2024. Father

filed a “Response and Motion to Strike,” asserting that the petition

was untimely (father’s motion to strike). He also requested, as a

3 sanction, that the court place mother under filing restrictions due

to the number of frivolous motions she had filed.

¶ 11 Mother then filed a “Motion to Strike [Father’s] Response and

Motion to Strike” (mother’s motion to strike). Father filed another

response to that motion, again requesting filing restrictions as a

sanction.

¶ 12 On March 26, 2024, the district court entered an order

striking mother’s petition for review (order to strike). The order to

strike states, “[The court] already issued a ruling regarding the

[November 30 order] on June 27, 2023. That order is the subject of

appeal in [A.M.E. II].” The order to strike also granted father’s

request for filing restrictions, although it didn’t contain any detail

about the contours of those restrictions.

¶ 13 On March 27, the court issued an order titled “Clarification of

Process for Filing Further Pleadings” (restriction order). The

restriction order says that (1) filing restrictions are necessary to

prevent the court, court staff, and father from the need to review

“irrelevant and frivolous pleadings”; (2) mother must file a motion

for permission to file with a copy of any proposed motion before she

can make any further filings; and (3) the proposed motion must be

4 supported by statute or case law, must be in compliance with the

Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, and must be “relevant to a

pending issue[] before the Court.”

¶ 14 Consistent with the court’s filing restrictions, mother

requested permission to file a reply in support of mother’s motion to

strike. On April 9, 2024, the district court issued an order rejecting

that filing (April 9 order).

¶ 15 Mother appeals the order to strike, the restriction order, and

the April 9 order. We dismiss mother’s appeal as moot in part and

affirm the orders.

II. Finality

¶ 16 We reject father’s contention that we lack jurisdiction over this

appeal because the orders mother appeals aren’t final. The orders

completely resolve (1) father’s motion to strike mother’s petition for

review of the November 30 order; (2) father’s request for filing

restrictions; (3) mother’s motion to strike father’s motion to strike;

and (4) mother’s request to file her reply. There is nothing further

for the court to do to completely resolve the parties’ rights with

respect to this proceeding. See In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d

291, 294 (Colo. App. 2005) (A final judgment is one that “ends the

5 proceeding in which it is entered and leaves nothing further to be

done regarding the rights of the parties.”). To the extent that any of

these orders weren’t final prior to the district court’s ruling on

mother’s petition for review of the November 30 order, that defect

has now been cured.

III. Rulings Regarding the November 30 Order and the Order to Strike

¶ 17 Mother contends that the district court erred by (1) concluding

that the district court’s June 27 order pertained to the magistrate’s

November 30 order and (2) striking mother’s petition for review.

This portion of mother’s appeal is moot.

¶ 18 “An appellate court will not render an opinion when the issues

presented have become moot because of subsequent events.” In re

Marriage of Tibbetts, 2018 COA 117, ¶ 7. “An issue is moot when a

judgment, if rendered, would have no practical legal effect on the

existing controversy.” In re Marriage of Dauwe, 148 P.3d 282, 284

(Colo. App. 2006). Both of mother’s contentions pertain to whether

the district court should address mother’s petition for review of the

magistrate’s November 30 order. Because the district court

ultimately accepted mother’s petition as timely filed and issued a

6 ruling on it, see A.M.E. II, slip op. at ¶ 8, our judgment would have

no effect. Therefore, we dismiss this portion of mother’s appeal.

IV. Denied Permission to File Reply

¶ 19 Next, mother contends that the district court erred by not

accepting her “reply” in support of her motion to strike. We discern

no reason for reversal.

¶ 20 As best we understand her briefing, mother contends that

(1) mother’s motion to strike was an independent motion for which

she was entitled to file a reply after father filed his response; (2) the

district court erred by characterizing her motion to strike as a reply

in support of her petition for review of the November 30 order; and

(3) the district court, therefore, should have permitted her to file a

reply in support of her motion to strike father’s motion to strike.

(To the extent mother’s motion to strike was an independent

motion, we construe the court’s order to strike, the restriction

order, and April 9 order as a denial of that motion.)

¶ 21 Mother doesn’t explain how the court’s failure to accept her

reply prejudiced her. Mother’s reply (1) asserted that father failed

to address one of mother’s arguments about a procedural defect in

father’s motion to strike and (2) reiterated that she timely filed her

7 petition for review of the November 30 order. The district court

considered and implicitly rejected mother’s argument about the

procedural defect when it granted father’s motion to strike. Mother

doesn’t articulate (and we can’t discern) how that outcome would

have changed based on her reply.1 Thus, even if we assume

(without deciding) that the district court erred by declining to accept

mother’s reply, any error is harmless. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The

appellate court may disregard any error . . . not affecting the

substantial rights of the parties.”); Curry v. Brewer, 2025 COA 28,

¶ 42 (“An error affects a substantial right of a party only if ‘it can be

said with fair assurance that it substantially influenced the

outcome of the case . . . .’” (citation omitted)).

V. Filing Restrictions

¶ 22 As best we can discern, mother next contends that the district

court erred by granting father’s request to place mother under filing

restrictions because (1) father’s motion was procedurally deficient,

1 To the extent mother asserts the court erred (and that she was

prejudiced) because it didn’t consider her additional arguments regarding the November 30 order, that issue is moot for the reasons set forth in Part III of this opinion.

8 and (2) father cited incorrect or insufficient law in support of his

request. We again discern no reason for reversal.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 23 We review a district court’s order restricting a litigant from

making pro se filings for an abuse of discretion. Carbajal v. Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A., 2020 COA 49, ¶ 41. A court abuses its discretion

when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair.

Id.

B. Analysis

¶ 24 Litigants generally enjoy an “undisputed right of access” to the

Colorado courts, but that right is not without limits. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs v. Winslow, 862 P.2d 921, 923 (Colo. 1993) (citation

omitted). A district court may enjoin a litigant from making pro se

filings when necessary to protect the court and opposing parties

from “the deleterious impact of repetitive, unfounded pro se

litigation.” Id. at 924 (citation omitted). A court is justified in

issuing filing restrictions when the litigant “hampers the efficient

administration of justice to an intolerable degree.” GHP Horwath,

P.C. v. Kazazian, 2024 CO 8, ¶ 66.

9 ¶ 25 The April 9 order clarifies that the filing restrictions are

necessary to protect the court and father from being required to

review and respond to pleadings that are “excessive,” “groundless,”

“frivolous,” and “irrelevant.” Mother’s arguments all center around

purported defects in father’s motion to strike. However, the court

could have entered the restriction order without any motion from

father. See Winslow, 862 P.2d at 923-24 (Courts have a “duty” to

protect themselves, citizens, and opposing parties against “the

hardships brought about by increased court costs, crowded

dockets, and the unreasonable delay and confusion that accompany

a disruption of proper judicial administration.” (citation omitted)).

And because mother’s opening brief doesn’t otherwise advance any

developed argument about why the district court abused its

discretion by entering the restriction order, we decline to further

address this issue.2

2 We also decline to consider any expanded contentions mother

makes in her reply brief. See In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.

10 VI. Requests for Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 26 Mother requests that this court award her attorney fees

“pursuant to C.A.R. 39.1 due to the misrepresentations and

vexatious actions of [father] and [his] counsel.” We broadly

construe mother’s request as one for appellate attorney fees under

section 13-17-102. Because we don’t conclude that father’s

arguments on appeal lack substantial justification, we deny

mother’s request.

¶ 27 Father also requests his appellate attorney fees under section

13-17-101, C.R.S. 2025, and C.A.R. 38(b), 39, and 39.1. He asserts

that mother’s appeal is frivolous and that he is suffering from

emotional distress.

¶ 28 A large portion of mother’s appellate issues pertained to the

filing of her petition for review of the November 30 order. Given the

district court’s eventual conclusion that mother had, in fact, timely

filed that motion, we decline to conclude that mother’s appeal is

frivolous. See In re Estate of Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 34 (An

award of appellate attorney fees under section 13-17-102 “is

appropriate only in clear and unequivocal cases where no rational

argument is presented.”).

11 ¶ 29 Father requested — and is entitled to — his appellate costs.

C.A.R. 39(a)(2) (“[I]f a judgment is affirmed, costs are taxed against

the appellant.”). Because the trial court is better suited to

undertake the factfinding necessary to determine the amount of

appellate costs, we exercise our discretion to remand to the trial

court to determine and award father his costs incurred on appeal.

See Bertoia v. Galaxy Mgmt. Co., 2025 COA 55, ¶ 95.

VII. Disposition

¶ 30 Mother’s appeal of the order to strike — insofar as it

concluded that the court had already ruled on the November 30

order and struck mother’s petition to review — is dismissed as

moot. The remainder of the order to strike, the restriction order,

and the April 9 order are affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.