In Her Capacity as Co-Personal Representative of the Estate of Philip Louis Cloud v. Cloud

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 16, 2026
• Docket: 23-3107
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 16 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RUTH ANN MUNGER, Individually, and No. 23-3107 in her Capacity as Co-Personal D.C. No. Representative of the Estate of Philip Louis 3:22-cv-00263-HZ Cloud,

Plaintiff-ctr-claim-defendant - MEMORANDUM* Appellee,

v.

TRACY LAMPRON CLOUD,

Defendant-ctr-claimant - Appellant,

INTEL CORPORATION, a Delaware Corporation, as Plan Administrator of the Intel Retirement Contribution Plan, Intel 401(K) Savings Plan; Intel Minimum Pension Plan, Intel Retiree Medical Plan, and Sheltered Employee Retirement Medical Account;; INTEL RETIREMENT PLANS ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE; INTEL BENEFITS ADMINISTRATIVE COMMITTEE,

Defendants - third-party- defendants - Appellees

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. PEGASUS FIDUCIARY SERVICE, LLC, in its capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Philip Louis Cloud, MARK IAN CLOUD, DAWN WILFONG ROBINSON, CASSANDRA MARIE WILFONG,

Real-parties-in-interest.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Marco A. Hernandez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 29, 2026**

Before: LEE, SANCHEZ, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Defendant-Appellant Tracy Lampron Cloud was convicted for the second-

degree murder of Philip Louis Cloud in Oregon state court. During the pendency

of this appeal, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed Ms. Cloud’s conviction and

Ms. Cloud’s petition to the Oregon Supreme Court was denied. A final judgment

on Ms. Cloud’s criminal conviction issued on December 18, 2025.

Plaintiff-Appellee Ruth Munger is the representative of Mr. Cloud’s estate

who sought and received relief from the district court on summary judgment that

Ms. Cloud is not entitled to Mr. Cloud’s Employee Retirement Income Security

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

2 23-3107 Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., benefits because she is his

slayer. Ms. Cloud appeals this determination.

1. “We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.”

Spirit of Aloha Temple v. County of Maui, 49 F.4th 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2022).

“Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-movant, there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. The applicability of

collateral estoppel is reviewed de novo, and a district court’s decision giving

preclusive effect is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 1193. We can “affirm

on any ground supported by the record.” Johnson v. Barr, 79 F.4th 996, 1003 (9th

Cir. 2023).

2. We need not resolve whether Oregon or California law applies, or

whether their state slayer statutes are preempted by ERISA, because there is no

triable factual dispute that Ms. Cloud is Mr. Cloud’s slayer and is therefore not

entitled to his ERISA benefits. Under both California and Oregon law, a person’s

killer is not entitled to benefit from the decedent’s pension, see Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 112.515; Cal. Prob. Code. § 252, and a final judgment of conviction for a

felonious and intentional killing is conclusive as to whether an individual is a

slayer, see Or. Rev. Stat. § 112.555(1); Cal. Prob. Code. § 254(a). Ms. Cloud has

exhausted her appeals, and her conviction for the second-degree murder of Mr.

3 23-3107 Cloud is now final. Accordingly, Ms. Cloud is not entitled to Mr. Cloud’s ERISA

benefits per California or Oregon law.

Even if the state slayer statutes were preempted, federal common law refuses

to allow a person to benefit financially from a murder she has committed. See Mut.

Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, 600 (1886). Accordingly, Ms.

Cloud’s criminal conviction for the murder of Mr. Cloud conclusively establishes

that she is not entitled to Mr. Cloud’s ERISA benefits under federal law.

3. The district court did not err in estopping Ms. Cloud from relitigating

whether she murdered Mr. Cloud. “Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1738, the preclusive effect of a state court judgment . . . is determined by the

preclusion law of the state in which the judgment was issued.” In re Harmon, 250

F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein,

516 U.S. 367, 374 (1996). We use several criteria to analyze the application of

issue preclusion. See Ayers v. City of Richmond, 895 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir.

1990); see also Nelson v. Emerald People’s Util. Dist., 862 P.2d 1293, 1296–97

(Or. 1993) (substantially the same). In this case, all criteria are met because Ms.

Cloud was convicted for the intentional murder of Mr. Cloud which is a serious

offense, and her guilt was established in the criminal case where she had a full and

fair opportunity to litigate.

4 23-3107 4. Whether Plaintiff-Appellees violated Ms. Cloud’s Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights was not pleaded or adjudicated in the district court and

therefore is not properly before us on appeal. Cf. G & G Prods. LLC v. Rusic, 902

F.3d 940, 950 (9th Cir. 2018).

5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Cloud’s

request to appoint counsel because Ms. Cloud failed to make the requisite showing

of exceptional circumstances. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331

(9th Cir. 1986).

6. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Cloud leave

to amend to assert a counterclaim based on a rescinded state settlement agreement.

See California ex rel. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Neville Chem. Co.,

358 F.3d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 2004). The proposed claim was both futile and unduly

delayed.

AFFIRMED.

5 23-3107