Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp

977 F. Supp. 335, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18430, 1996 WL 911212
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedDecember 9, 1996
DocketCivil Action No. 70-3054
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 977 F. Supp. 335 (Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 977 F. Supp. 335, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18430, 1996 WL 911212 (E.D. Pa. 1996).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

DuBOIS, District Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

Between 1970 and 1971 four related cases challenging the constitutionality of conditions and policies at a number of Pennsylvania State Correctional Institutions were filed in this Court. On May 22, 1978, after those [336]*336suits were consolidated and a plaintiff class certified, then — Chief Judge Joseph S. Lord, III approved a Consent Decree settling the majority of issues raised. Judge, Lord addressed the remaining issues in subsequent Opinions.

A motion for the issuance of an order to show cause and for contempt judgment was filed by plaintiffs in 1980. On December 30, 1980, with the assistance of United States Magistrate Judge William F. Hall, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the outstanding allegations of contempt. With the further assistance of Magistrate Judge Hall, the 1980 Stipulation was amended by an agreement of the parties, approved by Judge Lord on May 11, 1983. Since Í983 a number of motions alleging violations of the Consent Decree have been filed with and, adjudicated by, this Court.

There are a number of motions presently pending before this Court,1 each raising one or more of the following four procedural issues:

1) the scope of the plaintiff class;

2) whether individual violations of the Consent Decree may be remedied by the Court;

3) whether pro se submissions may be considered by the Court; and

4) whether inmates must exhaust their available administrative remedies before petitioning this Court for relief.

These issues are the subject of this Memorandum. Applying the conclusions set forth in this Memorandum, the Court will rule on each pending motion by separate Order.

II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF CONSENT DECREES

In 1971, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 91 S.Ct. 1752, 29 L.Ed.2d 256 (1971). Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall set forth the basic framework for the interpretation of consent decrees. He wrote:

Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced agreement on their precise terms. The .parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in the case____ Naturally, the agreement reached normally embodies a compromise.... Thus the decree itself cannot be - said to have a purpose; rather the parties have purposes, generally opposed to each other, and the resultant decree embodies as much of those opposing purposes as the respective parties have the bargaining power and skill to achieve. For these reasons, the scope of a consent decree must bé discerned within its four corners, and not by reference to what might satisfy the purposes of one of the parties to it. Id. at 681-82, 91 S.Ct. at 1757 (footnote omitted).

The Third Circuit has summarized the basic principles of Armour in the following manner: “Although consent decrees are judi[337]*337cial acts, they have many of the attributes of contracts voluntarily undertaken, and are construed according to traditional precepts of contract construction.” Fox v. United States Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, et al., 680 F.2d 315, 319 (3rd Cir.1982) (citations omitted). In interpreting the Imprisoned Citizens Union Consent Decree this Court has always followed the dictates of Armour and will continue to do so. See Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, CA No. 70-354, slip op. at 5, 6, 12, 29 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 25, 1987).

III. JURISDICTION

In 1988 Judge Lord noted that “[u]nder the terms of the Consent Decree, I have retained jurisdiction over it and proceedings have continued.” Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 1988 WL 59270 (E.D.Pa. June 8, 1988). Under § XXVII of the Consent Decree this Court continues to retain jurisdiction over both this lawsuit and the Consent Decree., Consent Decree, at 17 (“[T]he Court retains jurisdiction of this action. ...”).

Furthermore, § XIX of the Consent Decree- preserves plaintiffs’ right to bring certain types of complaints before this Court. In reference to defendants’ right to alter administrative remedies, §' XIX states that “plaintiffs reserve their right to contest in this Court any such amendment, suspension, alteration or modification of the provisions of this Consent Decree.” Consent Decree, at 14. Continuing, that section provides that “[pjlaintiffs also reserve the right to contest in this Court, at any time, by any appropriate legal proceeding, any institution or system wide pattern of failure or refusal by defendants or their agents or employees to follow the provisions of this Consent Decree.”. Id. at 15.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. The Scope of the Plaintiff Class

A number of the pending motions have been filed by inmates confined at state correctional institutions which defendants argue are not covered by the Consent Decree. Defendants assert that only inmates in the institutions included in the plaintiff class — which defendants assert includes only State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) — Graterford, SCI-Dallas, SCI-Huntingdon, SCI-Muncy, SCIRockview and SCI-Pittsburgh — have any rights under the Consent Decree. The inmates confined in’ other' state correctional' institutions argue that the coverage of the Consent Decree was expanded when the Decree was modified in 1983. The SCI-Camp Hill inmates also argue that the language of § V of the Consent Decree includes inmates at institutions other than the six named in the class certification Order.

Judge Lord’s October 20,1972 Order certifying the plaintiff class clearly limits membership in the class to those inmates confined at SCI-Graterford, SCI-Dallas, SCI-Huntingdon, SCI-Muncy, SCI-Rockview and SCI-Pittsburgh. That Order reads, in its entirety, as follows:

AND NOW, to wit, this 20th day of October, 1972, it is hereby ordered that Plaintiffs’ Motion that the instant suit be maintained as a Class Action on behalf of themselves and all other persons who are now or will be incarcerated in the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institutions at Graterford, Dallas, Huntingdon, Muncy, Rockview and Pittsburgh is hereby granted.

The Court concludes that § V of the Consent Decree does not expand the plaintiff class as argued by the inmates at SCI-Camp Hill. That provision, entitled “Compliance With Administrative Directives,” reads as follows:

Defendants shall comply with the regulations of the Bureau of Correction (hereinafter the “Administrative Directives”) and the amendments and additions thereto.
Defendants shall expend their best efforts to assure compliance with this Consent Decree and with the Administrative Directives and the amendments and additions thereto by all institutional staff members, and all other persons subject to defendants’ jurisdiction.

Section V does nothing more than require defendants to comply with the Consent Decree and the regulations of the [338]*338Bureau of Correction.2

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977 F. Supp. 335, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18430, 1996 WL 911212, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/imprisoned-citizens-union-v-shapp-paed-1996.