REVISED United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 96-20963.
IMPERIAL PREMIUM FINANCE, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
John KHOURY, et al., Defendants,
John Khoury and Southern Assurance Inc., Defendants-Appellants.
Dec. 1, 1997.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before DeMOSS and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and LEE, District Judge.*
LEE, District Judge.
Plaintiff Imperial Premium Finance, Inc. filed this suit
against appellants Southern Assurance, Inc. (SAI) and its
president, John Khoury, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of
warranty and fraud in connection with a premium finance transaction
arranged by SAI and Khoury on behalf of SAI's client, Monterrey,
Ltd., a Nigerian company in the business of providing offshore oil rig support for certain American oil companies. Imperial alleged
that Khoury and SAI, through Khoury and others, misrepresented the
identity of Monterrey's insurers, the amounts of the premiums and
the cancellation terms of the policies that were to be purchased
with the funds advanced by Imperial pursuant to the finance
* District Judge of the Southern District of Mississippi, sitting by designation.
1 agreement, which constituted fraud and breach of certain
agent/broker warranties contained in the agreement. Following
trial, the jury returned a verdict against both SAI and Khoury for
fraud, awarding actual damages in the amount of $314,000 and
$490,000 in punitive damages against each defendant. The jury also
found against both SAI and Khoury on the breach of warranty claim,
inexplicably assessing damages on that claim in the sum of $44,000.
Imperial waived entry of judgment on the breach of warranty
verdict, choosing instead to secure judgment against defendants
only on the fraud claim.1 The district court entered judgment on
the fraud verdict and denied defendants' motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.
On appeal, defendants advance several grounds which they
contend warrant reversal of the jury's verdict. Having considered
defendants' arguments, we conclude that we must reverse and remand
the case for a new trial.
Background
For several years preceding the transaction at issue, SAI, an
independent insurance agency, had used Imperial for premium
financing for its clients. For the policy year 1992-93, SAI had
procured for Monterrey a hull policy and protection and indemnity
(P & I) coverage from "Lloyds and ILU [Institute of London
Underwriters] Companies" for a combined annual premium of nearly $2
1 Neither plaintiff, defendants nor the district court were able to account for how the jury could have found damages of $44,000 on the breach of warranty claim when the parties agreed that the amount of compensatory damages at issue was $314,000.
2 million, of which approximately $1.5 million was financed by
Imperial. When the time came for Monterrey to renew its policies
or obtain other coverage, SAI again sought premium financing from
Imperial on Monterrey's behalf. The record reflects that there was
some question initially as to whether the "London market" would be
able to provide the necessary coverages as it had for the prior
policy year, and Imperial was thus advised by SAI that there would
be "new players." Ultimately, however, SAI informed Imperial that
the securities, or insurers, would be the same as in the previous
year, and a premium finance agreement was prepared by SAI which,
like the premium finance agreement of the preceding year,
identified Monterrey's insurers as "Lloyds and ILU Companies." The
agreement further recited January 31, 1993 as the effective date of
coverage and reflected a combined annual premium of $2,763,000 for
the two policies. Imperial financed nearly $2.2 million of that
amount pursuant to the premium finance agreement which included not
only the signature of Donald Koehl, Monterrey's president, but also
reflected Khoury's signature under a paragraph entitled
"Agent/Broker Warranty" which recited, in pertinent part, as
follows:
By submitting this agreement to Imperial [Plaintiff], the undersigned warrants and agrees: 1) That Borrower's signature is genuine, ... [that] Borrower has authorized this transaction in the manner required by applicable state law ... and agrees to the assignment of the security interest as set forth herein; 2) that Borrower has received a copy of this Agreement; 3) that the policies are in full force and effect and the information in the Schedule of Policies [appearing immediately above the warranties] and the premium is correct, that none of the policies listed is non-cancellable or written for a term of less than one year, ... 5) that all unearned premiums, dividends and unearned commissions will be paid to
3 Imperial, and that any lien on any unearned premium is subordinated to Imperial's lien or security interest therein; 6) that the policy(ies) can be cancelled on 10 days' notice.
After making a number of the monthly payments required by the
agreement, Monterrey defaulted. When Imperial attempted to cancel
the policies and recover the unearned premiums under the policies,
which stood as collateral for Imperial's loan, Imperial learned
that Monterrey's hull coverage had not been obtained from "Lloyds
and ILU Companies," as represented in the premium finance
agreement, but had instead been purchased for the same premium from
North American Casualty Company, S.A., a Costa Rican insurer, and
it discovered that while the P & I coverage was placed through the
London market, the premium for that coverage was $102,000,
substantially less than the $238,000 premium set forth in the
premium finance agreement. Due to minimum unearned premium
retention provisions in the policies, the amount of unearned
premiums which Imperial was able to collect toward satisfaction of
Monterrey's remaining indebtedness was not sufficient and a
deficiency balance of approximately $314,000 remained.
Accordingly, Imperial filed this suit against Monterrey and Koehl
for their default.2 Imperial also sued SAI and Khoury alleging
breaches of the Agent/Broker Warranty and fraud arguing that
because these defendants misrepresented the insurers and the terms
of the policies for which premium financing was sought, plaintiff
sustained damage when, upon Monterrey's default, it was unable to
2 Imperial secured a default judgment against Monterrey and Koehl prior to the trial of its claims against SAI and Khoury.
4 collect on what it understood was its collateral because the
policies which were actually issued, as contrasted with those that
had been represented by defendants, did not have satisfactory
cancellation terms for plaintiff's protection.
Validity of the Premium Finance Agreement
As one basis for reversal of the jury's verdict, defendants
contend that since the Imperial premium finance agreement form had
not received approval of the Texas Board of Insurance as of the
time of the parties' transaction in accordance with TEX.INS.CODE ANN.
art. 24.11(a) ("A premium finance agreement shall be in writing on
a form approved by the board"), the agreement was void. Defendants
then reason that since the agreement was void, it could not have
been validly asserted by plaintiff as the basis for any of its
causes of action against defendants and that consequently, the jury
verdict must be set aside.3 The district court rejected
defendants' argument, concluding by reference to McLaren v.
Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co., 767 F.Supp. 1364 (N.D.Tex.1991),
aff'd, 968 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 915, 112
3 The particular premium finance agreement form used in the January 1993 Imperial/Monterrey transaction was first submitted to the Board for approval in May 1993. For more than a year, no action was taken by the Board on the form, and in June 1994, Imperial submitted a revised form to the Board for approval. At that time, the Board advised Imperial there was a problem on both forms relating to the statutory requirement that the forms contain "the amount or method of computing the amount of any default or delinquency charge that is payable in the event of late payment." art. 24.11(d)(3). Imperial submitted a revised form which corrected the problem identified by the Board and that form was approved by the Board in August 1994. The form submitted by Imperial in May 1993—the form involved in the transaction at issue in this case—was never approved or disapproved by the Board.
5 S.Ct. 1269, 122 L.Ed.2d 665 (1993), and Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 442 S.W.2d 888, 893
(Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [1st Dist.1969], writ ref'd, n.r.e.), that
the finance agreement executed by the parties was not illegal or
void due to Imperial's failure to secure prior Board approval of
its form. The courts in both of the cited cases, considering
article 5.06 of the Insurance Code which permits insurers to use
only policy forms approved in writing by the Board, held that the
insureds could not use the fact of the Board's non-approval of the
insurers' policy forms to prevent the insurers from enforcing
exclusions in their policies, reasoning that the insureds could not
insist on their right to coverage while at the same time denying
the insurers' right to enforcement of exclusions from coverage.
Rather, "when an insured seeks to enforce a policy, ... the insured
cannot select the good and discard the bad. Instead, he must take
or leave the policy in its entirety." McLaren, 767 F.Supp. at
1376. See also Hertz Corp. v. Pap, 923 F.Supp. 914, 922
(N.D.Tex.1995), aff'd, 98 F.3d 1339 (5th Cir.1996) ("The insured
cannot choose to void only that language in the policy which does
not favor her and retain the remainder of the policy, including the
payment provisions."); cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v.
Daddy$ Money, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex.App.—Dallas, 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (where insurer had secured approval of policy
form but had not obtained Board approval of conflicting
endorsement, in violation of Article 3.42 of Insurance Code,
insurer could not enforce endorsement against insured so as to
6 restrict insured's coverage).
Though our rationale may be somewhat different, we are
convinced, as was the district court, that the premium finance
agreement is not void. Nothing in the language of article 24.11 or
any other provision of the Texas Insurance Code suggests that the
legislature intended that an agreement executed in violation of the
statute be declared void. In fact, indications are to the
contrary. No penalty provision is included within the terms of
article 24.11, but article 24.08 makes any violation of Chapter 24
an "offense" which is a Class B misdemeanor, and article 24.05
specifically authorizes the Board to revoke or suspend a premium
finance company's license if, after notice and hearing, the Board
finds "that the licensee has violated this chapter," which, of
course, includes article 24.11. Thus, a penalty for the violation
is already prescribed by statute. See Chicago Bridge, 442 S.W.2d
at 894 (fact that Act prescribed penalty for violation—revocation
of insurer's permit—indicated legislative intention that policy not
be declared void).
Furthermore, the legislature explicitly declined to invalidate
premium finance agreements for more serious violations than the
mere failure to obtain Board approval. More to the point, article
24.08(b) states:
A premium finance company's taking or receiving from or charging an insured a greater charge than authorized by this chapter does not invalidate the premium finance agreement or the principal balance payable under the agreement but may be adjudged a forfeiture of all charges that the premium finance agreement carries with it or that have been agreed to be paid on the agreement.
7 In our opinion, this provision reflects a clear intent that the
insured/borrower not be permitted to avoid its obligation under a
premium finance agreement to repay the principal loan amount,
though it may be relieved of what would otherwise have been its
contractual obligation to pay additional charges where those
charges are imposed in violation of the provisions of Chapter 24.
This is consistent with the manifest purpose of Chapter 24, and
article 24.11, in particular, which is protection of the
insured/borrower under these types of agreements. Indeed, the
concern to which article 24.11 is directed is evident from the
language of the statute: full and complete disclosure to the
insured of all terms of the loan, including all applicable charges
and required payments. Where there is a failure of the complete
disclosure contemplated by the statute, then the proper response
might well be to invalidate those terms and conditions not
disclosed, but not avoidance of the agreement in toto.4
Moreover, while we do not suggest that defendants lack
standing to assert a challenge to the validity of this agreement,5
the facts that these defendants are not insureds, for whose
protection the statute was drafted, and that the warranties which
4 Of course, had the form involved been disapproved by the Board rather than simply not affirmatively approved by the Board, the court's analysis would no doubt be different. But that is not the situation which we confront or the issue we address. 5 Imperial argued to the court below that SAI and Khoury, not being insureds/borrowers under the premium finance agreement, lacked standing to challenge the validity of the premium finance agreement. The district court concluded that these defendants' interest in the agreement was sufficient to confer standing, and we do not disagree.
8 they are charged with having breached are not among the matters
which article 24.11 mandates be included in premium finance
agreements, tend to further persuade the court that defendants'
argument in the case sub judice ought to be rejected.6 Since the
court concludes that the agreement is not void, the court finds no
merit to defendants' contention that the lower court erred in
excluding evidence that the form had not been approved by the
Board. The trial court correctly concluded that defendants'
evidence regarding the failure of approval was irrelevant and
inadmissible.
The Fraud Verdict
Defendants' primary argument on appeal is that the jury's
verdict for fraud cannot stand in view of the principle espoused by
the Texas Supreme Court in Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex.1991), that while the acts of a
party may simultaneously breach duties in tort and contract,
"[w]hen the only loss or damage is to the subject matter of the
contract," the plaintiff's claim "ordinarily sounds only in
contract." The court must reject defendants' argument, however,
given the Texas Supreme Court's recent clarification in Formosa
Plastics Corp. v. Presidio Engineers, 40 Tex.Sup.Ct.J. 877, 1997 WL
378129 (Tex. July 9, 1997), that DeLanney does not apply to
6 Indeed, Imperial makes a plausible argument that since article 24.11 does not include agent/broker warranties among the matters which must be included in premium finance agreements, then the Agent/Broker Warranty contained in its premium finance agreement is severable from the remainder of the agreement and enforceable in spite of any defect in the terms of the premium finance agreement.
9 preclude tort damages in fraud cases.7
Defendants submit, alternatively, that even if plaintiff's
fraud claim is not objectionable on DeLanney grounds, it still must
be reversed inasmuch as it is legally and factually insufficient.
More to the point, defendants object that the district court erred
in failing to specifically instruct the jury that defendants could
be found liable for fraud only if their challenged representations
were false "when made." And, seeking relief from the district
court's denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law,
they argue that there was not sufficient evidence from which the
jury could have found that their representations were false when
made.
Contrary to defendants' urging, the record discloses ample
evidence from which the jury could have inferred that Khoury and
SAI knew prior to preparing and presenting the premium finance
agreement to Imperial that the insurance carriers, policies and
terms reflected therein were not the carriers, policies and terms
which they, in fact, intended to secure for Monterrey. And if the
jury so found, the jury likewise had before it sufficient evidence
from which it could also have inferred that defendants' purpose in
misrepresenting these matters was to induce Imperial to loan monies
7 In so ruling, the Texas court explicitly disapproved a number of state appellate court decisions which held that tort damages were not recoverable for a fraudulent inducement claim in the absence of an injury distinct from any permissible contractual damages. Formosa Plastics, 1997 WL 378129, at *7. The court thus implicitly rejected this court's conclusion in Heller Financial, Inc. v. Grammco Computer Sales, Inc., 71 F.3d 518 (5th Cir.1996), and Fielder v. King, 103 F.3d 17, 20 (5th Cir.1997), which adopted the view of those disapproved state court decisions.
10 which it would not have loaned had it been apprised of the
defendants' true intentions. Thus, there is evidence in the record
which would support a verdict for fraud on the basis that Khoury
and SAI made representations which were false "when made" with the
intent that Imperial loan money to their client in reliance on
those representations.8
However, in addition to its argument at trial that Khoury
and/or SAI knew when the premium finance agreement was signed that
the matters reflected therein relating to Monterrey's insurance
coverage were false, plaintiff also suggested at trial that even if
the jury were to find that Khoury and/or SAI correctly represented
these matters in the premium finance agreement, the jury might
nevertheless find SAI and/or Khoury liable for fraud if it
determined that subsequent to their representations to Imperial but
prior to Imperial's disbursement of funds to Monterrey, SAI and/or
Khoury effected a change in Monterrey's insurance which they failed
to disclose to Imperial. In our opinion, this theory of fraud
liability is legally inadequate.
Under Texas law, in the absence of a duty to disclose, mere
silence does not amount to fraud or misrepresentation; and a duty
to disclose arises only where a fiduciary or confidential
8 The only specific evidence to which defendants have pointed as having belied plaintiff's allegations of misrepresentation and breach of warranty (other than Khoury's denials of wrongdoing) is documentation which reflects that in December 1992, a month before the premium finance agreement was signed, plaintiff was apprised that there might be a "new player." However, when, a month later, defendants specifically represented that the players were the same as those of the previous policy year, plaintiff reasonably could have assumed that there were no new players.
11 relationship exists. Bay Colony, Ltd. v. Trendmaker, Inc., 121
F.3d 998, 1004 (5th Cir.1997) (quoting Southwest E & T Suppliers,
Inc. v. American Enka Corp., 463 F.2d 1165, 1166 (5th Cir.1972)
("Texas law is clear that if there is no confidential or fiduciary
relation between the parties [creating a duty to disclose], mere
silence does not amount to fraud or misrepresentation."). Imperial
acknowledges this principle, but pointing out that it adduced
evidence at trial of its fiduciary relationship with Khoury and
SAI, submits that defendants' "duties"—referring presumably to
their alleged duties of disclosure—"arose from a special business
relationship of reposed trust and confidence which was breached."
In Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar International
Transportation Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, (Tex.1992), the court
explained that "while the existence of a confidential relationship
is ordinarily a question of fact, when the issue is one of no
evidence, it becomes a question of law." In this case, the jury
was never called upon to consider whether such a relationship
existed and consequently never found, implicitly or explicitly,
that a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed between
Imperial and SAI and/or Khoury.9 Neither was the jury apprised
that the existence of a fiduciary relationship stood as a
prerequisite to a verdict for fraud premised on a failure by SAI
and/or Khoury, following execution of the premium finance
9 A review of the record discloses no basis for the statement in Imperial's brief that "[i]n the case before the Court, the evidence amply supports the jury's finding that Plaintiff Imperial and Defendants SAI/Khoury had a special relationship."
12 agreement, to inform Imperial of the changes in carriers and
coverage. Thus, even had the evidence tended to show a fiduciary
or confidential relationship between the parties, the absence of a
jury instruction on or jury finding of a fiduciary relationship
would undermine any fraud verdict for plaintiff premised on such a
duty. It is manifest, though, that there was no evidence from
which the jury could have found such a duty had it confronted the
issue, and therefore, as a matter of law, a jury verdict for fraud
potentially based on such a duty cannot stand.
Recently, in ARA Automotive Group v. Central Garage, Inc., 124
F.3d 720 (5th Cir.1997), after surveying pertinent Texas authority
on the subject of fiduciary and confidential relationships, a panel
of this court reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff on its
claim for breach of fiduciary duty upon concluding that the
plaintiff's evidence was not sufficient to establish a fiduciary or
confidential relationship. This was the court's conclusion,
despite extensive evidence of a "long history of "oral and written
agreements, joint undertakings, shared confidences and cooperative
ventures'," marked by "cooperation and friendship." Id. at 724,
726. The court noted that in Texas, certain formal fiduciary
relationships, such as principal/agent, attorney/client,
partnership and trustee-cestui que trust, give rise to fiduciary
duties as a matter of law. Id. at 723 (citing Crim Truck, 823
S.W.2d at 593-94). Other "informal relationships," termed
"confidential relationships," may also give rise to a fiduciary
duty "where one person trusts in and relies upon another, whether
13 the relation is a moral, social, domestic or merely personal one."
Crim Truck, 823 S.W.2d at 594 (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 150
Tex. 39, 237 S.W.2d 256, 261 (1951)). But as the court made clear
in Crim Truck, particularly in the business arena, trust and
reliance alone are not sufficient ingredients for the relationship,
for "[t]he fact that one businessman trusts another, and relies
upon his promise to perform a contract, does not rise to a
confidential relationship." Id. at 594. "Neither is the fact that
the relationship has been a cordial one, of long duration, evidence
of a confidential relationship." Id. at 595. Rather, a
confidential relationship exists only where "one party is in fact
accustomed to being guided by the judgment or advice of the other,
or is justified in placing confidence in the belief that such party
will act in its interest." Thames v. Johnson, 614 S.W.2d 612, 614
(Tex.Civ.App.—Texarkana 1981, no writ).
We recognize, as did the ARA panel, that under Texas law, "
"a fiduciary duty will not be lightly created' since "it imposes
extraordinary duties' and requires the fiduciary to "put the
interests of the beneficiary ahead of its own if the need arises.'
" ARA, at 723 (quoting Floors Unlimited, Inc. v. Fieldcrest
Cannon, Inc., 55 F.3d 181, 188 (5th Cir.1995)). And as was further
noted in ARA, since the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Crim
Truck, "few Texas cases have found fiduciary relationships outside
of legal relationships that carry fiduciary duties as a matter of
law." Id. at 726, and none had found such a relationship in "a
transactional setting involving experienced managers," id.
14 This case now before the court obviously does not involve any
of the formal relationships that automatically give rise to
fiduciary duties, and therefore, Imperial could only have
established a duty of disclosure which might support its claim of
fraud by adducing sufficient proof of an informal, confidential
relationship with SAI and/or Khoury. The only proof presented by
Imperial toward that end was limited testimony that Imperial had a
business relationship with SAI, and with Khoury, spanning a several
year period, and that Imperial had given SAI, through Khoury, draft
authority up to a certain amount. The fact that it extended them
this authority, according to Imperial, clearly establishes the
trust which it accorded SAI and Khoury. These facts are plainly
insufficient to establish a fiduciary or confidential relationship
between these parties for they would not have warranted Imperial's
expecting that SAI and/or Khoury would put Imperial's interests
ahead of their own. At best, Imperial established that it reposed
a degree of trust—and not unlimited trust—in defendants' judgment
and integrity. We would reiterate, though, "[t]he fact that one
businessman trusts another ... does not rise to a confidential
relationship." Crim Truck, 823 S.W.2d at 594.
For the reason that there was no fiduciary relationship
between the parties, it follows that there could have been no
legally sufficient basis for a fraud verdict premised on SAI's
and/or Khoury's post-representation nondisclosure of the change in
insurance carriers and coverages. Because the court submitted to
the jury a single fraud interrogatory which did not differentiate
15 between the theories of fraud liability posited by plaintiffs, it
is impossible for us to now determine whether or not the jury's
verdict is legally sustainable. This court has said that "[w]hen
a district court submits two or more alternative grounds for
recovery to the jury on a single interrogatory and the plaintiff
prevails, we ordinarily order a new trial if one of the grounds for
recovery is "legally inadequate,' " Reeves v. AcroMed Corp., 44
F.3d 300, 302 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1104, 115 S.Ct.
2251, 132 L.Ed.2d 258 (1995) (citing Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co.,
952 F.2d 119, 126 (5th Cir.1992)), for in such a case, "the
reviewing court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict
on a sound or unsound theory," id. (quoting Pan Eastern Exploration
v. Hufo Oils, 855 F.2d 1106, 1123 (5th Cir.1988)).
In most cases, "[w]here two [or more] claims have been submitted to the jury ... in a single interrogatory, a new trial may be required if one of the claims was submitted erroneously," unless we are " "reasonably certain that the jury was not significantly influenced by issues erroneously submitted to it.' " Braun v. Flynt, 731 F.2d 1205, 1206 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 883, 105 S.Ct. 252, 83 L.Ed.2d 189 (1984) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Berkley & Co., 620 F.2d 1247, 1258 n. 8 (8th Cir.1980)). Thus, if we find that the defendants were entitled to a directed verdict on any one of the ... theories of liability, we must remand the case for a new trial unless we are "reasonably certain" that the jury's verdict was not based upon the erroneously-submitted theory or theories.
Woods v. Sammisa Co., Ltd., 873 F.2d 842, 849-50 (5th Cir.1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1050, 110 S.Ct. 853, 107 L.Ed.2d 847 (1990).
Because we cannot be "reasonably certain" that the jury's
verdict in this case was based on a sustainable theory of fraud,
rather than on a legally invalid and hence erroneously submitted
theory, we must reverse the verdict and remand the case for a new
16 trial on the plaintiff's charge that defendants SAI and/or Khoury
made representations to Imperial which were false "when made." We
would be compelled to do this even were we of the view that the
jury's verdict on the breach of warranty claim was proper and could
be upheld, since the jury, in addition to its verdict for
compensatory damages, also awarded punitive damages which, under
Texas law, are available for fraud but not for breach of contract.
See Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.1986).
But plaintiff's claim for breach of warranty suffers a shortcoming
similar to that identified with respect to its cause of action for
fraud.
Breach of Warranty
As with its fraud claim, Imperial urged at trial that SAI
and/or Khoury knew at the time the Agent/Broker Warranty was
executed that the identity of the insurers, the terms of the
policies obtained or to be obtained and the amount of premium for
those policies which were set forth in the finance agreement were
not correct. However, the jury was also permitted to find for
Imperial on this claim even if it concluded that the matters
warranted by Khoury and/or SAI were correct when the warranty was
signed if the jury were to find that Khoury and/or SAI knew, prior
to Imperial's disbursement of the loan funds, that Monterrey
planned to purchase alternate coverage. In support of their
contention that this latter theory could constitute a valid basis
for imposing liability, Imperial reasons that because the finance
agreement executed by the parties specifically requires Imperial's
17 written consent to changes in the agreement, then the agreement
necessarily mandates that Imperial be notified of any changes in
coverage.10 And while it concedes that Monterrey was not precluded
by the agreement or otherwise from changing its insurance coverage,
it maintains that in the event of any change in coverage, it was
entitled to notice, and that therefore, even assuming that the
policy information contained in the premium finance agreement was
correct when the warranty was signed, the failure of SAI and/or
Khoury to notify it of Monterrey's change of insurers, coverage and
premium amounts constituted a breach of the contract. Defendants
are correct, however, in their contention that any contractual duty
to notify Imperial of post-execution changes in coverage was
Monterrey's, not Khoury's or SAI's, and any breach of that duty by
Monterrey could not provide the basis of a verdict against SAI or
Khoury for breach of the Agency/Broker Warranty.
Personal Liability of Khoury
Khoury argues that there is no factual basis upon which he
could be held personally liable to Imperial on any theory of
recovery. In support of his position, he asserts that there was no
evidence that he spoke directly with anyone at Imperial concerning
Monterrey's insurance coverage or the premium finance agreement and
that instead, all communications between Imperial and SAI were with
SAI employee Sarah Estep. In response to this contention, Imperial
10 The agreement states in relevant part:
ENTIRE DOCUMENT AND GOVERNING LAW. This document is the entire agreement between Imperial and Borrower and can only be changed by a writing signed by both parties.
18 points to evidence which was presented at trial to demonstrate
Khoury's intimate involvement in the transaction at issue from
which, in our opinion, the jury could reasonably have inferred that
at the time he signed the Agent/Broker Warranty, Khoury knew that
the information included in the agreement was false, or that he
made the warranty regarding Monterey's insurance coverage
recklessly without any knowledge of the truth.
Khoury insists further, though, that he did not sign the
warranty in his personal capacity but rather did so solely in a
representative capacity as an agent for his disclosed principal,
SAI, as evidenced by the fact that SAI, and not Khoury, was
identified as the "Agent" in the upper left-hand corner of the
document.11 It is clear under Texas law that since Khoury's
signature appears on the Agent/Broker Warranty, unaccompanied by
any designation to suggest that he was signing on behalf of SAI,
then at least in the absence of any proof by Khoury that he
disclosed to Imperial at the time of the transaction that he was
signing the document in a representative capacity, he cannot escape
personal liability on the warranty. See Seale v. Nichols, 505
S.W.2d 251 (Tex.1974); see also Griffin v. Ellinger, 538 S.W.2d 97
(Tex.1976); A to Z Rental Center v. Burris, 714 S.W.2d 433
(Tex.App.—Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.). And this is so even
11 Khoury notes that while his signature appears under the Agent/Broker Warranty on the premium finance agreement, he did not actually sign the document himself but rather his signature was stamped on the form by a secretary. However, Khoury has not contended that he did not authorize the placement of his signature on the document, and in fact, he implicitly acknowledged at trial that his signature was placed on the warranty with his approval.
19 though the identity of his principal, SAI, was disclosed in the
agreement. Cf. Griffin, 538 S.W.2d at 99 (fact that name of
corporation appeared on check and account was that of corporation
does not establish that signer signed check in representative
capacity).
We have considered the other issues raised by the defendants
and find them without merit.
Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court's ruling denying
defendants’ motion for new trial and REMAND this case for a new
trial consistent with this opinion.