Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed November 10, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D21-0225 Lower Tribunal Nos. 19-9697CC, 20-210AP ________________
Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, Appellant,
vs.
Ariel Acosta, et al., Appellees.
An appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Diana Gonzalez-Whyte, Judge.
McFarlane Law, and William J. McFarlane, III, and Michael K. Mittelmark, for appellant.
Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Mark D. Tinker (Tampa); Jose A. Dapena, P.A., and Jose A. Dapena; Douglas H. Stein, P.A., and Douglas H. Stein, for appellees.
Before SCALES, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
MILLER, J. Appellant, Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, challenges a
final order dismissing its complaint for declaratory relief. In the lower court
proceedings, Imperial sought a judicial declaration that the policy it issued to
appellee, Ariel Acosta, was properly rescinded due to material
misrepresentation. Concluding the complaint stated a facially sufficient claim
for declaratory relief, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Acosta was the named insured under the policy. During the policy
period, Arcelio Valdes was involved in a motor vehicle accident while
operating Acosta’s motor vehicle. He and two passengers sustained bodily
injuries and received treatment at various healthcare facilities. The three
then assigned their rights to obtain insurance benefits to appellees, GLG
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Advanced Health Imaging, LLC, and Variety
Children’s Hospital d/b/a Nicklaus Children’s Hospital. The entities
subsequently submitted claims for benefits under the policy.
While investigating the claims, Imperial purportedly learned that Acosta
failed to disclose Valdes as a household resident or an additional driver on
the application of insurance. Contending this failure constituted a material
misrepresentation, Imperial rescinded the policy, returning all earned
2 premiums to Acosta. Declaring the policy void ab initio, it then denied all
claims for benefits.
Imperial then filed a single-count declaratory action against Acosta,
Valdes, the injured passengers, and the various medical providers in the
county court. In the complaint, it requested “the court ratify and affirm [the]
rescission of its policy of insurance.” After the complaint was filed, appellees
filed suit separately against Imperial, seeking the payment of their respective
claims.
All appellees, save Variety, moved to dismiss the complaint for
declaratory relief. They contended the complaint was facially deficient or,
alternatively, the issues raised by Imperial were capable of resolution in the
companion litigation. The trial court concluded the claim for declaratory relief
was facially insufficient and granted dismissal. The instant appeal ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo “whether the complaint alleges sufficient ultimate
facts, which under any theory of law, would entitle a plaintiff to the relief
sought.”1 Cohen v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 367 So. 2d 677, 681 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1979).
1 Our review is confined to whether the complaint stated a cause of action. Thus, it has no bearing on the ultimate issue of whether relief should be afforded. See Ribaya v. Bd. of Trs. of City Pension Fund for Firefighters &
3 ANALYSIS
Florida’s Declaratory Judgment Act (the “Act”), codified in chapter 86
of the Florida Statutes, confers jurisdiction upon the circuit and county courts
“within their respective jurisdictional amounts to declare rights, status, and
other equitable or legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed.” § 86.011, Fla. Stat. (2021). Under the Act,
[a]ny person claiming to be interested or who may be in doubt about his or her rights under a . . . contract . . . or instrument in writing or whose rights, status, or other equitable or legal relations are affected by . . . contract . . . or instrument in writing may have determined any question of construction or validity.
§ 86.021, Fla. Stat. Permissible actions include those initiated for “the
resolution of a doubt or the removal of a peril, rather than redress for an injury
already inflicted.” David L. Dickson, Declaratory Judgments in Florida:
Jurisdiction and Judicial Discretion, 27 U. Miami L. Rev. 47, 60 (1972).
Police Officers in Tampa, 162 So. 3d 348, 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“A complaint can be legally sufficient even if the plaintiff ultimately loses the case on its merits.”); Royal Selections, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 687 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“A motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment is not a motion on the merits. Rather, it is a motion only to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of its rights, not to whether it is entitled to a declaration in its favor.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Emery, 579 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“All the criteria necessary to permit the lower court to consider Travelers’ petition for declaratory judgment were satisfied, and the lower court erred in adjudging the petition to be ‘premature.’ We express no opinion regarding whether the policy exclusion at issue applies to the facts alleged or not.”).
4 In enacting the Act, the legislature foresaw the need for the
construction of contractual rights. To that end, it statutorily authorized courts
to construe a contract “either before or after there has been a breach of it.”
§ 86.031, Fla. Stat.
A viable complaint for declaratory relief must allege, at a minimum,
that:
(1) there is a bona fide dispute between the parties; (2) the plaintiff has a justiciable question as to the existence or nonexistence of some right, status, immunity, power or privilege, or as to some fact upon which existence of such a claim may depend; (3) the plaintiff is in doubt as to the claim; and (4) there is a bona fide, actual, present need for the declaration.
Ribaya, 162 So. 3d at 352. These elements are necessary “to maintain the
status of the proceeding as being judicial in nature and therefore within the
constitutional powers of the court.” Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167,
1170 (Fla. 1991) (quoting May v. Holley, 59 So. 2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1952)).
This is because our legislature “never intended, and lacks the power to, allow
declaratory judgment procedures as a vehicle for obtaining advisory
opinions.” Mandarin Lakes Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mandarin Lakes
Neighborhood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 322 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA
2021).
In the instant case, the complaint sought a determination of whether
the omission of Valdes from the policy application constituted a
5 misrepresentation sufficient to justify rescinding the policy. Imperial alleged
it harbored uncertainty, along with the other requisite declaratory relief
elements, albeit in a relatively conclusory manner.
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed November 10, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D21-0225 Lower Tribunal Nos. 19-9697CC, 20-210AP ________________
Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, Appellant,
vs.
Ariel Acosta, et al., Appellees.
An appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Diana Gonzalez-Whyte, Judge.
McFarlane Law, and William J. McFarlane, III, and Michael K. Mittelmark, for appellant.
Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Mark D. Tinker (Tampa); Jose A. Dapena, P.A., and Jose A. Dapena; Douglas H. Stein, P.A., and Douglas H. Stein, for appellees.
Before SCALES, MILLER, and BOKOR, JJ.
MILLER, J. Appellant, Imperial Fire & Casualty Insurance Company, challenges a
final order dismissing its complaint for declaratory relief. In the lower court
proceedings, Imperial sought a judicial declaration that the policy it issued to
appellee, Ariel Acosta, was properly rescinded due to material
misrepresentation. Concluding the complaint stated a facially sufficient claim
for declaratory relief, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Acosta was the named insured under the policy. During the policy
period, Arcelio Valdes was involved in a motor vehicle accident while
operating Acosta’s motor vehicle. He and two passengers sustained bodily
injuries and received treatment at various healthcare facilities. The three
then assigned their rights to obtain insurance benefits to appellees, GLG
Rehabilitation Center, Inc., Advanced Health Imaging, LLC, and Variety
Children’s Hospital d/b/a Nicklaus Children’s Hospital. The entities
subsequently submitted claims for benefits under the policy.
While investigating the claims, Imperial purportedly learned that Acosta
failed to disclose Valdes as a household resident or an additional driver on
the application of insurance. Contending this failure constituted a material
misrepresentation, Imperial rescinded the policy, returning all earned
2 premiums to Acosta. Declaring the policy void ab initio, it then denied all
claims for benefits.
Imperial then filed a single-count declaratory action against Acosta,
Valdes, the injured passengers, and the various medical providers in the
county court. In the complaint, it requested “the court ratify and affirm [the]
rescission of its policy of insurance.” After the complaint was filed, appellees
filed suit separately against Imperial, seeking the payment of their respective
claims.
All appellees, save Variety, moved to dismiss the complaint for
declaratory relief. They contended the complaint was facially deficient or,
alternatively, the issues raised by Imperial were capable of resolution in the
companion litigation. The trial court concluded the claim for declaratory relief
was facially insufficient and granted dismissal. The instant appeal ensued.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo “whether the complaint alleges sufficient ultimate
facts, which under any theory of law, would entitle a plaintiff to the relief
sought.”1 Cohen v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 367 So. 2d 677, 681 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1979).
1 Our review is confined to whether the complaint stated a cause of action. Thus, it has no bearing on the ultimate issue of whether relief should be afforded. See Ribaya v. Bd. of Trs. of City Pension Fund for Firefighters &
3 ANALYSIS
Florida’s Declaratory Judgment Act (the “Act”), codified in chapter 86
of the Florida Statutes, confers jurisdiction upon the circuit and county courts
“within their respective jurisdictional amounts to declare rights, status, and
other equitable or legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed.” § 86.011, Fla. Stat. (2021). Under the Act,
[a]ny person claiming to be interested or who may be in doubt about his or her rights under a . . . contract . . . or instrument in writing or whose rights, status, or other equitable or legal relations are affected by . . . contract . . . or instrument in writing may have determined any question of construction or validity.
§ 86.021, Fla. Stat. Permissible actions include those initiated for “the
resolution of a doubt or the removal of a peril, rather than redress for an injury
already inflicted.” David L. Dickson, Declaratory Judgments in Florida:
Jurisdiction and Judicial Discretion, 27 U. Miami L. Rev. 47, 60 (1972).
Police Officers in Tampa, 162 So. 3d 348, 352 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“A complaint can be legally sufficient even if the plaintiff ultimately loses the case on its merits.”); Royal Selections, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 687 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“A motion to dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment is not a motion on the merits. Rather, it is a motion only to determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of its rights, not to whether it is entitled to a declaration in its favor.”); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Emery, 579 So. 2d 798, 802 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“All the criteria necessary to permit the lower court to consider Travelers’ petition for declaratory judgment were satisfied, and the lower court erred in adjudging the petition to be ‘premature.’ We express no opinion regarding whether the policy exclusion at issue applies to the facts alleged or not.”).
4 In enacting the Act, the legislature foresaw the need for the
construction of contractual rights. To that end, it statutorily authorized courts
to construe a contract “either before or after there has been a breach of it.”
§ 86.031, Fla. Stat.
A viable complaint for declaratory relief must allege, at a minimum,
that:
(1) there is a bona fide dispute between the parties; (2) the plaintiff has a justiciable question as to the existence or nonexistence of some right, status, immunity, power or privilege, or as to some fact upon which existence of such a claim may depend; (3) the plaintiff is in doubt as to the claim; and (4) there is a bona fide, actual, present need for the declaration.
Ribaya, 162 So. 3d at 352. These elements are necessary “to maintain the
status of the proceeding as being judicial in nature and therefore within the
constitutional powers of the court.” Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So. 2d 1167,
1170 (Fla. 1991) (quoting May v. Holley, 59 So. 2d 636, 639 (Fla. 1952)).
This is because our legislature “never intended, and lacks the power to, allow
declaratory judgment procedures as a vehicle for obtaining advisory
opinions.” Mandarin Lakes Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mandarin Lakes
Neighborhood Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 322 So. 3d 1196, 1199 (Fla. 3d DCA
2021).
In the instant case, the complaint sought a determination of whether
the omission of Valdes from the policy application constituted a
5 misrepresentation sufficient to justify rescinding the policy. Imperial alleged
it harbored uncertainty, along with the other requisite declaratory relief
elements, albeit in a relatively conclusory manner. Indeed, one passage of
the complaint deemed the declaration necessary “to construe the provisions
of [the insurance] contract and statute and determine whether the
misrepresentations, omissions and/or concealment of facts regarding the
application for insurance were material thereby justifying denial of benefits
and coverage and rescission of the policy.” Viewed as a whole, these
allegations were sufficient to survive dismissal.
Appellees contend, however, that because the complaint inescapably
yields the conclusion Imperial was seeking a post hoc judicial ratification of
its past decision, any declaration would be merely advisory. Putting aside
the fact that Imperial alleged uncertainty, any doubt as to the practical need
for a declaration was assuaged by the fact that appellees separately filed suit
seeking the payment of insurance benefits. Although no party should be
rewarded for winning the race to the courthouse, the propriety of the
rescission indubitably requires resolution. Consequently, we conclude the
trial court erred in granting dismissal.
In closing, we echo the sentiment penned nearly seventy years ago by
Justice Sebring in Stark v. Marshall, “[a]lthough our Declaratory Decree Act
6 is broad in its scope and should be liberally construed in order to effectuate
its purpose, it was never intended that it should supplant all other types of
civil procedure known to our jurisprudence.” 67 So. 2d 235, 236 (Fla. 1953).
In accord with this principle, our decision should not be construed as
precluding the consolidation of this matter with the companion litigation.
Reversed and remanded.