Impact Engine, Inc. v. Google LLC

District Court, S.D. California·Decided May 26, 2020·No. 3:19-cv-01301·Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 IMPACT ENGINE, INC., Case No.: 19-cv-01301-CAB-BGS

12 Plaintiff, ORDER ON DISPUTED 13 v. INTERROGATORIES NOS. 1 & 12

[ECF NO. 66] 15 Defendant. 16 17 On April 22, 2020 the parties indicated there were disputes regarding four of 18 Google’s interrogatories. (ECF No. 64.) The Court allowed the parties to file a Joint 19 Statement in which both sides were to “specify the exact issues in dispute” and explain 20 their positions. Id. Thereafter, the parties filed their Joint Statement regarding Google’s 21 Interrogatory Nos. 1 and 12, while indicating that they had resolved the other two 22 interrogatories in dispute. (ECF No. 66 at 2.) 23 I. Dispute Regarding Google’s Interrogatory No. 1 24 Google specifies the information it is requesting in Interrogatory No. 1 (“ROG 25 #1”) as follows: “Interrogatory No. 1 asks Plaintiff to describe, in detail, on an element 26 by element basis, all facts relating to conception and reduction to practice of the asserted 27 claims, including all acts it contends represent diligence between conception and 28 reduction to practice; the persons involved in the conception and reduction to practice; 1 where the invention was first reduced to practice; when, where, and to whom it was first 2 disclosed; and each person who worked on the development of the alleged inventions.” 3 (ECF No. 66-1 at 2.) 4 There are two issues presented to the Court in this dispute. The first regards the 5 overbreadth and burden of ROG #1 on Impact. Impact’s principle objection to ROG #1 6 is the “element by element” component. (See ECF No. 66-2 at 2–3.) Impact argues that 7 seeking all details relating to conception and reduction to practice on an element by 8 element basis for all 41 asserted claims is burdensome and disproportionate to the needs 9 of the case. Id. at 2. Further, Impact asserts that Google has cited no legal authority that 10 supports this “element by element” request. Id. at 3. 11 Google contends that ROG #1 is relevant to Google’s invalidity defenses. (ECF 12 No. 66-1 at 2.) Specifically, Google argues that ROG #1 is relevant to its contention that 13 the priority date for each asserted claim is not “novel.” Id. Google also argues that ROG 14 #1 is relevant to issues as to whether the Plaintiff named the proper inventors of the 15 alleged invention. Id. 16 Conception and reduction to practice dates are relevant to a party’s defenses in 17 patent cases because they are related to the priority date, which a defendant “must beat to 18 show that the claims are invalid over the prior art.” Digital Reg. of Texas, LLC v. Adobe 19 Sys. Inc., 2013 WL 5442269, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Fresenius Med. Care Holding Inc. 20 v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 644, 650 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Impact responded to ROG #1 21 stating the conception and reduction to practice was “at least as early as” the filing of the 22 patent application. (ECF No. 66-1 at 3.) The Court finds this response to be incomplete. 23 See West v. Ultimate Metals Co., No. 13CV03651WHOMEJ, 2014 WL 466795, at *1 24 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (granting Defendant’s request for a further response after finding that 25 Plaintiff’s response that it was relying on his initial filing date for conception and 26 reduction to practice was inadequate). 27 However, the Court narrows ROG #1 to eliminate the “element by element” 28 portion. Google does not address specifically how an “element by element” analysis is 1 relevant to its invalidity defenses. Further, Google’s own relevancy arguments in support 2 of ROG #1 limit novelty to each asserted claim, not each element. (ECF No. 66-1 at 2) 3 (“Novelty is evaluated based on the “priority date” of each asserted claim.”); see N.D. 4 Cal. Model Patent Jury Instruction 4.3a1 (stating that a patent claim is invalid if the 5 claimed invention is not new, meaning “all the requirements must have existed in a single 6 device or method that predates the claimed invention”); Williams Advanced Materials, 7 Inc. v. Target Tech. Co., LLC, No. 03-CV-276-A, 2004 WL 1811397, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. 8 2004), aff'd, 140 F. App'x 268 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reasoning that anticipation occurs when 9 the referenced prior art “expressly describes or inherently contains each element of a 10 claimed invention.”); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1983) 11 (reasoning that the invention was not anticipated where the prior art did not disclose all of 12 the elements of the invention). 13 Google’s other argument for relevancy is whether Impact named the proper 14 inventors of the alleged invention. (ECF No. 66-1 at 2.) Google, as to this defense, does 15 not offer how an element by element analysis is relevant. In fact, Model Patent Jury 16 Instructions for the Federal Circuit Bar Association defines inventor to be one who makes 17 a significant contribution to the conception of one or more claims of the patent. Fed. Cir. 18 B. Ass’n Model Patent Jury Instruction 4.3d; see Quintel Tech. Ltd. v. Huawei Techs., 19 Inc., No. 4:15CV307, 2017 WL 9250312, at *24 (E.D. Tex. 2017) (stating that 20 inventorship is determined on a “claim by claim basis”). 21 The point is that both invalidity defenses for which Google seeks this discovery 22 require Google to prove that the asserted claims are either not novel and/or there were 23 earlier inventors of the asserted claim(s), i.e. inventions. The Court finds that by 24 requiring Impact to comply with an “element by element” analysis is unduly burdensome 25 and not proportional to the needs of the case. See e.g. Sol IP, LLC v. AT&T Mobility 26 LLC, No. 218CV00526RWSRSP, 2020 WL 60140, at *1–*2 (E.D. Tex. 2020) 27 (concluding that an element by element response requirement was not proportional to the 28 1 needs of the case). Therefore, Impact is required to provide a further response to ROG #1 2 as narrowed by the Court and as summarized by Google. 3 The second issue presented in this dispute is the timing of Impact’s complete 4 response to ROG #1. Google wants the complete response by May 15th, while Impact 5 argues it is burdensome to require Impact to supplement its response by May 15th when 6 Google’s invalidity contentions were due May 8th.1 (ECF Nos. 66-1 at 2–3; 66-2 at 2–3.) 7 The Court concurs with the approach taken in West v. Ultimate Metals Co., wherein the 8 Court required, “If [Plaintiff] believes in good faith that he is unable to state a specific 9 date or dates, he shall state with clarity the approximate date or dates of conception he 10 intends to claim in this action.” West, 2014 WL 466795, at *1–*2 (citing Boston 11 Scientific Corp. v. Micrus Corp., 2007 WL 174475, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2007)). 12 In Boston Scientific, the Defendant sought the dates of conception and reduction to 13 practice. 2007 WL 174475, at *1. The Plaintiff argued it would be premature to require 14 it to take a firm position as to either date. Id. The Court held that Plaintiff did not need 15 to state specific dates if it in good faith believed it cannot do so, but ordered Plaintiff to 16 serve a further response stating with clarity the approximate date(s) of conception and of 17 actual reduction to practice the Plaintiff intends to claim in the action. Id. at *1–*2. 18 Accordingly, if Impact believes in good faith that at this point in the litigation it 19 cannot complete its response to ROG #1 as narrowed, then it is to give approximate 20 date(s) of conception and reduction to practice it intends to claim in this action. Such 21 response is due June 2, 2020, where Impact will either provide specific or approximate 22 dates of conception and reduction to practice. Further, the parties are to meet and confer 23 to try to resolve when Impact will be able to fully supplement ROG #1.

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