IMO the Petition of Derrick Smith for a Writ of Prohibition

• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware
• Decided: February 2, 2026
• Docket: 431, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF THE § PETITION OF DERRICK J. SMITH § No. 431, 2025 FOR A WRIT OF PROHIBITION §

Submitted: November 19, 2025 Decided: February 2, 2026

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

ORDER

After consideration of the petition for a writ of prohibition and the State’s

answer and motion to dismiss, it appears to the Court that:

(1) In 2011, the petitioner, Derrick Smith, pleaded guilty to attempted first-

degree assault and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony

(PFDCF). The Superior Court sentenced Smith as follows: for PFDCF, to twenty-

five years of incarceration; and for attempted first-degree assault, to twenty-five

years of imprisonment, suspended after five years for decreasing levels of

community supervision. We affirmed Smith’s convictions and sentence on direct

appeal.1 After a remand for resentencing, we affirmed the Superior Court’s partial

grant of postconviction relief and sentencing.2

(2) Smith now petitions this Court to issue a writ of prohibition to the

Superior Court under Supreme Court Rule 43. He asks this Court to “restrain” the

1 Smith v. State, 2012 WL 1530849 (Del. Apr. 30, 2012). 2 Smith v. State, 2014 WL 1017277, at *1-3 (Del. March 13, 2014). Superior Court from enforcing what he claims is an unlawful sentence because he is

serving his sentence for PFDCF before his sentence for attempted first-degree

assault, contrary to then-extant 11 Del. C. § 1447A(e). When Smith committed the

conduct that led to his convictions, Section 1447A provided, among other things,

that: (i) a person convicted of a felony and the possession of a firearm during the

commission of that felony would serve the sentence imposed for the predicate felony

before serving the sentence imposed for PFDCF, and (ii) a person convicted of

PFDCF was ineligible for “good time, parole or probation during the period of the

sentence imposed” for PFDCF.3

(3) A writ of prohibition is the legal equivalent of the equitable remedy of

injunction and may be issued to prevent a trial court from (a) proceeding in a matter

where it has no jurisdiction or (b) exceeding its jurisdiction in a matter that is

properly before it.4 The jurisdictional defect alleged by the petitioner, however, must

be clear from the record.5 And a writ of prohibition will not issue “if the petitioner

has another adequate and complete remedy at law to correct the act of the trial court

[that] is alleged to be erroneous.”6 “The right to appeal a criminal conviction is

3 11 Del. C. § 1447A(d), (e) (2011). 4 In re Goodlett, 2005 WL 2333923, at *1 (Del. Sept. 21, 2005). 5 In re Hovey, 545 A.2d 626, 628 (Del. 1988). 6 Id. 2 generally considered a complete and adequate remedy to review all of the questions

presented in a criminal proceeding.”7

(4) There is no basis for the issuance of a writ of prohibition here. The

Superior Court has jurisdiction over the crimes for which Smith was convicted and

sentenced.8 And Smith has failed to demonstrate the lack of an alternative remedy.

On direct appeal, he could have asked the Court to remand for resentencing to

conform with then-extant Section 1447A but did not.9 In any event, Smith raised a

similar argument in his challenge to the September 2013 sentencing and in two other

Rule 35 motions. The Superior Court denied both requests.10

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the State’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED and the petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition is

DISMISSED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. Chief Justice

7 Id. 8 See 11 Del. C. § 613 (defining the felony of first-degree assault); id. § 1447A (defining the felony of PFDCF); id. § 2701(c) (“The Superior Court shall have jurisdiction, original and concurrent, over-all crimes, except where jurisdiction is exclusively vested in another court.”). 9 We also note that Smith is benefitting from the legislative amendment to Section 1447A because, among other things, he is now eligible to earn good time while serving his PFDCF sentence. 10 Exs. C and D to the State’s brief. 3