Immigration Solutions, Inc. v. Joshua Stiffler

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 29, 2023
• Docket: 22-35163
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 29 2023 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IMMIGRATION SOLUTIONS, INC., No. 22-35163 Incorporated in Florida doing business as Sam Asbury, D.C. No. 2:21-cv-01186-HL

Plaintiff-Appellant, MEMORANDUM* v.

JOSHUA C. STIFFLER, an Oregon resident,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Andrew D. Hallman, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 25, 2023** Portland, Oregon

Before: BENNETT, VANDYKE, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff Immigration Solutions, Inc., appeals the district court’s dismissal for

lack of diversity jurisdiction and the court’s denial of its motion for default

judgment. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). “District courts have jurisdiction in civil actions where there is complete

diversity of citizenship among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” Crum v. Circus Circus Enters., 231 F.3d

1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)). To establish diversity

jurisdiction, Immigration Solutions must show that the parties were citizens of

different states “at the time suit is filed.” Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S.

468, 478 (2003); Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857–58 (9th Cir.

2001) (indicating that the burden of establishing diversity jurisdiction belongs to the

party asserting jurisdiction). Because there is no dispute that defendant Joshua

Stiffler was a citizen of Oregon and Immigration Solutions was incorporated in

Florida, the sole question for diversity of citizenship is whether Immigration

Solutions carried its burden to show that it had its principal place of business

somewhere other than Oregon at the time it filed its complaint. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(c)(1).

A corporation’s “principal place of business” is “the place where a

corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities,”

commonly referred to as “the corporation’s ‘nerve center.’” Hertz Corp. v. Friend,

559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010); see also Co-Efficient Energy Sys. v. CSL Indus., Inc.,

812 F.2d 556, 557–58 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that a corporation’s principal

place of business was where the “sole shareholder and director” “made business

2 decisions”). Immigration Solutions contends that its principal place of business at

the time it filed its complaint was Tampa, Florida. However, Immigration Solutions

cites to no specific evidence, apart from drafting the complaint for this matter,

indicating that Immigration Solutions’ activities were directed from Tampa between

March 2019, when Immigration Solutions purchased the Oregon investment

property, and August 2021, when it filed the complaint. Immigration Solutions also

relies on the presence of Samuel Asbury, its president, in Tampa on July 22, 2021,

at a meeting for the association that manages Immigration Solutions’ office

condominium. But Immigration Solutions fails to show that this meeting has

anything to do with “direct[ing], control[ling], [or] coordinat[ing]” Immigration

Solutions. Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 92–93.

Instead, the specific evidence in the record of Asbury and Immigration

Solutions’ activities between March 2019 and August 2021, when this complaint

was filed, suggests that Asbury spent much of that time in Oregon fixing up

Immigration Solutions’ investment property. Indeed, at the hearing before the

magistrate judge, Asbury admitted that “one could reasonably conclude that” during

the time leading up to the complaint, the record indicated that “the only corporate

actions that were going on were … the work on the [investment property]” in

Oregon.

3 The magistrate judge characterized the evidence that Immigration Solutions

advanced for Florida citizenship as “broad, sweeping statements about general

business activity from a time period spanning [Immigration Solutions’] creation in

2012 through 2021,” and did not “find these broad and time-expansive

generalizations convincing in establishing diversity between the parties at the time

of filing.” Instead, the magistrate judge found the location ambiguous. That finding

is not clearly erroneous. See Co-Efficient Energy Sys., 812 F.2d at 557 (stating the

standard of review). Because Immigration Solutions failed to meet its burden of

establishing diversity of citizenship between the parties, the magistrate judge did not

err in concluding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter.

Immigration Solutions additionally appeals the magistrate judge’s denial of

its motion for default judgment. But “[b]ecause we conclude the district court did

not have diversity jurisdiction, our jurisdiction is ‘not of the merits but merely for

the purpose of [affirming] … the lower court in [not] entertaining the suit.” Nike,

Inc. v. Comercial Iberica de Exclusivas Deportivas, S.A., 20 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir.

1994) (quoting United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 440 (1936)). It is immaterial

that the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction came after the motion for default

judgment was denied, as federal courts “ha[ve] a duty to consider jurisdiction sua

sponte” and may assess jurisdiction at any time in the course of a federal case. Nome

Eskimo Cmty. v. Babbitt, 67 F.3d 813, 815 (9th Cir. 1995).

4 AFFIRMED.