Imere Dejon Hall v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: May 7, 2025
• Docket: 23-1560
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1560 Filed May 7, 2025

IMERE DE’JON HALL, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County,

Monica Zrinyi Ackley, Judge.

A postconviction-relief applicant appeals the district court’s order dismissing

his application. AFFIRMED.

Elena Greenberg of Greenberg Law, PLLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and

Sandy, JJ. 2

AHLERS, Judge.

A jury found Imere Hall guilty of first-degree murder and first-degree robbery

by aiding and abetting, and our court affirmed his convictions on appeal. See State

v. Hall, No. 17-0570, 2018 WL 4635685, at *1–6 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018).

He then filed an application for postconviction relief (PCR) raising numerous claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court denied the application. Hall

appealed, claiming both that criminal trial counsel and PCR trial counsel were

ineffective. While that appeal was pending, Hall filed two more PCR applications

alleging his first PCR trial counsel was ineffective. The district court dismissed

those applications as premature.

This court then affirmed the denial of Hall’s first PCR application, addressing

his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to both criminal trial counsel

and first PCR trial counsel. Hall v. State, No. 20-1630, 2022 WL 2827485, at *2–4

(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2022). Hall then filed his fourth PCR application—the

subject of this appeal.

The State filed a motion to dismiss Hall’s fourth PCR application under

Iowa Code section 822.3 (2022) because Hall filed it more than three years after

procedendo issued in his direct appeal. Counsel for Hall then filed a motion to

amend his PCR application. The PCR court heard arguments regarding both

motions at one hearing. It issued an order granting the State’s motion to dismiss

without ruling on Hall’s motion to amend. Hall appeals.

“Our standard of review for a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is

for correction of errors at law.” Hedlund v. State, 875 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa

2016). Likewise, we review PCR proceedings for legal error, but to the extent that 3

Hall raises a constitutional claim, our review is de novo. Goode v. State, 920

N.W.2d 520, 523 (Iowa 2018).

We begin by recognizing that the only matter before this court is the PCR

court’s dismissal of his fourth PCR application.1 The PCR court dismissed Hall’s

PCR application as time barred by section 822.3. On appeal, Hall does not deny

that he filed his fourth PCR application outside the three-year statute of limitations

set by section 822.3. Nor does he attempt to bypass the statute of limitations by

asserting a “ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the

applicable time period.” See Iowa Code § 822.3. Instead, he essentially contends

that it is unfair to subject him to the statute of limitations because his first PCR

counsel was ineffective when raising his original ineffective-assistance claims and

his first PCR action did not terminate until after the three-year window to initiate

another PCR action closed.2 We reject this contention for several reasons.

First, our supreme court recently explained that section 822.3 “is clear that

1 To the extent that Hall attempts to challenge the dismissal of his second and third

PCR applications, we do not have jurisdiction over those proceedings. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(b) (requiring an appeal be filed within thirty days of a final order); Baur v. Baur Farms, Inc., 832 N.W.2d 663, 668 (Iowa 2013) (“[A] failure to file a timely notice of appeal leaves us without subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal.”). Hall also attempts to argue that the PCR court should have granted his motion to amend his PCR application. But the PCR court never ruled on his motion to amend, and Hall never filed a motion asking the court to make such a ruling. As a result, his claim is not preserved for our review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). 2 Hall’s argument partially relies on the premise that he could not have brought his

ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal. If he means he was barred by Iowa Code section 814.7 from having his ineffective-assistance claims decided on direct appeal, he is mistaken. Hall filed his direct appeal before the 2019 amendments to that section became effective. So he could have raised those claims on direct appeal. But if he means he could not prove those claims without making a record in a PCR proceeding, we accept his premise. 4

the ineffective assistance of first PCR counsel is not a reason to extend the statute

of limitations on an applicant’s [subsequent] PCR application.” Ruiz v. State, 18

N.W.3d 453, 458 (Iowa 2025). The supreme court recognized that “[t]he only

exception to the statute of limitations under Iowa Code section 822.3 that could

possibly apply” when a PCR applicant files an application outside the three-year

statute of limitations and asserts that counsel in a prior PCR proceeding was

ineffective “is for ‘a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the

applicable time period.’” Id. at 459. And as previously noted, Hall makes no such

assertion on appeal. Second, we consider Hall’s appellate argument to amount to

an equitable tolling argument. But we do not apply equitable tolling to PCR actions.

See James v. State, 858 N.W.2d 32, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014); McGuinness v.

State, No. 23-1603, 2025 WL 707272, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2025) (“We

have ‘frequently held’ that equitable tolling does not apply to Iowa Code

section 822.3.” (citation omitted)). Third, to the extent that Hall attempts to

challenge the constitutionality of the portion of Iowa Code section 822.3 that

abrogated Allison v. State, 914 N.W.2d 866, 891 (Iowa 2018) (adopting a limited

version of equitable tolling), his challenge fails. See McCoy v. State, No. 23-1286,

2025 WL 400745, at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2025).

Finding no error in the district court’s dismissal of Hall’s fourth PCR

application, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.