Ilya v. Talev v. John E. Reinhardt

662 F.2d 888, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 332, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1185
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedAugust 31, 1981
Docket79-1132
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 662 F.2d 888 (Ilya v. Talev v. John E. Reinhardt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ilya v. Talev v. John E. Reinhardt, 662 F.2d 888, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 332, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

Opinion

Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III.

SPOTTSWOOD W. ROBINSON, III, Chief Judge:

This appeal features a claim that the Voice of America (VOA), the broadcasting arm of the International Communication Agency, 1 discriminates against an employee because of his national origin. Perceiving no. issue of fact material to the litigation, the District Court held that the evidence proffered by the employee did not make out a prima facie case, and entered summary judgment for VOA. 2 We conclude that even if a prima facie case was established, it was effectively rebutted by an uncontested evidentiary tender by appellees 3 demon *890 strating that the differentials protested are job-related, and thus no predicate for litigation.

I. BACKGROUND

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 as extended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 5 prohibits federal employment practices having the purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 6 In 1974, Ilya V. Talev, a Bulgarian-born American citizen, was hired by the Bulgarian Section of VOA’s European Division 7 to prepare and broadcast radio programs in his native tongue. 8 Talev initially had indicated that he was amenable to a foreign service position 9 at the grade equivalent of GS-7, and a minimum salary of $12,000. 10 Eventually, however, he was offered, and accepted, employment at a grade equal to GS — 9 and salaried at $13,193. 11 Nevertheless, Talev quickly grew dissatisfied with his grade level and remuneration. 12 After unsuccessfully seeking gratification administratively, 13 he sued in District Court on behalf of himself and others purportedly similarly situated, 14 alleging discrimination *891 on account of national origin. 15

In essence, Talev’s complaint charged that employees in VOA’s Worldwide English Division, 16 who primarily are American-born, are given preferential treatment in comparison with employees in VOA’s European Division, who largely are foreign-born. 17 In an attempted support of this, claim, Talev pointed to various facially neutral VOA employment policies and practices assertedly operating to the disadvantage of foreign-born employees. 18 Talev lost on a bid for class certification, 19 but prevailed substantially on his motion to compel discovery of statistical data on VOA employees. 20 With these data, 21 Talev proffered extensive statistical evidence, 22 and both sides moved for summary judgment. The District Court, concluding that Talev had not met his burden of establishing a prima facie case of employment discrimination, entered judgment in favor of appellees, 23 and sua sponte taxed costs against Talev. 24

In the main, Talev assails the District Court’s ruling that his evidentiary tender did not make out a prima facie case. 25 In addition, he asserts that the court erred in denying his motion for class certification, 26 in restricting discovery, 27 and in assessing costs against him. 28 Appellees, in turn, argue that Talev did not present sufficient evidence to generate a claim under Title VII or, if he did, that higher grades and salaries existent in the Worldwide English Division are explained by heavier responsibilities shouldered by employees therein, as well as by superior qualifications they bring to their tasks. 29 Appellees resist all of Ta-lev’s other contentions except the last, which they say is moot in light of their decision not to seek costs. 30 In view of that position, we vacate the award of costs, and proceed to consider the remainder of Ta-lev’s challenges.

II. THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

The shifting burdens of proof in Title VII “disparate impact” litigation 31 are well entrenched. The complainant has the initial burden of constructing a prima facie *892 case by showing that facially neutral employment standards operate in a proscribed discriminatory fashion. 32 The burden then falls upon the employer to demonstrate that these standards have “a manifest relationship to the employment in question.” 33 The complainant may then show that other policies or practices would “serve the employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy workmanship’ ” without a discriminatory impact. 34

This analytical approach is to be taken whether the adjudicative context is summary judgment or trial. 35 But since summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” 36 the court must ascertain at each successive stage 37 whether any fact essential to the claim or defense is disputed and, if not, whether on the basis of the proffered evidence a summary disposition is legally demandable. 38 Our task on this appeal is to ascertain whether the District Court was obedient to these tenets.

III. TALEV’S SHOWING

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Bluebook (online)
662 F.2d 888, 213 U.S. App. D.C. 332, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1185, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ilya-v-talev-v-john-e-reinhardt-cadc-1981.