Illinois Watch Co. v. Robbins

52 F. 215, 3 C.C.A. 42, 1892 U.S. App. LEXIS 1393
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedOctober 1, 1892
DocketNo. 32
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 52 F. 215 (Illinois Watch Co. v. Robbins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Illinois Watch Co. v. Robbins, 52 F. 215, 3 C.C.A. 42, 1892 U.S. App. LEXIS 1393 (7th Cir. 1892).

Opinion

Woods, Circuit Judge,

(after making the foregoing statement.) In conformity with the ruling of the supreme court in the case of Corn Planter Patent, 23 Wall. 181, 218, it was right, we think, to construe the claims of the patent in question as embracing the devices shown in the specifications, each claim being regarded as including such devices [222]*222and combination as are necessary to meet the requirements of the general terms in which it is expressed. When the claims are so construed, it maybe said of each of them, in the language of that case: “The claim thus limited is considerably narrowed in its operation. It is substantially for a combination of the material parts of the entire machine, and no one can be said to infringe it who does not use the entire combination.” This, of course, does not exclude the doctrine of equivalents, •of which Church was careful in explicit terms to reserve the benefit. How far, when properly construed, the several claims may be distinguished from each other, the court below did not indicate, and we do not deem it necessary now to consider. It may be that there is no essential difference, since the reference in all is to the same devices as arranged in a single combination.

The devices and combination described in the reissued letters are not different from those of the original patent, and as the corresponding •claims of both must be regarded as limited by the devices, we do not perceive that in any of the reissued claims there appears or is asserted an invention different from or which is expanded beyond what was originally claimed. There is therefore no reason for pronouncing the reissue invalid.

In respect to Church’s invention and its advantages, the court below declared its “distinctive characteristic” to be “that the winding and hands-setting engagements are not effected by the direct force of the push and pull upon the stem arbor;” “that Church seems to have been the first in the art to obtain the winding and setting engagements by means of springs, which were brought into action by the inward and •outward movements of the stem arbor, thereby avoiding the liability to injure the wheels;” that, while Church did not invent the short stem .arbor, with its latch or lock, “he has adjusted and attached [adapted] what he did invent to be used with such stem arbor, and * * * has the right to claim that his winding and hands-setting train has no positive connection with the stem arbor, as he has by means of his sliding block, N, within the movement, secured all the results which would be accomplished by a longer stem arbor.”

After a careful examination of the patents exhibited in proof of the prior art, and especially in view of the Woerd patent, which, it is conceded, differs but little, mechanically, from the Church, we are notable to see that in the broad sense stated Church was the first to obtain the winding and setting engagements by means of springs, or so as to avoid liability of injury to the wheels. In the Woerd watch the winding or normal engagement is effected by the operation of a spring, e, and the same spring is in some measure effective, manifestly, to prevent injury to the wheels when the opposite engagement is accomplished, as it must be, by an outward pull of the stem arbor, whereby the lever, T, is pressed upon the arm,/, of the plate, b, pushing it inwardly, and swinging the yoke, V, so as to effect the setting engagement. As it is here used, the spring plays an important part in respect to both engagements, being the active force that produces one, and a resisting force which tends to [223]*223prevent undue and sudden violence to the injury of the wheels in the production of the other. Besides, there being one spring in the device, whereby one of the engagements is effected, with all the advantages of that mode of operation, it requires no invention to introduce into that device another spring to subserve the same ends in respect to the other engagement.' Such a spring might be located at some point between the end of the lever, T, and the yoke, V, in connection with, or perhaps without, some of the parts shown; but, what is simpler still, the lever itself might be so reduced in thickness as to become a spring, more or less strong, but not so strong but that with the resisting force of the spring, e, the meshing of the hand-setting wheels would occur without shock or injury. Turning to Hoyt’s patent No. 206; 674, we find two springs in use for effecting the respective engagements, one of which acts automatically, and the other under the pressure of a lever. There is, therefore, as it seems to us, no element of invention in the mere introduction of springs into the Church device, nor was any new use or new kind of advantage in watch construction obtained thereby.

Church’s invention, however, has superiority over Woerd’s, Hoyt’s, Carnahan’s, or any other which has come under our notice, resulting, not from any particular part or element of the device, but rather from the combination and arrangement of the parts as a whole. That combination is new and useful, and its peculiar usefulness consists, as we think, not so much in the springs and consequent protection of the wheels, as in the fact that the declared object of the invention, namely, to render watch movements and cases readily interchangeable,” is better accomplished than by any preceding construction. By transferring Carnahan’s lever from the works to the case, Woerd achieved a short stem arbor, and made the movements and cases interchangeable; but, to say nothing of other differences, the placing of the lever, which is one of the movement devices, in the case, is a marked disadvantage, since it requires a special form of case, and that, too, of awkward and unmechanical arrangement. One of the features of the Church patent, expressly mentioned in all the claims but the first, and implied, perhaps, in that, is that the winding and setting train is normally in engagement with the dial wheel; and it is to be observed that in the patents of Woerd, Carnahan, and others, which show the closest approximation in construction to Church’s device, the normal engagement is with the winding wheel. It is, of course, easy, and does not involve invention, to change such engagements, if nothing more than the change is sought, and in some of the designs in evidence normal setting engagements are found, but they are in lever-set watches, of which the Wheeler is an example, and which, as the evidence shows, may readily be constructed with the normal engagement in one wheel or the other; but in stem-winding and stem-setting watches it is not so, and as an element in the combination shown in Church’s claims the normal hands-setting engagement plays an important and indispensable part.

In respect to the question of infringement, a number of propositions are pressed upon our consideration. In the comparison made of the two devices by the court below it is asserted or assumed that of the two [224]*224springs in each the stronger produces the setting engagement, and resulting similarities of construction and operation are pointed out. • It is now insisted that Church’s patent does not show or describe a weaker and a stronger spring; that there is only one spring'in his device; and that the restraining of the action of a stronger spring, and thereby allowing the weaker one only to act without restraint, are shown in the Hoyt and Wheeler patents, which both belong to the appellant, and are older than the appellees’ patent. In this respect the court fell into verbal inaccuracy, but not, we think, into material error.

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Related

Robbins v. Illinois Watch Co.
81 F. 957 (Seventh Circuit, 1897)
Robbins v. Illinois Watch Co.
78 F. 124 (U.S. Circuit Court for the Northern District of Illnois, 1897)
Columbus Watch Co. v. Robbins
64 F. 384 (Sixth Circuit, 1894)

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Bluebook (online)
52 F. 215, 3 C.C.A. 42, 1892 U.S. App. LEXIS 1393, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/illinois-watch-co-v-robbins-ca7-1892.